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THE MANAGEMENT OF MEN

A Handbook on the Systematic Development of Morale and the Control of Human Behavior

BY

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TO

THE YOUNGER OFFICERS OF THE SERVICE

AND

ALL FUTURE LEADERS OF MEN

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PREFACE

The management of men and the development of morale are so inseparably associated that they are properly to be considered together. Each has heretofore been regarded as an art, in the application of which success by the individual largely depended on the relative degree in which the latter possessed inherent qualities of leadership.

The purpose of this book is to show that they should also be considered as a science, whereby mental state and human behavior can be comprehensively and effectively controlled by the scientific application of the fundamental laws governing human nature itself. The writer has long been impressed with the latter fact. Twice in charge of certain civil matters in the Philippine Islands, it was early apparent that no administrative methods could be successful which did not take the mental attitude of the human subject into full account. Four years ago, in relation to the army, he editorially wrote, "There must be systematized education and training in the psychology of the soldier and of war. This field is not now covered. It is a 'no-man's land' into which neither line nor staff penetrate." In March, 1918, he submitted a memorandum study showing the need for the systematized psychological stimulation of troops in the promotion of fighting efficiency and outlined general measures to that end. Later, as commanding officer of a camp of much more than divisional strength, the opportunity was utilized of trying out practically some of the measures thus proposed. Still later, in the organization and administration of the Morale Branch of the General Staff and the extension of its work over the entire army, there has been unique opportunity for the study of military psychology, the factors of human behavior and the methods of morale

control. A wide diversity and succession of great problems in human relationships, based on armies aggregating some four million men, have served the purposes of a psychological laboratory on a vast and unprecedented scale. These points are mentioned so that, while approaching the subject from the standpoint of theory, it may be clearly understood that every point here advanced has been abundantly verified by actual experience. Not only are the measures proposed correct in principle, but they have been shown to work in practice.

It would have been possible to illustrate almost every point and principle laid down in the following pages by quotation of specific instances and examples. This would doubtless have added interest and force to the presentation of the subject, but it has been necessary to exclude such matter in order to keep down the size of what would otherwise have become an unduly large volume. It is believed, however, that the vast majority of readers will be able to illustrate the subject sufficiently well to themselves by examples and evidence from their own experience.

It has also seemed better that the subject, while scientific, should be discussed in a practical way easily understood and readily applicable to the daily affairs of ordinary life. The book is not written for the abstract scientist but for the executive man of affairs who is to apply its teachings. For this reason, a style of expression has been followed which is simple and direct in language and often homely of reference or application.

While the book has been written from the military standpoint and thus has the appearance of special pertinency to military purposes, it is believed that the greatest field of usefulness of the principles which it brings out will relate to civil life in respect to industrial morale and that these should go far toward the solution of the disturbing economic, social and political problems springing from human relations in industry.

The subject of the development for war purposes of negative morale in an opponent has been given very extensive and careful study. A book might be written upon it alone. It does not seem essential to present purposes, however, and for that reason has not been included in this discussion.

To Major General William G. Haan, Director, War Plans Division, General Staff, the author desires to express thanks for kindly interest and valuable advice born of rich experience in leadership. Lieut. A. D. Showalter, Coast Artillery Corps, has given material assistance in the preparation of diagrams. The kindness of Major Harold G. Bingham, psychologist in the office of the Surgeon General of the Army, who read the manuscript and approved its psychological presentation, is much appreciated. The sincere thanks and appreciation of the author are due to Major Arthur H. Miller, Coast Artillery Corps, who reviewed and corrected the rough manuscript, typewrote the pages and prepared the index. His continued interest and assistance has been very valuable.

E. L. M.

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MANAGEMENT OF MEN

CHAPTER I

MORALE

Definition of morale as a basis for the study which follows; discussion of morale from the standpoint of efficiency as the result of mental state; spirit as an equivalent of numbers in respect to accomplishment; need of developing spirit like that of keeping up numbers; morale and conviction; morale and team work; negative morale in opponents. Importance of morale implies need for its scientific study. Purpose of morale work to develop practical efficiency. Morale work always helpful to the individual and organization; practical value of morale work. Positive and negative morale explained. Qualities of morale defined; some elements of morale.

All successful commanders have recognized the tremendous value of mental forces in war. History is full of examples. Napoleon said, "In war, the morale is to the physical as three is to one." Sherman said, "An army has a soul as well as a man." Foch wrote, "Ninety thousand conquered men retire before ninety thousand conquering men only because they have had enough, because they no longer believe in victory, because they are demoralized — at the end of their moral resistance." Marmont wrote of "the mysterious forces which lend momentary power to armies, and which are the key to the reasons why at times one man is equal to ten, and at others, ten are worth no more than one." And French drill regulations say, "The moral forces constitute the most powerful factors of success; they give life to all material efforts and dominate a commander's decisions with regard to the troops' every act." A prize fighter epitomized the same idea in a few words —"A man is licked when he thinks he is."

The experience of the war has been a practical demonstration of the fact that morale is as potent a factor in the industrial army as in the military. Wherever human beings are grouped together in mutual endeavor or for the accomplishment of a definite task, morale is bound to be a controlling factor in their work. That their mental state, their will to do, their coöperative effort, their morale — all of which are synonomous — bear a true relation to their output, productivity and the success of the joint undertaking, is so obvious and has been proven so often as to require no supporting argument. That modern industry has failed so often to comprehend this basic and vital economic truth or, comprehending it, has failed to grasp the opportunity and turn it to practical advantage, is regrettable. Directive and administrative energy has been turned too exclusively along mechanical and operative lines with disregard of the intrinsic and vitalizing psychological factors of producing.

Definition of Morale. Morale is a word not easy fully to define in the English language. Most dictionaries vary widely in their definition, while many of the definitions are not in accord with the popularly accepted understanding of the word at the present time. Perhaps the best is the following: —" A state of mind with reference to confidence, courage, zeal and the like, especially of a number of persons associated in some enterprise, as troops." But even this does not fully cover morale as it is understood in the light of this discussion, for collective morale is the resultant of the individual morales which compose it. Thus morale is an intangible which cannot be reduced to a concrete definition. No two conceptions of it are alike. Its qualities vary with conditions. But it can be felt, described, stimulated and guided.

Rather than attempt to define morale, it is perhaps better to express its qualities by comparison with those of its antithesis, the better known word " demoralize." This is defined as " to render untrustworthy in discipline, efficiency,

spirit or the like: hence, to disorganize." Every officer can readily picture to himself an army which is *de*-moralized — that is in which its morale has been gravely impaired or lost. Similarly, demoralization in an industry implies lack of team work, decrease of effort, and lowering of production and other factors, upon which business success depends.

On the other hand, morale work does not mean "moralizing," for the dictionary sense of this is not one of action, but rather of explanation or reflection of a purpose or the drawing of a moral lesson. Morale work is the actual doing of something beneficial to the man and the service of which he is a part.

The older dictionaries include a relation to morals in respect to morale. This is an error in the present acceptance of the word morale. The two have quite different meanings. Morale represents a state of mind — morals a state of conduct. There is no connection between them save to the degree in which immorality may impair military or other efficiency. Thus a venereal disease may represent the result of bad morals, but whether it affects the soldier's morale or not depends on whether it impairs his will to fight.

The definition of morale deduced from study by the writer is that morale is a term which should be used to express the measure of determination to succeed in the purpose for which the individual is trained, or for which the group exists. It describes the nature and degree of cooperation, confidence, and unity of understanding, sympathy and purpose existing between the individuals composing the group. It is fitness of mind for the purpose in hand. It is a sense of solidarity of strength and purpose, and ability to undergo in the accomplishment of a common cause. It rises and falls from causes which intelligent analysis can usually detect, and which when once detected are usually capable of being corrected. The emblem of morale work

might be clasped hands, symbolical of comradeship, unity and strength.

It is at least as important that soldiers should want to fight as that they should know how to fight. Good morale in an army may be likened to the "temper" in a Damascus blade. There is a "temper" in men like a "temper" in steel. If good, it means in both a keen, hard "fighting edge," with a resiliency that no shock can crack. Morale is to the mind what "condition" is to the body. Good morale is good mental "condition"; bad morale is poor mental "condition." In good morale, the commander can get most from his organization, deliver blows with greatest effect, receive them with least depression and hold out over the longest time.

Morale is not merely enthusiasm, nor mental courage, nor "pep," nor the fighting spirit. It is all these things — and more. It has a sterner element. It is that mental training and mental hardening which, in a body of troops, continue to function after everything else has broken. It is the quality which, in the trenches or in the charge, keeps things going at the last desperate moment, when all of the external circumstances which would naturally create it have disappeared. It is not only the "will to win," but it is the refusal to consider anything else possible. It is the collective character of the army made up of the "will to win," the discipline which directs that "will," and the mental endurance necessary to carry it through to a conclusion.

A civilian cannot be changed into a soldier merely by putting him into uniform, providing him with a weapon and instructing him in the rudiments of military discipline. If, month after month, he is to endure with cheerfulness and unshakable resolution the hardships and dangers, the exhausting nervous and emotional strain and the monotony of modern war, there must obviously be within him some powerful motive capable of dominating many of the

ordinary weaknesses of human nature, of so controlling his will that the victory of the army of which he is a part becomes the supreme object of his desire. Similarly, giving a worker a job and instructing him in its technique is far from satisfying the full requirements of successful industry.

Morale for all purposes of war is a state of faith. It is belief in ability to see anything through to a successful conclusion. It is a measure of the man's confidence in himself, his leaders and his cause. If any leg of this tripod fails, the whole structure falls. When the soldier has met and defeated the enemy, confidence runs strong that he can do it again. It is the unknown that is feared and tends to sap will-power and thereby diminish ability to act. Confidence rests further upon belief in the ability and desire of comrades to help win success. This is confidence that individual abilities will give power to fight collectively as a team. It is esprit de corps. Morale further means not only fighting power but staying power and strength of mind which resists the mental infections of fear, discouragement and exaggeration of difficulties, and which furnishes the mental stimulus that brings troops back to endure further punishment in the determination to win.

Confidence in leaders, in industry as well as the military service, is based primarily upon the strong personality of the leaders themselves. Their presence must quicken morale. The ingredients of this personality must include ability, devotion and justice. To inspire the highest confidence in a leader he should have achieved previous success. Confidence in cause rests upon a conviction that it is right and worth working for or defending. This depends on education. The soldier will not fight at his best for a cause of which he knows little or in which he does not fully believe. Instruction in such matters must be effectively given. This is particularly necessary in troops such as ours, drawn from diverse racial and national stocks.

Morale in General. Perhaps the first act of a new com-

mander on joining his troops is to call for a statement of their effective strength. The adjutant takes the total number of the roll, makes deductions for those absent sick, on leave, absent without authority and in confinement, and gives him the figures for the balance. This balance, however, does not represent effective strength at all. It represents numerical strength only. Effective strength represents power of accomplishment. Numbers and efficiency are quite different factors. The important thing in any organization is not how many soldiers there are in it, but what is the fighting capacity of the mass. Business success is not based on number of employees but on the degree of their productivity.

In any organization, efficiency relates to that subtle but mighty influence which passes from man to man, spiritualizing and energizing the whole. It pertains to the unseen but potent forces of the mind, which dominate matter, direct act and rise superior to obstacle. The stirring painting, "The Spirit of 1776," depicts no material strength or physical power, but expresses the mental harmony, conviction and determination which brought success to the Colonial Army. It bared the soul and not the body of the new-born Nation.

In modern war, the spirit of troops seems sensitive to outside influences as never before. This is probably due in part to longer periods of waiting and tension. It is also due to better means of communication and higher degree of literacy, whereby the men are better informed as to conditions at home and what is going on about them. Battle conditions are watched and interpreted in the light of experience for the results they may forecast, and as these are favorable or not the morale is correspondingly affected.

This spirit is a quality of the human element in war. Its stimulation and control are problems of understanding and management. Curiously enough, while military literature is full of references to the psychological factor in war, they nearly all relate to its abstract importance and throw

little, if any light on its practical application to war problems. History shows morale as an essential factor the scientific study of which has in the past been neglected, while its problems have been left to the individual to solve unaided as best he might. The results were naturally variable and imperfect. The comfortable idea that the old army was good enough is not borne out by facts. No better evidence is needed that something was lacking in the spirit of the old army than the great number of desertions and refusals to reënlist in time of peace, and of the absentees in time of war — the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, for example. It is true that certain results were ultimately achieved. It is also true that better results could have been accomplished in less time and at smaller cost if the full power of mental force had been exerted. The difference between success and failure in industry often depends upon the mental attitude of the workers.

Spirit is the mainspring of fighting power. Equal numbers of men, even assuming further equality of equipment and training, are never equal in fighting efficiency. Still further, the fighting efficiency of the same force is never equal at two different times. It is well worth reflecting that military organizations are recruited, organized, armed, equipped and trained along common lines. In comparison in such respects, one organization has no more to offer than its competitors. The officer and soldier are in a business to which they can contribute nothing but quality of service. Absolutely the only difference between a "good" regiment and a "bad" regiment is the intangible one of spirit with its controlling effect upon conduct. Among organizations, competition is keen. Starting otherwise on the same basis, the organization will succeed best which has made the most of its human factor.

History shows that mere numbers alone, without adequate military incentive, do not bring victory. If numbers alone counted, China, with its vast population, would have the

greatest fighting ability of all nations. The force which decides first that it is useless to fight longer, no matter what its relative strength in men, armament and position, is defeated. Nor is war won by the physical destruction of the enemy. Only in the warfare of small groups of savages is physical extermination practiced or possible. But wars are won by the overcoming of the powers of resistance through demoralization and inability to conduct concerted action. Obviously, the larger the military force and the more complicated its mechanism, the more important becomes this problem.

Even when a military force or nation is tremendously outclassed by overwhelming superiority, it will put up a sturdy resistance through high morale. The latter adds stupendously to the price an overwhelming enemy of only fair morale must pay for victory. The spirit of the Swiss, quite as much as their armed force, deterred invasion.

A long war is habitually decided by "staying power," which is one of the expressions of morale. As Clemenceau prophesied of the war, "The side that holds out for the last quarter of an hour will win."

In the World War, defeat was measured not by the miles of territory yielded, but by how the courage and confidence of the troops endured. For more than four years the Germans, according to the map, had won. Their defeat was due to their inability to break the spirit of the defenders of France and Belgium. When they found that they could not win, their morale dwindled. By their acceptance of failure and offer of an armistice they set Allied victory forward by a year and rendered the use of the preponderating force of the Allies unnecessary. Morale broke before the army was physically crushed — it was merely psychologically beaten. General Ludendorff says: "The results of the further fighting depended mainly on the maintenance of the men's morale."

The efficiency of an army as a fighting force obviously

depends on the willingness of its component individuals to contend and if necessary to die for ideas and ideals. Heretofore no systematic effort has been made to create, elaborate, explain and implant such ideals. They have been left to chance, hazard and casual environment. Hence they have been proportionately imperfect, crude, variable and lacking in psychologic stimulus. Training has been focussed on giving ability to fight, while the will to fight has been let to look out for itself. This is neither logical nor practical. Few men are born fighters. Many may be raised by mental stimuli to the bravery of heroes.

In most of its wars, the United States has placed dependence on volunteers, whose very act of enrollment demonstrated an initial and dominating desire to fight. All that remained was to transform their individual psychic initiative into that unity of thought and purpose which is the soul of an army and distinguishes it from the mob. The last war was quite different. A majority of the men under arms came there under the draft and not through individual desire. In them, the incentive to use arms needed largely to be created, as well as the molding of individual ideas into community of thought and purpose. The same will apply to any great war in the future. The added difficulties of this task bring increased obligations for systematized and persistent preparation for its necessary accomplishment.

The United States has been too materialistic where the military service is concerned. It tends to think of the army only in terms of men, money and munitions, which it assumes make the soldier. This is but part truth, for this combination does not necessarily make a fighting soldier. It is the psychologic stimulus that makes the soldier fight. Morale is the driving force behind the bayonet point. It is morale that gives effect to equipment, training and expenditure. It is that intangible, imponderable, yet dominating power which brings victory to armies through stimu-

lation of the purpose to use arms to the highest efficiency and to the last extremity. And as that power falls below the highest standard, the probability of victory is by so much lessened. Of the fundamental truth of this history is replete with instances. The Russian collapse of 1917 is probably the greatest breakdown of morale in all history. Great armies became impotent, and their weapons became dangerous only through employment against fellow nationals and former comrades.

War, to the average mind, merely means a clash of arms. This is a superficial interpretation. War is more a contest of will and endurance than a physical collision, for if one nation in the conflict confesses its weakness the physical contact necessary to warfare is withdrawn. And this is true not only of the military forces, but of the entire nation which stands behind them. The whole purpose of the entire machinery of war is, in final analysis, merely to create a desired change of mental state in the adversary. It is the factor of will power that decides upon or accepts war, assembles the materials for war, wages the war, and that — on one side or the other — admits defeat and ends the struggle. All physical agencies are but the means of mental end and purpose.

During the recent war there was a marshalling of figures relating to the man-power, guns, finances and equipment to prove that one or the other force could or could not win or achieve a certain thing. All of these calculations left out of consideration the fact that mind triumphs over physical difficulties. "Faith moves mountains." A firm determination to fight to the bitter end defies all mathematical methods of prognosticating the duration of a conflict.

Every method known to science is used to perfect military material. But material is useless without personnel trained in its operation. In turn, personnel in an army is useless unless it be animated by proper spirit. Flaw in morale is more disastrous than defect in material. Suc-

cess may be won by the poorly equipped, but victory never crowns the banners of an army disbelieving in itself and without the will to win. Therefore it is as important to arm the mind as it is the body. Material things do not win wars. Men win wars — these things merely help them. The quality of the men behind the guns determines how efficiently the guns are served, or even if they are served at all. Morale work enters to develop quality of manpower. It is as necessary to deal with emotional states as with the physical side of military life.

Morale means conviction. The soldier is entitled and expects to understand the cause, reasons and principles of the government which he is called upon to defend. Unless he both understands and believes in them, he is always a potential danger to the morale of the unit to which he belongs. Particularly in time of special strain, of long continued inactivity, or of disaster, if uninformed he tends to become a focus of discouragement or disaffection. The man who questions the cause for which he contends has his energy and efficiency sapped at their source.

The morale of an army of the United States, therefore, must be based solidly on conviction of justice of cause and the right of ideals and principles. This conviction can come only through information and understanding. Education, the mainstay of democracy in peace, must also be its strength in war. It follows that an educated democracy will not engage in an unrighteous war, but will prosecute one for humanity to the utmost extent. Ideas are as important as armament. Ensuring that the soldier is provided with both becomes a military duty.

When a conviction of right and justice of cause is entertained, men who detest war and have little aptitude for military life become formidable soldiers. "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just." The resulting morale is steady, neither unduly elated nor depressed by any movement of events. There is a clear, settled, absolute con-

viction of the necessity that the enemy must be decisively defeated — a conviction resulting from vivid realization of what the enemy's success would mean.

The conviction to be desired is one which is produced by knowledge of the purpose of the soldier's efforts; of good to be reached by them, evil to be averted, or both. Rational action is to be directed toward some future end, and it is toward the future rather than the past that the mind of the soldier should be directed. The aims of the war are far more important to the soldier than its causes. In the unselfish, just war which is the only kind that the United States would wage, a far more effective type of conviction can be produced by stressing the evils to be averted than the positive good to be realized. The instinct of fear is stronger than that of the instinct of acquisitiveness. An intolerable situation resulting from an enemy's victory can be made clear to all, while the positive benefits to accrue to the individual and his group are less certain of comprehension and always open to controversy. Nevertheless, neither motive should be neglected.

In addition to conviction as to cause, purpose and result, the soldier must have conviction as to self-ability to conquer. An army is not beaten until it believes itself beaten. Marshal Foch, on being asked what had turned the final enemy offensive into defeat, said: "You ask me to tell you much in a few words. Victories are won by science, that is true, but also by faith. When one has faith, one does not retire; one stops the enemy where one finds him. You tell me that I gave victory to France. It was our admirable soldiers who gave it. I have but one merit, that of never despairing."

Where there is conviction of right and confidence of self, temporary failure and reverses merely serve as additional stimulus to endeavor. In the recent war, there were many dark days, when the line of democracy swayed and stretched under mighty blows. Only ideals held it together in dogged

tenacity of conviction and purpose. Great as was the material aid of this country, even more valuable was that moral support which created new vigor and zeal in the wearied Allies, caused loss to be regarded as a step to certain victory, turned defense into advance, and cancelled and annulled the achievements of the enemy in final success.

The idealistic morale of the Allies was often an example of mental unity and steadfastness. It rose above surprise and survived apparent defeat. At times it made up for lack of numbers in the field and for inferiority of armament. Countries overrun by the enemy maintained their heart; they might be physically overwhelmed, but refused to accept the status of conquered. Frightfulness deliberately planned to break morale and destroy resistance failed of effect against peoples who did not falter.

There is also a materialistic morale based on belief in superiority and inability to be defeated. This the Teutons had in high degree as a result of carefully cultivated egotism by which as a people they had come to regard themselves as super-men. They craved power and the material things of life. Posing as exponents of "Kultur," they were apostles of the most sordid materialism the world has ever seen. Faith in the justice of their cause was probably a lesser motive than their code that "might makes right," which also removed all moral obligations in respect to conduct against opponents.

If the Allies had been brought to believe that their cause was morally wrong, they could not have won. So too, when the Germans found that they could not win, they could not go on, for belief in any abstract justice of their cause was not sufficient as an incentive. After a series of brilliant successes, physical superiority passed from them. Once this was understood, the decline of morale was swift.

Morale means team work. The army represents the apotheosis of team work. Here individualism must be cheerfully merged in the common end. The problem be-

comes one of not how much the man can get out of it, but how much he can put into it. The question is not who did it, but was the work done. This implies the importance of carrying on, if need be, irrespective of personal opinions. But if personal opinions can be molded along the lines of the plans of higher authority the results will be far better. Coöperation is better than compulsion. Kipling expressed the idea when he wrote:

> "It ain't the individual
> Nor the army as a whole,
> But the everlasting team work
> Of every bloomin' soul."

Good morale implies attention to physical welfare. This merely means the securing for the men of such degree of reasonable comfort as army requirements contemplate, the government makes provision for, and local conditions render practicable. Every owner of a race horse knows that its care is necessary to develop best effort. Every officer has a similar duty toward his men. Morale work assists him in the performance of this obligation.

But morale work is in no sense pampering, nor does it diminish military obligation or the performance of duty. On the contrary it operates to cause the soldier to accept greater responsibilities, perform harder tasks, and give the best that is in him in a coöperative sense. The keynote of morale work is to have him "do it with a smile." This especially means when things are going badly — any one can smile when they are going well. It is the gospel of cheerfulness in adversity. It makes military life more interesting and attractive to the men and on the other hand smooths away the unnecessary asperities which interfere with efficiency and ability to "put their heart in their work."

To this end, it develops and uses the factor of mutual good will. The good will of industrial workers is well recognized as worth money and can be estimated in terms

of products and profits. The good will of soldiers is expressed in efficiency and demonstrated in success. The most successful organization is that in which contentment and harmony exist between all ranks. It works longer and harder because a collective state of mind exists which desires to see the common object accomplished with greatest efficiency.

The general tendency in fighting an evil is to fight the people by whom it was brought about. But under morale methods it is often possible to so alter conditions and procedures that the evil does not occur and conflict with any one becomes unnecessary. Friction and cross purposes are avoided. Most persons are reasonable and most fault is due to error and heedlessness rather than intent. In many instances, wise guidance averts any need for later punishment.

The usual military standard of welfare is that of the old idea of " the greatest good for the greatest number." As a general principle, this is correct. But morale goes further than this in its methods by endeavoring to secure the greatest good for every one. Such consideration for the individual interests of subordinates entails a little more time than if such matters received no official attention. But it pays tremendous dividends in efficiency. Even if conditions are such that personal difficulties cannot be fully remedied, the sympathetic interest shown in their welfare is more than appreciated by the men and tends to offset the results of physical fault. Officers who practice such methods have their men enthusiastically behind them. The efficiency born of good will is far greater than that of half-hearted or grudging obedience. All great leaders of men have had a profound knowledge of the human soul. An understanding of men is quite as important as all of the theoretical knowledge of other branches of military science which the student can acquire.

The ability to win a war means not only ability for the

troops to act alike but to think alike. A common purpose is necessary before community of action is possible. This must be brought about through indoctrination. Conversely, the use of high explosives has a value in destroying morale through the terror and confusion of purpose which it creates in the enemy, in a measure as great as the actual physical destruction of the objective. Focussing the attention of troops on one purpose makes morale work much easier, for the numerous minor problems of individuals tend to disappear or to be held in abeyance. Conversely, when a group is without a common purpose, friction and criticism develop. Unity of purpose, in which personal elements were submerged, prevailed before the signing of the armistice; once it was signed, an increase of criticism and recrimination developed, based on personal interests and motives.

In our army, no single racial stock, deep-rooted national traditions or ancient, historical background serve as unifying elements. The maintenance of morale is accordingly relatively difficult by reason of the chaotic multiplicity of nationality and racial strains. Each brings to the military melting pot its own psychology. Some, through recent arrival in America or through defective Americanism in their surroundings, enter the service with more or less complete Old World ideas, ideals and methods of thought. There are the fundamental differences of race, which everywhere throughout the world press for solution when different races come together and which are never fully solved. Similarly, these factors complicate the morale problems of industry.

A temporary morale can be built up on deceptions and false hopes. But aside from the ethics involved in the use of such an agency, morale created in this way rapidly dissipates when falsehood is revealed and false hopes crumble. The depression which follows such disclosures is far greater than that which would otherwise occur, and those of highest intelligence display this depression the most. All

morale of troops must be founded on confidence and reliance in officers. If these be betrayed, morale disintegrates.

Morale work is a two-edged tool. The result may be disastrous unless the psychological premises are correct. The enemy found this out to their cost when the frightfulness that they had expected would promote the instincts of fear and submission instead aroused pugnacity and self-assertion. Also when the false morale they had created among their own men by falsehood and deceit reacted against them.

In a high degree of morale, the individual or group is in such a state of mental exaltation as holds them superior for the time to factors naturally depressing to mind and body. The individual, through internal psychological forces, becomes in a way oblivious to external influence except along the preferred channels. In a sense, there is adjustment to the environment.

The standards by which morale is judged are variable through alteration of purpose. While these standards are complex in that they are the resultants of many factors, yet certain factors are always predominant. In war these are the desire to fight and the will to win; in peace, efficiency, contentment and self-respect. There is a strong similarity between the purpose of morale work in peace time and the creed of a great business institution expressed in the words: "To do the right thing, at the right time, in the right way; to do some things better than they were done before; to eliminate errors; to know both sides of the question; to be courteous; to be an example; to love work; to anticipate requirements; to develop resources; to recognize no impediments; to master circumstances; to act from reason rather than from rule; to be satisfied with nothing short of perfection."

Beside the state of morale of our own forces, that of the opponents is similarly important. A knowledge of it indicates when and where to strike, or whether or not an attack

may be expected. A negative phase of morale obtaining in the enemy has a military value equal to heavy reinforcements of one's own side. For this reason, every commander needs to know not only how many troops are opposed to him, but who they are, for every organization soon comes to have a relative standard in fighting capacity. Within the same national group, some organizations habitually fight better than others. After our troops shattered the Prussian guard regiments, they acquired supreme confidence in their ability to defeat any enemy troops. Given the same numbers and equipment, the difference in battle efficiency is purely one of morale. If this is true in respect to the enemy, it is even more important that the commander should accurately gauge the fighting efficiency of his own troops at all times so as to know when to give or decline battle and fight to best advantage. In deciding, care should be taken lest feeling becloud judgment.

Study of Morale Methods. Because morale is of such fundamental military importance, and its purposes and methods are demonstrable both as an art and a science, the essentiality of its systematized study is clearly indicated. This should be carried out in all of the army schools to the extent which its prominence deserves. The practicability of systematically controlling act through mental state should be understood by all officers. Morale, either in military life or civil industry, should never be regarded as an uncontrollable force working for good or ill according to fortuitous circumstances.

It is true that the problems of morale are never the same for any two places. They even vary in the same place from time to time. Their number and combination may approximate infinity. But study shows that they fall into a certain few general groups, ready of approach and susceptible of handling by the simple application of a few general principles.

Study and instruction in morale work as the cardinal factor of leadership, or the management of men, should be carried out as simple, practical measures, divested of all of the scientific abstractions which make psychology so difficult to the ordinary inquirer. Instead of considering the subject as abstruse and mysterious, it should be treated on a common sense, every day basis, and as a potent force for controlling the conduct of troops, amenable by the intelligent officer in its generation, direction, application and results.

But in addition to reading and reflection, practice in application of methods is necessary. Once a superior has mastered the basic general principles and familiarized himself with the methods which they suggest, they should be put into practical experiments and the results carefully noted. Every organization furnishes this opportunity. Better diagnosis of mental states and more skilful selection of appropriate remedy come with practice and fuller understanding. The officer should know the variations of his human units and groups as the sharpshooter recognizes and allows for the special peculiarities of his rifle.

Purpose of Morale Work. The purpose of morale work is to make troops more effective, creating a discipline which is voluntary and enthusiastic rather than enforced, stimulating and centering the minds and wills of individuals upon desired ends. Its ultimate aim is military success. In industry, it functions for greater interest, contentment and productivity.

In time of war, morale work exists for the psychological stimulation of troops. A fighting temper which can survive every possible mischance is the fundamental factor in all military operations. Equipment, discipline, drill, strategy — none avail with maximum effectiveness unless backed up by tenacious resolution which makes death appear preferable to defeat. Effective morale in war time is that which

can survive defeat or disaster, disappointed hopes, retreats, physically enervating conditions and heavy losses. The supreme tests of morale are time and adversity.

The objects of morale work in peace are to place troops in such mental condition that they will be most receptive to psychological stimulation in event of war; also to render the army as representative as may be of the standards and ideals of the country whose armed, vital force it embodies. The accomplishment of these purposes will result in a more contented, tractable personnel with few disciplinary problems, greater progress in training over any given period, and cause the army to be viewed by the civilian population with greater pride and interest.

So far as the individual is concerned, morale work is calculated to bring out, encourage and develop the best there is in him, and whatever betters the individual betters the group of which he forms a part. It aims to stimulate and assist the weak, direct the strong, correct the erring, educate the uninformed and encourage the successful. It brings the soldier to enjoyment of his work, to pride in its accomplishment, and to that end to give the best he has in him. To use a slang expression, "it puts the soul in soldier." Under its influence the individual comes to want to do what it is wanted that he should do. It is the inteligent stimulation of willing effort instead of possibly unintelligently planned compulsion.

It seems often to be tacitly assumed that the will to win exists preformed among troops, or may be safely left to develop itself. Such assumption is false. A few individuals have it; more only in a limited extent; some little or not at all. But it thrives under culture. Morale work points out the best cultural methods according to the special needs of the individual or group. It analyzes behavior in respect to cause. It evaluates cause and conditions in relation to their influence on the soldier affecting what he may do. It forecasts conditions which may be impending and

enables suitable measures to be taken in advance. Like weather observations which enable the farmer to gather crops or the mariner to shorten sail before the impending storm breaks, morale work acts like a barometer to warn of threatening emotional storm and the acts which may result from it. It goes still further, for it can avert the mental storm which threatens by dissipating or neutralizing its elements and diverting them into useful channels.

The purpose of morale work is in no sense critical. If undesirable conditions appear, they are accepted merely as problems which exist and in which morale agencies may cooperate in helpful solution. There is neither espionage nor discredit. The fact is recognized that even if an officer is at fault, any undesirable results are due to errors of judgment rather than intent. So long as intent is good, morale work safeguards and promotes the personal interests of officers and men alike. It takes no side, whether of persons or groups. Its concern is the common welfare and its functions are wholly beneficent.

Morale work is intended to promote contentment, both in the individual and group, by removing or diminishing as far as possible any factors operating to impair physical comfort or buoyancy of spirit. Only the individual who is reasonably satisfied with his lot can achieve in high degree the qualities of self-sacrifice, loyalty to superiors, devotion to comrades, endurance in adversity and cheerfulness under hardship, which must be possessed by the soldier if he is to be efficient.

One of the chief functions of morale work is to take the men's minds off their troubles, whether the troubles be real or fancied. Of the two, a fancied trouble is often harder to deal with, because it has no real substance, than an actual difficulty which can be located and removed. Many difficulties are entirely unnecessary and are the result of inadvertance or misinformation. Once they are pointed out, all are interested in their removal. Conduct in a body of men

is their way of expressing their interests, or what they take to be such. By exercising influence on interests and upon their translation into behavior, conduct may be controlled.

Morale work, at its best, is preventive rather than remedial, though, as in medicine, these two aims may go hand in hand. In many ways its purpose and methods are much like those employed in infectious disease. Thoughts are far more rapidly transmissible and capable of development than are disease germs. The disturbing element, as with disease infection, needs prompt recognition or diagnosis before it has a chance to spread and affect or contaminate others. Once recognized, it needs neutralization or disinfection; or if this is not possible, then isolation, so that in either case its power for harm is prevented. Further, morale work extends to the mental immunization of possibly susceptible subjects, similar to physical inoculation against smallpox, so that if the infectious germ or harmful idea escapes control it will find the soil in such subjects so unfertile that it will fail to establish itself. Finally, there comes the mental or physical cure of those already affected, with protection of others while this is being accomplished.

Morale work is not intended to reform offenders, though it frequently does so. Its primary purpose is to strike at any potential sources of inefficiency and disorder, thereby preventing conditions resulting in a state of mind in which the individual is willing to commit offenses. It has a distinct purpose in the reclamation of recruits who may enter the army with vicious or anti-social tendencies acquired in civil life. These young men need to be improved and strengthened mentally and morally as well as physically. The army has a moral obligation, not only to make good soldiers of them, but better citizens; to teach them, not only how to die for the Nation, but how to live for it.

Morale relates to efficiency in its expression of the desire to do things worth while, and to do them well. The very accomplishment of the task stimulates to further endeavor

— to making the most of opportunity. In all morale work, the purpose should be to develop the best in the soldier and not to be satisfied with less. It is perhaps where the material seems least promising that the greatest improvement can be accomplished and the most gratification come to the officer through the results of his constructive efforts. The pessimist may say, "Count no man a success until he is dead." Morale work counters with the addition, "nor a failure until he is through."

Value of Morale Work. The practical value of scientific morale work has now been clearly demonstrated, although still in the infancy of its possibilities. What has been found to be true in the army has similar applicability in civil life.

Recognition of the value of general morale measures is not new — it is as old as history. Famous leaders in the past possessed full appreciation of its worth and each in his own way used it in molding the minds of his followers for the achievement of his purpose. Philip, Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Napoleon and many others were leading exponents of morale work. One has but to turn back history's pages to the story of their campaigns and victories to see how they used it to attain military efficiency and superiority. Elsewhere in this book are quoted the words of great modern military leaders in testimony of the value and importance which they attach to it. What is sought now is a complete recognition of this importance by all officers and others concerned.

Positive and Negative Morale. All psychologic influences relating to military efficiency naturally divide into two main classes:

(a) Positive, which have to do with everything relating to the upbuilding of the mental state and the promotion of efficiency.

(b) Negative, which pertain to everything which operates as a psychologic depressant and reduces effectiveness.

In a general way, positive morale may be regarded as an expression of optimism — negative morale, of pessimism. Both of these factors are constantly in operation, varying in their components in respect to nature, degree and intensity of application. The state of morale, accordingly, may be considered as the resultant of the opposing positive and negative forces. It is therefore a variable, often passing through a wide and rapid degree of fluctuation in response to shifting environment. Like the tide, it is subject to ebb and flow.

The general problem relating to our own personnel is to



Figure 1. Diagrammatic Conception of Fluctuation of Uninfluenced Morale in Relation to Military Efficiency.

secure as high a degree of morale as possible by adding to the factors of stimulation and subtracting from those of depression. Men must be inspired with proper sentiments on one hand, while anything which will make them less keen and resolute must be kept out of their field of experience. This is the essence of morale work in our own service, which is entirely beneficent and has nothing to conceal.

The state of morale may be roughly expressed by Figure 1, which diagrammatically shows certain possible variations in mental state bearing on efficiency. The problem of management is to watch such mental states and make the necessary changes to remedy any existing or threatened fault. The parallel of this curve in business is discussed in the chapter on industrial morale.

Figure 2 roughly indicates the time and quality of the corrective measures to be taken. For explanatory purposes, a morale curve may be assumed to be supported by posi-



Figure 2. Diagrammatic Conception of Fluctuation of Influenced Morale in Relation to Military Efficiency.

tive or plus agencies and to be depressed by negative or minus influences. A number of apparently trivial factors may, in the aggregate, have great potentiality. The curve will tend to fall whenever the sum total of the negative factors is greater than the sum total of the positive factors. As soon as the curve starts to fall from its high level, the Morale Officer should be aware of it and formulate the remedy. In a general way, this would be done by adding to the positive or plus factors, similar to increasing the supports of a weakened bridge, or by subtracting from the negative or minus factors, just as excess strain is removed from a sagging span. In practice, a good administrator will endeavor to accomplish both, so that the morale curve instead of falling will promptly take an upward trend and be higher than before. His purpose is to create such a high state of morale as to actually constitute a reserve which can be relied upon to offset unavoidable mental depression, in whole or part, so that morale shall never be able to sink below the standard associated with reasonable efficiency.

In respect to the enemy, the problem is so to reduce his positive factors, and so to add to those acting as depressants, as to weaken or destroy his purpose and impair or avert act. In this field our opponents excelled. In their procedure, just as they contaminated sources of water supply, so they deliberately set about to poison the wells of

thought of their antagonists and to pervert the channels through which ideas were transmitted. Far more effort was given to undermining the fortitude of their opponents than to strengthening that of their own men. The success of their efforts was demonstrated in Russia and at Caporetto. In extent, their insidious propaganda covered the world. It was a power of darkness.

The Qualities of Morale. The quality of morale among troops cannot be determined by laboratory methods, but it will be instinctively and early recognized by the officer accustomed to command men. Ability to sense it is one of the prime essentials of industrial leadership. It has its signs in a thousand expressions of states of mind, while each act, even if in itself trifling, has its meaning to the competent observer. The spirit speaks as much in the manner in which a thing is done as in the performance of the act itself. The obedience, alacrity, cheerfulness and thoroughness with which a required duty is carried out indicates the morale. Action in battle and on the march, the number of men confined in the guardhouse, the number of desertions, trials, hospital reports, the appearance of the men off duty as well as on parade, are only its more obvious expressions. In business life, it is directly reflected in productivity.

Degrees of morale are required to support diverse degrees of mental strain. A state of morale which might suffice for training might prove quite inadequate under the stress of a campaign. The only safe plan is to establish early a high degree of excellence to meet possible contingencies as well as to facilitate training and preparation.

Differences in morale are cumulative. Nothing succeeds like success. A winning army believes in itself and is eager for further conflict in order to secure the anticipated successes. Depression grows by leaps and bounds in an army suffering continual reverses, its grip relaxes, and the depression may be a forerunner of fear and the disorder of panic.

Morale measures, important at any time, are doubly necessary in reverse.

Morale work takes cognizance of the existence of negative forces harmful to the individual as a man and as a soldier, and takes measures for their neutralization or removal by comprehensive, scientific methods. It may here be said that, in a general way, the causes which directly operate to reduce contentment in respect to themselves, further tend to create a generally depressed state of mind and morale, whereby other factors, both physical and mental, assume an exaggerated importance and become mental depressants, although under ordinary conditions their effects as such would have been negligible. A real grievance is like a Christmas tree, serving as a basis on which to display objects which otherwise would have been stored away and forgotten. In uplifting morale, no source of justifiable complaint and depression can be safely disregarded.

Morale is good when the minds and wills of the individuals are so firmly fixed on an identical end to be achieved that common understanding, purpose and determination express themselves in voluntary coöperation, in voluntary adjustment of the relations between individuals, in voluntary obedience and in cheerfulness and patience. In war time, morale can be said to exist to an effective degree only when the largest possible number of individuals — being relieved so far as may be from all personal worries and maladjustments, purged of all doubts concerning the end to be gained and made proud of the privilege of participating in the task — enthusiastically center all their energy, will and resolution on a purpose which is so desirable that even infinite discomfort or fear of death cannot affect their unaltering determination to accomplish it.

Morale is poor when the degree of coöperation or unity is slight and when individuals are held together and made to act only by fear or force. There is grudging or half-

hearted response to orders, which may amount to passive opposition. Poor efficiency is obvious. Under contact with the enemy, or in adversity, such cohesion as existed is lost and disintegration occurs. The quality of force disappears because the incentive which stimulated it is lost.

Morale is absent when troops refuse, or fail through indifference, to exert whatever physical qualities or training they may possess to the accomplishment of military purpose. Mutiny is the expression of the zero point in morale. All the above qualities have their corresponding phases in civil industry.

Good morale does not mean simply good discipline, physical courage, instinctive pugnacity, fear of the social ignominy which attaches to cowardice or disloyalty, esprit de corps or a feeling of hostility toward the enemy. All of these may be aids to it or elements of good morale; most of them are indispensable factors in it, yet neither singly nor together do they make up the whole of it.

Good discipline may be mistaken for good morale when troops execute military movements with precision. Esprit de corps may be mistaken for good morale when there is pride in the fame or appearance of the unit. The desire for combat by green troops may be mistaken for good morale when it may indicate merely a desire for change of scene instead of actual eagerness to fight or a deep underlying discontent with the routine of training, or really bad morale. A boastful eagerness to " go over and fight " may be manifested by individuals or units, when in reality they have such poor morale that after one night of trench hardship and danger they would want no more of war.

Good morale implies high qualities of endurance, initiative, self-sacrifice, loyalty, subordination of self, exaltation of the ideal, contempt of danger, reaction against force, resistance to frightfulness rather than submission to fear, ability to resist the agents of mental depression and to

come back under punishment. These and other qualities create an efficiency which wins in war.

Self-control enters into morale. This means refusal to be swayed by wayward impulse, lest the resulting act be harmful to the cause or influence others to detrimental action. Similarly devotion and self-sacrifice are essential elements. This is consecration to a cause and a willingness to give up life itself, if necessary, for the furtherance of an ideal.

Persistency and tenacity of purpose express the quality of continuing against tremendous odds and in the face of contrary desires that are keen and imperative. They are directly opposed to various elemental instincts and need to be cultivated to a large extent. Yet through them only have come the great results of civilization and military achievement.

Initiative is especially valuable. Troops whose confidence in themselves is shaken are hesitant and irresolute. Their motivation is insufficient or too clouded to achieve success. An army which can maintain a stout aggressive must necessarily be of high morale. The morale that wins is usually such as seeks and holds the aggressive. General Pershing in his report speaks of the French attacks on Mort Homme and Chemin des Dames as being "characterized by most careful preparation to insure success in order to improve the morale of their troops." And of the attack on the Marne salient he said: "But, more important than anything else, it would restore the morale of the Allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing."

Speaking further he says of the Allies: "Discouragement existed not only among the civil population but through their armies as well. Such was the Allied morale that although their superiority on the Western front during the last half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to twenty per cent., only local attacks could be undertaken and their

effect proved wholly insufficient against the German defense."

Ability to wait for a favorable opportunity to strike, parrying the blows of the enemy, is a great test of good morale. Patience under difficulty is a strong test of the quality of troops. Staying power in the face of apparently imminent defeat, when it seems that all help is exhausted, represents one of the highest attributes of good morale.

Also a strong indication of good morale is the ability to know the truth without break of confidence or purpose. The enemy commanders who deceived their troops as to military events thereby showed their distrust of their men in respect to standing discouragement. On the other hand, Allied reverses reported in England promptly resulted in great increase in recruiting and a stiffening of the defense at the front. It armed determination.

Vision enters into morale. It is the ability to anticipate the need or the event, so that preparation may be made accordingly. So, too, pluck, which embraces not only physical but moral courage, is an important ingredient. Faithfulness is also a factor. It means the continuous performance of duty, no matter how hard or irksome, until relieved. It is the acceptance of responsibility and living up to the demands made by that responsibility. Buoyancy and humor are great aids to morale, for they express ability, while realizing the gravity of a situation, to throw off depression and convert difficulty into jest. Every captain who has a singing or a witty soldier in his company will testify to this. When morale is good, one expression of it is found in the fact that officers and men are "boosters" for their organization and the military service in general.

In good morale there is an element of altruism — that is, concern for the welfare of others. It is the spirit which makes the soldier share his last drops of water or volunteer for the forlorn hope to assist his comrades. Self-interests are forced into the background. Love for the flag is a

great factor in military morale. It has a tremendous inspirational value, for it visualizes all the ideals which the flag represents and for which sacrifices have been made and will be made. It is because of the ideals and imagery which it embodies that one's own flag uplifts where the flags of other nations merely excite interest.

Patriotism and love of country are at the basis of military morale. It may be perverted, as by autocracies, for sordid purposes. For us, patriotism expresses democracy, freedom, civilization, the self-determination of peoples and opportunity for higher things.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALE CONTROL

Need of standardization of measures to promote morale; establishment of some best methods as both practicable and desirable; such scientific measures here set forth probably for the first time; morale work based upon collective experience on the one hand and on principles of human nature scientifically determined on the other. Morale work a social rather than a mathematical science; morale work and scientific management; morale problems are those of "human engineering"; mental reservoirs of power; use of basic laws governing human nature to promote rather than hinder efficiency; the wasteful methods of "trial and error"; study of the human being as a source of "man-power." The media of morale work; selection of appropriate media. Some general measures to promote morale; interaction of civil and military morale; some elements of civil morale affecting military success; general factors affecting morale. Some reasons for poor morale; some evidences of poor morale; service as affecting morale problems. General methods of morale work. Information necessary in morale work.

Standardization of Morale Work. Only recently has the logical deduction been made that since morale is such a basic element in the success of military accomplishment, it is important enough to cultivate by every effective means. The fact that an attack upon the morale of enemy troops and civilians has become one of the most important and carefully elaborated methods of offensive warfare, as practiced by the Germans for example, makes it necessary to adopt appropriate and adequate defensive measures.

It can never be safely assumed that morale will take care of itself. This is not the case. Such an assumption would imply that while every other factor contributory to military success must be the subject of careful study and painstaking effort, the most important, subtle and complex of all — the psychological factor — may be wholly neglected. As

morale crumbles under attack and wastes under neglect, so it develops under care. To exist in proper degree, it must be built up; and as with any other construction work, there are some best methods which it is the part of wisdom to determine and employ. A ground-work of correct theory is the best basis for putting principles into practice.

The forces of psychology are as old as mankind. All officers use them more or less unconsciously. Some get better results than others. Those who have given special consideration to the management of their men will be particularly interested in what systematized morale work has to offer. For all, the question is whether all has been done that should be done, and done in the best way possible. Whatever there has been of a will to win in our army in the past has been too much a by-product, engendered not of scientific purpose, but incidental to some phase of the service or to general discipline. Until recently, no official effort was made to create the necessary state of mind intentionally, deliberately and systematically.

It is believed that this presentation sets forth for the first time the forces which can and should be scientifically controlled and systematically directed to the achievement of high morale. Although these forces are intangible, so is the force of electricity or that which emanates from radium, and both are being steadily brought more and more under scientific control. Similarly, the control of the psychological forces is as yet in its infancy. The measures here brought out are, accordingly, in no sense final, but merely the beginning in a field which is practically illimitable.

Since most of the problems which arise can be classified under a relatively few groups, and since all of them are governed by general qualities of human nature, morale work can be standardized. That is, certain procedures which are recognized as habitually effective can be carried out under all conditions. Others may be practicable and desirable only in part or in certain circumstances. But nearly

all of these measures can be formulated in advance, so that as need arises they may be put into operation with such modification as may be necessary.

Morale work endeavors to secure and furnish systematically information of scientifically successful methods of handling men. Experience will teach the young officer in the management of men, and to a degree proportionate to his aptitude and personality. But personal experience is a slow teacher and often a costly one.

The experiences of others in the handling of men can be advantageously used in the demonstration of general theoretical principles which, if followed, will not let the officer go far astray when he comes to put them into local application. Few problems are wholly new, and knowledge of how such general situations have been successfully handled in the past will serve as a reliable guide in the solution of similar problems of the present and future.

Morale work goes further than collation and presentation of experiences in handling men as examples for the study of the army at large. It has a still more important function in relation to research in the discovery of the laws and principles which lie behind them. Certain general truths concerning the relationships and reactions of all groups of men under any probable circumstances can be outlined. By analysis and synthesis it should be able to formulate procedures which are scientifically defensible, practicable of application, and which give every prospect of desired result.

On the general background of a knowledge of morale thus produced there appear from time to time special problems, each of which requires its own special measure for solution. These special problems are of most diverse character. Some pertain to individuals only, some apply to smaller or larger groups and some affect whole organizations or even an entire racial class. The most important of these are given separate discussion.

Morale Methods and Scientific Management. War is the supreme contest of efficiency. Under its pressure all leaks of efficiency must be promptly located and stopped. Every condition must be studied with a view to determining whether or not it can be handled so as to produce a better and more prompt result, and if so, how. Morale enters here in a way which cannot be disregarded, for it is translated into efficiency of the human element. A science is knowledge gained and verified by exact observation and correct thinking, especially as methodically formulated and accurately arranged in system. Morale work, as here developed, satisfies these requirements.

Morale work is not an exact science in the sense that it can be laid down dogmatically for once and for all. It does not deal with dead symbols, but with human beings of diverse character and trend, which enter into every equation. Accordingly it cannot have a mathematical exactitude whereby the same result can be obtained by any one under all conditions. But it is based on fixed laws, which are the same in their application to human nature as a whole, though flexible and variable for countless diverging cases. It belongs rather to the social sciences, and is like economics, sociology, political science and others. It is also an art, in that not every one can apply its principles with equal efficiency. Some persons are born with special ability to make such judicious application, but all can be improved in this respect by training and culture. Depending on the personality and ability of the officer and on modifying conditions, the success of its application varies. Even if imperfectly applied, its results are far better than the mixture of good and bad which results from leaving the matter to rule of thumb methods or the law of chance.

The handling of men has been long delayed in reaching a scientific basis. Nearly everything else has progressed to this end to a far greater extent. What has been practiced is empirical — that is, what has been found applicable

during the centuries has been retained and what experience has shown to be ineffective has been dropped. But the reasons for retaining, applying or discarding a method have never been made apparent. Tradition and the force of example and imitation have been the guiding factors, rather than the scientific principles governing the relation between cause and effect. Applied psychology of the present day is thus in about the same relative degree of development as the practice of medicine and surgery of two generations ago, when the origin of disease was not understood and remedies were not selected and administered as a result of known premises and their precise influence on symptomatology and pathological cause.

Morale work is a study of human nature and the human forces which determine the problems of efficiency. It is neither theoretical nor sentimental. Its purpose is wholly practical and for the attaining of better results. Its aim is to get more and better work out of each individual through his willing coöperation and to produce as nearly as possible uniform results for good. Aside from any other considerations, a basic reason why measures for morale should be carried out is the cold blooded one that "it pays." If it can do this, and at the same time contribute to the advantage of the individual, so much the better. Men are not inanimate cogs in a machine driven by an outside force, but living units that respond to command only to the extent that willingness has been generated within them. Morale work then, in its essence, is the science of human engineering, which, when applied to the army, makes each living component of the military machine function in higher efficiency and better coördination.

Human beings have a natural tendency not to exert themselves to the limit. Hence there are latent reserves of strength which may be called out by a powerful exercise of the will. High morale in the individual means ability and willingness to draw upon this reserve in time of need.

Well disciplined troops, of high morale, make marches in good order, when troops equally well qualified physically, straggle and break for lack of mental power to force the body to act.

The natural " reservoirs of power " are tapped by mental stimulation through great emotional stress. This reserve power seems chiefly due to adrenalin, a secretion of the suprarenal glands, which has powerful stimulating and recuperative value and which is discharged into the blood in larger quantity as a result of increased emotion. Every officer has abundant evidence that such reserve power exists. It may be demonstrated graphically as shown in Fig. 3, in which a regiment on a hard march with some long miles yet to go is assumed. After a certain degree of effort, shown in the level " A " of the chart, the troops begin to show signs of exhaustion and to straggle. The commander, noticing this, orders the band to strike up a snappy march, thereby appealing to the instinct of rhythm. The troops respond, catch the cadence, close up, temporarily forget their fatigue and expend additional energy to the level "B."

But the stimulation of the music wears off, and at the level " B " the men again begin to feel the sense of exhaustion, to straggle and to elongate the column. The company officers now bestir themselves to close up the ranks by admonition and encouragement. The appeal is made for the men and company to show the others of what stuff they are made. The instincts of self-assertion and rivalry are aroused, and under their stimulation good order is resumed and the command expends further energy up to the level " C."

On reaching the level " C," the command again shows evidence of exhaustion. If the commander now sends word down the line that a retreating detachment of the enemy is ahead and may be overtaken by hard marching, he will stimulate the still stronger instinct of pugnacity, which



Figure 3. Levels of Stimulation.

will impel the men to close up and expend much further effort in marching, reaching the level "D."

But on reaching "D," the command comes under long range artillery fire and it is evident that the enemy has escaped. The commander orders his troops to withdraw to a position of safety and, under the stimulus of the strongest instinct of all, that of self-preservation and caution, the command expends further effort and marches to the extent shown in the level "E."

It is obvious that, whatever the effort expended and distance marched between "A" and "E," these are expressions of will power. The men who started to fall out at "A," "B," "C" and "D" were not exhausted — they simply thought they were. But for practical purposes of marching they might as well have been actually exhausted, if depressing thoughts had not been replaced by emotionally stimulating ones and new physical and mental driving power thus created.

Effectiveness means power of accomplishment. To this, numbers may make no great contribution if spirit be wanting. On the contrary, they may enhance disaster. Gen. Ludendorff has written in his memoirs, "The value of masses in war cannot be denied, and without soldiers there can be no fighting. But numbers alone are nothing without the spirit that animates them." At Marathon, the ten thousand Greeks had a greater effective strength than the million Persians. Will wins. Accordingly, morale has a value which, like numbers, may be reckoned in ability to accomplish a given task. Fighting strength may be increased not only in the usual accepted way of increasing the

number of units, but by increasing the fighting power of each unit. If the morale of a certain million men could be doubled it would add the equivalent of a million such men to the fighting power. And such a thing is not impossible. Many leaders have inspired this fighting power, both before and since the leader of whom the poet wrote; "One blast upon his winding horn were worth a thousand men."

With a hundred men, a depreciation of morale by twenty-five percent is equivalent in terms of result to a loss of a quarter of the command. In fact, it is worse; for while seventy-five men in perfect morale will accomplish as much as a hundred men in three-quarters morale, in the latter case there are twenty-five drones who make necessary a larger overhead of superintendence, time and money and who further act, like unsound apples in a barrel, to threaten the integrity and efficiency of the others. This applies as much to business in civil life as to the military service.

The general principles of the efficiency systems of industrial management include the factors of individuality, functionalization, measurement, analysis and synthesis, standardization, records and programs, teaching, incentive and welfare. Such systems lay great stress on business and mechanical methods, without ensuring that the individual worker is desirous of adopting and carrying them out; this lack of the essential human element of mental coöperation has many times resulted in their failure. Morale methods, here outlined, propose to remove such deficiency. The final combination is such as can be applied as well to making a regiment effective in a military sense as to increasing the output of an industrial concern.

Morale work in the army is thus essentially scientific management, since it aims to correlate and systematize the best of all methods in the handling of men, to push developments further in accordance with the principles discovered, and by research to disclose and place in proper relation of importance any new facts bearing on the subject. Such a

helpful factor very obviously has a most important place in the military service. In war, expense counts for little, but the time factor is paramount. Delay frequently means disproportionate loss of life, and very possibly of victory. The most serious waste from the strategic viewpoint is not of material but of time. In this respect standards of industrial and military efficiency differ. To make an economy of time, there must be coöperation by subordinates, not only within compulsory limits but voluntary to the extent of human capacity. The commander must be able to inspire his men to do their best. The same applies in making a financial economy in civil industry.

It has apparently been considered that the ability to inspire could only be reached through experience and that the relative degree of excellence in results must depend directly on some innate quality and ability of the individual in respect to the handling of men. This assumption is true in a very limited sense. A few men undoubtedly are endowed with a high quality of leadership; they instinctively do the right thing in handling subordinates and thereby secure greater output and efficiency. The great majority so develop relatively rudimentary qualities that in time they become leaders. Another few are so lacking in such qualities that they will never become leaders of men, though they may do excellently in administrative work relating to things rather than persons. Also it is true to a certain extent that one cannot fully learn to handle men without actually handling them, any more than one could learn to ride by a correspondence course. Yet all these classes can profit by a clear understanding of general principles underlying any purpose or method. No one questions the value of books on seats, saddles and bridles in teaching horsemanship or in gentling horses. Yet the training of mounts is merely morale work applied to animals; the horse is not physically changed by training — he is merely brought into a state of coöperative mental sympathy with his rider. Principles can

similarly be laid down in print which will materially assist in molding and managing men.

If morale work does nothing more than set down the successful methods of good leaders, analyze them as to the underlying principles and place the results before the service at large, it will have justified itself. For there must be some best method of practice based on the composite experience of successful leaders; this best method and all that goes with it should not remain, as heretofore, practically "trade secrets" of certain officers. Those of less service and less innate ability as to leadership should have this short cut to higher efficiency opened to them. They can begin where others have left off, without toiling painfully over the same long route.

The gaining of knowledge of how to handle men by personal experience is generally wasteful and inefficient. Experience merely means a succession of combinations of trial and error. Mistakes are inevitable and the cause of inefficiency, while their only redeeming feature is that the wise officer will take their often discouraging and mortifying lessons to heart so that they will not be repeated. Success, too, may have its difficulties, for without understanding its underlying reasons, repetition of what may have been arbitrarily done and proven successful under some conditions, might not give satisfactory results under others.

Merely because the officer has done a certain thing before, or because his associates or predecessors have done it, is no argument in favor of blind continuance. Example is not always safe to follow. A poor commander may establish undesirable standards in inexperienced officers that can be changed only with difficulty. Standards of leadership and efficiency are too important to be left to such chance association and diverse personal equations. The alert officer is constantly seeking improvement and using it where he finds that it reduces his failures and increases his successes. Leadership, whether military or industrial, rests on very

definite laws of psychology and human nature. These are capable of being scientifically worked out and applied, like those of gravity, or other unseen force. It is the function of morale work to do this and to give the results to the entire army, showing leadership not only as an art but as a science, readily mastered by those interested in its application.

The army, with its standardized methods and similarity of environment and character of personnel, serves as an unparalleled laboratory for the determination of problems relating to the human factor in military efficiency and for discovering their solution. The results will in many cases be similarly applicable to relations in civil life, for the general principles of human nature are the same.

For such analytical purposes, human nature must be scientifically studied. The findings must be diligently applied to the object proposed. Modifications to general rules must be made to conform with diverse conditions and with the individual soldier as the basic unit. His particular trend, abilities and weaknesses must be noted, utilized or avoided. Morale work takes concern not only in ability to do a thing, but in interest and desire to do it. Only with a combination of these factors can there be human efficiency.

Medium of Morale Work. The medium of morale work is any agency whatever which comes into contact with the soldier in the influencing of his mental attitude. Anything which can produce effect through any of the body senses can be used for the purpose, the problem being to select those which will operate to best advantage in producing the desired result and to avoid or neutralize those which function in opposition to the military purpose. Beside the body senses, a score of instincts must be considered and their forces utilized.

Other than those dependent on the forces of nature expressed in climate and weather, the surroundings of the soldier are practically artificial. Every factor therein has

a definite purpose and is the embodiment of an idea or group of ideas. The structure of a bayonet or cup, the artistry of a painting or the complexity of an automobile represent crystallized thought as to purpose and form. So, too, ideas pertaining to the soldier can often be given shape and form where they relate to the physical factors of the environment.

In all morale work in our own army, the objects, media and methods are open and above board. They are wholly beneficial. Morale work corrects physical fault and maladjustment, fights wrong ideas with right ones, combats lies with truth, and errors and ignorance with fact. It proceeds on the basis that any proposition not justified by fact, fairness and ethics deserves to fail. This is the opposite to that practiced by the Central powers, wherein were used the agencies of falsehood, deceit, selfishness, fear and contempt for others. They considered morale particularly valuable in its negative phase. That is, in creating such mental attitude in others as would, through doubt, discordance, misapprehension, suspicion, hatred and fear, to reduce collective opposition to the Teuton and his ideas.

In the application of morale work, two factors or media must be considered. The individual or group must be studied to determine natural tendencies and habitual reactions, also the causes or forces which operate on the individuals to produce act. Some of the human factors may have qualities which, if developed or repressed according to requirements, may result in better mental state. In others, the relief of personal problems offers the remedy. Most physical factors of environment are capable of improvement.

No single panacea exists in morale work for all the difficulties under which the soldier labors. Military conditions may necessarily be such as to expose the soldier, physically and mentally, to the greatest vicissitudes — to an environment most depressing to morale. Remedial action which may be effective at one time may fail at another. But it can

be shown for morale work that the systematic, scientific application of morale measures will materially improve conditions, mental state, and the acts dependent thereon.

Measures to Promote Morale. Of measures to promote morale some may be deliberately planned from the start, not only to cover routine matters but to provide in advance for contingencies apparently liable to occur. Very much can be done along this line and a systematized campaign can be planned in advance for the stimulation of desirable agencies or acts, or for the repression of others harmful to morale. Other measures will have a natural beginning from circumstances. Here the Morale Officer, or in civil industry, the Director of Personnel, will be alive to taking full and prompt advantage of opportunity, or conversely of removing or destroying at once the power for harm of disturbing factors.

All morale method needs to be applicable from the general standpoint. It should suggest attitude rather than develop it. Its literature should clarify and set in order what has been found to be of value, forming a constant basis for procedure by recurrently taking stock. Like an algebraic formula, it should be capable of use without fresh derivation when problems arise.

Some measures to improve military morale follow. With suitable modification and addition, many are applicable to the maintaining of industrial morale:

1. Stimulation of pride in the service.
    a. Lectures on aims and purposes, history, traditions, campaigns, deeds of valor, etc.
    b. Circulation of literature on similar subjects.
    c. Posters.
    d. Slogans expressing fundamental ideas.
    e. Use of camp papers and slides at motion-picture shows.
    f. Assistance of camp library—historical novels, etc.

g. Private talks with peculiarly disaffected, dull or confused individuals.

h. "Honor Rolls" for Company, Regiment and Division.

2. Arousing interest among line officers in developing morale by:

a. Discussion of general morale problems.

b. Setting standards in courtesy, discipline, sanitation, etc.

c. Showing progress of other units.

3. Development of enthusiasm, coöperation and good-fellowship by:

a. Distinctive name and slogan for the organization and its units.

b. Public parades, ceremonies and exhibitions.

c. Commendation.

d. Variety of training and recreation.

e. Amusements.

f. Smartness.

g. Stimulation of pride in self, squad, company, regiment, division, army and nation, and in barracks, grounds and mess.

h. Day rooms made complete in amusement resources.

i. Personal appeals to the most intelligent and quick-witted to recognize their obligation to inform, coöperate with and enthuse their duller comrades.

j. Competitive games, mass athletics, meets, bowling, pool, billiards, etc.

4. Increase in contentment of the individual through education, vocational training and citizenship courses fitting him for civilian success.

5. Correction of bad conditions, ascertained by liaison with the Judge Advocate's office, Commander of the

Military Police and from analysis of evidence at courts martial.

6. Liaison of Morale Officer with Education and Recreation Officer, Medical Officer, Intelligence Officer, Insurance Officer, Mail Officer, Chaplains, Post Exchange Officer, Supply Officer, Prison Officer, Commander of the Utilities Unit and other officers in order to ascertain and correct conditions coming within their respective provinces.
7. Association of Morale Officer with any non-military organizations and the editors of camp publications.
   a. Familiarization with the work and resources of these agencies.
   b. Direction of their activities into channels favorable to good morale.
   c. Prevention of conflicting movements or purposes among them.
8. Relations with the press — publicity given organization activities.
   a. Coöperation with newspaper reporters — news, camp supplement, etc.
   b. Ascertainment and exploitation of incidents and facts helpful to morale.
   c. Prevention of publication or correction of falsehood or distorted facts harmful to morale.
9. Interaction with civilian morale by:
   a. Social intercourse between camp and community.
   b. Having men send to their homes letters, portraits, literature, camp papers, menus of holiday dinners, programs of festivities and lectures of famous soldiers or civilians.
   c. Encouraging frequent and cheerful letter writing.
10. Special attention to the
   a. Recruit.
   b. Foreign speaking soldier.
   c. Negro soldier.
   d. Illiterate.

e. Personal problems of men.

Civilian Morale. Morale in the military service cannot be dissociated from the general state of morale in civil life, for the influence of the latter is exerted on the state of mind of the army just as the state of military feeling is reflected directly back into civil life. In reaching troops it is not only necessary to reach the military forces themselves but also the citizen body which stands back of them. "Armies fight as peoples think" is a wise epigram. General Ludendorff recognizes this in his memoirs as follows: "In Berlin they were unable to accept our opinion as to the necessity to . . . steel their wills to the point of magnetizing the whole nation and directing its life and thought to the single idea of war and victory. The great democracies of the Entente achieved this."

Inestimable good must come from realization on the part of the soldiers that not only the army and navy, but the whole nation as well, is a unit for victory—"that everybody is behind them." Every particle of evidence of this fact is ammunition for morale purposes. Especially valuable is such news of efficient coöperation and achievement at home as over-subscription of Liberty Loans, plentiful production of munitions, and the defeat of the submarine menace by ship-builders. Wars are not conducted by armies alone — they are clashes between nations in arms. The attitude and efficiency of industrial workers are especially important, and the manufactories of war essentials are to be classed as part of the second line of defense. No class or group is too small to receive consideration in respect to mental state and productivity. The worker and the soldier should be linked up as comrades cooperating to the common end, steeled in resolution to see the struggle through.

Through the undermining of the resolution of the civil population, that of troops at the front may be affected or destroyed. The wreck of the Russian army was due to

propaganda causing civil revolution. In their preparation for the Italian offensive, one of the most important things the enemy did was to undermine the morale of the Italian population at home, thereby weakening the spirit of the soldiers at the front in defense of the common cause. When the same weapon was turned against themselves, General Ludendorff complained that "The breaking of our morale at home, with its effect on our fighting capacity, the war against the home front and the spirit of the army were the main measures by which the Entente hoped to conquer us, after it had given up the hope of a military victory." Conversely there was a noticeable improvement in the morale of French troops whose homes were in the districts where the Americans landed before the effect was apparent elsewhere. The good news from their families that great help had come and really been seen heartened them all.

The civil community and its material interests are concerned in every war. It is desirable to bring this out so that the soldier may visualize himself as a defender of home interests. Modern armies come from all classes of society and their members are in constant touch with the civilian population. Modern facilities of communication result in community of thought between the men under arms and those they have left at home. Any mental state in one promptly reacts in the other. A break in morale at home is soon reflected in a break in morale in the trenches. When the general public is calm and confident the soldiers representing it are resolute and enthusiastic, but if the people at home are critical and disunited the same spirit is communicated swiftly and surely through the military organization.

The relation between civil and military morale was well expressed by General Ludendorff: —"Every man was required to be kept at the front and to be inspired with the

utmost determination. The armistice offer had an unfavorable effect on the men's spirits and war weariness increased. No stirring call from home came as a counterblast and the work of explaining the situation seemed to have been abandoned there. On this point there were many complaints from the army. In the end the army and population would have to show their colors and let it be seen whether they were really determined to fight, for only thus could we hope to improve the morale of the army. The commands and explanations issued to the troops from Spa were not in themselves sufficient. The intimate connection between feeling in the army and feeling at home could never be more clearly perceived than it was in these critical days. The army wanted to know definitely what was to be expected from the people at home."

The family and friends of the man are a most powerful factor in morale. If they back him up in his duties, keep in touch with him, and take pride in him and in the service they are a tremendous force for self-respect, discipline and contentment. Home influence is the best antidote for any tendency toward depravity on the part of the men in the new atmosphere of the camp or garrison. The family must be told what their boy is doing, how he is being treated, of his food, care, discipline, drills and surroundings, the opportunities for advancement, and the consequences of serious infractions, especially absence without leave. In other words, the family instead of being excluded through neglect or omission, should be given as close contact with the army as possible, made to feel a share in it, and stimulated to feel a pride in their soldier not only because he shares their blood but because he wears the uniform of their country. Where the family has not been given such an interest in the service, the tendency is to look at the matter selfishly and wholly from the standpoint of presumed self-interest. Letters written in exaggeration of conditions at home, with

appeals to leave the service, take the heart out of the soldier even if they do not result in absence without leave or desertion.

Women have a powerful influence on military efficiency and morale, as expressed in " the girl behind the man behind the gun." What she desires, man endeavors to secure for her. When women are stirred to patriotic sacrifice, men fear to be slackers. Military morale can be greatly promoted through home contacts and association with the right kind of women. Here is an opportunity to use the various women's and girls' organizations in a social way, also, with enthusiasm and definite purposes, by getting them to think and talk about war aims in war time and systematically putting their ideas into letters in clear and persuasive fashion.

Only when affairs at home are going well will the soldier perform his duties with full spirits and assurance. Practically all soldiers have dependents or persons in whose welfare they are interested. Here the Red Cross, through its home service, can serve a most useful purpose in relieving the soldier of anxiety and concern. Depressing news of domestic troubles and complaints rapidly sap morale.

On younger soldiers the home and civilian influence is exercised chiefly through letters; on older men more through newspapers and periodicals. Therefore it is important that letters be cheerful and that publications be free from unjust criticism and dissension. If the people at home are thoroughly informed as to war aims and purposes, the troops at the front will get their own information added to in a most effective way.

Political news, indicating dissension as to war aims and methods, is always irritating and depressing. The men resent bitterly, while they are disheartened by, any insincere and unwarranted criticisms by political demagogues arousing for selfish ends emotions that should have remained dormant. The education of civilians for morale ends in

war is of great importance. Publicity machinery must be organized for civil purposes to combat the depression that follows the reverses, difficulties and disappointments which may come. Such an organization is also necessary to fight with truth the lies, slander, calumny, doubt, suspicion and other causes of dissension which the enemy will sow with a view to weakening the common purpose.

Factors Affecting Morale. Every physical thing entering into the environment of the soldier, and the expressed state of mind of every person with whom he comes in contact, affects his morale. It is obvious that the number of such factors, with their possible combinations in varying proportion and importance, is infinity. No specific mention of each is possible, but the effect of many of them on human nature is common knowledge. The factors affecting the morale of troops broadly fall into three classes:

(a) Those pertaining to the military service.
(b) Those in civilian communities adjacent to the camp or post.
(c) Those in the home of the individual man.

All these factors can and should be reached by the officer. Those pertaining to the military service are under military control and can be handled with a high degree of efficiency. Those pertaining to civilian communities can be largely modified by purposeful coöperation between the commander and his officers on the one hand and the city authorities, civilian organizations and individual civilians on the other. Through letters, publications, welfare organizations and other means of communication, the officer can extend his influence into the home of the soldier.

Of the factors affecting morale, some naturally tend to raise it and some to lower it. The positive factors raise spirits and fighting efficiency; the negative factors undermine and lower them. In morale work, many of these positive factors will be created deliberately and with a specific pur-

pose. On the other hand, many conditions which depress morale and unfavorably affect the natural and proper interests of the soldier are unnecessary. The detection of these and their prevention or elimination are a most important feature of morale work. It implies the artificial and deliberate elimination of such painful points of contact between the individual and his environment as may be practicable. In practice morale work uses both methods simultaneously; while it adds to the positives it subtracts from the negatives. In result, the accomplishment of one is as important as that of the other. The state of morale is merely the expression of degree of difference between the factors of plus and those of minus.

Inasmuch as morale may be raised or lowered by an infinite number of factors or causes, or a combination of them, a similar number of remedies with their appropriate modifications is necessary to meet all morale needs. But the problem thus apparent, while extensive, is not as difficult to handle as at first might seem the case. Morale work very closely resembles the treatment of disease, one dealing with states of mind as the other deals with physical conditions. As with disease, so cases of defective morale fall into classes and types dependent on specific causes and handled under certain broad principles, whether of the individual or group. These types can be described and illustrated. The relation of cause and effect in their treatment is as apparent as that relating to their development. As with medicine, where each physical ailment is best remedied by certain classes of drugs and selective drugs within these classes, so in morale work remedies fall into general classes and the officer must formulate and administer his prescription according to the condition and its causes. Clear understanding of the nature, source and intensity of the cause is necessary to the selection of the proper remedies.

Thus discontent may proceed from many causes of which

it is merely the symptomatic expression. So also fever in disease is merely a symptom of the tubercular, typhoid, malarial or other infection which gives it rise. Intelligent treatment in both instances is directed toward the source rather than the result.

The period of the war has a direct relation to morale. Tolstoy said that "most nations are happy at the beginning of war, especially if powerful and long living in peace. There is pleasure in the unfolding of strength by the nation and individual — yet no long continued war is fought in this mood. There develop fatigue, lassitude, irritation, criticism, a sense of frustration at the postponement of victory, and envy or even hatred of superiors. The soldier comes to believe himself the victim of the superior power, greed, or cunning of exploiters, and finally the tedium of war exceeds the tedium of peace. Desertions increase, other military offenses increase, courts martial are kept busy, and in the end discipline may turn to complete collapse and anarchy." The recent war has been full of such examples in other armies. Fortunately the United States was not long enough engaged to demonstrate in our own forces the ultimate ends mentioned.

Poor Morale. Poor morale will not exist without reason. Everything affects morale either favorably or adversely. To understand the underlying causes of poor morale it is necessary to study the effect which all things in the daily life of the soldier, both physical and psychological, have upon his state of mind. The purpose of training and study in morale work is to equip officers with a knowledge of the relationship which all things bear to morale and of the scientific manipulation of all agencies for the producing of a desirable mental state. Conditions which obviously cannot be remedied may not seriously affect morale unless protracted or intense. It seems especially the conditions which are apparently due to inefficiency or carelessness that are harmful.

Among the factors which come within the scope of morale study and which have a direct bearing upon the state of morale of a command, influencing it either for good or for bad, are:

1. ENVIRONMENT — MENTAL

Psychological Agencies

a. Instincts: use of, diverting or repressing the natural instincts.
b. Esprit de corps.
c. Interest and pride in the military service generally.
d. Ideals, goals, standards, personal pride and organization pride.
e. Inspirational ceremonies, reviews, parades, etc.
f. Freedom from worry and the elimination of disturbing agencies.
g. Initiative and individual expression.
h. Commendation and appreciation.
i. Restraint and discipline.
j. Patriotism.
k. Balance of work and play.
l. Rumors and gossip.
m. Propaganda.

Leadership Agencies

a. Sympathetic relationship between officers and men.
b. Example of officers.
c. Justice and "square deal."
d. Proper use of punishment and reprimand.
e. Encouragement and reward.
f. Confidence of men in the leadership ability, knowledge and efficiency of officers.
g. Loyalty.
h. Respect.
i. Understanding of and personal interest in individuals.

j. Adjustments and maladjustments.
k. Personality of the leader.

2. ENVIRONMENT — PHYSICAL
   a. Food.
   b. Clothing.
   c. Shelter.
   d. Cleanliness.
   e. Pay.
   f. Passes.
   g. Creature comforts.
   h. Insurance and allotments.
   i. Recreation: physical, amusement and entertainment.
   j. Relations with civilian communities.
   k. Drill schedule.
   l. Duties: drill, fatigue, guard, special, etc.
   m. Sickness.
   n. Profiteering.
   o. Climate and weather conditions.
   p. Educational work and vocational training.
   q. Library, reading, writing and studying facilities.
   r. Post Exchange.
   s. Laundry.
   t. Transportation.
   u. Guard House.
   v. Visitors.
   w. Clubs.
   x. Promotion.
   y. Non-commissioned officers.

All of these agencies exist in greater or lesser degree in every post and camp and are subject either to the use or misuse of all officers with corresponding effect upon morale. Their misuse renders them causes of poor morale. Likewise if they are neglected or not understood the state of morale is left largely to chance and the result becomes chiefly

a matter of speculation or subject to the law of probability.

Poor morale has its early evidence in a tendency toward inertia, lack of initiative, apathy toward the common end, increased attention to individual interest and a state of dissatisfaction not readily traceable to any adequate causes. There is restlessness under the necessary military restrictions which had previously not been burdensome. With further depression of morale a stage of complaint is reached. The men develop well defined grievances about which they are not slow to complain. With such contagion in the air, fault-finding, based on real or imaginary difficulty, redoubles. The men become slack and slouchy, losing nattiness of appearance and alertness of bearing. Esprit de corps wanes. Soon a stage of disorder supervenes, in which rebellious thought is expressed in careless or unruly conduct, the sick report rises, unauthorized absences increase and the guard house acquires more occupants. Morale work contemplates such recognition and handling of early symptoms as will prevent the development of the later advanced stages.

Branch of Service as Affecting Problems. Besides those of general application to the military service as a whole, each branch of the service has its own special and particular morale problems. These depend upon the special character of the service required, the environment in which it must be performed and the special trend of mind resulting therefrom. The results of these relative disadvantages or advantages of certain special arms or services are apparent in the court-martial records, proportion of desertions and in other ways. It is not by accident, for example, that twice as many men per 1000 strength deserted from the Cavalry and Field Artillery during the period of reorganization after the Armistice as deserted from such special service Corps as the Motor Transport, Engineers, Signal and Tank Corps. Here inducements to leave the service, originating outside of it, would apply equally as a common factor to all parts and groups of the army. Any difference in desertions

must thus spring from causes pertaining to the various arms and branches themselves. Similarly, each industry has its own special morale problems, beyond those pertaining to industry as a whole.

It is of course impracticable to go into detail here as to the special causes of depressed morale which adhere to any particular arm or branch of the service, especially as local environmental conditions may at times operate to modify morale conditions in an organization so as to create wide individual deviations from the normal for the arm or branch. But the point is one of much practical importance and officers should keep informed at least as to respective desertion rates as an index of the branch of service in which morale problems are especially to be apprehended.

Methods of Morale Work. In certain instances, the handling of the American soldier seems to have been attempted in defiance of the laws of human nature. Some of the methods, like the Articles of War, have been largely adopted in the past from other armies of different racial psychology. Whether they were applicable to the American mental make-up, or to present day conditions, was not always duly considered. Some commanders, deliberately, if innocently, attempt to repress natural instincts without affording other outlet to the pent up energy. It must be emphasized that all administrative methods not in accordance with the laws governing psychology will fail.

Morale work is like a business in the sense that some of the methods used are more or less like those of commercial life. It is the "selling" of ideas, which is brought about in much the same way as the selling of physical commodities is accomplished. In both instances the person to be reached is brought to accept the viewpoint desired. Morale work is governed by general principles only. Rules will not apply, for methods which may be successful at one time or place may be successful only in part, if at all, under other conditions. Selection and application must be efastic.

Methods for promoting morale are many. Often diverse methods, if sound, may give equally satisfactory results; just as six and one, or five and two, will each give the sum of seven. All methods must be practical; most of them will probably have withstood the test of experience. In a general way, successful commanders have used them, but such use has been empirical and without clear appreciation of how the scientific application of these agencies will give scientific control of the forces they develop.

In the meeting of any problem of morale depression it is first necessary to recognize the existence of fault. Secondly, the nature of this fault and the conditions creating it, with their relative importance, must be understood. Thirdly, the measures necessary to the correction of the conditions leading up to such fault must be determined and formulated in proper proportion. Finally, they must be effectively applied.

Whenever morale is low, the first step should be to investigate the organization affected in order to find the cause. The early symptoms should be recognized and their causes inquired into and corrected, for morale work is essentially not repair work but work of prevention, though both may go hand in hand.

In meeting any morale problem, it is of the greatest importance that the remedial measures should be applied promptly, before the unfavorable influences have had a chance to develop and spread. The same general principles apply in respect to the importance of the time factor as relate to the prevention of an epidemic of communicable disease, the infection of which has been introduced.

The work to be thoroughly effective must be continuous. Every effort must be made by constant, but suitably varied endeavor to offset the effect of depressant influences, of whatever nature, and to avert or remove specific potential causes of depression before their effects become apparent. Also because repetition has a powerful influence, and be-

cause there are always new men who, in various ways, have not been sufficiently acted upon. A continuously high standard of general morale is important, which can withstand certain negative influences without the resulting depression which they would otherwise develop. It is desirable to maintain not only a high standard of morale, but an evenly balanced one. Oscillations between states of depression and exaltation should be avoided.

Morale methods imply " follow up " work. Once a desirable state of mind has been induced, it is equally important to maintain it. The latter task is relatively easier. Morale work implies not only a knowledge of what it is best to do, but also a nice discrimination as to what not to do.

All general morale work should be carefully planned out and fully scheduled. Nothing should be left to chance which can be systematized; otherwise the scope and methods will be imperfect and the results incomplete. Such standardized plans should avoid any direct approach savoring of compulsion and should be so flexible as to permit the meeting of unexpected contingencies. The results of morale work represent no one thing, but the cumulative effect of everything.

Morale work, to be effective, must not become monotonous. The maintenance of interest is necessary. Often several quite different measures will be found to give the same results and it is desirable to use them all successively as soon as the predecessor begins to pall. The element of surprise is valuable. It may often be well to jar the command out of its rut by an unexpected sensation. Later an original approach may be returned to and used until the novelty has again worn off.

In carrying out morale work, its effect should be constantly watched with a view to determining the continual production of the desired reaction. Too much should not be done at one time, but a system of dosage devised which

will be necessary to counteract undesirable symptoms. When it appears that as much has been done as is necessary to accomplish the desired result, or when the command gives evidence of approaching the "saturation point," the time has come to modify the morale work and perhaps discontinue it along certain lines while continuing or initiating it in others.

In all morale work it is good psychology to make the last impression summarize the idea which it is especially desired to convey and to make it vivid and forceful. This point is not infrequently overlooked. In all positive morale work it is a basic principle that attention shall be focussed toward one definite aim by directing energies and ideas toward it. One of the methods of creating negative morale, on the contrary, is to introduce so many and such confusing issues among the enemy as to raise doubts and produce acts at cross purposes.

Morale methods for controlling act may be grouped under several headings; physical betterment, educational, informational, inspirational, recreational and special. All have their proper place in any morale system, varying in their relative importance according to the conditions to be met.

Methods for physical betterment have to do with correction of the physical environment and the removal from it of any points of painful contact producing unpleasant reaction in the individual or group. The number and variety of such possible corrective measures are obviously great. A reasonable amount of physical comfort is necessary with new troops to induce a good state of morale, though once gained, it may survive with old troops under hardships for considerable periods.

Educational factors in promoting morale are numerous. They include instruction in war aims, history and citizenship. This implies publicity, carefully directed, systematic

and thorough. The lower the standard of knowledge, the greater the need of education.

Information is a part of any educational system. It is, however, more casual and primarily intended to give the soldier facts pertaining to his immediate needs. One of the most discouraging features of early army life to the recruit is ignorance of what is expected of him and for knowledge of which the military system holds him responsible. Much of the early life of the recruit can be made interesting and stimulating by the giving of information, in the absence of which it is depressing and may prove intolerable.

Inspirational methods are those which tend to dramatize and idealize for the man the things he is doing or will be expected to do. They make him feel not an isolated unit but part of a great organization and plan. Thus parades, ceremonies, mass activities, group singing and similar functions arouse the herd instinct and esprit de corps and glorify the humble part of the individual in that of an impressive whole. So, too, addresses and other methods for the creation of ideals serve the purpose.

Recreational methods are important factors in morale. They include athletics in all forms, games, hikes, amusements, etc. Some, as athletics, bear close relationship to, and help fit the soldier for the regular military program. Reading, the drama, moving pictures and other methods may serve to educate and inspire as well as amuse. In a general way, recreational methods are used to fill up the leisure time of the soldier.

Special methods for the handling of particular problems may include any or all of the foregoing, and to varying extent. It is obvious that their total contains all the essential qualities and requirements of personal leadership.

Information Necessary in Morale Work. Any scientific process of investigation or deduction must proceed from the known to the unknown. There must be premises of facts.

The foundation of morale work rests, accordingly, on the constant possession of accurate, up-to-date information. Without such information results will be unsatisfactory and misleading.

In order to modify the ideas of men which are affecting their conduct, it is clearly necessary to know what these ideas are. It is further necessary to get their mental viewpoint and to understand the processes of human mentality, in order to interpret these ideas properly. Few men are naturally perverse. The great majority do not do undesirable and exasperating things without reasons which, to themselves at least, are satisfactory. In general, they do the things which they think are best for themselves. These need to be given facts and instruction, and voluntary departure from error of thought and act usually follows.

In all morale work, a system of information, checked up by overhead inspection, is thus necessary. Minor and central authorities must be constantly informed as to the factors that sap morale and be continually in touch with the shifting situation relative to the development of depressing conditions and the measures being employed, or which should be employed, for their remedy. Without this service of information, higher authority cannot properly become aware of undesirable states of mind until they have received expression through act. But the effectiveness of morale work is judged by its ability in modifying or averting act through the changing of the thoughts which tended to prompt it. Early and comprehensive knowledge of states of mind is therefore necessary.

Words usually precede acts and are warnings of undesirable conduct yet to come. Through words, therefore, the nature and degree of impending conduct may be forecasted and steps taken to avert and prevent undesirable action. It is therefore important to know what the men are talking about and the character and extent of criticisms or commendations.

Where morale problems seem to affect the individual alone, investigations may show that overt complaint is but the scapegoat for difficulties of a more personal and intimate character and sore points of complex nature. Secretiveness is often due to calculation and the dread of betraying interest in some definitely foreseen way. But it sometimes occurs as a blind propensity. The impulse to conceal is more apt to be evoked by superiors than by equals or inferiors. The wise officer will, accordingly, not be led aside by superficialities but will satisfy himself as to facts.

"Actions speak louder than words" and what the men tend to do is thus important. Behavior should be known so that it may be analyzed as to cause or causes. It is important to know not only how a thing was done but the manner in which it was done. From this knowledge, states of mind may be deduced. Warning may thus be had of potential acts which may eventuate if measures are not taken to avert them.

If the quality and morale of an organization start to fall it is the duty of the officer to recognize the fact and to institute prompt inquiry and correction as to the causes for its deviation from its own and other accepted standards. Therefore, the first problem confronting the officer is the necessity for ascertaining the existing state of morale. Until he has some comprehension of this he cannot hope to direct his activities intelligently.

In a general broad sense some idea of the state of morale can be secured from personal observation. But it is the object of systematic morale work to have extensive, definite and reliable information from many sources which cannot be secured to any trustworthy extent by any one individual merely by observation. It is for this purpose that the morale organization is planned. The company morale operatives are designed to bring detailed information concerning any matter affecting the morale of the company to the company commander. Matters of serious moment will be

brought by the company commanders to the attention of the regimental or unit organization commanders. These, in turn, will bring to the attention of the Commanding General matters which they consider important enough to demand his attention. With all important matters and the mental state and attitude which they produce, the Morale Officer, as the eye and ear of his commander in such matters, should be informed. In industrial morale, a similar organization is necessary.

Besides the morale organization, the chief sources available to the Morale Officer in securing desired information may be classified as follows:

1. Line and staff officers, especially
   a. Intelligence Officer.
   b. Provost Marshal, Military Police.
   c. Officer in charge of the Utilities Unit.
   d. Athletic Officer.
   e. Education and Recreation Officer.
   f. Insurance Officer.
   g. Company Officers.
   h. Non-commissioned Officers.
   i. General and Special Inspectors.
2. The Judge Advocate's office; evidence given in courts-martial.
3. Surgeons, psychologists, psychiatrists.
4. Chaplains.
5. Representatives of any non-military agencies, such as Red Cross representatives, etc.

In ascertaining the existing state of morale in the body of troops to which he is attached, and in each of its component units, and in dealing intelligently with problems presented by it, the Morale Officer will need such information as the following:

1. General information,
   a. From personal observation.
   b. From general expressions of opinion; e. g. in general conversation at mess, conferences, etc.
2. Special information from those best qualified to give it:
   a. Character of the enlisted personnel of the several units; e. g. whether urban or rural, racial or ethnic, make-up of units, etc.
   b. Nature and frequency of minor offenses in each unit, with analysis of reasons for their occurrence; e. g. exceptional circumstances, etc.
   c. Nature, frequency and cause of serious offenses — to be secured from the Judge Advocate's office, from evidence given in courts-martial and camp disciplinary records.
   d. Discontent as expressed in wanton breakage or destruction, to be obtained from the officer in charge of the Utilities Unit or Supply Officer.
   e. Evidence of serious disaffection and of enemy propaganda, to be secured from Intelligence Officer.
   f. General health and living conditions of the organization from the Medical Officers.
   g. Responsiveness and enthusiasm and general good feeling from the officers in charge of athletics and others.
   h. Insight into camp conditions from the viewpoint of the men from the Chaplains and officials in charge of any non-military organizations coming in contact with the men.

These are indicated as but a few of the sources from which information can be gained to supplement the information secured from personal observation, from other officers and from the morale organization. Once in the efficient discharge of his duties the Morale Officer will discover and utilize many other agencies and means besides those here enumerated.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Psychology in general; its use in developing energy along desired lines; its empirical use as a force old but its scientific application new; morale and electricity compared. Necessity in morale work for knowledge of psychological principles, methods and purposes; normal persons react in normal ways; applied psychology and psychanalysis; applied psychology as a two-edged tool; some difficulties of mental conformance. The special psychology of the soldier; military limitations of psychological problems; mental attitude of the soldier class. Group psychology; the crowd mind; the character of crowds; common incentives to crowd reaction; leaders and followers; utilization of crowd impulses; importance to the leader of knowledge of mass psychology; mental groups and "key men"; suggestibility of crowds; crowd acts and psychic contagion; credulity, irresponsibility and assertiveness of crowds; measures for controlling the crowd mind; homogeneous and heterogeneous crowds. The psychology of peace and war; special psychological states developed from strife. The psychology of pubescence; special mental states characterizing the youthful and immature; their relation to delinquencies and character; need for their consideration in handling young recruits.

Psychology in General. Psychology is the study of the genesis, powers and functions of the mind. The management of men, and the exercise of efficient personal leadership, are merely the application of psychological principles to the daily affairs of life. Morale is a psychological state, and the study of psychology is therefore necessary for its satisfactory maintenance and development. However, the reader need not be daunted by this necessity, for this book endeavors to strip psychology of its abstractions and often obscure phraseology, and show it as a force which can be practically utilized on a basis of common sense for the control of behavior in the solution of every-day problems. Its purpose is to take a science which by itself is dull, dry and

uninteresting, endow its skeleton with flesh and blood and make it play a giant's part in the direction of human endeavor.

The recognition of psychology as a force is of course not new; probably it was coincident with the dawn of the human mind. But it was considered wholly as an abstract and speculative matter until recently, when efforts were made to apply it practically in a certain few limited fields, as of advertising, salesmanship, teaching, and the differentiation of mental caliber and aptitude. It is believed that the present study is the first time that the psychological forces have been shown as agencies which may be intelligently developed and directed for any of the purposes of human life through comprehensive understanding of the natural laws behind them. One reason for the long delay in its application to acts is the common idea that many of these acts are brought about in some mysterious way, precluding the necessity or possibility of even attempting to explain them by natural laws. Another is that some are so complex as to discourage analysis of their causes. Still another is the well known difficulty experienced by the human mind when it attempts to deal with the intangible and invisible.

But electricity was likewise long known to exist as a force, though it has been actually only within the present generation that the laws governing it have become understood so that it could be utilized for practical purposes. Between the forces of psychology and electricity there is close resemblance. Both are invisible, imponderable and without dimension. Results alone evidence their existence and power. Electrical force moves, lights and heats the street car; the psychological force is evidenced by the physical act. Both may be scientifically generated and controlled.

Nor does it take an expert to do this. It is within the power of any one who knows the laws of psychology to interpret them for the more effective carrying out of measures affecting the individual and society. The daily life of

all human beings in their relation to each other requires the exercise of psychological forces. Men achieve success in their purposes according to the efficiency with which they evoke appropriate mental states, or repress those in opposition, among the individuals about them. This is particularly true in the case of officers.

Morale work thus implies not only a knowledge of psychological principles and methods, but also of the purposes to which they are to be applied. All officers know something about mind, but such fragmentary, uncoördinated knowledge does not make them psychologists nor meet the psychological needs of military science. The facts and laws of mind must be so arranged and organized as to give a systematized idea of what they are and how they work, if they are to be successfully applied. Further, and of similar importance, morale work presupposes adequate knowledge of the human nature and material to which the psychological processes and methods are to be applied. A thorough appreciation of existing defects, best method of approach and receptivity is essential.

Man is a reservoir of potential forces, which are roused to expression and development by appropriate stimuli. Whether these shall be excited for good or ill is a problem of mental control. Human life is spent in seeking adjustments to environment. This means a series of responses to situations in forms of behavior. There are certain accepted norms of conduct and those who do not conform to them are classed as eccentric or insane. But within the limits of normal conduct, acts are as diverse as the emotions which arouse them. If the emotions can be regulated, the impulses which they arouse and the acts which flow from them will be controlled. Theoretically, this can be accomplished with mathematical certainty if the appropriate stimuli are brought into appropriate operation. In practice, various mechanical difficulties may arise in endeavoring to create an environment in which all appropriate stimuli are

blended in proper proportion and desired intensity. Accordingly results cannot be prophesied as matters of exact certainty in all cases, but they can usually be made satisfactory for all practical purposes, and even in the most difficult cases they can be made far better than if allowed to develop without control. The reactions and behavior of the great majority of soldiers can, by proper understanding of psychology, in the great majority of instances, be forecasted and modified.

Applied psychology as a factor in promoting efficiency has come to stay. The wise officer will use it in accomplishing his ends. His command, with its peculiar, intimate and controlling official relations existing between officers and their subordinates, opens to him a field of observation, interpretation and deliberate causation of human mental states, reactions and behavior. His results will be doubly gratifying in that they not only redound to his credit and to the benefit of service efficiency, but that they at the same time add to the sum total of human contentment and happiness.

In the application of psychology to such purposes, however, it should never be forgotten that its results may be nullified or work in the opposite direction to that desired if the premises or inferences be not accurate. There must be careful study of the individual or group to determine how they presumably will react to the measures contemplated, and this study must fully take into consideration the viewpoints and temperaments of the subjects. Failure results if such a study is not made.

In the judging of individuals and peoples, the right interpretation of their thoughts and acts can only be obtained from a knowledge of their own psychological viewpoint, for they tend to act according to their own mental standards, processes and promptings and on no other. This basic point the Germans utterly failed to grasp in their designs for world control. Their methods were properly worked out for their own racial psychology — that is, their home

reactions were what were expected. But these methods, in their effect upon most of the rest of humanity, worked against and not for the purposes intended. The Germans made the fatal mistake of assuming in advance that the mental processes of other peoples would function the same as their own. Hence they found that measures which were expected to produce fear merely crystallized into pugnacity; those which were to cause submission actively aroused stronger self-assertion; those intended to create despair resulted in inflexible determination.

Just as no two people are alike in body, so they are no more alike in mental qualities. Nor can they be brought exactly into a common mold. This is a fact which less successful officers often seem to disregard. Similarly, the same differences exist between races and nations. Races no more think alike than they look alike. Their mental processes are different and the results consequently are diverse.

The United States is at a disadvantage in war because it is racially heterogeneous and because its diverse stocks, due in considerable degree to recent immigration, have not been fused into common standards of thought. Its very geographical vastness and diversity of resources develops differences of interest. Many called to the colors will have been born abroad and still entertain many of the ideals and customs of the old country. There are sectional differences. Also the national trait of individualism, so evident in this country, stands in the way of acceptance of community of thought and purpose.

One of the great problems of the army, therefore, is the harmonizing of racial differences of mind. It is the real melting pot of the diverse types that compose it. Some traits can be modified only and not eradicated. In any case it takes time to abandon old standards and establish new, even with the assistance of the cohesion under pressure of the military environment.

On the other hand, the application of psychological meas-

ures in the army is much easier and more exact in its results than is the case in civil life. The reason for this is that soldiers are carefully selected, and that various factors disturbing to the efficiency of psychological work in the general civilian class, are, in the army, more or less effectively eliminated. Those due to disease, deformity or weakness, or common to persons with evidence of intemperate, filthy or vicious habits are excluded; the psychiatrists reject those with mental aberration and the psychologists those of mental deficiency. Past records of applicants are looked into, and the criminal, with his tendency to delinquency, is kept out. The physical and mental defectives, who, in civil life, operate indirectly to complicate the psychological problem and its solution, are not allowed to enter the military service.

Further, the soldier is the physically, mentally and morally elect of the male class representing the military age group. The diverse psychological problems presented by females, and the psychological variations dependent upon age in the extreme thirds of the period of life, are here absent. Most soldiers are unmarried and have no strong family ties; practically all of them are in the period of strongest self-expression. In addition, the soldier lives in an environment, which not only makes him more susceptible to suggestions, but which provides the administrative agencies for presenting them to him. Finally, the many special ideals of military life appeal strongly to the individual and group representing the soldier class.

The Psychology of the Soldier. The psychology of the soldier is a special thing, apart from the psychology of the race or nationality as a whole to which he belongs. As already indicated, the soldier is in a special mental class because he is a male of the fighting age and of a group from which physical defectives, mental substandards and moral delinquents are excluded. The psychology of women, children and of the extremes of life does not enter as a factor.

Furthermore, soldiering is a profession of its own, different from those of civil life, performed in a totally different environment, with new standards and ideals for the judging of conduct, and with new ways of testing character by unfamiliar difficulties. Individuality is merged, to a large extent, in the common identity of the group. Many of the influences obtaining in the army have thus no counterpart in civil life. These factors produce in the soldier a state of mind and modes of mental process peculiarly his own. The psychological problems pertaining to the soldier are accordingly special problems, being more restricted in number and extent than those of the population from which the soldier is drawn and, on the other hand, including a number in which the former does not share.

All this makes the soldier think differently from civilians, even differently from what he himself thought before entering the service. There is a correspondingly different reaction as expressed by conduct. The soldier, therefore, needs to be studied in the light of close observation and long experience with military conditions by those who would forecast his reactions and interpret his behavior.

The eligible class from which soldiers are drawn comprises a very limited percentage of the population. In round numbers, all males from twenty to thirty-one or thirty-two years of age comprise only ten percent of a community; an extension of the age limit to forty years increases the proportion only to fifteen percent, and extending it to fifty years takes in twenty percent. Failure to qualify in physical fitness for service reduces the percentage of actual eligibles still more. Rejections for physical causes in the draft averaged 29.1 percent. Thus it will be seen how the psychological problems of the soldier are narrowed down in variety from those of an entire civilian community. See Fig. 4.

In considering the psychology of the soldier there are two factors requiring attention. One is natural endowment in



Figure 4. Distribution of Population in Reference to Military Service.

respect to mental qualities. The other is adaptation or responsiveness to environment. These vary with race and individual. To all, however, certain general principles will apply. These are discussed in detail elsewhere.

It may be stated here that the soldier in many ways comes closer to being the ideal man than one of any other occupation. His selection, training and development require qualities which are recognized universally as desirable, yet which are cultivated to far less degree in other walks of life. Physical soundness and well-rounded muscular development, with strong, erect posture, are essential. There must be neatness of clothing and person. His life inculcates high sentiments and ideals, good habits, team work, comradeship, response to orders and subordination of self to general welfare.

The American soldier possesses a high degree of intelligence, individualism and initiative. He responds best where he understands most. He has been accustomed to survey and evaluate conditions, formulate action for himself and initiate and carry it out. These civilian standards of thought, with all their individualism, curiosity and freedom of mental process are retained after he enters the serv-

ice. The average soldier thinks for himself and is not content to perform a duty unthinkingly or to accept a situation without knowledge of reasons or purposes. If not informed as to these, he will endeavor to deduce them for himself, and his deductions are usually all that could be expected if his original premises are correct. It follows that, to avoid mental or physical error, information should be given where opportunity offers and there is no reason against it.

In his individualism, the American soldier likes what appears to be extemporaneous and presents appeal to his reason and personality. His instinct of constructiveness is strong and he is perhaps as interested in working out the methods by which a task is to be accomplished as in the results obtained.

He subconsciously reacts against repression and responds to stimulation. He objects to the compulsion of " Do this because I say so," and does not enthuse over directions to " Do this because it is right," but he responds with interest to the explanation " Now I will tell you why we do this." Or his gregariousness and self-assertion are both appealed to by "Do you know, Smith, why this is done? If not, I am sure that Jones does "— and Jones is asked to explain.

As with all groups, the soldier class contains certain individuals whose qualities appear to be chiefly negative. They give no trouble. But in many such soldiers the desired qualities are latent and merely need encouragement and stimulation to ensure their development. How far this development may be carried depends on the individual in respect to opportunity and response to stimulus. Some need only to be inoculated with the virus of ambition and to demonstrate to themselves, through minor successive steps of success, their power of accomplishment. Others may need appropriate stimuli of another sort. But, generally speaking, without special attention by their officers, such will scarcely achieve mediocrity.

For a full understanding of the matter of soldier psychology, it is necessary to appreciate that each individual forms a dynamic center, the individual mental state of which directly affects morale in others so far as that particular unit is concerned. Each also has its indirect suggestive influence, for from each radiate thoughts, emotions and examples, both in greater and lesser degree and in large or small groups. The state of mind of the individual soldier thus reacts upon that of all with whom he comes in contact. The psychology of the individual is accordingly more or less of a reflection of the psychology of the group to which he belongs. The influences are mutual and interlocking, in that each individual is both an active agent through which the thoughts and conduct of others are modified and also is the passive object and recipient of the influence of others. Each bears somewhat the relation to the others that a single cellular element of the human body bears to all other cells which together compose the body. They cannot properly be considered apart from each other.

Accordingly, the degree to which the individual soldier is discouraged and depressed is the degree of drain exerted by him upon all those associated with him either in morale or in their confidence in the cause for which they are striving. Every man in the army has his influence upon some one else. Whether this is good or bad depends upon the soldier, and in the last analysis it largely relates to the influence the officer has had upon the soldier in determining his mental outlook, conduct and attitude toward others.

It therefore pays in terms of military efficiency to remove any unnecessary causes of physical or mental discomfort in any individual or group, not only for the obvious relief which is thus afforded them, but for the removal of a focus from which discontent, transmitted through the instinct of sympathy, might later be aroused in others.

In any general depressed state of mind, each individual tends to imagine his own case the worst. By exaggeration

and repeated expression of his views, his imagination tends to get the better of him. He comes to believe as fact what was at first assumed. He tends to reason from the particular to the general and applies the result of his own environment and mental state to the whole — to the soldier in flight, the whole army is defeated.

One marked characteristic of the soldier's psychology which may here be mentioned is the tendency to exaggerate both by word and deed. This exaggeration is usually unconscious, may be due to lack of discrimination, and tends to increase as a result of repetition. Memories of actual perceptions are confused with imaginations. Of this, the stories told by old campaigners furnish an example — likewise the excess to which the soldier tends when released from restraint. Such are expressions of pent-up energy which, checked along certain channels or at certain times, find relief in expression in a degree above normal through other channels of instinct or through those temporarily opened.

As the special characteristics of the soldier's psychology will be discussed elsewhere in detail, they will not be treated under this special heading.

Group Psychology. The ultimate purpose of military morale is success through community of ideals and interest. Hence, in the maintenance of military morale, it is the group which is of particular importance. The disaffection of an individual may be numerically a trifle. Its importance lies in the fact that states of mind are communicable, often very rapidly so, and what began as an apparently insignificant individual matter may become a most serious group sentiment.

There is a general incentive, based on the gregarious habits of human kind, which impels a crowd toward a common resultant in action. However, it is a fact of importance that under certain conditions the crowd mind presents group characteristics quite different from those of the individuals composing it. Men in groups think, act and are

influenced otherwise than the component members in their individual responsibility and capacity. Their mental fusion results in a crowd personality, differing from that of any of them.

Crowds as mere physical aggregations are the same the world over, but their psychological reaction is never the same. City and rural crowds behave differently under parallel conditions. Soldier and citizen groups of Americans, Europeans and Asiatics all respond differently to the same stimuli. The foreign spokesman fails to gauge the effect of his words through inability to understand the psychic reaction of his hearers. Similarly the foreigner in the crowd fails to react to the aggregate response. The bond of unity carries a psychology of its own, and the mental cohesiveness of a military or industrial organization is due to its common ideal.

The moral of this is that a proper understanding of the racial and psychological make-up of a crowd, whether it be a company of infantry or an unorganized group of workers, is essential to its effective handling. For the superior, it means that he must know his men collectively and individually, not merely superficially but in such a way that he understands their limitations, trend and viewpoint.

The individuals contributing to a crowd mind do not have to be long together. If mentally trained along common lines, they will present the crowd characteristics on first coming together. This is one of the products of standardized methods of military training. It shows the advantage of presenting common ideals in advance to all who are later to work together in larger assemblages created for military purposes. Since every decision taken by the mass develops from an accidental or prepared majority, it is the part of common sense not to trust to chance where advance plan may substitute it. The common incentive is presented in advance of the group emotion later to be aroused. This is a basic argument for standardization of character, extent

and methods of training. When a command is scattered, provision should be made to accomplish this standardization.

All men are either leaders or followers. Civilization and organization cannot exist without despotism of a sort, for without leaders the state is one of anarchy. The average man removed from isolation soon falls under the influence of a leader, for the special reason that most men do not possess clear-cut ideas on any subject except the one with which they are most familiar. The leader serves as a guide to those of weaker personality or lesser conviction. The group responds to his personality rather than to a cause, and to emotional appeal rather than sober reason.

Every crowd must have a leader. If it finds itself without a selected leader, it chooses one for itself. This leader is necessary before the forces which actuate a crowd can be put in motion. In the army the men look first to the senior officer, on account of his acquired prestige, for guidance. If he fails, either confusion results or some one else takes hold; when this appointed leader fails, he not only loses his prestige, but usually there is a revulsion of feeling against him. His position is especially hard because a crowd of any sort always tends to idealize its leader. If he falls short of their expectations, their outcry against him becomes far greater than the conditions justify. Excuse will not reestablish him. The only thing which will restore his prestige will be some unusual act which will appeal to their emotions in such a way as to restore him to the pedestal from which he has fallen. In time of war the officer must be calm when all about him is excitement; he must appear fearless, however great the danger. In time of peace, he must be a little better informed than his men in a multitude of subjects, and in addition he should be an executive of unusual ability. Some officers naturally never attain such excellence, but deficiency is unusual as a result of the gradual process of development through which most officers pass.

The submission by crowds to the leadership of a chief is instinctive. In civil crowds, the leader may be merely a casual agitator, who suddenly becomes conspicuous and is vested by the group with control of its destinies. The leaders of such casual crowds are more often men of action than thinkers. They hold profound convictions, beyond the effect of reason, and their will power supplies the mental force that many in the crowd lack.

In any permanent organization, leadership for the group is always definitely provided. This is particularly true of the army, in which every group or subdivision has its leader furnished, ready-made and trained to a common purpose. These leaders are invested officially with all the prestige and influence that can be conferred artificially, in addition to that pertaining to the personality of the individual himself.

About the will of any leader, the opinions of the crowd crystallize and acquire identity, while his purpose creates the crowd state of mind and its fixed direction. The qualities of this leader are magnified to his followers, thus conferring prestige and exalted significance. Office, station and momentary exaltation tend to create uncritical aggrandizement. The uniform, rank and power accompanying military status help tremendously at once to establish acceptance of appropriate leadership. Distance, actual or psychological, magnifies. The superior, accordingly, must stand a bit apart if he would more fully control his men — yet not so remotely as to lose a communal relation with them.

The practical utilization of the crowd impulse is seen in the complete reliance of the soldier on his leaders, in whom he rests the responsibility for his own safety and conduct and the outcome of affairs. This can and should be used to direct the activities of the group to good advantage. The natural tendency of the crowd is to the free exercise of the primal instincts, but the wise leader may convert its latent forces into efforts for the attaining of high ideals.

An important factor in the success of an officer's administrative work is his recognition and understanding, in relation to mass psychology, of the anti-social groups which tend to appear in his command just as they occur in civil life. These may become more or less potent and constant agencies to the detriment of morale and good order unless steps are taken intelligently and tactfully against them. It not infrequently happens that wise handling will not only neutralize these negative influences, but convert them into positive forces for good. Such groups should be broken up, both through physical separation of their component units, especially in removing weaker characters from close association with those of undesirable personality, and by undermining in various ways any anti-social ideas which may be entertained by the group. These ideas are nearly always based on misapprehension and error, and can be dissipated in the light of truth. Sometimes they develop from actual inequity affecting the group or others, and merely require being known by superiors in order to be remedied.

In handling such problems of group morale, it should be further recognized that there is a "key man" in every group, who is consciously or tacitly recognized as a leader. The identity of such men should be ascertained and efforts to modify the group state of mind focused particularly upon them, since if their mental attitude is altered the weaker personalities of the followers will be influenced through unconscious imitation of their example. A very few men are really the controlling factors of public opinion in a company; if they can be reached, such difficulties as pertain to others will tend to settle themselves without further attention. Conversely, to handle a situation without special recognition of the influence wielded by these leaders is usually unsatisfactory in results, since those of weaker mental force may revert to their former undesirable mental attitude if allowed to come again under the influence of leaders who have not also been won over.

Suggestibility is exhibited in its fullest force in the crowd, and the normal standards of the individual tend to be overthrown for the time being. Even the individual who may have unwittingly joined an excited crowd may temporarily depart from normal standards of self-control; though race psychology is here an important factor, since there must be sympathetic understanding for community of thought and act. The psychic contagion in a crowd is a phenomenon to be compared with a pathological contagion.

The acts of a crowd or group are very often of a nature entirely different from those which involve only one person. Such acts as are expressed in a riot, a St. Bartholomew's Night, a lynching or a mutiny are manifestations of crowd psychology. Panic, perhaps without physical cause, may result, for there is neither the check of individual reason nor of public opinion.

Being one of a crowd stimulates the instinct of gregariousness and gives a sense of personal safety, while being one of a large number gives a feeling of coöperative power which nullifies the sense of personal caution and responsibility. The least observed and known is the individual in a crowd, the sooner he parts with the feeling of personal responsibility, and therefore those of lower status or character are first apt to go to excesses. A high degree of willpower on the part of any individual is necessary to oppose the action of a crowd of which he is a part. However, it is often not difficult to divert crowd action away from one line by introducing new and appropriate suggestions.

The crowd, having surrendered its responsibility, becomes especially credulous. For it, the improbable does not exist. In this rests the extraordinary facility among troops with which rumors are manufactured, exaggerated and disseminated. Mobs are impelled to violence by stories of acts which a little reflection would show to have been impossible of accomplishment. The power of analysis is in abeyance. Being unreasoning, the crowd is uncritical and vacillating

and is capable of being influenced toward a rapid succession of quite dissimilar acts. It is only vaguely aware of its own motives and tendencies.

A crowd is always self-assertive and intolerant. Those who directly oppose or contradict it arouse resentment, anger or force. Once suitably influenced, the members of the crowd are willing to sacrifice themselves for the ideals with which they have been inspired. Being unthinking and irresponsible, the crowd may be led to run risks for the triumph of a cause which its individual units would be unwilling to incur. The interests of the individual do not dominate the crowd, and it is swayed in one way or another by passing causes and impulses. It is not only emotional but carries its emotions to extremes, sympathy rapidly becoming adoration, and antipathy changing into hatred. It is also swayed by preference, prejudice and sentiment.

Crowds, being unreasoning and unintelligent, have a high imaginative power, pay heed to suggestions from any source and are readily impressed. Mental pictures evoked in the crowd mind have vividness almost as great as the reality. This quality, if uncontrolled, may produce the direst results, as in panic. On the other hand, it is one of the most potent agents in leadership. Since crowds tend to think in images, they respond to pomp, pageantry and the dramatic and sensational. Military service, like religious observances, makes large use of these qualities.

Crowds may be controlled through force and fear, but consideration is often interpreted by them as a form of weakness. The crowd mind is, however, readily taken possession of by leaders and molded to the purpose they desire. For the control of a crowd the latter must have a certain degree of unity of spirit, a community of outlook and instinct, and mutual sympathy and comprehension. The race factor enters as favoring certain expressional trends, but is largely modified by circumstance and tradition.

In controlling the group mind one should remember that

it is impulsive, changeable, swayed by the momentary impression, more susceptible to manner than to matter, subject to the influence of contagion, requires adroit approach to clear away prejudice or opposition, responds to vigorous, direct address when the avenues of expression have been cleared, is prone to extremes, is loud in demands when roused and is easily led into excess. Crowds are readily swayed by mere association of ideas. Logic does not appeal to the crowd, for the reason that it responds to sentiment rather than reason.

In the control of crowds, an impression must be made on their minds by the creation of mental images. This can be done by means of physical images such as flags, insignia, etc., representing simple ideas, simply expressed. They may be further evoked by words and formulas. Catch-words and epigrams are particularly potent, and often reason and argument cannot successfully combat them. They may evoke grandiose and mysterious mental images, only vaguely pictured and differing with each individual. The crowd mind thus appears as the easy prey of the unprincipled and also as the resource of the great ideals and enthusiasms of mankind. When it is desired to move a crowd to action, it should be rapidly worked upon by appropriate suggestions, followed by a direct forceful appeal, and concluded by an act to furnish the example for imitation.

In forecasting the probable effect of an action upon a certain group, the information given by psychology varies with knowledge of the mental attitude of the individuals or organization concerned, and especially with their reaction under more or less analogous conditions. The good commander who knows his men has a very good understanding of what his men will do under a fair range of conditions. On the other hand, it seems impossible to prophesy successfully in civil life, with accuracy, as to the probable reception of a new play or book by a public whose units are unknown. The probable reaction in such cases may be tentatively

tested on a small scale with a minor group, and the results may be considered as applicable to the group as a whole under consideration. Politicians use this method by giving out tentative ideas through the press and then carefully noting the reaction toward them, with a view to making them official if well received. This method of trial and error is the only feasible way of determining the reaction of the civilian body-public under ordinary conditions, when a wide diversity of circumstances and influences must be considered. However, in the presence of some dominating condition, as war, the public mind very obviously functions toward certain ends and its reactions can be foretold with considerable accuracy.

When any plan of procedure has been decided upon as representing the greatest good to the greatest number, it is often desirable to ascertain who react unfavorably to it and to modify their ideas as soon as possible by approach and information through suitable agents. It is probable that no single action could be taken which would be completely satisfactory to everybody within a military group of any considerable size. But to many a knowledge of necessity will remove objection.

Heterogeneous crowds are composed of individuals of any description, of any profession, and any degree of intelligence. Homogeneous crowds are composed of the same sect, castes or classes. Trained soldiers always belong to the same caste and usually to the same class. If a crowd is composed of people of the same race, religion and caste, it represents the highest degree of organization of which a crowd is capable and is, therefore, the most susceptible to mental unity.

A heterogeneous crowd is subject to indirect suggestion, and a homogeneous crowd to direct suggestion. The crowd which is homogeneous to start with does not require the hypnotic influence of a powerful leader to render it subject to direct suggestion. In a well-trained military organ-

ization, the officers may lack in qualities of leadership, but the men will cheerfully obey their orders so long as they do not actually betray qualities of cowardice or show signs of ignorance or inefficiency to such a marked degree as to merit contempt. The more disciplined a crowd is, the less emotional it is and the less subject to hypnosis. It is thus much more difficult to arouse a high pitch of enthusiasm among veterans than among recruits. Under the influence of strong leaders, untrained troops will become entirely unconscious of personal danger and perform acts of heroism, but the same troops are subject to unreasonable panics. There are times, however, when veteran troops require strong leadership. Certain conditions cause an abnormal disintegration of the conscious mind, such as extreme hunger, thirst or fatigue. The same troops which won the battle of Wagram by their heroic fighting were seized with panic that same day toward evening and ran away without any real cause.

When a leader wishes to imbue the mind of a crowd with ideas and beliefs he resorts to affirmation, repetition and contagion. Their action is somewhat slow, but the effects, once produced, are very lasting. Affirmation is stronger than logic in impressing an idea upon a crowd. It has no permanent influence, however, unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. If an affirmation is repeated often, it is finally accepted as a truism. After a certain number of converts have been made to an idea, a current of opinion is formed, the ideas pass by imperceptible channels from one set of individuals to another and the influence of contagion intervenes. Contagion is so powerful that it forces upon an individual not only certain opinions, but certain modes of feeling as well.

Since imitation is an effect of contagion, crowds may be guided much by force of example. There are always a few individuals whose examples are followed by their associates and contemporaries. These leaders, however, must not

differ in fundamentals from those which determine the character of the crowd. This fact sometimes makes the position of an American army officer a difficult one, because of the diverse classes from which Americans are drawn.

A wise leader in speaking to a crowd follows the rule of frequency and last impression rather than to try to reason with his crowd. Many ministers have been discouraged because their most learned discourses fall on deaf ears, while the personality and methods of the revivalist carry the members of his congregation off their feet.

Unorganized crowds break up through the fact that personal interests and advantage soon resume supremacy. Mutual obligation is slight and cohesion lacking. When officer-control of the Russian army was lost through Bolshevist ideas, it is stated that whole army corps disintegrated and disappeared almost in a night.

Psychology of Peace and War. It is obvious that the largely dissimilar environments of peace and war must produce corresponding change in mental attitudes and in the behavior resulting from them. These environmental conditions are so diverse that it is not possible to set down the various expressions through conduct which flow from them.

In time of peace, conditions of life are well ordered and the soldier is not subjected to the mental stress pertaining to war. Matters which would be regarded as inconsequential in time of war thus assume, in peace, a far greater importance. Everything is relative, and in peace the supreme ideas and standards of war no longer exist. In time of peace, therefore, minor matters may arouse discontent and trouble. This was particularly well shown in the recent war after the signing of the armistice, when forgotten grievances not only came to the surface, but were reinforced by new ones based on conditions long accepted without thought of complaint. Within sixty days after the armistice the court-martial cases among the troops in France not only doubled in number but increased in gravity. Thoughts and

desires had changed and acts had changed accordingly.

Prolonged peace, like prolonged prosperity in business life, tends to produce lax methods in the military service. Ideals are lowered unconsciously and imperceptibly. Faults tend to go unnoticed, or if noticed are often allowed to continue. It is the easiest way, and the natural tendency is to move along lines of least resistance. The greatest by-product of peace, so far as the military service is concerned, is inefficiency and failure to progress. War, accordingly, tends to find the army unprepared as a natural result of the mental inertia due in turn to the lack of visible stimulus. This is a very real and at present imminent danger which thinking officers will recognize and do their best to avert. One great purpose of morale work in peace is to induce such a state of mind as will promote preparation.

War, of course, creates intense psychological states of its own. Its nervous and mental effects range all the way from the specific shock suffered by the individual soldier through noise, suffering and hardship to the subtle effects which an atmosphere surcharged with hatred, fear and change has upon the minds, thoughts and acts of whole nations. The soldier is subjected to nervous strain from the day he is sent away from home. At camp he is confronted with a life different from any he has known and he must adjust himself to it. In some cases, military life may be intrinsically distasteful to him, yet he cannot leave it until his mission is performed. A struggle between duty and desire ensues. This may not be acute in the camp or in the first few months in the field, but as drudgery and battle follow each other, the mental struggle becomes more strongly emphasized.

War generates great discontents and stirs emotions that have lain dormant throughout many years of civilization and peace. Many of the discontents and emotions are healthy, and are but the yeasts of progress. But they are too strong for all but the strongest; ill-balanced minds give way under them and weak and diseased nervous systems col-

lapse. All sorts of criminal tendencies, many of which are caused by nervous and mental troubles, tend to break loose from the bonds of habit and circumstance which have held them in check. This state of mind is carried over by many soldiers after return to civil life. After our Civil War, there was a period of crime and brigandage that lasted a quarter of a century — the hey-day of the James and Younger brothers — and some of the psychic effects of that war are still apparent in the more primitive parts of the country. It will be a generation before the present emotional state of the people returns to normal.

War, and the community of military service, blends the differences of race and pure nationality into a common American consciousness. The individual devotes himself to a common cause which he recognizes as a worthy one. It is relatively easy to achieve a fighting spirit when the enemy is near and battle imminent. Here the military atmosphere is electric with the feeling of preparation and conflict. Purposes are few, interest is active and necessity presses.

The phase of morale work that occupies attention in war-time is aimed to produce a fighting edge and may be summed up in the words " information " and " confidence." It consists in explaining and keeping before the soldier the righteousness of his cause, the need the country has for him in its defense, the sufferings of the oppressed who look to him for aid, and other exalted considerations. It is also aimed to keep the soldier confident of the excellence of his arms, equipment and gas mask, of artillery support, and of sufficiency of reserves. It is intended to keep him comfortable in respect to material things like shelter, food and clothing, and if these fall short of what is desired, to make him accept the situation as one which is inevitable and which might be worse. Also it is to protect him against the workings of propaganda, spies, lies, false reports, disquieting rumors and other factors calculated to create discourage-

ment and doubt. The methods by which this may be done are set forth under their appropriate headings.

Psychology of Pubescence. Pubescence does not mean merely endowment with sexual capacity, but implies also a considerable period of general development and change due to the functioning of the sex glands. In this country, the period with males is usually placed as covering eight to ten years, beginning at about the age of fourteen and including that of twenty-four years. The last four or five years of this period comprise the time of life at which very many recruits are enlisted, and accordingly, the relation of pubescence to mental state is a matter for due consideration in the military service.

Maturity, either physical or mental, varies with the individual. Age is misleading in this respect, and certain young men of from eighteen to twenty-four years may still be subject to the mental stress and emotions characterizing the period of adolescent life. Condition, rather than years, should be considered in such cases. Some individuals really never seem to grow up in the sense that they acquire mature control over the emotions.

The outward physical changes of puberty, the rapid growth of body, sex development, beard, etc., have their psychological counterparts in altered mentality, disposition and resulting conduct. The rapid growth in body strength implies mental growth in individuality, imagination, self-control and abstract reasoning. It is not only the period of new desires but of psychic hyperaesthesia and suggestibility. Since the higher mental qualities are of later development, the individual may for a long time be the subject of impulses which he has not yet the judgment to control. Pubescence thus often influences conduct to a very great degree, for the new chain of thought created may be the inspiration of a new line of conduct.

Adolescence is characterized by instability of ideas and emotions and hence of behavior. There are excessive im-

pulses with excessive lack of control. The conduct of youth may seem at times irrational under the perspective of maturity. The community wonders "what that boy will do next," but after adolescence wears off he probably settles down and becomes as staid and orthodox as any of them.

Frequently there is excessive physical or mental lethargy, sleepiness or laziness, which may often be combined with recklessness. The adolescent is hyper-sensitive, as shown in romanticism, dissatisfaction, hypochrondia, etc. There is a lack of foresight remaining from childish mentality. On the other hand there is egotism manifested by ambition, conceit, etc. Some of these adolescent states of mind approach those of beginning insanity, though the latter state is not reached and the mental symptoms gradually subside in those who never reach a true psychosis. The tendency is toward exaltation — not toward depression. But a definite condition of mental instability may exist and produce conduct irregularities for which no real reason could later be adduced.

The delinquencies of adolescence are obviously largely those of immaturity of mind, namely of impulse and irresponsibility. Rough violence is readily indulged in and there is a recklessness of conduct that is not found in the more cautious later stages of life. There is not an accurate appreciation of results, nor their balancing against desires, to determine whether gratification of the latter is really "worth while." There may be a tendency to rebel against authority, and desire for new experiences formerly not even imagined. It is easy to understand how various exaltations and depressions and morbid imaginings come about together with the peculiar fault-findings and dissatisfactions with surroundings that are frequently noted among adolescents. Fortunately, most of these states of mind are temporary only.

This state of adolescence in the undeveloped soldier is of special importance in the determination of future char-

acter. Intelligent handling by his commander at this time will largely determine his later efficiency and discipline as a soldier and his standards after returning to civil life. The wise officer will recognize that slight breaches of discipline in soldiers who are immature do not necessarily mean depravity. Usually they spring from a childish irresponsibility. There is a tendency to do something on the impulse without authorization rather than to go to the proper authority for permission. The thoughtful officer will also remember that such soldiers are profoundly affected by environment, that in the military service their environment is beyond their own control, and that he himself has it in his power to materially alter such environment to their advantage and secure their better adjustment. And in recognizing and accepting such responsibilities he will see that he performs the obligations which go with them.

The best treatment for adolescent troubles is preventive. This means to create and stimulate healthy interests, especially athletics, but not forgetting other forms of recreation. The adolescent class does well both when worked hard and played hard. With this goes due overseeing as to companionships and associations, the remedying of faulty environment, stabilization of the new environment and the instillation of ideas of discipline, respect for authority and self-control. Of final importance is the giving of knowledge which will prevent misconduct due to ignorance or mental vacuity.

It should be remembered that the young soldier is endowed with great surplus of energy and is under a constant physiological sense of urge for its expenditure. What he needs is wise direction for its outlet, for his unfolding character resents obvious pressure. He will idealize and support the sympathetic, aggressive leader as much as he will resent and react against the uniform repressions and restrictions of an iron discipline. He is managed better through the emotions than cold logic. In many instances

where the mentally immature soldier gives cause for concern, inquiry as to his antecedents by letters to relatives and friends may give insight into previous environment, revealing causes of indiscipline, and indicate proper modes for present handling.

What has been said regarding the adolescent soldier of course applies with equal force to the apprentice, young worker or student in civil life. The attributes of their special physiological state must be taken into account in determining their successful handling. With this state, however, goes an impressionability which renders their control relatively easy to sympathetic understanding and oversight.

CHAPTER IV

THE BASIC INSTINCTS

Definition of instincts; their effect on emotional state; examples of instincts; instincts and behavior; stimulation of instincts; the blocking of instincts and resulting mental pain; inevitable effect of community life in blocking instincts; channels of stimulation and expression; the development of energy through stimulation of instincts; need of release of mental energy once generated. The instincts of hunger and thirst; their reactions as expressed in behavior; their deprivations and mental state. The instinct of fear; its compelling power and infectiousness; fear and self-preservation; effect of fear on physical act; human control through the agency of fear; mental endurance and military success; some generic causes of fear; panic; methods of preventing and controlling fear. The instinct of repulsion; its nature, manifestation and value; reaction of blocking repulsion. The instinct of pugnacity; its stimulation and exercise; its use for self-protection; race, age, sex and individual as affecting pugnacity; anti-social qualities of pugnacity; war as an outlet for pugnacity; stimulation and development of latent pugnacity; exhaustion of pugnacity; anger and hatred. The instinct of self-assertion; a desire to be found worthy; its expressions; pride as compared with self-respect; reactions to repressions of self-assertion; adjustment to place and status; development of self-assertion. The instinct of self-submission; its nature, expressions and importance; its necessity to discipline and community life; submission and initiative; need of checking undue submissiveness; special attention needed by men of weak character.

Instincts in General. Instincts are primary inherited tendencies to act in such ways as to produce certain ends, but without rational foresight of these ends, and without the necessity of any previous education in the performance. Everything about psychology has relation to them. Instincts form the background of character as it is developed through environment under guidance of the intellectual faculties.

Instincts are known to exist from the fact that they

function more or less effectively the first time the appropriate stimulus is experienced. For example, the newly hatched chick pecks objects before it; the new-born baby grasps the finger placed in its hand, perhaps a reminder of the instinct of its arboreal ancestors; the setter puppy "points" its first partridge. All instinctive acts are expressions of innate and inherited tendencies. They continue to function throughout life, but in a degree variable with the individual and his environment.

Every instinct is the basis of some emotional excitement whose quality is peculiar to it. Many of the instincts relate primarily to self-protection and the preservation of the race. Examples of such are the taking of food, holding out the hand in falling, flight from a dangerous environment, etc. Other instincts have their appropriate reactions.

There are some twenty-one instinctive tendencies that are generally recognized as basic, and of these about twelve or fourteen have a particular value in relation to the military service, and to military conduct. All, however, have importance. Their relative significance, the reactions which they cause, and the best methods by which they may be turned to military or industrial purpose should be fully understood by superiors. All these instincts essentially represent a dynamic force, which, if blocked in its expression, reacts with explosive violence in the form of anti-social conduct, but which may be controlled and directed through more desirable channels with beneficial results.

Instincts are more clearly exemplified in the lower animals than in human beings, since in the former reason does not appear as prominently as a factor in controlling conduct. But the effects of instincts in human behavior must not be underrated. They are a factor in conduct which always has its influence; variable it is true, but none the less positive. They are common to the human race as a whole, are more complex than reflexes, and are usually accompanied by consciousness, though the latter is not necessary. They may

be modified as to intensity by experience, volition and habit.

Certain instincts are racial and lead to diversity of action. Some races are proverbially pugnacious, some are submissive, some are acquisitive, etc. Standards of expression of basic instincts may be different; thus ideas of harmony and reproductive art among the Mongolians are quite different, for example, from those of the Caucasians.

Some instincts may be abnormally strong or abnormally weak in individuals, with the result of marked variations in behavior. Some men are by nature wholly unfitted for certain duties or environments and highly qualified for others. This is true both within the army and in civil industry, yet it is a fact too often disregarded. What the individual likes and dislikes is largely determined by instinct based on peculiarities of cellular quality. Physiologically it is a fact that "what is one man's meat is another man's poison." The same applies to mental difference and capability. There is truth in the adage that "poets are born, not made."

In man, many of the instincts ripen later in life, when considerable power of mental control has been acquired. Hence the acts which they naturally tend to excite are modified by experience, custom and the inhibitions of reason. But when the repressive influences of ordinary life are removed, these instincts may flare up as mob-spirit or war-spirit, apparently with primitive intensity. Repression does not abolish — it merely produces latency.

The primal instincts form the basis of the more complex experiences and acts of life. According to the varying degree with which the individual is endowed with them, they furnish a modifying factor in the behavior resulting from environment. The control of instincts in the military group is in various ways simpler than in civil life, for the restrictions as to enlistment tend to bar out many whose unchecked expression of one or more instincts has resulted in anti-social acts or criminalities which disqualify them for

service. It is these individuals, remaining in civil life, who especially create the problems of the habitual delinquent.

Instincts may be aroused not only by their natural and appropriate excitants, but by ideas of such excitants. This makes the release of the force which they represent a relatively ready and simple procedure. It is possible, accordingly, to more or less organize instinctive tendencies about certain objects or ideas and bring them into permanent service for a desired purpose. It also shows the necessity of avoiding or suppressing ideas which might arouse instincts tending to expression in undesirable acts.

Every instinct embodies an impulse. These instinctive impulses determine the general ends of activities and supply the driving power which sustains them. Complex mental activities are the channels through which these impulses receive satisfaction, while pleasure and pain guide instinct in choice of the means. Accordingly, in any consideration of the control of act, the fundamental instincts cannot be disregarded. They can, however, be modified and directed, but no instinct can express itself except under conditions of environment more or less adapted to such expression. If they do not find such environment, they tend to be repressed and become latent. Hence the importance of creating conditions favorable to the stimulation of instincts promoting military purposes and unfavorable to the exercise of those instincts whose action would be undesirable.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the gratifications of instincts are basic human interests, and that the blocking of all instincts, or many of them, would be intolerable. Yet the needs of the military service require that some be repressed or minimized and others stimulated, according to the necessities of varying situations and objects desired. It is often not difficult to do this, for with proper understanding of instincts and their expression, it will be found that their control will fall largely under certain gen-

eral principles capable of wide application and with such modification as the local situation may require.

The instincts of primitive man rarely crossed those of others and so he could act much as he pleased. But in response to his "herd" instinct, the tendency was to draw closer to his fellows and to form larger and still larger alliances. With the increasing size of the group came corresponding limitation of action, for many of the things that he wished to do ran counter to the wishes and instincts of others in the community. The size of armies, and the military necessity of subordinating all interests to a common end, obviously implies the repression of instincts to a greater degree than under any other conditions.

As progress toward the end of instinctive striving elicits satisfaction, so continued interference with it is painful to the individual and tends to be reflected in conduct. But an unwise administration of the military machine will often thwart certain instincts without necessity, thereby creating difficulties of mind and conduct that might just as well have been avoided. Further, the acts of the enemy directly and of necessity block certain instincts, and these difficulties may not be susceptible of remedy. But in such case the reaction may be against the causative agent and thus serve the military purpose. Therefore, the acts of the enemy, in proportion as they block natural instincts through being threatening, brutal, treacherous, arrogant or otherwise intolerable, focus resentment and anger upon that enemy and call forth the acts through which these mental states find expression.

The expression of a certain instinct in one individual or group tends to arouse the same instinct in another. A sympathetic state of mind arouses a desire for reciprocal understanding, as soothing a child evokes an expression of its troubles. Pugnacity tends to arouse counter pugnacity. Acquisitiveness by one is met by desire to retain or increase property rights in another. "Whatsoever measure ye

mete, that shall be measured to you again " related to quality as well as quantity.

The channel of an instinct is used both for afferent and efferent impulses. That is, external stimulation of an instinct produces the development of energy within the individual, which preferentially seeks release through some outward expression of the instinct stimulated. Thus if the reproductive instinct is stimulated by persons, books, pictures, sights or conversation, the natural tendency is to seek gratification of the instinct of reproduction. But if an instinct has been stimulated and its expression checked by ethical considerations or other means, the energy which has been developed may be drawn off by the suitable opening of other channels through the stimulation of compensating instincts. An example of this is where the play instinct is aroused, and free expression to energy given through sports as an offset to the tendency of the reproductive instinct to find expression.

As a corollary to this, the importance of preventing or of minimizing the stimulation of undesirable tendencies is obvious. Human nature is weak, and one of the pleas of the Lord's Prayer is " Lead us not into temptation." If the factors which tend to stimulate undesirable acts are kept at a distance sufficient to prevent their influence, the act does not occur.

A too common fault in the handling of men is based on the idea that instincts and personalities can and often should be suppressed. The tendency is to produce conformance by compression. This teaching is not only unscientific but dangerous, for the unnecessary blocking of an instinct inevitably produces discontent and usually trouble. The better way is to recognize that instincts exist as laws of nature, that they have to be reckoned with, and to direct and utilize them so as to promote the purpose desired.

In the military society, some instincts need to be repressed or controlled. Among these are fear, self-assertion, the

reproductive instinct and others. But when an instinct is to be repressed, its energy should not be blocked, but provided with some suitable avenue of expression. Prohibition fails of the complete results desired, and some substitute activity



Figure 5. Diagrammatic Conception of the Human Reservoir of Power.

should be found. Conversely, when certain instincts are to be stimulated, the energy released in this way will tend to relieve pressure in undesirable channels.

In the better understanding of the control of instincts, the individual may be represented as a reservoir of energy generated within himself by appropriate stimulation. See Fig. 5. This surplus energy tends to seek release along the lines of the instinct which has been stimulated. If it can be dissipated through the channel of this instinct, pleasure

results; if its release in this way is abruptly checked, the result is painful and reaction is expressed through conduct, which may be anti-social or destructive. On the other hand, the energy so aroused may be drained away through minor outlets of the main channel for expression of the basic instinct aroused, but in such a way as to do good rather than harm. A fair comparison is seen in the waters of the irrigation ditch, which, if dammed back will gather volume and power until they break through all obstructions and, as an uncontrolled flood, create wide devastation. In the same way, checking the flow in the main ditch may do no harm if sufficient outlets nearer the source are opened and the floods thus dissipated in the growing of crops before they reach the main obstruction.

The same analogy applies if the energy aroused through one instinct is diverted through entirely different channels pertaining to other instincts. This is similar to tapping the reservoir at the head of the irrigation ditch, and lowering the water level and pressure by means of other ditches so that little, if any, water flows through the main ditch in excess of its proper capacity. See Figure 6.

The point especially to be remembered is that energy is constantly being developed for the fulfilment of one instinct or another, and therefore must constantly be expended. If it is not directed through proper channels, its pressure will force it through harmful ones. Fortunately, it is largely possible to select the useful channels of other instincts through which this surplus energy should be diverted. The particular instinct or instincts which should be catered to and made to serve as a "by-pass" will vary with circumstances. The play instinct usually affords a very convenient and satisfactory channel for the release of such surplus energy, and is commonly used for this purpose without full appreciation of the reasons behind it or the principles involved.

In order to master his own instincts, the individual must



Figure 6. Diagrammatic Conception of Energy Stimulated Through a Blocked Channel Seeking Expression Through an Open Outlet.

have a clearly defined ideal supported by a sufficiently strong will. It is a logical duty of officers, therefore, to supply such ideals or to correct any deficiencies, and to reinforce any weak will by oversight, advice and moral support. If this is not accomplished, false concepts will induce wrong

conduct, or a weak will will not enable recognized ideals to be attained.

Efficient leadership consists of stimulating the desired instincts to the requisite degree; in preventing the stimulation, as far as possible, of those which are not desirable; or if the latter have been unavoidably stimulated, in diverting, through the channels of instincts useful to the purpose in hand, any excess of energy thus generated. Of great importance is doing this at the proper times and in the right ways. The handling of the instincts is like the handling of an organ of twenty-one notes, from which the selective master-touch evokes rich harmonies and from which the tyro brings forth discord.

Hunger and Thirst. These instincts are basic in that they relate to self-protection and the preservation of the species. They are excited only in certain body states, in which fluid and material for the upbuilding of the body cells are more or less lacking, and are probably aroused through the stimulation of sense organs within the body. Opposition to any restriction in the use of food and drink is thus instinctive with the individual. So also, inability to satisfy adequately the instincts of hunger and thirst is promptly reflected in anti-social conduct. Strong as other instincts are, hunger and thirst habitually over-ride them. Every other desire is subservient to their satisfaction, though on occasion, the parental instinct may rise above them.

Both the hunger and thirst instincts are powerful, but thirst produces the more immediate and violent reaction. Even the most timid animal when thirsty braves the hunter to reach the water hole, and the soldier will risk almost certain death to replenish an exhausted water supply. March discipline cannot be maintained in the absence of water. Orders and authority are brushed aside and mutiny may result when the instinct of thirst is blocked. Exhortations and force are useless as deterrents where an intense

need for fluid exists within the system. There is instinctive recognition within the body that its mechanism will not function without water. One of the early symptoms of intense thirst is loss of will power toward other matters, and as the deficiency becomes greater, delusions, hallucinations, mania, coma and other mental symptoms develop. The power of reason dwindles until it disappears.

The sensation of thirst may, however, precede the serious physical lack of fluid or in some individuals may be an expression of habit. Here training in water discipline, particularly with unseasoned troops, will be of value. When the actual deficiency of fluid is only slight, will power may control the outward expression of thirst. But where the deficiency of fluid is considerable, the instinct of thirst will supersede all other instincts, emotions and sentiments. Under such conditions, to prohibit men from drinking any water they can get is to invite disobedience of orders.

Hunger is likewise a personal instinct, which, if left unsatisfied, will result in the submergence of other instincts. Starving game will come down from their fastnesses to procure food in the vicinity of human habitations, and at such times may lose all shyness. Hungry troops will break all restraint to forage, and thence proceed by easy transition to loot, pillage, disorder and mutiny. Blocking the satisfaction of hunger produces the most intense anger and destructive tendency toward the agency believed at fault.

Under-fed peoples revolt against the governments believed to be at fault. Bolshevism springs from deprivation and want, more especially that of food. With troops, hunger destroys discipline and morale and produces physical disintegration of a military force. Where there is chronic starvation, as in famine, a state of mental apathy results, for malnutrition saps strength of mind as well as of body. Troops, however, lose their cohesiveness and efficiency long before such apathetic state is reached, disintegrating in reactions of indiscipline, disorder and violence.

A sufficiency of suitable food is absolutely essential to morale. Under-fed or starving troops cannot and will not fight effectively. Every military plan must be subordinated to questions of food supply. The character and quality of the food he gets forms a large part of the thoughts of the average soldier, whose nutritional needs, due to age, development, and nature of duties, are practical problems of the greatest importance. Even temporary deprivation of food promptly and adversely affects the mental state, and with it, the power for action. Conversely, the value of a good meal in maintaining or restoring cheerfulness and courage to troops going into battle, as well as increasing their power of endurance, is proverbial. The eating of food has a power of restoring self-confidence that exceeds mere food value.

Hunger may be supported over longer periods than thirst, merely because the fat and glycogen stored up in the body furnish a reserve food supply. To a certain extent, therefore, the body may be called upon to subsist on itself. But habit and appetite clamor for satisfaction, and mental state exaggerates physical lack. If shortage of food continues, the men will inevitably get out of hand. Even temporary departure from normal food standards produces profound discontent. These standards include not only sufficiency of nutrition but time of meals and nature and palatability of foods. Much discontent and difficulty in a company can often be traced to a faulty kitchen. The old adage that " the way to a man's heart is through his stomach " is based on a primary instinct.

The moral of this is that the first duty of a commander is to attend to the proper feeding of his men. It is not a duty to delegate to a subordinate as being something of a minor significance and more or less unmilitary in nature. On the contrary, the provision, planning, preparation and supply of food are duties of basic psychological and military importance.

It may well be said that when the instincts of hunger and thirst are readily satisfied the vast majority of mankind tends to be humane and benevolent. The altruism of America is based on its abundance and prosperity. But in time of want and famine, when the instinct of hunger is unsatisfied and malnutrition prevails, the emotion of selfishness, based on self-preservation, arises. At such times, discontent, envy and resentment have their fruitition in disorders, as man fights with man, like beast against beast, for the right to survive.

Fear. Next to hunger and thirst, fear is the strongest and most compelling instinct. In primitive life, it controls largely the matter of self-preservation through its final expression in flight from any agent in the environment which cannot be confidently opposed in the expectation of success. When followed by flight, fear is often further expressed by the tendency to concealment. Terror represents the highest degree of fear.

Fear may induce almost any act. Realization of place and space are lost, and fugitives, acting under its compulsion, may run toward the enemy. In a general way, however, they tend to flee over the route by which they advanced. Flight is usually accompanied by illusion and hallucinations; ideas of numbers and strength, time and space may be clouded or lost, and exaggeration is the rule.

Fear is extremely infectious, whether in men or animals. Horses stampede and men run in panic. The appearance of one or more fugitives giving expression to terror by voice, motions or facial evidence may break the steadfastness of troops that their own casualties have not shattered. Immediate measures, of the strongest character if necessary, are required in such cases.

Courage is not inborn in man, but rather the domination of will-power over the instinct of fear. The latter is the common standard from which varying degrees of courage represent departures. All persons feel fear in varying de-

gree and at some time or another. The absolutely fearless person does not exist, but some, through stronger volition, are able to hold the expression of fear in more or less complete abeyance.

Fear may be repressed and kept under control by discipline and mental training; when the mind is prepared and determined on a course of action, fear is absent. But an unforeseen circumstance may release it, to spread its influence broadcast from its original source through an entire group by contagion. Men who have become habituated to risk of any kind are predisposed to take the larger risk of war. The big game hunter, explorer, miner, lumberman, cattleman or others of the more dangerous pursuits have learned to discipline themselves against fear in a way that serves well in war. Narrow escapes either confer a greater self-confidence or inspire timidity and caution. With young men, the former is more apt to be the case.

Fear is a natural reaction against an unfit or unfriendly environment, and to a considerable extent an unknown environment. After the conditions of the environment are actually experienced without harm, the liability to fear from that particular cause is greatly reduced. Contact produces callousness toward it. On the other hand, if any factor of an apparently satisfactory environment proves on experience to be painful, the reaction of fear, perhaps modified into caution, tends to be developed in the presence of that factor.

While fear is a common mental quality, susceptibility to it is a variable. In some races it is more highly developed than in others. Susceptibility to fear also varies between individuals, and in the same individual under different conditions, either physical or mental. Some men have an inborn dread of heights, others of water, while the opposite extreme is marked by men who find a real exhilaration in high places or in swimming in deep or rough waters. Fear tends to develop in those who recognize that their power of

physical resistance is materially impaired, as for example by an exhausted supply of ammunition during action.

Practically all other mental activity is brought temporarily to an end by fear, the attention being focused on the object of fear to the exclusion of all others, a deep and lasting impression being created on the mind. The impression thus created may be stored away in the subconscious recesses of the brain and later recalled either in dreams or waking life. Shyness is closely allied to fear, and expresses imperfect adjustment to environment. The mental stress due to shyness may be considerable. This explains the appreciation often so obvious in the new recruit for kindly interest manifested by officers in his welfare.

An army is weakened more by fear than by the enemy. It destroys the power of resistance more than could be accomplished by any means of physical destruction. Knowledge of its origin, nature and of methods for its prevention and control are accordingly most important for commanders. Once developed in an individual or force, it destroys the military value of all previous training. Ability to remain calm in crises often determines victory.

New conditions of warfare, such as gassing, flame throwing, aerial bombing, or submarine torpedoing, operate to impair morale until strangeness has worn off and actual danger can be estimated. The long continued strain of trench fighting is particularly depressing to morale. All soldiers realize the increased personal hazards of war. To risk them is to oppose the natural instincts of self-preservation and to create a condition of mental stress. With some, the inner conflict is far less than with others. With them, the will is disciplined, the baser emotion of cowardice is strongly repressed and the mind turned into other channels. Others yield more readily — perhaps because of inherited tendency, or of less development of the power of control. Fear enters as a factor in the making of many so-called "conscientious objectors," who hide timidity be-

hind the pretext of religious idealism. Fear enters into disease, not only developing or exaggerating symptoms, but retarding recovery. It is the subconscious basis of many cases of shell-shock.

Fear is properly to be regarded as one of the most unmilitary tendencies, with vicious effects upon efficiency in war. Cowardice in the soldier is thus rightly considered as a most disgraceful attribute. Yet the use of the fear instinct, in certain restricted channels, with some individuals and at appropriate times, is a valuable agency in the management of men. One of the qualities of good leadership is to know when and how to evoke and utilize it. Another useful quality of the fear instinct is its development in a restricted sense and along certain lines, in creating caution. In the soldier, this means an appreciation of useless risks, and their avoidance, without impairment of initiative and self-assertion.

But the definite control of men and the direction of their actions through fear result in relative inefficiency. Even when passive opposition or sullenness is not aroused, men do not do their best work in an atmosphere of fear. Fear conduces to nervousness, mistakes and loss of initiative. The mind is cramped and the sense of judgment is impaired. There is no desire to venture on anything which has not received official approval in advance.

On the other hand, this element in fear has a definite function and a proper use. Fear is the great inhibitor of action, both present and future, and in primitive societies is a powerful agent for social order, by means of which individuals are led to control their egotistic impulses. Accordingly the fear instinct is at the basis of punishment. The lower the intellectual scale of the individual, the more the agency of fear must be utilized to control conduct. The young child, without experience and of undeveloped reasoning powers, needs appropriate corrective punishment and control through fear. But those of higher intelligence and

maturity require its stimulation for their control only in a relatively small degree, and are animated to desired standards of conduct better through the stimulus of reward than fear of punishment. Fear is the only instinct the stimulation of which is essentially painful, while stimulation of the remaining score of instincts is pleasurable. It is clearly wise to avoid mental hardship where this is possible. In industry, fear of losing employment is a powerful factor in conduct, which unquestionably is too much relied upon by superiors to the minimization of other measures.

Nevertheless, a few individuals require corrective measures through force, fear and painful experience, to control other instincts and compel reflection before action. The wise commander will recognize these and govern them through fear instinct as individuals and not by repressive measures applied to the organization as a whole, many of whose units respond far better to quite different methods of handling.

The fear of punishment, and not punishment itself, is quite sufficient to control most men. In this lies the value of inspections, made frequently, unexpectedly and at irregular periods by commanders. Knowledge of their liability to occur and the fact that a fault may at any time be found out and perhaps result in penalty tends to keep it from being committed. Punishment need not be physical to be effective in many instances. The commander who is himself admired and respected by his men will find rebuke, reproach and disapproval among his most powerful agencies of coercion.

The ancients recognized that mental endurance, equally with physical endurance, is the deciding factor of success or defeat. As their battles were short and soon decided they endeavored to strengthen their will power for the brief period necessary by making the soldier fear his commander more than the enemy.

The Teuton war machine was chiefly ruled by fear and

its discipline was largely the discipline of fear. This means inculcation of subserviency in individuals. The plan may work with submissive types of people, while organization is preserved; but if the latter is disrupted the fear attitude toward superiors is transferred toward the enemy, with tendency to acknowledge inferiority by act of surrender. Conduct founded only in the fear of punishment, the sense of accountability and on habits formed under this influence, is essentially servile conduct.

With the average American, accustomed to reasonable initiative and self-reliance, control through fear only will fail. Such attempts tend to block unduly the instinct of self-assertiveness and reaction is apt to occur with expressions of sullenness, resentment and acts of disorder.

Fear may be excited by certain specific impressions transmitted through any of the special senses. For the soldier, these channels are practically limited to sight, hearing and painful sensation. Smell and taste function in a far lesser degree. The threatening attitude of others may arouse it, especially if accompanied by terrifying and gruesome sights of the results on others of such hostile attitude, as on the battlefield.

Loud noises, especially if of a strange or compelling nature, seem especially an agent which evokes fear. Animals are startled into panic and flight by strange sounds. Thunder and lightning create fear not only in children but in many adults. The enemy, attacking, is the more dreadful from the noise he makes, which explains the reason for the shouts and battle cries that are part of bayonet training. An artillery bombardment often has more value through its destruction of morale than of men.

Through painful sensations resulting from experience, fear is aroused by apprehension lest they may be repeated. Thus through injuries received the soldier may learn to fear, or in a smaller proportion of cases to be angered by, the

presence of individuals or things to which he was at first indifferent.

But fear may also be excited by a variety of objects or sense-impressions prior to all experience of hurt or danger. Here it is based on imagination of the possibility of harm, and as there is no limit to imagination, it follows that fear of the strange and unknown is often greater than fear based on fact. This is a relic of the time when prehistoric man, almost defenseless, was surrounded by a multitude of dangers liable to develop from anything not fully recognized as harmless in character. Whatever is totally strange or untried tends to arouse it. This apprehension of the unknown in the soldier can be largely or wholly prevented or removed by timely information, explanation and advice as to environment and procedure.

The supernatural also arouses fear. The mental state produced in the superstitious and ignorant is liable to express itself in acts of unreasoning terror. The idea of their being supermen, which the Germans promoted to increase their own self-confidence, was also calculated to produce fear, despair and submission in their opponents.

Darkness tends to cause fear. This probably descends from the danger of attacks on our prehistoric ancestors by nocturnal animals. It lies at the basis of the greater efficiency of night attacks, especially when combined with the element of surprise. It explains the nervousness of sentries at night, and the need of special oversight by officers to counteract it.

Fear may be due to blocking the instinct of self-expression through withholding the opportunity for retaliation. This explains the shaken morale of troops held in reserve and receiving fire to which they cannot reply. The soldier's fear may leave him when he is ordered to advance, when he opens fire, or comes into hand to hand combat with the enemy.

There is a fear of being afraid. This is much more common than actual cowardice. Here there is apprehension that will-power will not suffice to live up to an ideal. The moral fear of shame may be greater than the physical fear of harm. Few men act cowardly when the actual test comes, though many may experience apprehension at the vague but tremendous mental pictures of possible danger conjured up by imagination. Soldiers should be made to realize this fact and given confidence in themselves.

There is a true fear of blood, or the shedding of blood, in a few individuals. This is seen in its highest form in cattle, which may be thrown into a state of mingled fear and pugnacity on smelling the blood of one of their own kind. Frequently the fear of blood is an apprehension which may not be realized by the soldier in battle, when he is under the influence of more powerful emotions evoked through other instincts and ideals.

A few persons have a fear of closed spaces, and to these trench warfare is far more trying than open warfare. Others dread the crossing of open spaces. Some persons have an inherent dislike of crowds and others cannot bear solitude. Still others inherit fear of some particular animal or object. This form of fear is perhaps of prenatal origin and founded on some experience of fright or aversion on the part of the mother during motherhood. Most of these specific fears may be overcome by will-power and habituation to the environment. On the other hand, hereditary tendencies to fear may be so strong as to persist despite efforts to remove them, and render the individual unfit for service.

Fear is accompanied in the individual by a characteristic group of symptoms. Its involuntary physical manifestations are rapid heart action, rapid and irregular respiration, goose flesh, dryness of the mouth, dilated nostrils, staring eyes, perspiration and muscular tremors and involuntary contractions of the bowels and bladder. The face of fear is characteristic and speech is incoherent. The intellectual

faculties are impaired or in abeyance and there is incoordination of muscles, which manifests itself in inability to carry out movements which are so habitual as to be almost automatic. Trembling makes it impossible to hold the rifle on the target. Fear also dilates the pupil of the eye and interferes with its accommodation so that objects are not clearly seen, distances cannot be accurately estimated and rifle sights are blurred. The distinctive effect of fear on ability to fight, as well as on willingness to make the attempt, is thus obvious.

Panic is the expression of a fear which has taken possession of the individual or group and cannot be controlled by reason. It is based on the idea of self-preservation, driving away all other ideas and emotions and causing the individual to "lose his head."

Panic is caused by direct and indirect factors. The latter are predisposing causes like fatigue, mental depression, doubt and uncertainty, which make the individual and group receptive to emotion and suggestion. The direct factors are those which excite panic in persons already more or less susceptible. These factors are events, usually unforeseen, unexpected and suddenly and violently changing the current of thought. The military value of surprise has long been recognized, as not only preventing initiative in the attacked but being destructive of clear judgment.

Panic is further due to the operation of certain psychological processes — illusion, hallucination, suggestion and contagion. Illusions are due to the fact that the mind perceives the wrong object, because although on this occasion it is not the real cause, it is still the usual or most probable cause, or the mind is temporarily full of the thought of that object, and this is especially liable to suggest itself. An example of the deliberate creation of an illusion is seen in camouflage. Hallucinations are mental images with no outside objective stimulus, but causing as true a sensation as if a real object were there.

The victims of illusion or hallucinations are the first to start panic. The mental state inspired by them produces an appearance and acts, which, seen by others, convey a similar state to them by suggestion. Credulity is increased, and the most improbable tales are readily believed. The factor of contagion then enters to spread the suggestion from every focus. The sentiments of fear, self-preservation, ferocity and violence are thus rapidly aroused throughout the mass, replacing all others. The organization is demoralized into a mob, unreasoning and without purpose other than the seeking of safety. The individual mind is submerged by the crowd mind. Brave men thus succumb to collective fear, and accept the position of helpless victims without thought of defense.

One of the most important functions of training is to overcome the instinct of fear and bring it under control. The primary problem which faces every officer is how to secure control of fear, both in himself and in his subordinates, else the individual is of no use as a combatant soldier.

Fear may be brought under control in many ways. Some of the measures are direct, as when the fear of the enemy becomes less than the fear of punishment by higher authority, or the fear of contempt of comrades if there be yielding to cowardice. They may be indirect, as where the thoughts may be turned into another channel and not allowed to remain focused on the peril. Any diversion which involves personal activity is especially useful in relieving the mental tension and averting fear, particularly in awaiting the moment of attack or lying in reserve under fire. Physical activity under such conditions may not be possible, yet usually the attention can be secured under some pretext which will keep the mind off the supreme task to come. The very order to advance into the dangers which have been apprehended will often come as a relief.

Example by superiors or comrades is a powerful agent in the dissipation of fear. All men are imitative. When the

act is performed by one who is respected and admired, its influence for imitation is greater. Here is where the officer must set the standard. Unconsciously the men watch him and take their cue from his attitude. So, too, the stories of brave deeds are valuable in building up a foundation of courage through emulation. Decorations tell the same story, for they are the outward evidence of achievement and glory.

Fatalism is a factor in the control of fear. Many old soldiers have it. They have seen their comrades fall while they passed scatheless. Ultimately there may come a time when a fatalistic idea is engendered. If the bullet which is to kill them has not been cast, no harm can come to them. If it has been cast, they cannot escape it. Such ideas give relief from fear, for under them an immutable fate, and not relative danger, governs destiny.

A few find relief from fear in religious solace. This is high, for example, among the Mohammedans, who feel more than repaid for the dangers of battle by the promised delights of "Paradise" if they fall. Others are of the stuff of martyrs, and lose their fear in the willingness to die for country and ideal.

In preventing fear, the conditions which might be assumed to be capable of arousing it are avoided, neutralized or explained as far as possible as soon as recognized. The problem is to tide the soldier over his mental distress and later to relieve him of his discomfort. Among groups, fear has its evidences in agitation or irresolution, and those who are weakening under the strain should be given support. Here advice, occupation, encouragement, moral support, touch, example, or anything which will turn thought into a better channel is useful. A stern command may turn yielding into strength. Physical ills and hardships, since they predispose to fear, should be avoided as much as possible when troops are due to undergo mental strain. There is nothing like a rest and a good meal to restore confidence.

In the control of fear, action affords an outlet for the repressed energy. If possible the men should be given something to do, and especially a minor task of an accustomed nature, the required movements of which have become more or less mechanical as a result of habit.

Another way is to charge the individual with responsibility, especially that which has to do with the welfare of others and in which fear, as a self-conscious element, is lost in altruism. It is important to have the soldier approached in a reasoning way and made to realize that the situation is as bad for the adversary as for him. Further, idealism can surmount fear by sinking the individual interest in the promotion of the ideal.

The recognized interest of the officer in the welfare of his men will do much toward allaying apprehension among them. The soldier feels that with his officer safeguarding his welfare, his personal concern is more or less unnecessary. Superior intelligence and ability to reason often prevents or removes fear by showing the relatively harmless qualities of apparently fearsome things, or of developing ways for successfully opposing those with power for harm.

Fear is always anticipatory — not of what has been done but what may be done. Information will, in such cases, avert fear by clearing up misapprehension and preventing exaggeration. If the unknown is explained, it is robbed of most of its vague terrors. If a danger be forecasted, it is not only minimized, but deprived of the element of surprise as a factor in the unleashing of fear. Thus school children, trained in fire drill, do not have fear when the alarm is sounded and there is no panic if the fire is real. The element of the unexpected has been eliminated, the difficulties shown, and the methods of overcoming them explained and demonstrated.

The outward expressions of fear should be looked for in action. The able company officer will know the soldier's ordinary manner of conduct, will have already esti-

mated the probable degree of fortitude possessed by the individuals of his command, and will recognize the weaker links which are apt to show the first signs of yielding. General measures to stiffen the will-power of the latter should be taken in advance, depending on the personality of the individuals. Proximity of superiors will strengthen them. A non-commissioned officer may be stationed near by, or a man of doubtful fortitude may be made the captain's orderly. Systematic encouragement and explanation should usually be practiced. A clap on the back of the hesitant soldier by his officer, with a word of encouragement, a joke, or some passing remark relating to something entirely different from the object of attention will serve the desired purpose. Close individual contact of this sort will succeed where general methods to divert attention will fail.

The best agencies for the prevention of fear are the ideals inspired and the mental processes established as a result of training. If these are strong enough, and are supported by the determination of volition, fear does not occur.

Repulsion. The instinct of repulsion, like fear, is one of aversion. It is manifested when any object which produces painful sensation, and which it is believed can be mastered, is introduced into the environment. Repulsion thus differs from fear in that, while the latter induces flight, repulsion prompts removal of the offending agent. The reaction of repulsion, for example, is aroused against such agents as pestiferous insects, snakes, and dangerous, filthy or loathsome objects generally. Fear and disgust are apt to be closely allied. Accordingly, the repulsive instinct may be said to express reaction against anything which is disliked or dreaded. There is a desire to prevent contact. The man strikes at the snake; the horse kicks at the dog barking at his heels. Fear, repulsion and pain probably account for all aversions.

But the repulsive instinct is not manifested alone against physical objects. Through the higher intellect it extends to

offensive mental traits and peculiarities of character. This accounts for the aversion felt toward certain individuals purely on the basis of their irritating personality and the desire and effort to keep them at such a distance that they cannot affect one's individual environment. It accounts also for the effort made to reject and remove ideals and ethical standards which clash with our own.

In general terms, repulsion expresses the tendency of the individual or group to correct fault in environment which is remediable by his or their own effort. As with fear, some relief is found in repulsion through corrective effort, even if it be incomplete. Hope of diminishing the painful state through the action permitted tends to relieve mental stress. There is much satisfaction of this instinct in the knowledge that at least the best possible under the conditions is being done.

Repulsion is thus an instinct of very great practical importance, for it has to do with the correction of faulty environment from which undesirable acts may flow. It has to do more with minor than with major difficulties of adjustment; but the "pin-pricks" seem to have a psychological influence often greater than any physical effect, while the sum-total of the iritation and discomfort they produce may be very great. The relief of any of them subtracts by so much from the total amount of annoyance. It should not be forgotten that, especially for the recruit, the military environment tends to include many points with which contact is painful to the individual and which, if left to himself, he would remove. Further, many such points are removable without detriment to military purpose, often yielding easily to a little intelligent effort.

If the instinct of repulsion is blocked, irritation and reaction tend to result in proportion to the intensity of the repulsion desire. Any factor of maladjustment in the environment, from which escape is not possible, produces annoyance until removed. Restrictions which interfere with

the voluntary tendency toward such removal are resented. This applies, for example, to the physical and mental strain involved in keeping a persistent fly at a distance; to the irritation at being forced into constant and close association with uncongenial individuals in barracks, and in a broad way, to painful contacts with various points of the compulsory environment necessary in the military service. In all these the desire of the individual to take steps to relieve himself of irritation may be largely blocked. Restrictions which are artificial and the need for which is not understood, in so far as they interfere with the personal correction of the environment, are particularly resented. However, this feeling may be greatly diminished by explaining their necessity when they exist.

The moral of this is that the necessary military restrictions involving checking of the individual soldier in his efforts toward self-comfort imply the corresponding responsibility of superiors to safeguard in every way the interests of their subordinates. If the latter are to be deprived of powers of initiative and of free agents, then these powers must be fully assumed and exercised in their behalf by their superiors. If this is not done, discontent, perhaps crystallizing into definite resentment against certain superiors, is bound to result. Acts of disorder or even mutinous conduct may arise. If a painful environment be uncorrected through the exercise of repulsion, relief may be sought in separation from the environment through desertion. The soldier acquiesces to a state of relative personal helplessness only if the powers which he would naturally desire to exercise are adequately exerted by others in his behalf. The foregoing remarks apply with equal truth to industry, where failure to correct fault and blocking of the exercise of the instinct of repulsion by the worker is a powerful factor in the causation of labor turnover and discontent.

Conversely, where the superior looks out for the welfare of his men in every way and sees that every irritating object

is removed as well as possible, their appreciative reliance on him engenders a loyalty and support which is at the basis of discipline and esprit de corps. Information here is also of value, so that subordinates may know that even if results are not wholly satisfactory they are at least as good as earnest and intelligent effort by superiors can provide. Human nature tends to accept the inevitable with resignation, provided only that it is known to be inevitable.

Pugnacity. The instinct of pugnacity, with its corresponding expression through anger, is not nearly as universally and intensively implanted as fear. However, it ranks with fear in the great strength of its impulse and the high intensity of the emotion it generates. Pugnacity is peculiar in that no specific object arouses it, but rather opposition to the free exercise of any impulse aroused by any of the other instincts.

Pugnacity, therefore, presupposes other instincts and develops intensive reaction against opposition as their purposes are blocked. Any effort toward checking satisfaction arouses pugnacity; it does not exist where there is complete satisfaction. Also if the desire for the object wanes, the feeling of hostility correspondingly diminishes. Even fear may induce its opposite, pugnacity, when there is no escape; as for example, the " cornered rat " turns and fights desperately, or the command with its retreat cut off renews action in the hope of breaking through. Women naturally have less pugnacity than males, but danger to her child, through blocking the maternal instinct, will change the timid mother to an Amazon fighting without sense of fear. This also applies to the lower animals, which in defense of their young will fight desperately to the death, refusing escape from hopeless odds.

Pugnacity is exhibited in appearance as well as acts by men and animals. The expression of anger in man is characteristic — the scowling brow and raised upper lip. Man also shares with animals the tendency to express anger, and

at the same time frighten an opponent, by characteristic cries as well as by threatening appearance. These qualities are developed in bayonet drill, where effort is also made to have the soldier think and look the part he acts and terrify his opponent into submission.

The fighting instinct represents an inherited tendency to seek physical combat with those who threaten welfare, invade rights and destroy or appropriate property. It thus expresses the purpose of self-preservation and the perpetuation of the species against aggression. It is a check against undue self-assertion in others and an essential in the struggle to survive. It is often aroused in behalf of the weak or helpless and without idea of personal advantage. Fighting is preceded by the feeling of resentment, and if this feeling cannot be adequately expressed, it rises to anger or rage, culminating in physical combat. Championing the weak is sublimated into chivalry and freed from all sordid motive. The same applies to the defense of ideals, which are more desperately defended than even property or life itself. The nobler the ideal the more it is cherished and attack against it is resented. But property acquisitions, such as those pertaining to family, home, money, and things, are jealously guarded, and aggression against them arouses reaction in pugnacity. Its simplest form is seen in the family dog, which snaps at its friends on attempt to take away its bone.

Certain physical states relate to pugnacity in the lower animals: the stag in the mating season may attack persons toward whom it had been well-disposed, or dash its horns against inanimate objects. Similarly clashes over women tend to occur, especially where soldiers and civilians are together, or soldiers of different nationalities are garrisoned together.

Race has a strong influence on the intensity of the pugnacious instinct. It is highly developed in the Celt, for example; little developed in some Asiatics. In volatile peoples it bursts quickly into flame and as quickly subsides; in

those of less emotional qualities a succession of stimuli is necessary, but these ultimately create the implacable fury of the Berserk. This should be considered in averting difficulties and disorders on the one hand, and in arousing combativeness in a proper cause on the other.

Pugnacity, too, is a quality which finds its expression early in life and dwindles with advancing age. "Young men for action, old men for counsel." In the soldier class it reaches its maximum degree as an incentive for combat, together with the highest physical ability of accomplishment.

It is especially an attribute of males. In childhood it is the boys — not girls — who readily fall into disputes only to be settled summarily by violence. Games and contests which have a vicarious element of pugnacity are the games of boys and men. So, too, in war; the "Amazons" and "Death Battalions" of all history are so few as to be recorded as notable. Yet women, even if they are not prone to exercise this instinct themselves, may arouse it among their males. They are emotional, and once swayed by a conviction they call on the other sex to do what their own will not or cannot do for itself. The Spartan mother who told her son to "return with his shield or on it" was merely one of the multitude of women who adjure their defenders to prefer death to dishonor. To arouse the women to the will to win is to furnish the greatest incentive to pugnacity in troops. How far feminine influence should be used, and in what direction, is a factor which the wise commander will effectively determine. As this source of inspiration of troops exists only in civil life, measures applicable to its control must extend beyond the confines of the military establishment.

Pugnacity is also expressed in that class of individuals who seem always "spoiling for a fight." In such it may be expression of excess vitality, which can be given outlet in other ways when pugnacity is not desirable. The combative individual is usually a leader through sheer force of

personality. Actual authority conferred on such an individual usually changes a quarrelsome, contentious attitude into one of upholding the official standards. Gang spirit can be far more successfully coped with by directing the potential influence of the leader in the right channels than by adopting drastic measures. If one leader is removed another will spring up.

A high degree of pugnacity in an individual, manifested toward persons offending against accepted ideas of ethics is a mental quality usually admired. But if such pugnacity is exercised against persons generally, the individual is regarded as quarrelsome and his attitude resented. To exercise pugnacity against a weaker object, especially without full reason, is regarded as bullying and seldom fails to arouse resentment and to produce a champion for the person incapable of defense, through the instinct of sympathy thus aroused. It therefore follows that pugnacity, to be a virtue, must be exercised within certain limits recognized as fitting for time, place and object.

Pugnacity by personal violence in civil life is repressed as being an anti-social quality. Civilization and its laws assume the protection of the individual and his property, and not only relieve him of the necessity but, except within certain limits, deny him the right to exercise it. Assault is an offense against law and order, and even the victim of it must prove right of resistance in self-defense.

Duelling is outlawed and a felony among most civilized peoples. While savage peoples may feature pugnacity as a desirable attribute, even among them it may be exercised only within certain recognized limits and must be directed against some common enemy of the family or clan. The armies of civilization, therefore, start in with a handicap in fighting qualities which needs to be deliberately and systematically overcome. War thus affords almost the only outlet for pugnacity. Not only are the artificial repressions of the instinct due to civilization removed in so far as the spe-

cific objects against which the pugnacity is to be directed are concerned but everything is done which will stimulate combativeness against the resisting enemy.

Psychologically, training along certain lines tends in the average man to compensatory expression in others. The soldier whose pugnacity is developed against enemy resistance, tends to lose it once that resistance is abated by surrender or armistice and to exercise greater tenderness toward friends and the helpless. "The bravest are the tenderest." There must be opposition for pugnacity to be aroused or maintained. Acquiescence or servility does not arouse pugnacity, though it may engender contempt. Accordingly, the harmful acts and hostile purposes of the enemy should be given publicity in order that pugnacity may develop from the opposition. War aims are necessary stimuli to the defense of national rights.

International law represents an effort to control national pugnacity. How far this artificial agency has succeeded in repressing a primary instinct recent events testify. How far any international combination will do it without invoking a constant impelling influence of fear through the use of force, and creating the condition it was proposed to avoid, each may decide for himself. Innate tendencies are not trifles which can be set aside for any ideal, no matter how alluring and right in theory. Human nature is changed not by a dictum but by a slow evolution working through environment. Pugnacity will doubtless cease to operate as a factor of human conduct only when each member of society possesses all he wants at all times. Until that time comes this instinct cannot be disregarded.

Recent events show no reason to believe that the fighting instinct has weakened or died out. Civilization has merely rendered it latent and altered its modes of expression between individuals. As expressed by collective combat between nations and various forms of competition, the instinct remains and the right to gratify it is conceded.

In time of war, the repressed instinct of pugnacity needs stimulation and development. It can be directly promoted by athletics and mass games. Minor oppositions must be created and increased in difficulty so that the men may gain mental strength and confidence by overcoming them; every success makes the accomplishment of the next task easier. Pugnacity must be aroused to make bayonet training effective, where a mental state of regarding the dummy as an adversary is quite as important as the technique of the thrust and parry. More important still is the giving of ideals to the soldier for which he will desire to fight — of rights to protect and wrongs to redress. There must be an object and the object must appear sufficiently worthy to the individual who entertains it, however it may be regarded by others. For this reason, even the Germans were made to believe that their war was one of defense. Their leaders knew that many might have little incentive to fight a war of obvious and unnecessary aggression, but all could be roused to fight by the idea of self-protection and defense of possessions.

In battle, pugnacity comes out in its highest form when the instinct of self-preservation is required to make choice of " kill or be killed." Here this latent quality is developed to the fullest, and once aroused it may pass all bounds of control. Troops may pursue the enemy beyond the objective, and slay when capture might be an alternative. It is important, therefore, that officers should know how to keep the quality of pugnacity under control, lest the impetuosity of their men cause them to interfere with a general plan in which they are but minor units, or to fall under their own barrage.

Pugnacity is an instinct which relatively soon exhausts itself and requires opportunity for renewal by rest between activities. Men long exposed to the enemy suffer depreciation of will to fight — that is, ability to fight. The recognition of this fact is seen in the necessity for the periodic

sending of troops to rest areas — ostensibly to refit physically in supplies and recruit in numbers, but quite as much to allow the depleted mental quality of pugnacity to recover its force by rest and change of physical and psychological environment. Here the fighting instinct needs to be reinforced by the will and by sentiments which set standards for further conduct. Ideas must constantly be supplied as the effect of the old ones wanes, or the latter must be presented in new form in order to arouse or hold interest. At rest areas, psychological stimulation of this sort is often more important than minutiae in physical training and the use of arms. The hardships and hazards of war tend to make the soldier seek compensation in thoughts of peace which undermine determination to be victorious. Not a few soldiers are so constituted as to react against danger by bravery and increased effort. Some have recourse to strength in religious conviction. Others seem to entertain the idea that, while many may fall, no bullet can stop them.

In time of peace the innate love of combat finds outlet in cock-fights, boxing matches, etc. Competition in sports, especially in rough games, such as football, gives expression to the fighting spirit which is inherent in all males. Preparation for war implies the cultivation of the instinct of pugnacity, and hence in military training all games should be promoted which especially imply physical contest. Like any other mental or physical quality the development of pugnacity results from cultivation and use. In certain of the lower animals, such as game-cocks and pit bull-terriers, the combative instinct is methodically developed by careful mental training which is as much a part of the preparatory course as the securing of physical fitness. The same is even more necessary with troops, especially under the draft where men are taken in whom combativeness is latent or poorly developed. Most soldiers can be made to acquire it in satisfactory degree. Recruits should be watched in this respect. The integrity of the fighting line is too im-

portant to be jeopardized by any weak units whose fault in this respect is due to mental make-up or temperament, perhaps as much beyond the control of the individual as time and patience have shown it to be beyond sufficient modification by his officer. Those who do not develop pugnacity in sufficient degree on account of inherent defect should be transferred to some branch of the service in which this quality is not essential. This should be done before the soldier loses respect for himself, not only as a combatant but as a man. Not every individual has the innate qualities necessary to a high grade fighting animal.

Anger and hatred are great stimulants to pugnacity and endeavor. Under their influence many things can be done foreign to usual character. But anger and hatred to be most potent need to be personal. Modern war prevents this and it is not easy to keep an impersonal anger at high pressure, since there is no individual to serve as an excitant. Under such conditions, indifference develops. Steps should always be taken to prevent fraternizing, since the enemy may take advantage of it, as the Germans did on the Russian front and against the Italians at Caporetto, to undermine the fighting spirit of their opponents and pave the way for their own success. It is as important to success for troops to depress pugnacity among their opponents as to promote it among themselves.

Physical exhaustion also drains away pugnacity. This explains the great advantage of bringing troops into action fresh, even though it may be for the defense in which no great physical exertion is required. The desire to fight necessarily implies some ability to do so. The converse, however, is not true, for physical strength and cowardice may co-exist.

There is profound advantage to morale in fighting fair, and in clean, sportsmanlike methods. Underhand methods such as the enemy used may secure a little temporary, material advantage, but they arouse a contempt for such

violations of honor as steeled the Allies to a determination to stop such methods forever. Atrocity merely imposed an added obligation to deal with the agent, not only according to his deserts, but that no one afterward should repeat such things.

The pugnacious instinct, though in itself essentially destructive, is nevertheless also a constructive force. The great steps of human liberty and realization of ideals have been secured only through the compulsion of warfare. Pugnacity, expressed through armies, operates more than any other instinct in producing collective behavior on a large scale. As combat passed from the phase of the individual to the group, the various qualities necessary to coöperation were developed, while the necessities of a life and death struggle stimulated inventions which were to find later utility in peace. Pugnacity may also be a source of increased energy of action toward the end set by other instincts in overcoming difficulties. They are attacked in a combative sense as if they were personalities rather than things and other impulses are thus reinforced.

Self-Assertion. Self-assertion is a true instinct, apparent in children at an early age and particularly well demonstrated in the lower animals. It is closely akin to pugnacity. The child of forceful character tries to attract attention, "shows off," and domineers over its nursery playmates, strange dogs bristle as they approach each other, and the game-cock crows defiance and seeks out the challenger.

Self-assertiveness in human beings is merely a desire to be found a worthy person among men. This wish to hold one's own with one's associates is a strong motive which should be fully utilized. Life for the individual centers about himself. He judges the whole world as good or ill according to the way he considers it has treated him and the consideration it has given his merits. The outstanding

moments of life are those which bring him, in one way or another, an increased sense of ability and accomplishment.

Assertiveness lies at the basis of the cardinal military virtues of self-respect and agressiveness. Military success depends not so much on ability to suffer casualities as on maintaining the will to win. The enemy is not conquered by a defensive. Self-assertion varies with race and individual. The Anglo-Saxon race, as compared with some others, is bold, confident and dominating. The self-assertive individual, if properly endowed with other essential qualities, has the forceful and basic character vital to leadership. He is above the petty doubts and apprehensions that make most human beings mediocre. In all, it plays an important part in the volitional control of military conduct.

Self-assertion is much more of a masculine than a feminine quality. Men are more aggressive, and within certain limits this is regarded as a necessary masculine attribute. For military purposes, its development is necessary in those in whom it is deficient. On the other hand, it exists naturally in high degree in children and youths regarded as "self-willed," and here it needs curbing or directing lest it result in extremes of individual conduct not compatible with the standards of complex society.

Self-assertion tends to increase with age and develops rapidly in the male at the time of pubescence, coincident with the appearance and development of the reproductive instinct. In older persons it is expressed in dogmatism. In extreme degree it is one of the manifestations of certain types of insanity, as the general paralysis of the insane. It is a quality only brought into action in the presence of spectators, especially those who are regarded as inferior in one way or another and whom it is desired to impress. In fact, most persons, on noticing that they are objects of attention, tend to do something more rapidly, energetically and with display of activity. It puts them "on their mettle." Ac-

cordingly, contact with rival military organizations and with civilians, and such ceremonials as parades and reviews tend to arouse it.

The self-assertive instinct leads to self-consciousness, display, domineering and other acts which tend to excite the instinct of self-abasement and submission in other and weaker personalities. It may develop the extremes characterized by pride, vanity and arrogance, but if the expression is futile in such cases and the self-valuation of the individual is not accepted, the emotions of shame and humiliation may supervene. Some persons exhibit this instinct in over-tendency to display, as expressed by swaggering and boasting. Such proclivities were deliberately developed in the German army and civilian population, who went so far in offensiveness in thrusting their ideas and personalities on others as to arouse intense antagonism when they failed to produce acquiescence and submission. It was at the basis of their contempt for others, arrogance and the self-conceit contributing to the mental state known as "Prussianism." Here what in lesser degree was a virtue was exalted and exaggerated until it became a fault.

In this form of self-assertion attention for one's self is craved. To be ignored is resented, unless it be accepted as a part of menial estate. Usually this feeling results in more or less effort to secure the attention that the instinct requires for its satisfaction. The butler, for example, does not yield to this tendency, for he is paid to cultivate the quality of self-submission, and the energy developed by blocking self-assertion expends itself along the channel of acquisitiveness. The wealthy leisure class, with its conspicuously useless waste, is an evidence of craving for public attention and approval. Its prodigality would lose its savor if it were not advertised.

Where a high belief in self exists, pride tends to result and self-consciousness is extreme. Pride is nourished by the admiration and gratitude of others but is indifferent to

moral approval or blame. It may be illogical in that it may be based on ignorance and blindness, rather than on real worth. The demonstration of the superiority of others only arouses anger, but pride yields to scorn and ridicule and turns to shame and pessimism. Pride is a powerful factor in the direction of act as long as such acts meet with success, but it has little to do with the morale of adversity, being quite different from self-respect in this matter.

In its higher stages, pride is an expression of egotism that cannot tolerate contradiction. In this way it is the animating spirit of the bully. Self-sufficiency and self-assertiveness which, in really efficient individuals, make for great accomplishment, often appear in those of less qualifications as an expression of over-compensation for grave defects of character. There is a blind faith in self which disregards facts. Such persons express opinions about everything with a concrete finality, obtrude themselves on all occasions, and believe themselves capable of anything, no matter how difficult. For this reason, it may cause the attempt of the almost impossible and thereby, at times, bring success. On the other hand, it causes the underrating of the abilities of an opponent and thereby more often leads to failure. The contempt of the Germans for the ability of the Russians to mobilize quickly caused disaster in East Prussia and a change in plans and results on the western front.

Accentuated too far, pride may turn the soldier into a braggart and arrogant swashbuckler with a sense of over-importance and special privilege — as the results of the Prussian military training gave example. Carried to the extreme found in the borderland of insanity, neither the sentiments of shame, humiliation, admiration, gratitude nor reverence are possible.

Self-respect differs from pride in that it includes an element of self-negation as well as self-assertion. Accordingly it is a quality that enables the individual to make an

accurate estimate of his own qualities and to profit by example and precept, by advice and exhortation and by moral approval and disapproval. It admits a capacity to do wrong since it accepts the obligation of social standards. It opens the way for the subtle influencing of conduct through public opinion. While striving for the ideal of perfection, it does not claim to have achieved it. It is not shaken by adversity that would destroy pride. It is satisfied by fame, where pride is gratified by notoriety.

Self-respect should be adroitly appealed to and carefully stimulated in the men by their officers. Action should be avoided which will result in detracting from the self-respect of troops. A strong sense of self-respect in the individuals of a command is a powerful factor in good conduct, efficiency and in the regard they bear for their officers.

Such quality of pride as properly enters into the composition of self-respect is of great morale value. This should pertain to the military forces as a whole, to the regiment, battalion and company, and finally to the individual. Such organizations and units may fight to the death because of belief in self. Such belief can be stimulated and expressed by friendly competition in drill and military requirements. It should be behind athletics, and extend to neatness, smartness, loyalty and responsibility. It should be reflected in surroundings and in the treatment of public property.

In the management of men, self-assertion and reputation are powerful agents in the hands of the wise superior who knows how to turn them to account. Every normal man has not only an earnest desire to succeed, but a deep interest in winning success. One measure of success is reputation. For this reason, commendation should be as public as occasion warrants.

A certain amount of expression of self-assertiveness is necessary to satisfaction in the normal man — otherwise he chafes under restraint and lack of opportunity, is moved

to bitter complaint and often opposition and seeks expression of his individuality through such outlets as may remain open to him. These expressions tend to excesses, because the pent up energy of individualism, instead of being dissipated along the general line of endeavor, is forced to expend itself through a few channels. A reaction normally to be expected against a so-called iron discipline is thus excesses of conduct. These excesses especially develop under conditions in which the individual is a free agent, namely, during the period off duty, when he is relatively independent. In civil life, the individual of the military age has various outlets for self-assertion after business hours, which are denied the soldier. One of these is the expression of assertiveness in domestic relations, while another is assertiveness in civil and political affairs. To the soldier who is hemmed in by too great restriction, and in whom initiative is repressed and stifled by the unwise exercise of too much authority from officers, exuberancy of spirit and assertiveness tend to find outlet and expend themselves in sex excess, drunkenness, profanity, and anti-social conduct or over-emphasis of anything which can be done uncontrolled. These are common ways of assertive expression among all repressed classes not only military, but in civil industry. As a result, the repressed individual especially brags of his sex conquests, while his ability to "hold his liquor" he considers a mark of superiority, and the whole is garnished with exaggerations of language expressed by oaths. Profanity doubtless expresses self-assertion through what the psychologists call "side-tracking." Such profanity is often habitual, unconscious and exaggerated, and is usually devoid of intent and application. Workmen and soldiers who have apparently reached their limit of advancement and are held under economic or disciplinary stress particularly exhibit the above tendencies. Both are suffering from limitation of opportunity for self-expression.

With the soldier, it therefore pays to deliberately develop

opportunities for the expression of self-assertion during the off-duty period and to see that they are utilized in such a way as to bring the satisfaction required without resort to anti-social measures for gratification. This is a safety-valve for military repression and has the further advantage that it affords a wide range in choice of activities whereby something can be found in which even the most unpromising can do creditably well. But conditions would be much further improved if military life, methods and tasks were so studied and amended as to afford the maximum opportunity for self-expression along military lines. A small task becomes ennobled once its responsibilities and results are made our own.



Figure 7. 8-Hour Sleep Period.

As the piston is drawn upwards, the cylinder fills with air. This process is comparable to the sleep period of the soldier during which he stores up energy. It will be noted that in this diagram all cocks, both military and other, are closed.

Cocks

Military

1. Exercise of initiative
2. Opportunity for advancement
3. Physical exertion

Personal

4. Domestic
5. Civic
6. Pleasure

The accompanying diagrams, showing the divisions and level of the soldier's day and illustrating the provision of opportunity to demonstrate individual capacity, express this ideal graphically.

In these, the soldier's day of twenty-four hours may be compared to the operation of a hand air-pump, with two sets of cocks, one set to represent the outlet for energy in military activities or drill; the other to represent the flow of energy in personal activities or recreation.

The positions of these cocks — whether open or closed — determines the proportion of energy devoted to military and other activities.

The soldier like any other individual will, in so far as he

can, devote the most energy to that in which he is most interested.

Hence, open the military cocks — that is, increase the soldier's opportunity for the exercise of initiative at drill — and he will expend the major portion of his energy in his work.

Close all outlets but that of mere physical exertion, and the soldier carries over to his personal period a surplus store of energy which might have been diverted to drill. As the average soldier has neither domestic nor civic interests, this surplus is devoted mostly to pleasure and much of it is wasted.

The explanatory diagrams (Figs. 7, 8 and 9) show the application of the air-pump as representing the three periods of the soldier's day — the sleep period, the military and the personal. The sleep period is shown first, as it is during this period that the soldier stores up the energy he expends in the other two.



Figure 8. 8-Hour Military Period.

As it often is

A. During half the waking period, initiation and opportunity are repressed and represented by closed cocks 1 and 2.

As it should be

B. Cocks 1, 2 and 3 are all open, indicating opportunity to express personality as well as expend physical energy.

The love of adventure expresses a desire for self-expression and self-activity under exceptionally stimulating or unusual surroundings. It is especially strong in youth and early manhood. As a factor in recruiting its strength is well recognized. This is doubtless one of the chief reasons why desertions and absences without leave are so much more frequent in time of peace than in war. The routine and lack of the spectacular in peace time does not satisfy the craving for adventure.

Self-assertion should be stimulated along lines outside the necessary restrictions imposed by military discipline and within the limits implied by self-respect. The soldier should be encouraged to do things for the betterment of himself and organization. The very strength of his self-assertive impulses which, if left to themselves may lead to harm, can, if properly directed, be turned to good. He



Figure 9. 8-Hour Personal Period.

As it often is

A. With more than half of the day's store of energy at the soldier's disposal and cocks 4 and 5 as well as military outlets, closed. The result is a heavy flow through No. 6.

As it should be

B. The position of the piston at the beginning of the period shows most of the day's energy already expended. Cocks 4, 5 and 6 are all partially open and there is some flow through each. Education has enlarged the soldier's field of interests so that this period is not confined to pleasure alone.

should be given opportunities for the development of self-reliance and initiative. Competitive games and sports afford an always ready opportunity, while study, training and the exercise of suitable authority are others. Promotion and success in wider fields give assurance of ability to win larger success.

The instinct of self-assertion can also be stimulated in urging the emulation of a good example. Men like to feel that they have strong character. If this be emphasized and soldiers shown that it takes men of strong character to see a hard task or a hard march through, they will try to live up to any reasonable standards set for them. Superiors can stimulate aggressiveness and persistence in the face of obstacle, in those of weaker will, by causing them to believe that a high estimate is set upon their abilities by others. It is an old adage that "nothing succeeds like success." This is because the stimulus of victory reacts to stimulate all of the instinctive qualities that make for success, the psychological value of which is that it increases military self-assertiveness. The victor no longer shrinks from contest when he has proved by experience that his foes are his inferiors. The negative self-feeling in him diminishes and the mere presence of such a foe arouses self-assertiveness and desire to demonstrate further superiority. The psychological value of the early successes of the Germans, in their materialistic frame of mind, cannot be over-estimated as a factor in maintaining their fighting efficiency.

The same factor is at the basis of the success of the individual. The comrades of the new recruit try to impress him with a show of superiority, but he soon finds out those who are really superior, those whom he may master by effort, and those below him in ability of accomplishment. His gradual success against the weaker makes him a more formidable competitor of the stronger, until he reaches and recognizes his final limitations. The officer who helps the

recruit find himself and his place in the company cosmos as rapidly as possible does much for the efficiency of the individual and the organization.

A marked and easily recognized human trait is obstinacy. In some it is so marked that general conduct may be measured in its terms. Such persons are so opposed to everything as to be always ready to do the opposite of what is desired of them. This is really an extreme degree of self-assertion to the extent of ego-centrism. It calls for tactful handling and wise discrimination as to whether suasion or punishment will be more effective in the individual case. If fully roused and developed, such refusal to yield becomes an obsession, dominating all ideas and acts. It is important in such cases not to let the status of martyrdom be assumed, lest the sympathy of comrades be evoked whereby moral support will be gained and mental comfort secured. This condition is particularly well demonstrated in the case of so-called "conscientious objectors." Self-will in an individual becomes undesirable only when directed toward objectionable and anti-social purposes. Individualism, within military limits, is a valuable quality. It should mean a desire to perform some duty better than any other person or organization.

The bully in the company is very often a man who finds an outlet for self-assertion in overbearing, offensive conduct toward others. Various responsibilities and opportunity for leadership will not rarely divert this forceful personality into wholesome channels of action. If such be called upon to help the class of men least able to express themselves, both may be helped at the same time.

Thus self-assertion implies initiative, perseverance and confidence based on knowledge of proven efficiency of self. It is the driving force back of purpose to achieve an object despite obstacles and opponents. It gives self-respect and utilizes the assurance that the public very considerably judges people on their own estimate of themselves. It should not

be stimulated by mere assumptions not warranted by facts and unchecked by achievement. The soldier should be told of his efficiency merely as a basis of stimulation of confidence in larger achievement.

Many a man enters the army who has previously had little opportunity for self-expression. He then suddenly discovers that he is as good as the next man and has equal chance for promotion if he applies himself. He begins to grow and develop new powers as he gains confidence in himself. His commander should watch such a man, for often he is at first shy and a small rebuff may send him back into himself and the makings of a good soldier thus be ended. Such men need encouragement to find themselves and their powers through successful effort.

The constant blocking of the instinct of self-assertion in many ways, through the necessary loss of individual freedom dependent on the military service, is something that the soldier never ceases to feel and in many instances unconsciously resents. The same applies to civilian industry, in which the worker feels that his abilities are unrecognized, ignored or belittled. Repressions of self-assertion are common causes of reactions against industrial management. The same outlet for self-assertion holds good here — to give the individual duty to perform which requires personal initiative and judgment and to bring him into contests of competition and rivalry. The delegation of a task of responsibility, leaving the details to be worked out by the individual, will serve as a safety-valve and help to offset the necessary physical and mental restriction along other lines.

Delegation of authority is the essence of effective military and industrial organization. Still superiors will be found who try to carry or prescribe all details themselves. This is resented by subordinates, who see in it reflection on their own abilities and intelligence. They should be held strictly responsible for results, but given all reasonable latitude as to methods. The superior who prescribes every de-

tail for his subordinates stifles self-assertion. The men are prepared to give way in this respect to superiors to a very large extent, but there is always a limit beyond which the average man will not cheerfully accept the blocking of his own self-expression. He prefers to coöperate rather than mechanically execute an obligation. Moreover, where the superior descends to detail, he tends to fall in the respect of his men as a man of large caliber. Making subordinates the executive agent gives them the feeling of personal interest and of pride in the result. Inculcating initiative and the ability to execute details enhances their ability in an emergency and makes them capable of higher things.

Self-Submission. Self-submission is the opposite instinct of self-assertion. It avoids self-display and is a protective instinct developed in the presence of what is believed to be a superior power. All of its expressions denote submissiveness to the will of others and are calculated not to attract attention or to mollify and not to arouse the pugnacity of others. It is more of a feminine than a masculine quality. Children show it early. All who admit a higher authority express it. The puppy, which on the approach of a strange dog, rolls over on its back and puts its feet in the air in a position of helplessness furnishes the extreme example. In the human being it is outwardly manifested in appearance and behavior, as a drooping of the head and shoulders, lowering of the eyes or hesitating glance, a general weakening of the muscle tone, absence of any posture adapted for attack or defense, and hesitancy of movement. Constant submission destroys initiative and becomes servility. It may be the basis of shame, yet if habitual the sense of shame and degradation may be lost. It is responsible for social caste. In undue exaggeration it may be an early symptom of unsound mentality.

There is an instinctive tendency to submission, at least in certain respects, in the presence of one larger, more powerful or of greater prestige. Here the element of caution

enters as a factor in self-preservation, for the possession of superior power and knowledge of reliance thereon by another is tacitly recognized as implying obligation of protection. But the existence of slave-driving, persecution and the hazing of the submissive shows that the mutual obligations resting upon submission of one to another do not always obtain.

Submission is recognized usually as a means of securing protection. Nor does submission enter in defense against wild beasts, with which it is recognized that yielding inevitably means destruction. The same applies in respect to an enemy being contended against after announcement by him that "no quarter" will be given. If the declaration of "no quarter" fails to terrorize into submission, it operates in the opposite way and provokes a resistance and cohesion based on desperation and in the greatest degree of which the individuals are capable.

Persons who are habitually self-submissive to an undue degree are apt to reach and assume an exaggerated degree of assertiveness toward those whom they regard as inferiors. This is a tendency to seek an outlet for emotions which they have been called upon to suppress. At such times they swagger, strut and bully. The idea is manifested in Prussian officialdom, in which submissiveness to superiors tends to be matched by harshness to those below.

Certain races manifest a high degree of submissiveness. They disarm what they regard as superior power by acceptance of domination by stronger wills. Individuals show it in varying degree, sometimes to the point of arousing contempt in others. Recruits have it more than old soldiers, some through temperament, others through character formed by repression in civil life, and still others through desire to conform as rapidly as possible to the requirements of the unfamiliar military environment in which they find themselves.

Every human being, like every one of the lower animals,

seems, when in groups, to arrive at a state of mastery or submission toward every other individual of that group. Clashes are thus inevitable. With animals, these clashes are usually physical combats, though one may give way before the menacing aspect of another. But with man, physical combats are relatively rare and are practically always preceded by a contest of wits and wills. Here the able officer will gain recognized supremacy. He will be more successful if he secures this result in a succession of minor matters, kept as far as possible from any outward appearance of personality and not allowed to develop as an acute situa tion of much gravity. Relationships can be established in this way which are satisfactory for disciplinary purposes without the subordinate really being aware that they are being so established. Rank in the army imposes submission without the necessity or possibility of trying conclusions to determine supremacy.

Settlement of status in respect to self-assertion and submission is a desirable adjustment of relationship which makes for harmony. Where there is serious clash within a company and where barrack conditions require individuals who are discordant to live in close physical relationship, the old method of letting the men get together with boxing gloves behind the barracks to " see who is the better man " may at times have advantages. No great physical damage need be apprehended, emotion gains outlet and expends itself through physical effort, and the men usually part with mutual respect and frequently become firm friends.

In war, one of the first steps in the self-submission of a military force is loss of initiative and impairment of aggressiveness. The army which is psychologically content to act merely on the defensive against its opponent is on the road to disintegration and defeat. Of the final fighting in 1918, General Pershing's report says of the enemy: " His morale had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the breaking point." It is obvious that

when such breaking point is reached, group self-submission occurs, defeat has been accomplished and surrender of military aims as well as of military forces is the final result. If the military situation is such that general aggressiveness must be delayed or withheld, it is thus desirable to demonstrate a certain degree of initiative through raids and minor attacks, not only as a physical check to the enemy and to impair his confidence, but to strengthen the will power of one's own forces.

It is obvious, that in a large sense, submission is out of place in a service which, like the military, is essentially aggressive. Yet it plays a valuable part in the maintenance of internal discipline through promoting respect for superiority. Also it is obvious that some nicety is necessary in determining the degree to which it should be developed and in confining it to the limited channels through which it should be exercised. This is a matter of individual and racial psychology. The disciplinary relations of the German army would be tolerated in few others, certainly not in our own.

Not a few non-commissioned officers completely fail to grasp this important point. Unconsciously perhaps, the bullying of a recruit into submission expresses desire on the part of those with authority to gratify their own instinct of self-assertion and possession of power. The result, from the standpoint of service efficiency, is bad. A horse whose "spirit has been broken" is a poor goer, and the analogy applies to men. Rough handling, and the ostentatious forcing of submission, has driven many a recruit of strong character and high promise into desertion rather than accept self-abasement. It has destroyed the vestiges of initiative in the shy and self-deprecatory who really needed to be brought out of themselves and given confidence and responsibility. Wise handling of men in respect to the instinct of submission is especially necessary. Those who do not exercise this quality are not worthy of authority.

Only that degree of submission is necessary in the military service which will cause the individual to sink his mental self in the common mind to the extent required for military purposes and to cause his official reactions to conform to the common reactions of the whole. To go further is to impair efficiency by tending toward automatism and undermining that self-reliance so valuable when the soldier, deprived of direction from above, is thrown on his own resources. All this is best accomplished by information and training. The better and more sturdy the soldier material in the recruit, the more readily he conforms to reason and resents force. Given time, the constant and unappreciated pressure of the normal military environment will usually do all that is necessary in evoking due submission. The mounted services take time to gentle horses and make them submissive to military requirements; the same applies to men.

Blame and disapproval check self-assertion, reacting in blind submission. If deserved, and given in a manner of impartial justice, they evoke repentance and shame in which self-negation is paramount. Further punishment is often unnecessary. If it is imposed in excess or unjustly, it not only fails of its intended purpose but has the opposite effect by arousing resentment and anger in which the desired mental submission is lacking even though force compels physical conformance.

Toward the enemy, no suggestion or implication of submission should be permitted. An essential part of the German propaganda was that they should be regarded as irresistible and that opposition was therefore useless. No such expression as "held up" or "checked" should ever be permitted, lest it carry with it the stimulation of submission. No officer or man should be allowed to conceive of an obstacle which could hold up his organization. Inquiry should be not "can you do it?" but "how will you do it?" The same principles apply to the development of personal initiative and forcefulness in industry.

The general methods for the undermining of the undesirable elements in submissiveness have been outlined under self-assertion. The carrying out of these by officers is an important duty. Men should be studied from the standpoint of self-submission so that excess of this quality may be removed. Those of naturally weak, submissive character do not excite admiration and interest, yet they are the ones with whom officers should be particularly concerned. Their natures in this respect should be changed as far as thought and opportunity may permit. They are weak links in the military chain, and submissiveness has too many elements of cowardice to permit commanders to allow its excess to go unremedied. Just as every group has its leader, so it has members who are relatively retiring and who have no great popularity nor many friendships. Such individuals are comparatively inaccessible, are slow in getting acquainted, and perhaps suspicious as a result of misapprehension. Men whose instinct of submissiveness is observed to impel them to keep out of individual stress, competition and responsibility should be deliberately placed in situations where these are involved, and where one success will merely mean another situation requiring the exercise of greater assertiveness.

The two opposing instincts of self-assertion and self-submission, therefore, require a proper correction and balance, and no more. Undue weakness or strength require compensation. The able but submissive man needs to be given initiative and self-confidence, while the too self-assertive soldier learns to recognize his own weaknesses.

CHAPTER V

THE BASIC INSTINCTS (Continued)

The instinct of rivalry; its nature and value as a source of energy; self-standards and self-competition; group competitions; envy and jealousy; the stimulation of rivalry. The instinct of curiosity; its nature and value for protection and progress; repressions of curiosity and their reactions; American individualism and curiosity; purpose and methods of satisfying curiosity. The gregarious instinct; its value in promoting collective action; physical and mental gregariousness; group solidarity; American individualism and gregariousness; sociability and social forms; organization and discipline; esprit de corps and public opinion. The instinct of sympathy; mental quality of sympathy; its influence on concerted action; reactions from lack of sympathy; efforts to secure sympathy; praise and blame; the sharing of emotions; sympathy as a stimulant; sympathy in human relations. The instinct of imitation; its character and purpose; imitation as affecting behavior; usefulness in training; example of superiors and associates. The instinct of acquisitiveness; its nature and usefulness; acquisitiveness, rivalry and publicity; thrift; usury; gambling; intangible rewards; the souvenir habit; property rights; pillage. The play instinct; its usefulness as a by-pass for energy and emotion and to stimulate interest; the motives for play; play and mental and physical development; mass play; limited function of play in morale work. The instinct of constructiveness; its motive in work; pleasurability of constructive act; personality of the worker; pride of workmanship; value of occupation with latitude as to method; team work and "doing one's bit." The migratory instinct; its seasonal stimulation; need for change of surroundings; desertions and labor turnover; passes and furloughs; unnecessary repressions. The reproductive instinct; its relation to home and family; its anti-social status in the army; methods for control. The parental instinct and its expressions; pets; chivalry. The religious instinct; its support of public opinion; battle omens and sacrifices; militant religiousness. The instinct of rhythm. The instinct of the comic.

Rivalry. The instinct of rivalry is closely akin to that of pugnacity. It is expressed by desire to compete with others, but this is usually without desire to inflict physical injury. There is emulation of any higher standards set by others. This tendency to emulate is particularly strong

in the young and those of early military age, of growing body and powers and pride of strength. It tends to wane after middle life, when individuals have largely found the limit of their capacity and have come to accept their status and lot in life with little ambition or expectation of improving it. With the relatively few successful individuals, it tends to persist longer, for the instinct which has been so exceptionally stimulated has acquired permanent strength, and one achievement gives confidence in the accomplishment of another. In the twilight of life, it usually disappears, though before this there is a tendency to realize a growing incapacity to carry any but routine and accustomed burdens, followed by an inclination to retire more and more from the competition of active affairs. This is perfectly psychological, and a serene old age, unhampered by stress and bickering, is a goal to be desired.

Nevertheless, advanced age is a serious handicap in a commander through its influence in impairing initiative and competitive desire. It is true that some successful commanders have been elderly. This, however, merely expresses exception to the general rule. It is true also that age is really expressed by condition rather than a term of years. Some men age far more rapidly than others and may have deteriorated as much in average middle life as have others at the proverbial " three score and ten."

Rivalry is an instinct which is of particular value in industry as well as in the military service, for it is one of the greatest aids to progress. Most human achievements are accomplished under its stimulus. To do a thing before another, or better than another, brings gratification that is its own recompense. A vast amount of work is done without expectation of reward, as for example in scientific research, where the scientist gratifies his instincts of curiosity and rivalry by doing it himself rather than letting some one else do it.

The military service tends to put certain restrictions on

rivalry, since rank operates to protect the superior against direct competition. Inertia above may thus be safeguarded and initiative and energy below checked. This is all the more reason why competition, in such ways as may be practicable, should be promoted. Without rivalry, ambition and effort, in time and with the great majority, are lost. The highest standards of efficiency are only reached when there is competition. The presence of an opponent engaged in the same activity rouses effort in proportion to the interest in the result. Thus in the face of the enemy, where the foe is competing for success, rivalry rises to such a pitch that troops make efforts which could be aroused nowhere else.

In its primary sense, competition is an expression of individuality and self-interest. It represents the more or less conscious effort to achieve certain ends that have been set up for ideals. It is also the expression of the desire to receive attention. Hence rivalry occurs not only between individuals and groups, as in tennis or baseball, but the individual competes within himself to surpass his own best record, as in golf or marksmanship. Thus the possible standard in such rivalry is perfection, with motive furnished in a desire to excel. Ideals must thus be present to arouse the sense of emulation.

To furnish such ideals — more or less ready made — to green troops or untrained workers is to facilitate their training by the introduction of the factors of rivalry, attention and interest. Too few officers appreciate the value of this short cut toward proficiency, as compared with the gradual and imperfect development of standards and purposes through experience. Ideals should be deliberately provided as a cause for training and not merely be accepted as a result. They furnish the chart and land marks upon which the individual lays out his course.

In group competition, persons cease to act for their own individual benefit and act for a common end. This stimu-

lates group unity. Mass games thus have an important military function in the subordination of self, whereby the individual gives all to his group in the knowledge that, in need, he will have full group support. Also within the group, if one achieves advancement over others, the latter struggle to catch up and progress of the whole results. Here gregariousness adds to rivalry.

But organization into definitely recognized entities is an important element. When men are massed together but are not in organized groups, it is a psychological fact supported by industrial experience that loss of ambition and initiative in each unit and the whole, resulting in decreased output, tends to occur. The individual efficiency tends to fall to, or below, the level of the poorest worker in the group. But if it be properly utilized, the spirit of rivalry between units or aggregations will not only overcome this tendency, but turn the current in the opposite direction. The total output of a civilian industry will go up tremendously if, for example, the short men are grouped in interested competition against the tall ones, or the married men against the bachelors. If the work is made piece-work and prizes are given the best workers, the total efficiency will be still greater. Napoleon wisely said: "If I had enough humpbacks in an army to make a regiment, enough negroes to make a battalion, enough dumb men to make a company, I would so organize them. No stimulus is more potent than the pride of men who have a common bond, either of race, nationality, color, or even affliction. Men thus put together want to show the rest of the army their extreme capability." France, England and Germany practised this rule.

Rivalry thus serves as the driving force, not only in games and recreation, but in the performance of duty and work, whether physical or mental. It actuates human beings to do with all their might things that by themselves could not secure even passive attention. It may be used to turn task into pleasure and put interest in the monotonous. It con-

centrates interest and purpose on result rather than on the performance of act and takes the mind off any painful or wearisome details of achievement.

The factor of wholesome rivalry should accordingly be utilized as much as possible, in war and industry. Each organization and individual should be induced by appropriate incentives to endeavor to better its best, whether in drill, training, games, conduct, or productivity. It should be informed as to the accomplishment of others and stimulated to excel them. The exact way in which competition can best be aroused varies entirely with circumstances, but ways can and should be found to instil this element as a moving factor in almost any situation.

Lacking adequate satisfaction through sublimation in sportsmanship, rivalry arouses the feelings of envy and jealousy and becomes a base motive. Hence proper rivalry means sportsmanlike competition and not ruthlessness. The generous contestant honors his successful opponent. But standards of honor in rivalry are artificial and the results of civilization. Primitive man had no standard of honor in combat. Lately the Germans deliberately set out to capitalize the advantage which disregard of accepted standards would give over those who refused to descend to such methods. Ideals as to acceptable methods should thus necessarily be inculcated along with the stimulation of rivalry in promoting the results to be desired. The end does not of necessity justify the choice of unethical means.

Competition is thus a potent factor in relation to morale, but it needs judicious stimulation, direction and control. That competition is best, which, in the individual, group or organization, produces the best results for coöperation of the whole. Organizations should be brought into a state of unconscious comparison of their own standards and accomplishments with those of rivals. Weakness should be searched for, not for criticism but for correction. Only in

this way will troops do their best. Without it, they tend to become self-satisfied and to retrograde. The same applies to individuals. The wise superior will often settle perplexing personal problems and in so doing evoke the best in his subordinates by pitting them against ideals and standards which he has suggested. He will lead them to one success only to use it as an incentive and means of approach to another. He will give his men confidence in self by setting to each such tasks and standards as can be progressively accomplished.

Psychologically as well as physically, it is impossible that men should be equal, but equality in opportunity should be the rule. All should have the same chance for the taking. But all will not take the same chance or use it the same way, for individuals differ so greatly in character, ability and viewpoint of service as to make this impossible. The freer men are, and hence the more competition enters as a factor, the less equal they are, for the human race progresses through the efforts of a minority that will not be denied.

Curiosity. The quality of curiosity is a primary instinct. Basically it is not as strong as fear, for it is obvious that too marked curiosity would result in the destruction of individuals in whom it was manifest in excess. It is a powerful stimulus to action, but is inhibited by caution.

The impulse of curiosity is to approach, examine or inquire into more closely the object or condition that excites it. Any unfamiliarity tends to excite curiosity, provided it be not sufficiently strange to excite fear. These two instincts, with their outward opposing impulses of approach and retreat, accordingly, often closely follow each other. The deer, which at first bounds away affrighted, often falls to the rifle as a result of curiosity prompting it to stop within range and inquire further into the cause of its fear. The child pulls his toy to pieces, not from destructiveness, but from inquisitiveness as to its make up. So in later life

curiosity is the basis of inquiry between cause and effect. It is the mainspring of science and progress. Without it civilization would halt.

Curiosity, not being of prime importance to the individual in self-preservation, varies widely in its innate strength. These differences tend to increase with age, the impulse growing weaker as a result of lack of exercise in those in whom it is innately weak, and stronger through use in those in whom it is innately strong. It is strong in the child, with its proverbial tendency to handle novel things and ask innumerable questions. Here there is an instinctive effort toward facilitating adjustment and promoting efficiency. It is strong in the young soldier and particularly in the recruit. Any tendency to rebuff the latter, manifested by some non-commissioned officers, should be curbed. Such repressive action blocks a natural and desirable instinct on the part of the soldier to inquire into the unknown, to learn what he is expected to know and to adjust himself to his environment. His instinct is to satisfy his curiosity by information so that he may not commit error. The superior who checks his inquiry and interest makes the task of both harder. Curiosity in the recruit or apprentice is a helpful trait that should be encouraged. It is akin to interest — and the man who is uninterested in his duties and surroundings makes a poor soldier or worker. Its blocking may induce anxiety, discontent, sullenness, lack of initiative or other negative qualities.

The instinct of curiosity is strongly implanted in the American, more so than in other peoples, as witness his preeminence in invention as a result of natural bent toward inquiry and investigation into the cause and betterment of conditions. He chafes in the presence of the unknown, and promptly accepts its challenge to discover its truths or to formulate a working hypothesis for its methods. This inquisitiveness is a quality, which, intelligently directed, makes

for good, but which, if neglected or unduly repressed, makes for stagnation, resentment and harm.

Some of the necessities of the military service require as unavoidable the repression of curiosity along certain lines. If the need for this is recognized by the men, the discontent arising from this cause is not serious. They are prepared to accept anything which they understand to be necessary to military success.

But when the soldier enlists, he ceases to be a free agent and turns over his destinies to his superiors. The same, to a considerable extent, applies in industry. His individualism, in so far as making investigations and plans for his own welfare is concerned, is checked. This at once stimulates the instinct of curiosity as to matters of self-interest and as to whether his welfare is being properly safeguarded for him by his superiors. He feels that, having surrendered all rights of initiative, it is his privilege to be given a certain degree of satisfaction as to the adequacy of the measures for his welfare and contentment. If an honest effort is made to give him all reasonable information on such matters, he is satisfied. If not, the blocking of his instinct of curiosity results in the releasing of the infinite number of speculations, inquiries, rumors, discussions, discontents and criticisms so characteristic of the military service. In this state of uncertainty and mental unrest, the soldier will, in the absence of truth and fact, accept error and misapprehension, and from them as premises proceed to faults of conduct. The same is true in industry, in which many difficulties spring from lack of proper information. It is safe to say that in the World War the rumors and actions born of unsatisfied curiosity gave the morale organization more concern than any other one thing. They sapped initiative and interfered with community of purpose. Constant watchfulness was necessary to avert disorder by displacing ignorance or falsity by truth. In the

armies of certain foreign nations bloody riots and mutinies occurred because information was withheld, as to when troops were to sail for home, when they were to be paid, what was being done with them, etc.— all of which information might have been given in advance and the resultant acts of disorder averted. Such protective action by the morale organization is one of its most logical, easy and helpful functions.

It has been said of soldiers: "Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die." Not to recognize soldiers as sentient human beings, but rather to consider them as cogs in the machine, whose mental state may be disregarded, is not only to block the instinct of curiosity but self-assertion. This combination is most unfortunate, for doubt and repression are incompatible with contentment. Always it depresses morale in proportion to its completeness. Frequently it is the cause of disorder proceeding from ignorance, part truths or misapprehension. The human mind is active. It will not tolerate vacuity. In the absence of fact it will fall back on imagination. The American soldier is so constituted that he can be trusted to bear up under any adversity. He wants to know its character and magnitude so as to know the nature of measures to be taken against it. It is the uncertainty rather than the reality that worries. He has a logical brain and feels qualified and entitled to use it.

While within smaller units the spoken word is the most rapid and effective agent in satisfying curiosity, the press and print serve the best purpose in connection with the doubt and inquiry of large groups. Orders, circulars and memoranda furnish official channels, but the camp and local papers supply a most useful outlet for indirect and suggestive information.

But the instinct of curiosity, beside being a powerful agent for harm if unsatisfied, may be turned into an equally effective agent for good. This is especially the case in training, where the soldier or worker can be interested in learning

merely for the sake of knowing, because he is innately curious. In this rests the great practical value of the interpretation of the reasons for military movements and the explanation of military appliances and equipment. Information of this sort vivifies drill and training and endows them with qualities of human interest. The satisfaction of curiosity about the enemy, by removing the apprehensions pertaining to the unknown, allays fear.

In the satisfying of proper curiosity, the officer proportionately adds to his prestige by demonstrating to the men his superiority of knowledge. He should make it his business to find out what the men want to know and, as far as proper, to give them the information, preferably in a casual way. In thus demonstrating common lines of thought with himself and the men, the bonds of sympathy between them are strengthened. In himself manifesting a proper curiosity in the affairs of his men the officer demonstrates interest and concern in their welfare. This is appreciated. But if it passes beyond certain bounds, it is regarded as meddlesomeness and is resented as such.

The spirit of adventure is one which calls many a soldier to the colors. This spirit is a combination of curiosity and pugnacity — to see what there may be and to measure strength with the unknown. War, from its maximum of surprise and danger, is the supreme adventure.

Gregariousness. The gregarious instinct manifests itself in the tendency of units to congregate into groups. Birds draw together in flocks, fish in shoals, bees in swarms, animals in packs or herds, and human beings in communities, crowds and organized masses. It is at once at the basis of the " gang spirit," as well as the highly organized society of civilization. The Boy Scouts, military organizations, clubs, fraternities, and civilian associations for any purpose are developed as a result of its influence. The tendency of the individual is to join with others. This explains why ducks come to decoys and why human beings on seeing a crowd

tend to join it. It is the attracting force impelling men to join organizations and the cohesive force that keeps them there. The crowd life seems to give a greater meaning to the individual act, and the presence of other individuals creates incentive and stimulus. The gregarious instinct is of particular value in promoting collective action. Thus it is of especial military importance, since military action is essentially collective. Gregariousness implies not only appreciation of the stimulus of a companion to initiate or increase accomplishment, but there is real satisfaction from the mere knowing that he is there. The child rousing from slumber calls to its mother and finding that she is there drops off to sleep again. The spirits of the sentry are steadied by the knowledge that his comrades are within call.

The tendency to congregate is based on effort toward preservation of self and species through the greater watchfulness, mutual defense and stronger resistance which may thus be maintained against a common enemy. The solitary individual falls a much more ready victim to predacity and force. Those of solitary tendencies have thus been eliminated during the ages and have left little posterity in which such predilections are apparent. The quality of gregariousness is so well recognized as a human attribute that the individuals who prefer to be solitary, such as hermits, tend to be regarded as peculiar and anti-social and to be looked upon with distrust. The great combinations of business show the superiority in power of the mass over the individual.

While dissimilar species and groups may temporarily merge, for example as horses, cattle and swine in a pasture, they promptly draw apart into their original groups if aroused. Like attracts like. The gregarious instinct thus implies not only desire to get together but also consciousness of kind. Satisfaction is not only felt in the presence of others, but the closer the similarity the greater the satisfaction. "Birds of a feather flock together." This similarity relates to the mental as well as the physical — the

group feels alike as well as looks alike. Thought and act take place through similar channels and processes, and there is sympathetic understanding and reaction. In every large gathering of human beings it will be noted that those of similar race and nationality tend to group together; the more so as they represent types more divergent from the accepted local normal. Similarly the uniform acts as a bond to bring soldiers together, because it blends them into a common appearance, and military ideas, customs and requirements give community of thought. Conversely, community of thought tends to stimulate gregariousness. Religious assemblages exemplify this, as do organizations developed for any common purpose. To take full advantage of the instinct of gregariousness, the superior thus needs to supply and develop common standards of thought. Mere physical association is not enough for cohesion under stress. Failure to appreciate this is one of the common faults of industrial management.

Constant reference to the group to which individuals belong strengthens the solidarity of that group and by implication confers an idea of superiority. An example of this is the term " we Germans," which is reiterated endlessly in one context or another through modern German literature and was doubtless deliberately promoted to stimulate the gregarious instinct, enhance racial unity, and make strangers to be regarded as inferiors. Thus it is of value to have the soldier habitually linked to his organization and his life made more communistic. His relation to his company, regiment and higher organization should be repeatedly brought out and emphasized in blending his individuality in the common whole. The same applies to any industrial organization in promoting efficiency through harmony, interest and coöperation.

Gregariousness is aroused especially by the factors of attack or defense. Both sides feel the need of support and men instinctively look for security in the presence of num-

bers of their own kind. The stimulus of war arouses gregariousness to its fullest, at the same time promoting the instinct of pugnacity. The nation solidifies as never before. There is pride and confidence in numbers and strength. In the army, individuals and groups manifest greater qualities of interreliance.

Race is a material factor in gregariousness in man, as kind and species are among the lower animals. Though all peoples have it, gregariousness is probably more dominant among the Germans than any other people. From this instinct comes the idea that the group is everything — the individual nothing. On this idea the Germans based their main concepts of State, Government and conduct of life. It is reflected in the endless number of singing, social, athletic, shooting and other societies and associations which give the race so much satisfaction.

Conversely gregariousness probably exists to less degree among the population of this country than any other, since the exploration of its vast areas and the settlement of its wilderness called for a hardy type of individualism whose volition dominated gregariousness. For this reason, special effort is needed with us to merge the individual soldier rapidly and effectively into the group. And for the same reason, the self reliant American tends to resent loss of individuality either in or out of the service and does not fully feel the need of looking to others for help.

The Germans used massed formations in the recent war, not because the greater danger of creating larger targets in this way was not recognized, but as a psychological concession. Teutonic gregariousness required that their men advance elbow to elbow in order to give them the requisite sense of solidarity and security. American individualism works in the opposite direction and makes the man rely too much on himself without due consideration for team work and the action of others. A powerful factor in morale is the sense of support dependent upon gregariousness. Thus

the morale of infantry on the battle line varies with the amount and efficiency of the artillery support, while the morale of both branches is correspondingly higher if they see hostile aircraft driven away and their own masters of the airfields above them.

The gregarious instinct is strongly conformed by habit and those who are accustomed to crowds are unpleasantly affected by isolation. The city recruit, accustomed to lights and crowds, is therefore especially liable to nervousness on a dark, lonely outpost.

Man is essentially a social animal, although his gregariousness does not necessarily imply sociability, as the isolation of a stranger in a large community testifies. But it makes sociability physically possible and stimulates it. Moreover, with many people the mere presence of others adds to the enjoyment of any recreation. The popularity of many amusements, such as baseball, is largely due to the crowd, the members of which find interest not only in the contest itself, but in watching each other. An inference is to use the instinct in promoting interest in mass games and contests, as well as for the exaltation of the group in promoting esprit de corps. One of the most attractive features of the military service is the opportunity it gives men to work and play in groups. Drill in the organization may be pleasurable, while the same effort required of a solitary individual would be a task and a punishment. Its value in morale work, in helping the recruit or new employee avoid homesickness by establishing new and sympathetic relationships should not be overlooked. Steps should be taken to make him feel at once that he is not only in the unit but is a definite part of it.

The gregarious instinct also has an important influence in civil and military life through its effect on social forms and military requirements. Where groups are created, customs and rules must be established whereby the conflicting interests of individuals may be kept from clashing. Army Regu-

lations, orders, etc., are thus the outgrowth of gregariousness, as they pertain to control of interrelations of the members of the group. The so-called " red tape " is merely an expression of effort to harmonize the work of the individuals and groups aggregated in the military organization.

Discipline, team-work and coöperation are founded on gregariousness. The Germans accordingly stimulated it to the fullest extent, accentuating for purposes of efficiency, the idea of their nationality as belonging to a separate group. But its over-development greatly diminished initiative, and the sense of helplessness of the individual when deprived of accustomed group support stimulated submission. Later in the school of war the Germans were forced into the exercise of greater individualism with less dependence on others and profited by it.

In the army, the aggregation of masses of men, their organization and community of living and purpose, both stimulates and satisfies gregariousness. While in its simplest form it does not necessarily imply either sympathy or capacity for mutual aid, yet it can and should be devoted to that end in the military service. In industry, the development and use of the instinct of gregariousness, by solidifying the industrial group through removal, as far as possible, of demarkation between employer and employed, makes for greater business success.

The individual should be made to realize that the organization of which he is a part has a capacity for collective suffering and collective prosperity, that it is collectively responsible and is the collective object of the judgments, emotions and sentiments of others, and that he, as a definite part of the whole, is in part the object of these regards. Thus not only his own conduct but that of his comrades affects his self-regarding sentiment, evoking in it self respect, gratitude, revenge, shame and other emotions. That his own organization shall prosper and stand well in the eyes of the military community may be made an incentive to conduct

by the soldier scarcely less strong than the desire for individual welfare. When esprit de corps is good, it furnishes one of the strongest appeals toward desired behavior. Anything will be hazarded and any difficulty surmounted for the honor of the company. The mere community of the name borne by the organization goes a long way to bring about the identification of the individual with his military group and symbolize his gregariousness.

The extension of this idea of group solidarity includes the larger military units, the profession of arms and finally the nation as a whole. Thus the soldier comes to feel that if he should give up his life in battle, it would bring glory not only upon himself but upon his country. Patriotism accordingly is a sentiment derived from gregariousness. If the national group is in danger, its value becomes more appreciated and exalted. Every individual in that group then assumes a closer, more intimate and more protective relation toward the others, and the social and fighting instincts are merged and reinforce each other.

Man responds to the absence of human beings by discomfort and to their presence by positive satisfaction. Of this, the delight of "Robinson Crusoe" at finding human companionship is an example. Men long isolated experience great anticipatory pleasure at the prospect of return to human society, and once returned they tend to give vent to the long repression in them of the gregarious instinct by social excesses. Thus blocking the gregarious instinct by restraint or solitude at once produces unpleasant reaction. The sheep cut off from the flock makes mad effort to rejoin it. The child whose playmates punish his fault by refusing to play with him suffers severe mental anguish. Solitary confinement greatly adds to the punishment of imprisonment, and is deliberately imposed for that purpose.

The tremendous power of the instinct of gregariousness was recognized by the ancients when they blocked it for purposes of punishment by the penalty of ostracism or elimina-

tion from membership in the group, as a sentence worse than death.

These facts have a value in the need for periodic change of troops from small detachments at isolated stations to centers of interest and large groups. Detached service, under unfavorable conditions, may produce such mental discomfort, unrest and discontent as to partake of the nature of punishment. The reaction against this is seen in anti-social conduct. The warmest friendship may turn to bitter hatred when, for example, two men are immured together in an Arctic winter and deprived of outside society. The same condition tends to occur in small outposts and is an argument for their periodic relief.

Social punishment is expressed by scorn. The withdrawal of approval and the giving of looks of contempt or derision may provoke a discomfort that may extend to utter wretchedness. Here the degree of influence depends upon the esteem or respect in which the scornful agency is held. The intensity of the pain which may be suffered in this way is often disproportionate to the fault involved — thus a social blunder which causes one to be "looked down upon" by persons who soon forget it will humiliate and burn in the offender's mind for a long time. Public opinion is thus a powerful agency for the control of conduct. The commander who has imbued his command generally with high ideals will have relatively little need to exercise disciplinary powers, for public opinion will largely take its place. The average individual hesitates at any act the consequences of which will substitute mental and social isolation for a prized comradeship.

Segregation of any racial or other group is always resented by it as blocking its instincts of gregariousness and self-assertion. To produce this effect, the segregation need not imply a physical separation. Segregation exists by implication in epithets such as "wop," "hunky," "square-head," etc., that are contemptuous and intensely resented.

The man so stigmatized feels himself regarded as an outsider and not admitted to the pride and privileges of an esprit de corps. For this reason superiors should promptly suppress all epithets based on race, religion or personal state in the interest of community and homogeneity in their organizations.

Sympathy. This is a basic instinct. The word sympathy, used in its primitive sense, implies the acceptance and co-experiencing of any feeling or emotion because the expression of that emotion is observed in others. The Spanish word " simpatica " well expresses this meaning. Sympathy, in its psychological sense, does not necessarily imply any quality of pity. It means the degree to which any emotion or mood may be communicated.

All animals display a quality of sympathetic understanding, as well as of imitation, when they reflect in their own acts the fear, flight or pugnacity shown by others. Sympathy exists between master and dog and between the cavalryman and his mount. Children express it when the wailing of one infant evokes crying by another and when the baby smiles back at the smiling face of the mother. In adults there is sympathy when sentiments such as truth, patriotism and honor are shared in and promote common purpose and action. All persons have the quality of sympathetic understanding, though it exists in varying degree and usually with special trend and development along certain lines.

Sympathy is the medium through which actors sway their audiences and move them through the gamut of emotions even though the situations they portray are known to be fictitious and unreal. Through sympathy the orator captivates the minds of his hearers, rousing sentiment or passion resulting in corresponding action depending on the vividness of his word pictures. Great leaders use sympathy to unify and bind their followers to themselves.

As sympathy is a quality of mutuality between the indi-

vidual and the group, its activity is closely related to the gregarious instinct. Without sympathy from associates restlessness and discontent are produced. Public opinion and approval of fellows are powerful factors in inducing conformance. A psychological environment, like a physical environment, is instinctively sought in which the relations and reactions can be adjusted with as little friction and difficulty as possible. Nor will even the most attractive physical environment satisfy this psychological need. After the novelty of a foreign country and the ideas and customs of an alien people have ceased to interest as curiosities, their very difference may accentuate the lack of the sympathy which is craved. This is a practical point for consideration in connection with troops on foreign service. Even though physically comfortable they are in psychological contact with ideas that are not understood or sympathized with, and which are more or less irritating and mentally painful. The contempt and dislike which soldiers express for foreign ideals, manners and customs to which duty may expose them are quite as real and as potent a source of action as are unfamiliar and uncomfortable physical surroundings. It is often the basis of clashes and race riots.

Active sympathy involves reciprocal relations between at least two persons. Both parties are anxious that the other shall share in his own emotions. Satisfaction occurs when this is accomplished. Thus joy is increased and sorrow is diminished by sharing them with a sympathetic person. Sympathy cannot heal the wound but it eases the pain. Close associates are therefore chosen from those who demonstrate a sympathetic understanding and from whom a desired response may be sure of being evoked. This relates to the instinctive desire for group support, mental as well as physical. Soldiers draw together who are congenial and who are devoted to each other's interests.

Sympathy accordingly impels the individual to attempt to bring the emotions of his fellows into harmony with his

own. This tendency is strong and continuous, for mental discordancy is painful and seeks relief. The individual endeavors to win his associates over to his own way of thinking. As this is often impossible, the result is a compromise in the sharing of emotion. Praise shows acceptance of emotion by others. Blame creates mental isolation, and emotional ostracism has the effect of a punishment. The lack of sympathy which the new recruit often experiences in a company is unquestionably an important cause of desertion. Deprived of home ties, affection and sympathetic understanding, the new soldier naturally turns to friendship with his comrades to remedy the deficiency. The commander will find that assistance to the recruit in early acquiring sympathetic friends is well worth while. The same is true in respect to human relationships in industry.

This innate tendency to transmit and receive emotion explains the spread of mental contagion through a group. Further, the instinct of sympathy is the basis of the deep-seated "buddy" friendships and the brotherhoods of soldiers, and with minds thus specially attuned to receive and transmit emotions, the development of a mental state and its acceptance by the group may be very rapid.

When one man in any organization believes that he has suffered an injustice, the tendency is for him to complain and to find ready sympathizers among his comrades to an extent and with a rapidity largely dependent on his own personality. Conversely, the optimists and boosters of an organization inspire their sentiments in those about them. The relative strength of the opposing emotions and the degree of the capacity for sympathy in the individuals concerned determine the result.

Sympathy and common understanding are thus the cement which binds the military or industrial group together and renders harmonious the actions of its units. Each of the major emotions seems capable of being aroused by this bond of sympathy and the great leader will use it to make his

subordinates responsive to him and to each other. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the development of community of sympathies and interests in an organization in promoting its efficiency.

Sympathy is responsible for the feeling of satisfaction experienced at seeing people contented and happy. The joy of others is as pleasant as flowers and sunshine. If competing influences are not too strong it creates response in kindly behavior and welcome expressed in smiles, laughter and sharing in pleasures. On the other hand, distress in one provokes a sensation of mental discomfort in another. Relief of such distress, or even its attempt, evokes relief from mental strain. Not a few psychologists believe that generosity is really selfish and based on personal pleasure, in that the giver gets more satisfaction from the giving to relieve another's wants than to hold for himself. The real test of generosity is not to give from abundance and surplus, but from what the individual vitally needs for himself. By such test few could be regarded as generous.

Friendliness in commercial life is a business asset. Sympathy in the army is an equally important factor for good. In all its essences it can flourish between those of different rank and grade, even though the outward expression of it may be different from what it is in civil life. True sympathy is not opposed to any military concept, but rather promotes military purposes through better understanding. The leader and his men may be devoted to each other without the development of any such personal familiarities of manner as might impair authority.

Active sympathy tends to grow up rapidly between individuals who are thrown much together and who share the same experiences, producing similar emotions. This means that the closer the official relations between superior and subordinates, the better the opportunity for understanding and coöperation. The nearer officers assume the position of sympathetic co-workers, the more they are respected and

cheerfully obeyed as representatives to whom common interests may be safely entrusted. The loyal support that sympathy induces is far greater than that which is commanded by authority.

The soldier also tends to look for such sympathy in an unconscious reaching out for the mental support which in civil life is afforded by family relations and ties and which is so largely absent in the army. Here an instinctive reaction is found in the selection of some close friend or "buddy" who can be the recipient of confidences in the assurance that they will be met in a receptive and friendly manner. The tendency to tell exaggerated stories of excessive hardship and suffering to civilians also expresses a seeking for the sympathy which military life so largely denies. This tendency is often the basis of the sensational stories of mistreatment which are avidly seized upon, featured in the press and believed by the public to the discredit of the service. If officers are in sympathetic relationship with their men many such stories and undesirable reactions of the public will not develop.

In the promotion of company and regimental spirit the instincts of sympathy and gregariousness should be stimulated as much as possible. The initiative and motive power largely repose in commanders. The men should be linked to each other and to their superiors by all possible interests, natural or artificial. Harsh, unsympathetic non-commissioned officers should be given attention. Disagreements should be tactfully smoothed out and feuds and hatreds not allowed to develop. Exaltation of group sympathies by contests, hikes, ceremonials and other means should be stimulated. The men should also feel that their personal problems, hopes and aims are of very real interest to their officers. An appreciation of sympathy by their superiors will do more to win their loyalty and support than any other thing. This sympathy need not be always, not even usually, verbally expressed, for actions speak louder than words.

However, appropriate commendation, inquiry and advice are very valuable in this respect.

The superior who looks after his men derives much personal satisfaction from his own actions. It is human nature to get enjoyment from doing a good turn, and here material reward is added in the form of higher efficiency. On the part of the subordinate, he too derives pleasure from doing in a way that gives pleasure to others. When the commander is beloved, the men often resist temptation "because the captain would not like it." If the commander notices and remarks on this, the pleasure is heightened and a further stimulus is afforded for continued good conduct. Many a man has been made better because an officer has played upon and satisfied the interest of sympathy in this way. Men who get the idea that others are not interested in their welfare become reckless and tend to anti-social conduct. A feeling of lack of sympathy on the part of others has doubtless been a common cause of seeking forgetfulness in liquor, or of building up a fictitious comradeship in the maudlin sympathies of intoxication.

It follows that the expression of sympathy and interest by superiors should fall where needed most. They must play no favorites, though they will naturally experience personally more pleasant reactions with subordinates of congenial character. Whatever seniors do is exaggerated in importance by the element of prestige. Accordingly they should be watchful for the need and opportunity of demonstrating sympathy. These will be found especially in the recruit or new-comer not yet adjusted; in the foreigner who finds the difficulties of language and custom painful and discouraging; in the older soldier or worker who has some special weakness or besetting vice to conquer; in the shy and unduly non-assertive who needs self-confidence, and in those struggling with the special problems of life which come to every individual and demand solution. In short, the wise officer seeks opportunity to be of service. He removes the cause of

difficulty when he can and if this proves beyond his powers at least his sympathetic interest is none the less prized by the recipient. Also he wins an individual supporter whose influence is promptly felt in group esprit and in the higher efficiency of his unit. All this is as important in industry as in the army; one of the great causes of labor turnover is unsympathetic handling by foremen and minor officials.

Where the men are materially out of sympathy with their superiors a condition tends to ensue which, in industrial relations, is termed the "conscious withdrawal of efficiency" or the "strike on the job." There is acquiescence in an enforced form rather than interest in substance, and productivity falls. The problem so created presents special points of difficulty. Such passive opposition of spirit will neutralize every effort of a superior who is efficient only in a mechanical sense. It cannot be reached by force. Attempts at punishment and arbitrary display of power only make it worse. In industry such attempts lead to sabotage and strike — in the army to disorder and desertion. But the condition yields to the restoration of mutual sympathy, interest and confidence. When passive opposition exists it is proof positive that the commander is lacking in certain elements of leadership. Transfer to another command is a common effort at drastic remedy, but to transfer an officer without ensuring a practice of better methods in his new field of duty is merely to create a new focus of discontent and inefficiency elsewhere. The basic cause must be removed. No undertaking can succeed unless the men and the commander are in sympathy. A commander who blames his subordinates for "lack of support" is usually himself at fault.

Sympathy as an altruistic instinct is expressed by a tendency to aid the weaker or those in distress, even at the expense of personal advantage. The spectator of a street fight has an active sympathy with the smaller man. His first instinct is to take sides with him and this often follows

unless dissipated by information that the smaller man has been guilty of an offense against life, property, or social order and is receiving a merited chastisement. The smaller combatant in a contest, if plucky, gets the applause. The unwarranted attack on Belgium raised up for her, through sympathy, a host of defenders against further aggression and of avengers for wrongs consummated. The innocent non-combatant sufferer in war furnishes additional motive for the punishment of the foe. In cases where direct assistance is blocked, or adequate relief cannot be given, the quality of pity is aroused as a component of sympathy. An altruistic quality of sympathy is evoked toward a superior from his organization if the men see that he is particularly concerned with the welfare of the weaker and those more in need of assistance.

Sympathy is capitalized for efficiency in result. The value of good will between chiefs and workers is an asset which may be estimated in millions of dollars by a great industrial organization. A greater output of a product of better quality is the result of sympathy in a mutual purpose. The same factor of efficiency which has such value in civil life also operates in the success of an army. The organizations whose officers are trusted and respected by their men will maintain higher military standards for accomplishments in peace and war. No superior, if only for personal and selfish reasons, can afford to affect to ignore what the men think of him, for upon the relative zeal and degree of thoroughness with which they carry out his orders rests his own reputation.

All persons are unconsciously regardful of signs and expressions by which they may interpret the mental attitude of others. Those of higher intellectuality readily interpret delicate shades of meaning, while those whose perceptions are dull may grasp only coarser expressions of approval and disapproval. Officers should pay special attention to this point of estimating the qualities and degrees of sympathy

manifested by their men, for correct knowledge of such premises is necessary to the solution of personal problems presented by their subordinates. And practically all problems, however large, begin as problems of the individual.

Sympathy must be real and not feigned. Sham in this respect will be quickly detected and create only disgust. Soldiers are shrewd judges of character and direct in their expression of interpretation and reaction. The officer who has little of the quality of sympathy, or exercises it with but few, will hardly be a leader and inspirer in those collective states of emotion which bind organizations together.

Austerity, an expression of lack of sympathy, is always instinctively resented as creating an unpleasant or painful psychological atmosphere. The obvious absence of sympathy on the part of others always arouses resentment, while a declared lack of sympathy creates opposition. A brusque manner, which some mistake as evidence of military quality, inevitably antagonizes.

All this is of special importance to inexperienced officers who may tend to regard their men as a subordinate class merely to be controlled and used. Some withhold sympathy because they do not realize its usefulness and desirability. Some treat the personal difficulties of the men which are brought to them as of little moment, though to the man himself the matter is of prime importance. Few soldiers thus treated repeat such an experience. They lose respect and liking for their commander, and indifference and distrust operate to undermine loyalty and efficiency.

Morale work has its basis in personal interest and human sympathy. It treats the soldier or worker not only as a military or industrial unit but also as an individual. It believes that he deserves something over and above his pay that the Government or employer gives him. That something is sympathetic, human consideration of his reasonable personal interests.

Imitation. Imitation is an instinctive tendency to do as

others are doing, and thus reinforces other instincts in their expression. It is highly developed in both men and animals, being observed perhaps in its greatest intensity in the imitative action of sheep. In the lower animals, it is particularly strong in anything that has to do with the fear instinct. Flight, with evidences of fear, produces similar action among those observing it. Cavalry experience shows that when a leading horse hurries, hesitates or jumps, those following tend to do the same. This is an expression of self preservation in the avoidance of presumed danger. With human beings, imitation has a powerful effect in the development of panic or, on the other hand, the control of fear.

Imitation is strongly developed in children, especially those of tender years who are receiving a multiplicity of first experiences and impressions and are being called upon for appropriate reactions. Many forms of childish play are due to attempts to reproduce the acts or experiences of others. The little girl who dresses in her mother's clothes, or the urchin who shoulders a stick and steps out alongside the marching column are expressing imitation. What their parents and elders do is intently watched by children and not only the act but the very mannerism or intonation of voice is reproduced. This conforms to the law that the stimulus for imitation shall come from a source recognized, in whole or part, as superior, and to the young child his parents and elders appear omnipotent.

When greater self assertiveness develops with pubescence, the instinct to imitate becomes lessened. In later life the tendency to imitate is limited to those examples recognized as possessing ability to do things particularly well or as having a superior status. It is an outflow of prestige and associated with the quality of submission, at least in so far as the act or quality imitated is concerned. Those undertaking a new task are prone to seek and follow an example. Exaggerated imitation, especially of one in the status of an inferior, expresses ridicule and contempt. It arouses resent-

ment in the subject; while if based on respect, " imitation is the sincerest form of flattery."

Imitation is a powerful factor in the control of action. It may be automatic and not governed by reason or logic. Here it follows example without inquiry into its purpose or cause. Compliance with the whims of fashion is largely due to it, just as it lies at the root of custom and procedure which impel the individual to do as others do. Those who do not follow the paths of precedent and imitation of accepted procedures find a painful environment in the conservative community. If their conduct is variant in the extreme, it becomes anti-social or perhaps criminal.

In imitation, the individual may or may not be conscious that he is imitating. Consciousness may play no directing part as, for example, when a soldier starts to run for the rear and others imitate him until the line breaks. A horse stampedes and the whole herd follows. On the other hand, it may be conscious, as when the recruit carries out the manual of arms as demonstrated to him by the drill sergeant, or when he deliberately sets about to imitate some admired officer or to reproduce some skilled action.

Imitation offers a short cut to the correct performance of act, avoiding the difficulties and painful emotions inseparable from experience founded on trial and error. It uses the result of experience painfully gained by others. In this way tradition comes into play as a worthy guide for conduct, while custom is act based on crystallized tradition, whether in or out of the military service. Imitation is thus the foundation of military conservatism which, if it does not yield promptly to the logic of events, is left behind in the march of human progress because it finds more pleasure in old modes of doing than in new modes of thinking.

The strength of the instinct to imitate those possessing prestige creates, as a corollary, the necessity for officers to present a good example to their men. The standards of ideals and conduct thus embodied by commanders must be

high, for they will be unconsciously adopted by subordinates and the virtues and faults reflected. The slothful officer will have a careless and indifferent command.

Imitation relates to the processes of sympathy and suggestion. Satisfaction is derived from the continued copying of the acts of others. It is expressed with particular power by the crowd, where reason ceases to govern and which swayed by the words or personality of its leaders follows them to excesses or extremes in action.

Thus it will be seen that imitation is a prime factor in collective mental life and behavior. Its force varies with the number and intensity of standards for imitation. The individual adapts his conduct to conform with those of his group, where all are molded by common standards of appearance, thought and act.

Instinctive, unconscious imitation functions strongly in the soldier, for the diversity of objective stimuli present in civil life is absent. Single standards prevail, impressions of similar kind are continuous and intensive, receptivity is great and the whole force of custom and code operates to produce conformance to accepted type. Conscious imitation is stimulated in the recruit, who is alert to follow others and thereby reduce mistake in his new environment. Frequently persons are designated as examples to follow in drill or other procedure.

Accordingly, the soldier quickly adopts the customs, methods and mannerisms of the military environment in which he lives. It should need no argument to impress officers with the fact that the military environment should be right, so that result of unconscious imitation should be along correct lines.

It is important to make soldiers realize the influence for good or bad they themselves thus have over their comrades. Many can scarcely appreciate it and instances of the force of imitation and example should be given them. The man who coughs at a lecture, drinks from his canteen, sings,

criticizes, starts to eat his lunch, goes over the top, or runs to the rear induces others to follow his example unconsciously. Most men respond readily to an appeal to set a good example in behalf of their comrades when they might resent the direct approach in behalf of themselves. In such matters, men are more willing to be the doctor than the patient. This method of handling a situation may often be used to good advantage. When soldiers have learned to appreciate their own influence they should be instructed as to the special ways they can be of service or, viewed from the other angle, how they may avoid being the unconscious cause of fault in others.

In civil life, bad companions are recognized as playing a large part in the production of delinquency. The same factor exists in the army, but not to the same degree, for the reason that the more careful selection of soldiers and the constant supervision under which they live exclude many undesirables and curtail the pernicious activities of those who do get into the service. Where soldiers of bad character are found, officers should, in addition to taking measures to better them, study their reaction upon their comrades. Often men of weaker personality should be withdrawn from the corrupting influence of bad comrades lest these more easily influenced men get into trouble from following vicious examples.

Imitation is a powerful factor in all training, especially that of a military nature. Inasmuch as many recruits are slow to grasp the significance of words and put them into appropriate action, their training is often greatly helped by giving them visual presentation. They should not only be told how, but shown how a thing should be done. Among the less educated classes the interpretation of the sense of seeing is far more active and accurate than comprehension through the sense of hearing. "Seeing is believing." Imitation is especially valuable in transmitting an idea to a large group, as for example in leading setting-up exercises.

In handling the instinct of imitation in soldiers it is entirely a matter of purpose and circumstance as to whether it should be checked or stimulated. It should be repressed when example is bad and encouraged to function in every channel where example is inspiring and efficiency may be promoted. The instinct cannot be wholly blocked, but a desirable outlet may be substituted for an undesirable one.

Acquisitiveness. The instinct of acquisitiveness is especially developed in man, but exists also in some of the lower animals. Bees and ants collect and store up articles of food, as do squirrels and other rodents. On the other hand, certain birds, monkeys and other animals take articles of no use to them but of strange and attractive nature. The extraordinary collections of heterogeneous articles made by the mountain pack-rat of this country are proverbial. Young children clutch for toys, flowers and things that attract them without sense of the property rights of others. There are but few older children that do not make " collections " of one thing or another. The useless articles contained in a boy's pockets are a marvel to his elders. In later life the collecting and acquiring instinct usually takes the form of amassing money, often to an extent beyond all possible want. In such cases the acquisitive instinct may be sublimated in the collection of the beautiful, rare or curious, as paintings, tapestries, snuff-boxes, or other articles in the pleasure of which others may share. In such instances, the possession of property is not valued for the intrinsic usefulness of the articles but for the prestige it confers. The latter is one of the reasons for acquiring property beyond all reasonable needs. The hoarding phase of acquisitiveness is stimulated in certain individuals, such as misers, until it becomes a sordid obsession, harmful alike to the best interests of the possessor and the community. It is intensified in certain races, whose dominant interests in life seem to relate to the possessing of property.

Acquisitiveness is often closely associated with rivalry.

Things which are most sought after are most prized through that fact alone. The demand for many articles is purely artificial and springs from competition. The diamond is more valuable than paste merely because it is more rare and not from any great difference in appearance. Acquisitiveness thus serves to animate competition through the opportunity for special reward which is offered and which is denied to all but few. Playing games for prizes thus always stimulates endeavor; even though the rewards themselves may have no intrinsic value, they are the visible symbols of success. Material things are wanted as evidence of mental contentment. If contentment with it be lost, the thing loses its value.

The value of possession is enhanced by publicity. It is not only to have something others have not, but to have others know it. Ostentation in dress or mode of living, beyond the needs of custom and comfort, expresses this. Publishing the score of the baseball game caters to it in the winners. Acquisitiveness is thus a quality of selfishness, having its roots in the purpose of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. Even the lowest form of mankind desires to secure and retain against future need. Upon the instinct of acquisitiveness the interests of capital and labor frequently clash.

All business conducted for profit has its basis in acquisitiveness. The motive which governs any business transaction is what the individual expects to get out of it. In the business competition of civil life it is reinforced by rivalry. Hence persons who have amassed great wealth are still spurred to continued activity by the extent to which the instincts of collection and competition have been developed, even though the use of them for self-protection is no longer needed. In industry, acquisitiveness is one of the mainsprings of endeavor. In the army, the fixed pay, common standards of living and regular if slow promotion tend to inhibit acquisitiveness along the usual lines. Officers and

men in the service understand that they have deliberately removed themselves from circumstances in which its stimulation for the acquirement of great wealth is neither expected nor possible. Hence its strength is exerted through the few channels left open to it in commendation and promotion, which explains the magnified and absorbing interest which the service has in these matters. They offer the only outlet for a perfectly natural instinct in the seeking of a reward for effort.

Acquisitiveness is back of the habits of saving and thrift, which are potent aids in maintaining morale. The possession of property, however small, tends to stabilize a man, promote his self-respect, give a saner outlook on life and enhance his status in the eyes of his associates. It is a bond for good conduct. The saving man is usually reliable, trustworthy and a supporter of authority. If an obligation of saving can be created, it will steady men who might fritter their money away, not only uselessly, but in forms of dissipation inimical to morale and efficiency. It is not so much the amount saved that counts for discipline as the state of mind responsible for the saving. The first hundred dollars deposited may give the owner more satisfaction than the multimillionaire derives from his wealth.

On the other hand, money lending and usury, whether within the military service or by civilians, is always provocative of lowered morale and should be rigorously repressed. When non-commissioned officers lend to privates at interest rates, the results are always highly unfavorable to discipline and contentment.

What has been said of thrift also applies to insurance, which is only another form of saving. Here it may be that the motive extends beyond self and is exalted by the fact that the act is for the benefit of another. Steadiness of character is engendered by insurance and morale is raised by knowledge of forethought for the future. Government insurance

further stabilizes the man as a citizen. Conversely, the depressing effect of lapsing premiums on the spirits and conduct of men is irrefutable, and officers should take steps to keep their men from overinsuring themselves, for deprivation of reasonable comforts tends to make the men allow their entire insurance to lapse rather than reduce it to a proper amount.

Liberty loan bonds, thrift and savings stamps are convenient forms of investment. The average soldier, however, has no safe place to keep such securities and they are liable to loss. Also they are readily convertible into cash, or are collateral for gambling, and thus their relative availability may be an argument against them. The company commander can usually provide for their safe keeping. If out of possession of the soldier he will be less liable to spend them as a result of transitory emotion.

Gambling may here be mentioned. It is an expression of acquisitiveness, self-assertion, rivalry, the spirit of adventure and a craving for excitement. Which one of these motives dominates, varies with the individual and his circumstances. The soldier naturally tends to fall into gambling practices, for his very calling is one in which life itself is a hazard and in which periods of high nervous tension alternate with relaxation and monotony.

Gambling within a company develops ideas and relations hostile to comradeship and morale, makes the winners selfish, deceitful and lazy, and stirs up rancor among the losers. It is worse when the company sharpers deliberately fleece the recruits. It is worst of all when the non-commissioned officers gamble with the privates and thereby undermine their status and authority. It may be that some commanders tacitly accept it as something that cannot be prevented and beyond their control. But very much can be accomplished to minimize its prevalence and reduce its effects, not only by compulsion, admonition and suggestion to the offend-

ers, but by physical alternatives. If the gambling spirit is given outlet through exercise and competitive contests it will be largely diverted into more desirable channels.

The instinct of acquisitiveness lies at the basis of appreciation of reward. It can thus be utilized effectively for military purposes as a stimulus for exceptionally meritorious conduct, either in the form of some material benefit, as a decoration emblematic of the service, or the purely abstract reward of commendation.

In the matter of reward, the army man, like the scientist, physician and others, prefers to measure achievements by yard-sticks other than those made of gold and he is not ready to admit that an individual with ten times the money is ten times as much of a man. The highest reward is the idealistic — not the material. Money does not tempt men to face death, but the desire to coin praise may reinforce ideals of purpose as a motive for heroic action. And so it is that acquisitiveness seeks rewards which are intangible as well as those which are apparent. If the source of commendation possesses prestige and does not cheapen it by too free bestowal, it is more highly prized. Citations in orders and commendatory letters are much cherished possessions. Verbal expressions of approval bring satisfaction, especially if accompanied by suitable publicity. The idea which they develop is a very real and valued possession to the one commended. The thanks of Congress is the highest gift which can be bestowed by the Nation. All this indicates the valuable results in efficiency which may be secured by the proper stimulation of acquisitiveness. The wise officer will see that appropriate reward is given when due and withheld when undeserved. The withholding of reward and commendation fairly won by accepted standards is always resented by those affected. To give it too freely is to cheapen its value to all. To give it in such a way as to secure maximum stimulus to all with the minimum feeling of injustice by any implies a high quality of understanding of

human nature. Therein lies the difficulty which must be overcome in using acquisitiveness as a military stimulus.

In the military service, one of the most noticeable expressions of the acquisitive instinct is the tendency of soldiers to collect souvenirs. Here the desire for possession of some battlefield object, as a helmet, may master the instinct of fear and make the heavily loaded soldier undertake the added burden. Articles intrinsically worthless may have a sentimental value to their possessor far in excess of anything expressible in terms of money. The souvenir or keepsake symbolizes the experience of emotion. Memory fades, but the sight of a personal memento conjures up the appropriate mental picture with great clearness. Mementoes gathered by others and without the flavor of personal association are relatively little valued.

One reason for the strength of the souvenir craving in soldiers is the fact that the limited facilities in barracks and the requirements of orders in limiting what may be kept in possession, habitually block the instinct of acquisition, so that special opportunity to gratify it brings it out with greatly increased force.

The control of the souvenir desire requires nice discrimination and tact. Too drastic and direct measures preventing the procuring or retention of souvenirs may arouse discontent and bitter resentment. The action of overseas authorities in removing practically worthless souvenirs from the baggage of certain troops returning home provoked anger beyond any relation to the value of the articles removed. Embarrassments of possession can usually be relieved by having the men send unnecessary articles home, or they may themselves get rid of them in time, after their novelty and interest in possession has worn off.

If the instinct of acquisitiveness is checked, resentment, anger or hatred may be aroused against those responsible. Against those who profit by comparative success there may be aroused the envy, malice and vindictiveness of those

whose desire to acquire has been blocked. There is a discomfort at being outdone and seeing others approved. This explains the too common attitude of belittling and criticizing those of accomplishment and prominence. If injustice is believed to enter, these feelings are enhanced and discord develops. Hence when special reward is given it is well worth while to see that others are informed and assured that it is well deserved. The creation of high altruistic sentiments of honor and sportsmanship is the best way of controlling such expression of selfishness.

Man and the lower animals will strive more desperately to hold property or prey, once secured, than to acquire more. Violation of possessive rights is resented more than interference with competition. Troops fighting on their own soil or defending it from invasion have added incentives derived from stimulation of most of the primal instincts. That resistance is most desperate when all that is dear is being protected. An invading force, whose home interests are safeguarded, can have no such incentive. All measures for stimulation of morale must take this basic classification and difference into consideration. The German authorities recognized this and left nothing undone to give their people the conviction that theirs was a war of defense rather than of aggression.

Acquisitiveness is of course back of the tendency to loot and pillage, once promised to soldiery as an additional incentive for success. The prohibition of looting in civilized armies, and the severe simplicity of military life, barrack furnishings and facilities, tend to block the instinct of acquisition, which is, on the other hand, so highly stimulated in civil life.

The tendency to appropriate the property of others is frequently accompanied in pillaging by a desire to destroy what cannot be used. Children sometimes destroy without apparent reason, but with evident pleasure, the toys or work of their playmates. This tendency helps to explain the ex-

traordinary acts of wanton destruction and pollution practised by the Germans where no military necessity existed therefor. Where soldiers or mobs get out of hand and pillage, arson may be expected.

Play. The desire to play expresses a true instinct and should be recognized as such. Like many of the other instincts it exists in both man and the lower animals and is especially strong in the earlier periods of life. The relatively immature recruit comes well within the age limit of the strong desire to play.

The play instinct has been chiefly considered, in such recognition as it has received in the army in the past, not so much as a psychological factor requiring studied attention as an incidental attribute of childhood exercised merely for purposes of recreation and pleasure. This idea is both wrong and unfortunate. The play instinct is a fundamental trait which has great possibilities of practical value in promoting military purpose and efficiency.

Play in the young tends to take the form of expression along the lines of the sterner duties of later life; the boy delights in contests of skill and strength, the girl in her dolls and playhouse. The same obtains in animals, and the pursuit of the string or ball by the kitten and the scuffling of puppies with each other are but the miniature of catching and killing prey. This idea may be usefully employed with soldiers in deliberately selecting diversions and contests which have a tendency to develop and maintain certain qualities of mind and body before they are needed in actual use, and thus have a preliminary value in preparing for military measures and emergencies.

The instinct of play can be used to instil interest and arouse effort in physical and mental tasks and competitions which would not be undertaken without it. It creates excitement and promotes the expression of certain other more utilitarian instincts by establishing the assumption that the occasions for their exercise are still there. By altering pur-

pose, it changes the whole impression produced by act. Mark Twain's boy hero, confronted with the necessity of white-washing the fence, converted it from a task of drudgery to a valuable privilege by giving it a recreational purpose. If a soldier who does not apparently relish a task is told to "play the game," he usually goes at it in a new spirit of endeavor and sportsmanship.

The motives evoking the play instinct are usually those of self-expression and rivalry, together with a desire for mental relaxation, or diversion of mental activity into new channels, with relief from anxiety or routine. This is the ostensible object. But the play instinct is, in addition, a valuable agent in molding the character of individuals, preparing them for military life, for coöperation, submission, leadership, sympathy, competition and better self-consciousness and self-confidence. It brings out adaptability, sociability, courage, ambition, cheerfulness and sportsmanship. It is one of the strongest motives for developing muscular strength and physical fitness, while the results accomplished in this way are quite as valuable, and usually more extensive, than those acquired by regular and formal military methods. Any task that is given the appearance of play is entered into with more zest.

The muscular development and activity gained by physical play tends to maintain a certain nervous tone that favors an alert and confident habit of mind. The effect of the play instinct in promoting mental activity is well known. "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." Mental play, such as games of checkers, cards, chess, etc., is a strong stimulant of the mental powers, calling for greater acuteness of memory, deduction, initiative, assertion and the like. Accordingly, mentally sluggish men should be encouraged in them. Strong play tendencies are usually found associated with high personal efficiency. Competitive play runs parallel with combativeness, in that the most pugnacious

peoples tend to show the greatest rivalry in sports and games.

The diffident, shy recruit can be given judiciously selected opportunities for play that will arouse self-assertion and confidence. Mimic competitions of this sort are of great help in promoting adjustment of mental status and relationship without the frictions that might result if they were made a serious business. Recruits especially should be made to play in mass games, and by contact and attrition remove unfamiliarity, strangeness and aloofness from each other. The social results of play are of great value in building up esprit and discipline. It also furnishes standards of strenuous but honorable conduct.

Where contests are carried out in play there is a certain amount of psychological self-restraint, which may be accepted as one of the rules of the game. In football, for example, the man who loses his temper is ruled out. This teaches the valuable lesson of self-control and of taking punishment in the pursuit of an ideal. Public opinion recognizes this in the esteem in which any one is held who is a " good loser," and by which conduct receives merit as well as the results of success.

Mass play teaches group solidarity and sympathy, in addition to its value as a social agency. Officers charged with athletic activities should thus see that every individual is included, the interest of all aroused to participate, and the benefits not confined to a few picked athletes or " stars."

The play instinct can be used to great advantage in reinforcing military training. Men believing themselves fatigued by drill, will in a few minutes willingly undertake setting-up exercise, especially if there be the amusement element of musical accompaniment. They will then engage in mass games with spirit. Play officially required shortly before the end of the working day will very likely be carried over into the spare time of the men by themselves and

a greater degree of physical benefit secured than could otherwise be obtained. The play instinct can be invoked as a diversion to take the minds of the men off other things and make them forget their mental troubles in fresher, stronger emotions of a healthy nature. It should be systematically stimulated for this purpose, and is a popular remedy always at hand and available for application. Play is a ready by-pass for the relief of energy that might otherwise be expended along undesirable lines. It is thus a direct aid to good order and discipline. When physical outlet is provided through play, men forget and lose their craving for the lower form of pleasures. Constructive recreation replaces destructive indulgence.

The use of play in relation to industrial administration is valuable. It cannot be carried out as comprehensively in civil industry as in military life, since much of its expression must remain a matter of individual preference. Yet within certain limits there are always opportunities for its promotion by superiors in an unobtrusive manner.

If the instinct of play be unduly blocked, the men become discontented, morose and hypercritical. Energy developed will assuredly be expended, and if proper outlets are not provided it will appear in undesirable ways and in acts of indiscipline and disorder. "Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do"—and play is a ready means for seeing that they are not idle.

The superior who interferes with reasonable expression through play creates resentment against himself. To be regarded as a kill-joy is to lose sympathetic support. Human beings, especially of the age-class within which the soldier falls, naturally tend to be cheerful, joyous and optimistic. Play expresses this state of mind as well as stimulates it. The child who nurses a grievance announces that it "won't play." The sulky, blue or unhappy soldier acts from a similar state of mind. Both lose their negative state of mind if they are brought to engage in play. The

commander need not worry about the conduct of his men during their off-hours if they engage in play of a wholesome character. It is his privilege as well as duty to see that it is wholesome.

The soldier, with a store of excess nervous force due to abundant nourishment and absence of undue exhaustion from overwork, has special need for relief through play. Some superiors seem to assume that hard work, even to exhaustion, will take the place of play in preventing the evils pertaining to idleness. This is a fallacy. Such commands will be found festering with discontent and desertion. Suitable relaxation in play is necessary to efficiency and proper state of mind. The play instinct cannot be safely disregarded. It is accordingly the part of wisdom to use it as one of the most valuable of military forces for efficiency, discipline and government.

The Constructive Instinct. The instinct of construction in man is genuine and powerful. Combined with curiosity, it achieves all human purposes. To some extent, the constructive instinct is seen in lower animals; ants and birds labor industriously in constructing more or less elaborate habitations, while beavers work with great intensity and devotion in building dams and houses. In all human beings there is an innate desire to modify plastic material, as shown in the child making " mud pies " or building houses with blocks. Each individual tends to mold certain objects or conditions to better conform to his own ideas and embody his thoughts. When brought into a new environment, he promptly makes changes which he fancies will contribute to his comfort and efficiency. Thus no commander follows exactly the measures of his predecessor; he has a natural desire to create something that he can call his own and takes pride in the result.

The instinct of construction — that is, making or doing something — is the instinct of work. It furnishes the basis of occupation and of pride of workmanship. It explains

why the man with a genuine occupation is happy in it, and why the prisoner in confinement and convalescent in hospital are irked by having nothing to do. The man with idleness on his hands and surplus energy to dispose of is very likely to give outlet to it through undesirable channels. The over-rich, with no need to work at useful things, incline toward making a systematized occupation of killing time in senseless frivolities.

Nearly every one derives pleasure from cultivating flowers and vegetation because of the satisfaction it gives to constructiveness in watching the results. It is common knowledge that the class of workers mechanically performing routine tasks at the behest of others desire relief in the opportunities for expression afforded on the farm or in the garden. Whether a man raises vegetables, writes a book, paints a picture, builds a house or organizes a regiment, he is impelled to it by constructiveness and takes pride in the result of his handiwork.

The impulse of constructiveness is strengthened if the individual is given a definite idea that he is expected to make something. The suggestion to the child that he build a house of blocks, a boat, or a snow-fort, at once starts him industriously toward a definite object, where aimless labor or whittling would soon have palled. The giving of definite purpose is particularly necessary where progress and result are not physically so apparent. Officers and drill masters must be given the idea that they are architects, contractors and foremen in the creation of a military structure none the less real because its components are human and not inanimate. The same applies to privates, who should be given ideas that they have a definite and responsible part to play in the up-building and operation of the war machine. Men of lower standards of intelligence deduce this relationship slowly at best and it devolves upon officers to present the idea in concrete and locally assimilable form.

Every man does certain things better than he does others,

and that act is most pleasurable to him which he performs most efficiently. Suitable adaptation of the man to a congenial job for which he is well fitted thus makes for success. The personnel adjutant can be of great assistance in such matters. Many men have such pride in efficiency that they resent an unfamiliar task because of the relatively poor results to be anticipated. Not rarely problems outwardly disciplinary have their basis in matters of executive maladjustment.

It is thus obvious that the constructive instinct is one to be turned to valuable military and industrial account. But to do so most efficiently, the personality of the worker must be allowed to enter. The individual must be given to realize that the task assigned to him is his own particular job, or he will have little incentive to put thought and labor into it. Every human creation, no matter how simple or complex, is an embodiment of thought and concept in which one or more persons had pride of origination and development. Every act offers opportunity for self-expression and self-assertion.

The individual must be given a certain latitude in doing things his own way, else his interest lags. One of the causes of labor discontent is that the day of the artisan who completed an article is past, and the workman is now a specialist creating but a minor part, the relationship of which to the completed whole he scarcely realizes. He gets his reward in money alone. In the old days the artisan received reward not only in money but in personal satisfaction and reputation in his work as an artist.

Similarly, a task in the army should be regarded as an opportunity, in so far as conditions permit, to demonstrate ingenuity and efficiency of method as well as industry in accomplishing result. The subordinate who has carried out a task well " on his own " usually gets as much gratification out of the way he did it as from the results he secured. If a more effective way has been found by him, it will be de-

scribed with pride, for there is a pride of parentage of ideas just as there is of children of the body. The constructive instinct, like all others, atrophies through lack of use. The soldier thus repressed tends toward automatic reliance on higher authority and in an emergency is found wanting.

The deduction from this is to keep the men busy within the bounds of fatigue — busy not with useless activity but with that in which there is obviously some purpose, useful result and the possibility of self-expression. Mere drudgery is resented and produces discontent where the object of the activity may have been to arouse the opposite. But any labor will be effectively done, no matter how arduous and disagreeable, if it be seen as part of a larger plan of which the individual approves.

In the army and in industry therefore, the constructive instinct of the individual should be linked up to producing something in which others are similarly producing parts. The social and gregarious instincts should be brought into play. The object sought should be visualized by the workers, and with men of lesser imagination this visualization can only be accomplished by explanation and demonstration. Parades and manœuvers, where great numbers of men participate, are valuable in showing the complete military machine to those on whom minor drills are beginning to pall. Industrial workers should understand the complete machine in the creation of which their efforts have been embodied. Team work thus comes from the instincts of gregariousness and construction, operating not under compulsion but by free will. The idea of " doing one's bit " expresses the just contribution of the individual in performance of the communal task. It gives a sense of co-operation and cohesion and adds luster to the humble part in the larger undertaking.

Where the constructive instinct of the individual is blocked, resentment is aroused against the task and the one who imposed it. Where it is checked, dissatisfaction re-

sults. The superior who delegates authority and restricts the methods of his subordinates only within broad lines, permitting of individual choice and expression, holding them to strict accountability for results, is both popular and successful.

Wherever the performance of duty is necessary, if it be given a social quality this will prevent any idea of monotony or drudgery. The impression should be given of satisfying occupation, in pleasant company, for a useful purpose, and with reasonable latitude of initiative and procedure.

The Migratory Instinct. This is a true instinct, impelling the seeking of new and more congenial surroundings. All animal life shows it in various forms of locomotion, as creeping, walking, swimming and flying. It is particularly well demonstrated in the periodic migrations of great numbers of fish, birds and animals. In human beings, it was doubtless at the base of the nomadic wanderings of races and peoples before and after the dawn of history. It is one of the factors behind emigration and pioneering. The " wander-year " of the German youth was a recognized expression of it. The instinct is stronger in early than in later life, when individuals tend to " settle down."

Most of the factors of civilization, through the stabilization of interests which it produces, operate to repress the migratory instinct. When these interests weaken, it at once functions more strongly. A large class responds to it, varying from the well-to-do individual who seeks vacation in travel to the roadside wanderer under the shifting purpose of vagabondage.

The migratory instinct has a strong seasonal variation in man as well as the lower animals, especially relating to spring and fall. Some persons habitually wander at such times, the greenery and warmth of spring and summer inviting to the road. Similarly, the drift is toward the south or city when the leaves begin to fall and all nature tends to become lethargic.

Conditions which are painful to the individual and which he cannot correct also stimulate the migratory instinct. Removal from the influence of the agencies of irritation is thus instinctively resorted to as a relief phenomenon, whether from mental conflict, uncongenial surroundings or physical repression. The punished or restrained child often threatens to "run away." It is responsible for the high proportion of recruits who desert because they have not yet adjusted themselves to the new and still painful environment. It is one of the great factors of labor turnover. It is also responsible for the desire to seek new surroundings, not because the old are necessarily painful, but because of the lure of anticipation of others still more pleasurable. In youth, excursions, sight-seeing trips, etc., result, or the boy may leave home to seek adventure.

The migratory instinct affects the military service in several ways. This is recognized in the definition of a soldier given by a high officer as "a man who wants to be in a place where he isn't." In recruiting, it is powerfully appealed to in showing the opportunity given the soldier to travel and visit strange lands. As already stated, it also has a direct relation to desertion, the ratio of desertions being much higher in the spring, when all nature is moving and stirring under a quickening urge, than at any other time of the year. It doubtless has considerable to do with the absence-without-leave problem and the extraordinary propensity of soldiers to wander away from camp on almost aimless trips of irresponsibility and inquiry. The latter, after the armistice, suddenly developed into one of the great problems of the troops in France and was temporarily beyond full disciplinary control.

Where military surroundings are necessarily unpleasant and cannot be satisfactorily improved, the men should be withdrawn from them temporarily as opportunity offers, for the relief of monotony and strain and to serve in a measure as a mental tonic. Such change of scene and thought need

not be extreme to produce beneficial mental results. This need of change of environment was abundantly demonstrated in the recent war in the necessity for the periodical removal of troops from the trenches to "rest camps." Here the need for "rest" was not so much dependent on physical fatigue as on mental strain. The men were still physically capable of performing their military duty, but were losing their enthusiasm for doing so. They were losing their "punch" and, as they expressed it, were "fed up."

The obvious checking of liberty of movement invariably arouses reaction. Men resent what may appear to them to be unnecessary restrictions in the use of the spare time to which they feel that they are reasonably entitled. It should be noted that repression of freedom of movement is one of the common factors in most forms of punishment, to escape from which almost any danger is dared. Restrictions such as quarantine, despite sublimation in altruistic purpose, are resented. Lack of consideration in unnecessarily restricting passes will always arouse discontent, often reflected in unauthorized absence. To withhold a reasonable degree of liberty is a flouting of the laws of human nature.

Much is said later relative to the need for reasonable liberality in authorizing absence from military jurisdiction, especially in relation to desertions and absences without leave. Suffice it here to emphasize the fact that the natural instincts of migration and curiosity impel all human beings, and especially young men, to escape, temporarily at least, from conditions that have become monotonous or galling and to undergo experiences that are novel and satisfying. Nor does a military society from which women and children are excluded meet all human needs.

There are also many personal and family affairs impelling to absence which, in the minds of certain individuals, may dominate other ideas and motives. Such should be known, inquired into, and, if the reason for absence be sufficient, the latter be given proper opportunity for expression. If

this be done, many cases of delinquency expressed in desertion and absenteeism will not develop. This does not mean that because a man thinks he would like a pass or furlough he should always have it. But it does mean that such requests should be inquired into and, if reasonable and practicable, they should not be denied. The wise commander will not remain uninformed as to facts nor refuse to be guided by them.

Moreover, consideration for the soldier when off duty goes far toward increasing military efficiency when on duty. Men work best when they believe that their proper interests are safeguarded. Reasonable pass privileges are necessary if the men are to be contented. They may not use them to the full extent, but the mere fact that they can be had by men of good conduct exerts a desirable mental influence and relation to behavior.

There is a certain class, probably not large, which might tend to take advantage of liberality. This is a group which often tends to irresponsibility and perhaps disorder. It can be influenced by the information that pass privileges can be earned by good conduct and that it depends on themselves whether they are granted or not. In any case, the welfare of the many should not be minimized by the faults of the few. What is needed is the summary punishment of individual abusers of privilege. Week-end passes should be given freely to specially good-conduct men as an incentive to good behavior. This is a ready means of reward for character and conduct.

The most effective way to hold the pass problem within reasonable limits, and one which arouses no reaction through blocking the migratory instinct, is to make the post so attractive to the men when off duty, by entertainments, events and facilities for recreation, that they will not greatly desire to leave it. When men find a station so unattractive that they are constantly desiring to get away from it, the impelling motives are fore-runners of states of mind which

tend to culminate in absence without leave and desertion.

In meeting the situation, the "good conduct card" is very valuable. This entitles the holder to absent himself from the command without further authority at any time when off duty between retreat and taps, or on holidays during the time specified by his organization commander. It certifies that the holder has been properly instructed and examined as to dress, bearing and military courtesy. The card may be taken up by any officer for failure to comply with its standards. This card system creates an honor class open to all soldiers taking proper pride in their duties, appearance and conduct.

As many men as can be spared should be given furloughs to visit their homes over Christmas and the holidays. This should be announced in advance as a reward to be made on the basis of conduct. This privilege is greatly appreciated by the men, even those who have no expectation of taking advantage of it. In one camp during the war, where Christmas leave was generally denied, the men so resented the deprivation that it was said that about half of them absented themselves illegitimately — a number so great that their action was condoned.

Beside being allowed pass privileges, the soldier must be given opportunity to take advantage of them. Transportation facilities — or rather their lack — may present a very practical morale problem. It has happened, for example, that the car or boat service to stations ran at such hours that the men could make little use of pass privileges after the day's work was done. Any inconvenient transportation schedules are worthy of representations by the commander, and these usually receive favorable consideration. Taxi or jitney systems may be encouraged, with fair charges subject to control by the military authorities, or be operated by the post exchange. Schedules of the transportation service should be posted in every company so that the men may know not only when they may go but when they must return.

The proper handling of the migratory instinct consists in drawing off its energy through suitable channels. Changes of station accomplish this. Practice marches, especially if interest be aroused in advance by suitable publicity and information, are very useful. Short hikes, over different roads, should be frequently substituted for drills. Pass privileges should be restricted only by military necessity and personal conduct. Short week-end trips, with or without official supervision, should be encouraged for the visiting of points of interest, for recreation and sport, hunting, sightseeing, etc. Furloughs should be liberal. Men return in a more wholesome, cheerful state of mind and with greater appreciation of the advantages of a former environment which may have temporarily palled upon them. In this way the migratory instinct is not blocked and its natural tendencies are turned into beneficial purpose.

The Reproductive Instinct. The reproductive instinct has for its object the perpetuation of the species. In civil life it is one of the most powerful social forces and is at the basis of the family. It is an instinct of vast potentiality, and when stimulated in certain individuals it may temporarily surpass and dominate all other instincts. It develops with a certain degree of physical maturity, is accompanied by many psychological changes, and perhaps reaches its highest intensity in the age-class from which soldiers are drawn. It is normally associated with the parental instinct, which similarly, on account of military restrictions, can have little opportunity for expression.

In ancient and medieval warfare the reproductive instinct was appealed to in reinforcing pugnacity and the victors habitually took the women captives as concubines. Indirect suggestion of this nature seems to have been included in some of the psychological appeals made to the enemy soldiers.

The nature of military service is such that normal satisfaction of the reproductive instinct in soldiers is blocked.

Their environment renders marriage impracticable and prevents legitimate expression of the instinct. Accordingly, it becomes, in the military service, an anti-social and anti-disciplinary force, having relation to immorality, venereal disease, sex offenses and other derelictions dependent on them.

Chastity and self-control are powerful factors in the support of war strain. Energy dissipated in one way is lost to use in another. There is less reserve to draw upon in emergency. In those addicted to promiscuous sex indulgence the very character is changed, habits and outlook on life are altered for the worse, and physical strength and endurance impaired.

The existence of the reproductive instinct causes the congregation near war camps of lewd women, whose purpose is to stimulate this instinct and satisfy it. There is also a fascination in the uniform which tends to break down the reserve even of pure girls, especially in time of war and emotional stress in which the soldier is idealized as a defender. The very aggresssiveness which is engendered by military training tends to lead to sex temptation, for bravery and ability to fight for what is cherished provokes admiration in the female of the human as well as other species. On the one hand, there is a feeling by the soldier that each day may be his last, that the hardships of war have won the right to self-indulgence and to the companionship and sympathy of the opposite sex, so greatly missed under his conditions of life. On the other hand there is an emotional state on the part of the woman in which nothing she can give is too much for the defender of herself and country. War also loosens family ties. There are long separations between husband and wife and a tendency to moral relaxation. Public opinion is inclined to be less strict, opportunities are greater and the tension impels to excess.

The problems thus presented are very great and not to be minimized by moralizing but met as practical problems re-

quiring practical study and practical methods. The wise management of men will go very far toward their solution. Because the instinct is latent it is aroused by special excitants. Therefore everything should be avoided which might serve to transform this potential force into action along its normal channels. This implies education, precept, example and particularly avoidance of temptation. The latent energy demands free outlet through other channels beneficial to the military service. The instincts of pugnacity, rivalry, self-assertion and play are particularly the by-passes which should be employed.

The sex instinct, like any other, becomes more active under stimulation and seeks expression along the lines of the excitant. If stimulation does not occur, the instinct remains dormant or is little noticed. In this rests one great value of the repression of prostitution, whereby the opportunities for temptation are minimized. The greatest stimulus to the sex instinct is the presence of the temptress.

Sex matters, in those of perverted ideas, can be associated with almost any object or act. Imagination is a powerful stimulant. Here enters the value of a clean mind by which auto-stimulation in sex matters by the individual is avoided or minimized. Indecent language should be repressed, not only for its effect upon others, but upon the individual himself. The same applies to indecent literature and especially to pornographic illustrations expressive of sex thought.

By sublimation, the attraction toward the opposite sex may be converted into chivalrous respect and used for its protection. One of the best methods of maintaining morality is by preserving relations with home and friends. The remembrance of a mother, wife or sweetheart influences for good. Such ties should be kept up by frequent letters, messages or gifts. Associations with high-class women, as canteen workers, hostess house workers, etc., is of the greatest value, as the men will turn to them for the feminine confidence and sympathy which they require.

Direct instruction in sex hygiene is very valuable, but it should not degenerate into platitudes or be pushed to the point where it loses interest for the soldier. The argument of avoidance of the danger of disease is effective up to a certain point, but it should be remembered that one of the chief objects of military training is to teach indifference to presonal danger and the taking of risks. Purity for the sake of wife and posterity is an argument of strong appeal. Religious appeal is effective with many. Self-denial for the purpose of greater physical strength and endurance will often be effective.

All young men need excitement. If this is not supplied in good kind and legitimate way it will be sought along forbidden lines. Sex excitement thus tends to develop when life is dull, uninteresting and monotonous, without strong purpose to catch and hold the interest. Military life can and should be made interesting, exciting and strenuous as one of the best means of promoting continence. Physical fatigue is a powerful sex depressant, since surplus energy has been drained away through work or sports and the system demands rest and recuperation. Distance from any source of illicit gratification enters here as a factor in deterring from the effort necessary for accomplishment.

The Parental Instinct. The parental instinct has for its object the perpetuation of the species through the protection and maintenance of the young. It is the dominant instinct of the family group. It exists in mankind and most of the lower animals, being particularly intense in new mothers, in whom it may override for the time all other instincts, including fear, hunger and thirst. If its impulse to protect is interfered with, pugnacity of the most fierce and unselfish type is aroused. On the other hand, one of the best approaches to the good will of parents is through that of their children, as politicians have long recognized. This may be used effectively as an approach in the handling of inhabitants of occupied territory in an administrative

way, or in cultivating sympathetic relations with workers in an industrial sense.

The single life of the soldier denies the direct satisfaction of this instinct to most in the service. This habitual suppression explains the great fondness for children of any race or color manifested by soldiers when they come in contact with them. The instinct of sympathy explains the confidence and affection reciprocally excited among the children thus attracted to them.

The parental sentiment should be catered to whenever practicable. The children of the post should be in evidence on proper occasions. At Christmas, every child should be remembered by general but small contributions from members of the command, who should be urged to attend the exercises and share by sympathy in the childish pleasure their generosity has produced. Invitations of soldiers to homes in which there are children, and in which they are allowed to share in the domestic life, are usually especially appreciated.

Despite the fact that the military life is a childless one, the parental instinct may still be appealed to in the interest of good conduct. Most soldiers expect to marry, and the appeal to maintain a good record and good morals, to leave a heritage of pride and health to posterity, is powerful.

Persons denied expression of the parental instinct in kind, often express it vicariously through the protection and care of pets. Thus the repressed maternal instinct of the spinster finds outlet in the interest and affection expressed on cats, dogs and birds. The general repression of the paternal instinct in soldiers explains the lavish affection of the trooper for his mount and of all soldiers for the organization mascot. It shows at once that the ancient and honorable position of company dog has a scientific basis in human nature, while it explains the propensity of troops to acquire a variety and superabundance of pets through one means or another. It is merely response to a natural craving which,

within reasonable limits, can ordinarily be gratified with advantage to mental state.

By direct extension of the parental instinct, the ill-treatment of any weak, defenseless creature arouses sentiments and emotions in others for its protection. Sympathy goes out to the " under dog." This is the basis of law and social order. The infliction of suffering on the helpless arouses moral indignation when other means of punishment of the offender are not available. The protection of the weak thus embodies the spirit of chivalry, which gives rise to some of the most noble and altruistic ideals and sentiments that actuate the soldier.

The Religious Instinct. The religious instinct, innate in mankind everywhere, finds expression in admiration, wonder, awe and reverence toward an omnipotency. It includes the element of fear of the unknown. Through it, expectation of reward for good conduct and apprehension of punishment for fault are extended far beyond all human limits. Its expression is largely emotional and tends toward intolerance of other beliefs. Accordingly, a common religious belief is one of the strongest forces a nation can have for general homogeneity of thought and ideals.

All branches of the human race, no matter how low in the intellectual scale, have religious concepts. The human mind is analytical and seeks a cause. Where this is not apparent there is a tendency to ascribe it to the supernatural. To this power, beyond his own, man gives homage, while on it he places reliance and toward it he establishes standards of conduct.

Religion thus supplements public opinion in the control of conduct, for public opinion ceases to apply if the conduct is unknown and if the unsanctioned acts are not found out. This defect is met by the religious doctrine of an all-seeing eye, with power to see all deeds and bestow appropriate reward or punishment. It creates conscience, setting the individual on guard over self at a time when outside influence

may be absent. It develops a keen sense of duty and obligation to right standards which, in its extension, is a potent aid to discipline.

Religion has also been one of the great factors in the development of wars. It enters into every military scheme by reason of its effect upon conduct. Every belligerent appeals to it for justification and support. Men do not hesitate to die for it, for religion is essentially the coördination and the expression of the highest ideals. Some wars, like the Crusades, had a purely religious purpose. Others were largely due to clash of religious conviction. In all wars it has been one of the most powerful supports of military morale, giving mental strength in adversity and supreme assurance in the outcome of undertakings. The Scriptures are full of appeals to heaven for military success. In bygone days the ancients decided upon battle by religious omens and sacrifices. If the former were unfavorable, the troops were already practically defeated, for they had no confidence in their ability to change the result. At the battle of Plataea, while the omens were unfavorable, the Spartans received the attack of the Persians without resistance,— " they let the enemy charge without repelling them and . . . suffered themselves to be slain and wounded in their ranks. But when the sacrifices appeared propitious and the soothsayers prophesied victory, the word being given, the Lacedaemonian battalion of foot seemed on a sudden like some fierce animal setting up its bristles, and the barbarians perceived that they encountered men who would fight it to the death."

Religion animated the Crusades just as it drove the Mahommedan fatalist to attack against certain death. It made steadfast fighters of Cromwell's " round heads." The Germans recognized its power as a military force with an apotheosis of the Deity as a god of war and attempted to mentally mobilize the irresistible force of the Almighty through the " Gott mit uns " motto on the belt-buckle worn

by each man. Their belief in the divine right of kings and the practical indivisibility of the Divinity and the Kaiser was one of their chief sources of mental steadfastness. Also it assumed divine authority for anything he might choose to do. It made might right. This is the antithesis of the idea of Lincoln when he said: "The question is not, is God on our side, but are we on God's side." The more just and righteous a cause, the more readily and powerfully may religious conviction and right reason be allied in its support. Religion, always a mighty factor in the lives of men, is strengthened in soldiers facing the possibility of death at any time. In some individuals it may become the strongest sustaining factor.

Religious instincts are manifested by a turning away from material and worldly things and by the subjugation of self. There is the exaltation of the supernatural and certain ethical ideals and sentiments. Many of these already exist in a form capable of direct application to any war waged for altruistic ends. As they can give a stern purpose to an individual or an army through being used in the light of obligation to carry out religious concepts and ethical ideals, so the religion of the American soldier should be not only personal but carry with it the teaching of the doctrine of ethics for peoples and nations.

Fatalism is an expression of the religious instinct — a feeling of helplessness in the hands of a higher power. Many soldiers incline to it after seeing others about them fall. This relieves mental stress in respect to a predestined future and allows concentration on doing one's best in the time allotted.

Soldiers are of an age and sex in which the religious instinct is not at its strongest. Nevertheless, they have nearly all been religiously brought up and are reverent especially in time of war. The successful expression of the religious instinct in the army is broad and divorced from denominational ideas. Bigotry and intolerance will provoke re-

sentment. The concept of military organization seems to give rise to an idea of a great common church in which sectarian lines have disappeared. The emotional type of religious pleading not only has no effect on the men but creates revulsion. The type of approach which may be effective with women and children is not psychologically sound in the effort to reach lusty young males of the military age. The men respond to a presentation of religion that is serious, dignified, honest and intelligent. Further, they are largely swayed by the personality of the men presenting religion to them. They must be real, red-blooded men of human sympathy and interest and without taint of cant or hypocrisy.

The Chaplain is the natural transmitter of religious enthusiasms, though the quiet piety of other officers may, like that of Stonewall Jackson, influence all ranks. He may show the relation between religion and patriotism. He may emphasize the righteousness of a cause based on justice, mercy and the protection of the weak as against the covetousness, cruelty and ruthlessness of the foe. He may emphasize the moral glory of such a cause and the service rendered to humanity and so to God. He may give comfort and assurance by stressing the evidence of life after death and the hope of reward for duty bravely done.

Blocking the religious instinct provokes a most intense reaction. Religious ideals are the most cherished of all possessions. They have been the basis of many a bloody war, and the history of the ages is full of instances where martyrdom was accepted rather than abandonment or modification of religious beliefs. Free outlet for it should be given to the individual in such ways and to such extent as the interests of the service may permit. Divine worship according to the methods prescribed by the conscience of the individual should be encouraged and facilitated. It will implant and nourish the qualities of the highest type of soldier as well as citizen.

Rhythm. Rhythm is a true instinct, especially developed in man; though some of the lower animals demonstrate it, as in the case of cavalry horses instinctively stepping in time with the band. It is so universal in man that those in whom it is absent or defective are subjects of comment. Rhythm of sound induces a characteristic rhythm of motion. Hence the lure to the dance offered in catchy music, the coordinating power of rhythmic drum-beats on the marching column, and the stimulus of rhythm in attuning the common mind to sympathetic receptivity and understanding. The rhythmic counting of the squad leader operates to synchronize and coördinate the movements of the squad. The appeal of poetry is in its rhythm as well as rhyme.

The chantey of the sailor, before the advent of the steam winch, was primarily to synchronize effort in hoisting sail or weighing anchor. The efforts of negro roustabouts are stimulated by rhythmic song, and their song leaders receive extra wages to gradually speed up their tempo, to which there is unconscious response by increasing movement and output. Phonographic music has similarly been used in industry. Marching to singing quickens lagging footsteps, while the words of the song may create desired ideals through suggestion.

Rhythm usually stimulates through the sense of hearing. With all primitive peoples, the drum, tom-tom or gong is probably the first musical instrument. Its action is reinforced if rhythmic sound is seen to be supplemented by rhythmic motion. This gives in large measure the pleasure of the dance or of witnessing the ballet. It is also responsible for the pleasure derived from seeing troops march by in unison to the tempo of playing bands, and adds to the attraction which draws the small boy and bystander to march along with the column.

History is full of instances of rhythm of motion as an expression of emotional state. Beside its social expression in the modern dance, it has had a religious expression among

the Mahommedan dervishes, the religious dancers of St. John in the 14th century, and the " Shakers " of the present day, while the war dance of the savage expresses and arouses pugnacity.

Some races, for example the African, have the instinct of rhythm more developed than others. It is also strong in youth, and the soldier comes within this class. To dance or sway to an insistent rhythm is an irresistible tendency in some persons. But the nature of the rhythm causes an appropriate change in the mental state and resultant act. Thus there is great dissimilarity in the emotions and conduct evoked by the rhythm embodied in the funeral march, jig time, waltz, jazz music, hymn, etc. In these instances it is not so much the musical sounds which produce the effect as the tempo in which they occur. This explains the popularity of jazz music, in which rhythm is over accentuated and harmony is only secondary. In the deliberate producing of mental effect, the tempo of the music is of great importance. The good musician can carry his audience through the gamut of emotions. The throbbing drum may excite the savage to frenzy.

The response to appropriate rhythm gives real pleasure. A powerful motive for the performance of otherwise monotonous action is thus created and its accomplishment stimulated. This explains the value of the drum and fife or the band in inspiring the men on hard marches. Brisk music at the end of a hard hike brings the troops in apparently fresher and in better spirits. It shows why music is a practical aid to efficiency, especially with respect to swaying and coördinating crowds, and why it should not be considered merely as a concession to enjoyment.

There is thus sound argument for the encouragement of plenty of good music in posts, either by official or volunteer bands, orchestras, musical clubs, special musical performers and mass singing, as affording a proper outlet for the satis-

faction of a basic human craving which can be turned to the advantage of military efficiency.

The Comic. This is an instinct peculiar to human beings. It is a tendency to note incongruities in the speech and behavior of others, and to regard all novel and unexpected experiences which do not excite fear as out of place and ludicrous. It is a powerful instinct and, especially when expressed by hearty laughter, it may dominate all others, temporarily driving them out of consideration. It is often a safety-valve for suppressed emotions, such as those pertaining to fear, shyness, pugnacity and other mental states.

The sense of humor exists to a varying degree in different races. The American or Englishman could see a humorous side in war where the Teuton maintained deadly earnestness. The value of such humorous war cartoons as those of Bairnsfather, in raising fighting spirit, can scarcely be overestimated. The company jester or the humorist in the work room is invaluable; even though the wit of his jokes be strained and not of the highest, his hearers are not critical. What they need and what he gives is relief from mental strain. Mirth at a common cause brings sympathetic understanding and mental cohesion. Men who cannot understand a joke are relegated to a class by themselves. Men who cannot take one are unpopular. Humor also gives expression to the fact that one refuses to be dominated by fear and in this way it was a valuable offset to the German campaign of frightfulness. The latter failed of its intended effect on the Anglo-Saxon — for when it did not create pugnacity it aroused ridicule. A joke just before going over the top often restored waning courage.

This sense of humor is very highly developed in the American. Children have it in disproportionate degree, and a relatively minor excitant moves the negro to laughter. Appeal to humor is often of great morale value, for it is a ready and safe outlet for relief of mental and nervous ten-

sion. Its value in averting or saving trying situations should be fully recognized in industry as well as the military service. Frequently it will induce complete change to a new channel of thought. A disturbing agent may be neutralized in proportion to the degree in which it is successfully ridiculed. The flow of chaff, wit and badinage among the men and between organizations is a great promoter of good spirits and esprit-de-corps. The standard of wit need not necessarily be high to produce the desired results, but it is very effective if given local application.

Intent governs the quality of humor to a large extent. Many an unpleasant truth may safely be told in jest, while conversely jests may go too far and leave a bitter sting. Arousing the instinct of the comic may thus be a two-edged tool if it be done clumsily or if a hurtful purpose be sensed. Also there are certain subjects and ideals which should be held in respect and reverence, and toward these the instinct of the comic should not be aroused. To jest at beliefs and the symbols that represent them is full of danger and liable to provoke strong resentment.

The manner in which a jest is uttered is the key by which it is usually interpreted. It must be good humored and kindly if opposition is not to be excited. It may embody criticism, but this must not be expressed in an unfriendly way. Slight exaggeration will create amusement where caricature arouses resentment. Some persons are so self-assertive that they cannot "take a joke" on themselves, though enjoying one at the expense of others. Satire is harsh and without kindly intent and jests of this nature can only be used with safety where common opponents are the objects. Sarcastic jokes at the expense of a man in the hearing of his comrades affront his self-assertion and impose a humiliation that is unwarranted, resented and may long remain unforgiven. If coming from a superior it may be regarded as an abuse of power, since it cannot be returned in kind. If too familiar, it may arouse undue familiarity.

Jokes which are of a personal nature are best left to be bandied between those of similar status.

Ideas of war humor vary. The egotism of the German would not permit him to admit that he himself could be in any way ludicrous or ridiculous, and his humor took the form of bitter satire of his opponents. The Anglo-Saxon, on the contrary, admitted that he had troubles and then proceeded to make fun of them, on the principle that difficulties turned into jokes are not feared. Obvious exaggeration of a quality, as in caricature or certain forms of wit, belittles the real fact and by suggestion decreases the idea of its harmful possibilities. If men can be got to smile in the face of danger, they become brave and fearless and lose any sense of tenseness and the unnatural. In revealing and making jokes of the weakness of the enemy, it brings out confidence, coolness and alertness in one's own force.

Repression of the instinct of humor is always resented. Man is, by nature, genial and cheerful, and the sour, unduly solemn individual is let alone. On the other hand, the man who can see and point out the funny side of things without being unduly personal enjoys great popularity and can be a great aid to good order and discipline.

Sublimation and Side-Tracking. The so-called sublimation of an instinct occurs when a strong feeling is removed from the instinct to which it naturally belongs and is fastened to another object with an entirely different response. This happens, for example, when the soldier "fights for a principle," thus appropriating to his personality the cause for which he fights; or as in the Boy Scout movement, where a semi-military organization is used for promulgating peace ideals.

Sublimation also occurs when some undesirable instinctive tendency is directed into a channel of positive value. Sublimation of this sort may convert the baser sentiments into something of true worth, as where envy can be applied to the happy disposition of another, the soldier is jealous of

his good reputation or feels anger at a base act. One way of sublimating the reproductive instinct is to express it through chivalry, whereby the soldier regards himself as protecting women and the ideals for which womanhood stands.

Sublimation only occurs at the expense of much energy; and when the paths of sublimation are closed, the instinct flows again through its old channels. The officer should study his men so as to bring sublimation into play as much as practicable and thereby convert traits of weakness of character into elements of strength.

As sublimation requires ideals, it functions more strongly in those of higher intelligence and education. As a general rule, it probably has a stronger effect on the officer class than enlisted men. The honor of the regiment appeals more to the non-commissioned officer than to the private, though length of service and longer subjection to the influences of association will probably need to be considered in this connection.

Side-tracking occurs when the superfluous energy which tends to expend itself along undesirable lines is given outlet in such a way that good results, or if its product has no value it is at least not harmful. Examples of side-tracking are where energy pent up as a result of the necessary restraints of military conditions finds outlet in the lurid oaths and extravagant language of the soldier, or the excess of conviviality and freedom from restraint which the soldier seeks when off duty. Of particular value here are games, sports and athletic competitions which not only train body and mind but release surplus physical and mental energy.

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES, RELATIONS, AND METHODS

Temperament, its nature and qualities; relation of temperament and sympathy; racial and individual traits of temperament; temperament and vocation; temperament and physical state. Mood; its relation to results anticipated or apprehended. Character; its nature and production; character formation. Habit; its faults and virtues; habit and training; formation of new habits; custom and habit. Consciousness; the nature of mentality; subconscious states; voluntary control and consciousness; self-consciousness and ego-centrism. Attention and interest; their nature and stimulation; their necessity in training; mental focusing and concentration; their influence on results; the factor of self-interest. Inhibition and repression; checks on conduct; their nature and use. Stimuli and sensation; their nature and purpose; complexity of stimulants; reflexes; incentives to action. Suggestion; its nature and influence; its value in morale work; suggestion, concept and purpose; agencies of suggestion. Suggestibility; its nature and extent; degrees of mental receptivity; personal influence; extent and source of information; mass suggestibility; factors of suggestibility. Contagion; the dissemination of ideas. Affirmation; its influence in suggestion; repetition. Prestige; its relation to leadership; qualities of prestige; the prestige of certain ideas.

Temperament. Temperament is the expression of certain inherent qualities of the primitive brain cell, shared in general by all of the same species, but existing as a variable among the individuals composing it. This matter of mental inheritance may be divided into temperamental qualities common to the species, those which are common to particular races, and those common in the family group. Temperament thus represents the result of unequal development of the various instincts. Diversity of temperament in the dog, cat or rabbit is obvious. The same applies, though in a lesser degree, to the several racial types of human beings and to the persons comprising them.

Temperament is thus the result of heredity. It represents a constant mental bias in certain special directions and consequently a tendency to act along these lines rather than others. The mind has a selective activity toward some function calling out, for example, such general mental attitudes as those of cheerfulness or pessimism. As temperament influences outlook, so it influences action.

Inherited tendencies thus represent paths of least resistance, open to use without previous training and followed as naturally by mental processes as water seeks an open channel. These inherited tendencies expressed in temperament are, however, subject to modification to a considerable extent. They are little under voluntary control but are alterable by outside influences under physical environment and experience. New outlets of expression may be opened by environment or training; habits or traits may be modified; violent tempers curbed; lack of ambition increased and other changes effected. The original quality of temperament determines how well this may be effected by outside influences. Temperament changes with age, both by reason of experience and modification of the functions of brain cells.

Differences of temperament are merely differences in the blending of common elemental qualities but in diverse proportions. They may be expressed by relative excitability, rapidity of response and reaction to stimulus, and rapidity of fatigue and recuperation. Thus temperament in a way is an expression of will. The "temperamental" artist is recognized as not readily yielding to social customs and ideas. Similarly, there are soldiers whose temperaments are such that they are not readily adaptable to their environment and need special attention from commanders to that end. This is particularly the case in the draft, where men are inducted into service whose natural inclinations would never have permitted them to enlist voluntarily.

Humanity implies participation in a common inheritance

of human consciousness. The brotherhood of man is limited by the felt resemblances, kindred impulses and sympathetic expressions of men; racial and other prejudices indicate its limitations. Divergent environments and interests estrange, just as common traditions tend to amalgamate despite racial diversity.

Peoples of different races vary in their mental make-up and trends, just as they differ in physical appearance. All have the same basic instincts, but these are combined in far different proportion and comparative intensities. Accordingly, sentiments and ideals differ, and mental processes function along different lines. Under such conditions, the psychological estimate of one race from the mental standpoint of another is to start from false premises and arrive at error. The Germans, in inflated self-assurance, failed to recognize this fact and apparently assumed that the mental processes of other peoples must conform to their own. They lost the war largely because the reactions and behavior which they expected, and which would doubtless have resulted had the mental processes of other peoples been like their own, did not occur in their opponents.

Between races, diversity of temperament prevents or materially interferes with sympathy, understanding or ability to grasp the other's view-point or processes of reasoning. The lack of common sentiments and ideals is an inevitable cause of friction between peoples as it is between individuals. Where the difference is considerable, the tendency is to draw apart into social groups which are congenial and to avoid a contact developing painful sensation. This is racial antipathy. If under such conditions close association is inevitable, reaction in conduct occurs and clashes or race riots result if the antipathetic groups are in large numbers. This is an ever present danger where organizations of different races serve together in time of peace, or when troops of one race occupy the country of another.

As a corollary to this, company commanders and indus-

trial leaders whose men tend to fall into a few groups of different racial stock should endeavor to bring them as quickly as possible into mental harmony by emphasizing the ideals in which all should share and by minimizing any matters unconsciously tending to draw attention to racial and temperamental differences. They should not only recognize the existence of but turn to good the diverse temperamental traits characteristic of the racial group, as may be exemplified in the Swede, Italian, Hebrew, negro and others. The intelligent employment of such racial traits affects success or failure in handling either the individual or the group. The superior may not be able to analyze fully the mental procedure of those alien to his own stock, but the experience resulting from contact will enable shrewd deduction to be made as to how they will react under given conditions because of reactions to more or less similar conditions observed before.

Within the same race, normal individuals possess very similar general characteristics in much the same degree. The less the ancestry of a stock is modified by intermarriage with others, the greater the racial resemblance, not only physically but mentally. There is a generic resemblance in racial mentality which renders far more easy the psychological control of a homogeneous racial stock, because it tends to think along common lines and the resulting behavior can be more readily directed and forecasted. This was an advantage possessed by the Germans in which they placed much reliance. In our army and country, the diverse racial types which compose it make control more difficult. Special attention needs, therefore, to be given to the psychology of race by superiors.

Within the race, every individual has certain traits or temperament as a result of his personal ancestry. The physical results of breeding are very definitely worked out, as in distinct types of dogs, horses, pigeons, etc. Mental resemblances are not so definitely determined, but what is

known is to the effect that immediate ancestry is of importance in determining mental traits. Fearlessness as well as muscular power was deliberately developed in creating the dog type of bull-terrier. It is certain, at least, that in man general intelligence is inherited. Many studies prove this point, and the transmission of family mental traits from one generation to another is well known.

The temperament of a man, that is, his natural bent, represents a group of qualities that largely determine the choice of a career among the opportunities offered, as well as the success achieved in his chosen calling.

In changing mental make up, there must be something to build upon. The stronger the quality, the greater the facility of its development. While the individual has a natural trend and fitness to do certain things, what he actually does may be due to environment. Success may be achieved along lines of environmental compulsion, but only at the expense of additional energy made necessary by the clearing of more or less blocked channels. Within environmental limits he will probably do his best to follow out his natural desires in such a way as to give them best expression. But if these trends are strong, they may cause the individual to revolt against the limitations of his environment and seek elsewhere the career for which he feels himself fitted. The draft brought into the service men temperamentally unfitted to be soldiers. This doubtless had its effect upon desertions and disorders.

While temperament may render it more easy for certain individuals to acquire high proficiency along certain lines, technical skill is never inherited. The soldier must be educated in order to become an effective military agent, while standards of education for the individual must be based on his relative ability to acquire it. Some individuals can never master the more intricate duties required in the military service or civil industry because of lack of capacity to do so. Some never master them because their preferences and in-

terest lie strongly in other directions. They are misfits and proper subjects for the attention of the personnel officer so that they may be transferred in order to achieve a higher degree of efficiency in other lines of duty.

Temperament is modified by the shifts of emphasis in the psychological ages of man. The young have an urgent disposition which demands instant and vigorous satisfaction and expression — "Youth will not be denied." At the other extreme is calm old age, phlegmatic, lacking in responsiveness and unassailed by vivid incentives or needs. Between the two are numerous degrees of variation. The point in handling men is that the mature officer or business superior should take care lest the influence of his own greater years destroy his psychological ability to grasp and utilize the young soldier's or employee's outlook and mental viewpoint.

There is also a temperament in certain individuals resulting from bodily state and affecting the outlook on life and the behavior flowing therefrom. This is due to the fact that the human machine in such cases is out of order and not functioning perfectly. It tends to be transitory in that there is reversion toward the inherited mental attitude if the cause of the physical disorder is removed. Among these pathological causes may be mentioned goiter, which may reduce the individual to mental apathy. On the other hand, exophthalmic goiter, which has some of the physical signs of simple goiter, arouses nervousness and excitability. The excessive presence or absence of certain glandular secretions are responsible here for mental result. Certain diseases also affect the temperament specifically, as where tuberculosis tends to optimism and cheerfulness, diabetes to criticism, and diseases of the digestive tract, particularly relating to the liver, to pessimism. A witty doctor remarked some two centuries ago when asked if he thought "life was worth living," that "it all depended on the liver."

All acute diseases affect mental state, chiefly through the flooding of the system by specific poisons produced within

the body. Physical infirmity and deformity tend to produce it through the effect of unescapable personal environment. All these are medical states which are ordinarily excluded from the army, or discharged therefrom unless soon corrected. Therefore they need to be considered but rarely in their psychological relations by the line officer, though they form the special basis of the great and often difficult problems of hospital morale devolving upon the medical officers, and are not to be overlooked in matters of personnel management in civil industry.

Mood. Mood is a definition given to a state of mind, which may be transitory, or more or less fixed as a result of a continuing stimulus. Men who are moody are susceptible to great oscillations in mental state, and the common acceptance of the word usually carries with it an idea of mental depression. If a mood is long continued it is usually regarded as an expression of temperament.

The nature of the mood naturally depends on the character of the stimulus. The latter may be psychological, as when depression follows reproof or exhilaration results from praise. Physical factors similarly operate, as when a depressed state of mind results from gloomy, rainy weather, or when the return of sunshine restores buoyancy of spirit. Thus children, quiet during bad weather, shout and play on a bright day. Obviously, weather cannot be changed as a factor in altering mood, but it is equally true that new factors for the promotion of interest and amusement may be deliberately introduced to offset its depressant effects. In northern stations during winter, or in the rainy season of the tropics, a succession of measures calculated to improve the character of mood is very necessary.

Mood is a barometer of ensuing act. If a man is in an "ugly mood," he is predisposed to commit acts of trouble or disorder. If he is in a happy state of mind the opposite is true. The recognition and interpretation of mood give results prophetically as reliable as the weather forecaster

from his study of meteorological data. But, while the meteorologist cannot avert the storm whose coming he can only prophesy, the officer has it within his power to prevent impending emotional tempest. For mood can be changed by appropriate stimuli. Discontent, for example, can be dissipated by arousing a new interest, just as fretfulness in a child can be replaced by giving it a toy. So, too, soldiers and industrial personnel can be given an entirely different frame of mind and outlook toward the service and life generally by stimulating their interest and attention along wholesome lines.

The frame of mind toward any result largely predisposes toward the result anticipated or apprehended. The optimist who expects good feels that any effort made toward the desired end will be successful, and this state of mind in itself stimulates him. On the other hand, the pessimist who looks on evil as inevitable naturally considers it little worth while to make strenuous effort toward success. Both unconsciously favor physical conditions which tend to transmute states of mind into the facts expected. The important relation which mood bears to efficiency is thus apparent. The superior is interested in the moods his men are in because of their effect upon act and accomplishment.

Character. Character is the sum of inherited tendencies modified by environment. Temperament is born in the man, while character is largely the result of outside influences upon this original predisposition, reinforced by his own efforts. The statement that life is character in action is subject to the condition that conduct is set in circumstance. Character means the subjective, and environment the objective determinants of conduct.

Just as men may be much like one another through original nature, so they may also come to be much like one another through the influence of environment. The training given cavalry horses is really intended to modify the instincts forming an unruly temperament and fuse them into a

character of the tractability desired. The same applies to the training of men.

It is often difficult to say in determining character what part of it is due to hereditary trend and what part to environment. The child may inherit certain tendencies from his parents which would evoke a resulting line of conduct. But the same child may have seen from his earliest recollection the same kinds of traits and acts exhibited by his parents and



Figure 10. The Relative Strength of Temperament and Civilian Environment Is an Unknown Variable.

exemplified as right and proper. It is not easy in such cases to decide how far heredity counts and to what extent minor predilections have been magnified by the surroundings. (See Fig. 10.) Nor is it easy to determine, for example, whether inebriety in the son of an alcoholic father was the result of transmitted cell craving for stimulant or merely the result of environment in which liquor was habitually accessible and presented in such a way as to be deemed desirable.

But it is relatively easy to determine the part played by environment on character when the child already of an age to manifest certain tendencies is brought into a new environment with influences perhaps diametrically opposed to those which had previously exerted themselves upon him. Here the change in character is often great, depending in completeness and rapidity of occurrence upon the intensity of

action of the new influences and the receptivity of the material acted upon.

The same applies in the army, for the average recruit enters at an impressionable period of life, the environment is new and unfamiliar and the pressure it exerts is great, intense and incessant. (See Fig. 11.) It is common knowledge that the soldier tends to respond promptly to



Figure 11. The Unquestioned Greater Influence of Military Environment in Modifying Temperament in Producing Character Is Roughly Suggested.

such influences through a new character formation and that his whole outlook upon life usually is rapidly changed for the better.

Part of the duty of the officer toward the men is not only to make soldiers but also one of character formation. Here the powerful influence of the military environment, many of the factors of which may within certain limits be intentionally adjusted to produce certain effects, can have quick and certain results upon the plastic human material. Many an officer may have a justifiable pride in the development by him of well rounded character in his subordinates which is reflected in better citizenship after discharge.

Among individuals, qualities of character, alike in kind, usually show very unlike distribution in degree. Hence one soldier cannot fairly be expected to measure up to all of the standards of another — he may naturally surpass in some and fall short in others. The problem of the officer is to

round out and modify character by remedying deficiencies and unobtrusively curbing undesirable tendencies. This can be done with great certainty once the officer has studied and understood the soldier, recognized his strong and weak points — that is to say, " sized him up "— and formulated a common sense plan for any desirable correction. He will do this by contact, observation under varying circumstances and by inquiry. Conduct, attitude, words, gestures and appearance reveal much to those who take the trouble to study and interpret them. Usually the " sizing up " is done more or less unconsciously and not according to any systematic plan or clearly recognized purpose. The hero of the " Sherlock Holmes " stories is particularly attractive as being one of the first to indicate the possibilities of such observation and logical deduction. On the other hand, some of the extreme advocates of the possibilities of the deductive method claim too much and are proportionately liable to error. The expression of the face often indicates the mental state as clearly as words. It is the mirror of the character and emotions and is as versatile as the mental life is rich and varied. The face of the recruit, who is of an age not yet able to fully master his emotions, is easily read. On a basis of knowledge of character acquired by observation and interpretation, the wise officer proceeds to select and apply such special factors of environment as the needs of the individual may require.

Habit. Habit is the tendency for every process to be repeated more readily and efficiently by virtue of its previous occurrence and in proportion to the frequency of its previous repetitions.

Habit is really the result of the creation of special brain channels by a succession of stimuli and impulses of the same general character. These channels might be considered as becoming deeper and more defined by repetition of the stimulus and its reaction, whereby the latter tends to move along the line of least resistance, just as the feet uncon-

sciously follow the meanderings of a worn and familiar pathway rather than attempt to open a new way to the objective. The familiar is instinctively preferred to the less familiar and the habitual to any novel adjustment. The more familiar is any process, the more difficult it is to change it; the more painful any change of environment that results in need for readjustment. Thus there are persons whose tendency to react along definite and precise lines is so strong that they are said to be " slaves of habit."

Habits are formed in the service of instincts and their expression. An instinct may be so modified by habit that it may be inhibited or expressed along a single preferential line. Habits resemble instincts in that they are not controlled by consciousness, yet they often have important conscious accompaniments. The difference between them is that habits are acquired and instincts are innate. This is the reason why habits are pleasurable and the breaking off of a habit produces discomfort. It explains why when one is proficient in anything a real pleasure attaches to its performance, though before the habit was formed the task partook of discouragement and drudgery. As habit is established, mental stress is lessened. Practice increases harmony and efficiency in the adjustment until the latter may be so nearly complete that the acts resulting from adaptation become automatic and practically predictable. Action, in response to stimulation may, through habit, be so rapid as to suggest instinct rather than reason. The recruit at drill and the novice at the piano or work-bench are awkward and under mental strain because habit has not been established, while the trained soldier and the expert pianist and handicraftsman have enjoyment in a once difficult task which has become easy through repetition.

Habit facilitates response but deadens consciousness. Carried too far, it dominates the individual, keeps him from readily adjusting to new environment, and is responsible in time for " old fogyism " in which change in processes of

thought or action is resented. Bad habits of long standing are hard to break because there is unwillingness to break them. The practical importance of teaching things in exactly the way they should be done, and of promptly correcting fault in training, is obvious.

New habits are most easily acquired by the young, whose mental state is plastic and in whom preferred channels of response to stimulation have not been developed. It is comparatively easy to fix the receptive mind of the recruit or apprentice in the right way, for he knows no other. However, there is no age when it is not possible to acquire new habits and break the old ones, but the task mounts in difficulty with increasing years.

Habits of thought and action tend to become more fixed with age and increasing dislike for change and the new. "It is hard to teach an old dog new tricks." This has significance in connection with the fact that superiors of controlling rank are usually elderly. The result is a constant physiological tendency in the military service toward conservatism. This is eminently desirable within reasonable limits, but blocks progress if allowed to develop to any undue extent. The result is that in war, when circumstances demand abrupt and extreme change, young blood comes to the fore. The enforced frequent changes in duty and shifts in environment, with the increased mental alertness, new interests and adaptations which they cause, are thus valuable — if sometimes trying — agents in preventing the forging of chains of habit in the military service.

Habit preserves mental acquisition, and all education has as its end the formation of useful habits. This is particularly so in the military service, where in the stress of battle, as in bayonet work, the individual loses all consciousness of self-control and performs his movements automatically because certain brain channels have been so cleared that the necessary stimuli produce a definite series of acts along lines to which the individual has been habituated in advance.

Military training likewise is intended in all its phases to create military habit, whereby the soldier will unconsciously do the right thing effectively under certain conditions, even though they are unexpected. The development of habit by industrial work makes for speed and certainty in output.

Drilling puts the soldier in a mental state where he immediately and unconsciously reacts in an appropriate way to the stimulus of command or environment. The latter is a highly important factor, in that the man should in time of conflict be retained in the same unit and place in which he was drilled in time of peace. Replacements — like shifts in industrial personnel — are under the handicap of strange officers and men who modify the accustomed environment. Habit gained by training should be strong enough to oppose instincts, especially the instinct of fear, and under battle conditions to replace thought and will.

In forming a new habit, the rate of progress is rapid at the outset. There is then a period of slower improvement, and then sometimes even periods of set-backs or relapse, as golf players learn to their disgust. Then persistence usually results in rapid development to maximum efficiency. All golfers know this sequence. This should be borne in mind in training, for it frequently causes discouragement and tends to interfere with further development. If slowness in response is due to physical or mental fatigue, temporary discontinuance helps matters. One deduction from this is that recruit drills should never be long enough to tire the individual before the elementary movements have been properly acquired.

In forming a habit, as in drill or industry, the mental attitude toward the habit is a fundamental factor in the efficiency of the formation process. Interest in it must be excited. This may be done through explanation by showing the purpose or need of the movement. Inattention causes error; and repetition may crystallize such error into

habitual fault. In teaching the recruit or novice, he must, therefore, be kept free from distraction.

Bad habits, as in drill, can best be broken by calling attention to them and requiring persistence in the performance of the correct act until it is habitually accomplished. There must be the creation of a countertendency of greater strength than the habit, for it is easier to accomplish substitution than deprivation. Correction is accomplished only at the expense of painful emotion. At such times sarcasm by the drill-master or foreman merely adds to mental stress in the confused subordinate or arouses resentment in those whose self-assertion is thus checked. A calm manner, patience, and possible rests will produce the best results. The superior must give the impression of helpful purpose — not of personal irritation over faults.

In breaking up any habit there must be a sufficient groundwork of desire, purpose and determination. There must be a will to assist. These may be stimulated by advice, appeal, reproach or ridicule, but true reform must come from within rather than from without. Withholding liquor in alcoholism, for example, may do away with certain stimuli and enable the volitional processes to gain strength, but relapse will recur with opportunity unless there is an honest desire to withstand it.

Custom resembles habit to the extent that it is the habitual expression of a solution of communal needs, sensibilities and aptitudes. Military custom expresses this for the soldier group, and is so strong as to have the force of common law. It thus creates and hands down the psychological environment to which the recruit responds and to which he must find adjustment, molding his individuality and conduct accordingly.

Consciousness. While the lower forms of conduct are based on instincts and prompted by environment, the higher forms of social behavior, and particularly the special and

strict code of conduct obtaining in the military establishment, involve voluntary control and direction of the impulses. This is done through consciousness.

There are two kinds of mentality, of which the conscious mind is the higher and responsive to will and reason; the other is the sub-conscious mind which reacts to suggestion even though the suggestion may be unreasonable. With the first, the man is a rational, self-controlled individual; with the second he is a negative self, plastic to outside suggestion and control. The latter is of great importance from the standpoint of military and industrial management.

Sub-conscious states are those which lie relatively near the surface, outside the focus of present attention but capable of voluntary recall. The trained soldier marches mechanically, but an obstacle in the road at once recalls his mind to the task he is performing. Repetition of advertising makes its unrecognized impress upon the sub-conscious mind. This is activated and the special brand of article advertised recalled when need for wares of any such general nature develops. The way is unconsciously cleared for a certain reaction at the proper time. Individual action controlled by the sub-conscious mind may be of little physical importance to the individual, as a slip of the tongue; or it may lead to severe crippling through development of odd mannerisms, a neurosis or even a psychosis.

Voluntary control proceeds from self-consciousness. Almost all living things are capable of learning to modify instinctive behavior through pleasure and pain resulting from experience. These sensations tend to determine whether or not certain acts should be repeated. If pleasurable and the impulse persists, they will be repeated until habit tends to result. In the human being, desire enters to transform instinctive impulse into continuous effort not readily affected by irrelevant suggestions. Appropriate desires may be artificially transplanted and stimulated. Consciousness must accordingly accompany mental states of adjustment to new and

unusual conditions, permitting of various reactions and therefore of selective judgment, criticism and choice.

Consciousness is more concerned with the relation between environment and self than with that existing between any factors of the environment. This explains why, in the vast majority of cases, matters are interpreted largely on the basis of personal reactions, thereby accounting for the universal tendency to reason from the basis of individual experience and from the particular to the general. We tend to judge the world to be good or bad according to the way it treats us — not according to any abstract standards of good or evil. The man caught in the storm says, "it is raining," and does not stop to think that the sun is shining elsewhere. Self-interest accordingly must be regarded as a prime factor entering into morale equations. It means that the soldier's problems can only be understood from the soldier's point of view. Superiors who understand this great principle, and apply it to their human problems in sympathetic understanding, will have little difficulty in the handling of men.

One object of training, therefore, is to add this factor of self-interest to the conscious relation of the soldier to his organization, the war or the task in hand. He should be made to feel a personal responsibility therefor and to consider himself in his relation to others. He must adjust himself to the thought and sentiment about him. Here enters the value of explanation in causing an appreciation which would otherwise develop only slowly and imperfectly. The man should be shown how he himself will benefit — what he will "get out of it." Explanation is not an unnecessary drudgery for officers; it is an essential part of all that is implied in leadership and pays heavy dividends on the trouble involved.

Consciousness exists so as to better adapt the organism to new environment. It is within the power of superiors to assist this quality in their subordinates and to promote ad-

justment to surroundings by modifying environment for the better, in so far as this may be possible and desirable. This merely means that there should be conservation of energy, diminution of friction, decrease of irritation, saving of time and promotion of efficiency. Obviously these objects have great practical value.

Consciousness is at its highest state when a new environment strains all faculties to meet the strange and unknown, especially with a sense of resistance, conflict or complexity. When a high degree of efficiency has been reached in an act, consciousness in the performance of the act has largely disappeared. It is at a low ebb when acts become habitual, reflex or automatic.

Attention and Interest. Attention and interest are the factors determining the elements which enter into consciousness, the manner in which these elements work together and the course which they take. According as they are aroused and maintained, the factors in the environment to which they relate assume proportionate importance in the influencing of behavior. Anything which is painful, startling or new tends to arouse them. This explains why the mind inclines to dwell on present troubles or difficulties unless some stimulating thought can be made to replace them.

Attention is passive and active. Passive attention is that which fits in with instinctive tendencies. No conscious effort is apparent in passive attention, though certain familiar and less important things are sub-consciously noticed. The soldier marching in drill is giving only passive attention to the ground walked over. Active attention is that which requires effort in attending to something not itself attractive, as the words of the drill-master. To get active attention, the purpose must be endowed with a feeling greater than that attached to the immediate tendency. This new feeling may be intentionally aroused by another for the desired purpose. Sharp, snappy commands evoke and maintain it.

A good voice and forceful delivery are thus potent aids to command and efficiency in counteracting distractions and wandering attention.

The situations which influence attention in mankind vary with sex, age and condition. But all come under the rule that human attention is excited by rapid change, marked contrasts, and by all situations to which there is further tendency to respond, such as flight, opposition, inquisitiveness, etc. The higher development and reasoning power of human beings, and the complexity of their surroundings, create in them a great range of situations attracting human attention. Attention is expressed by visual observation, curiosity, manipulation and experimentation. It may be aroused through any of the sensory organs.

Anything which is new makes to hold the attention until its novelty wears off. This is of protective value in adjusting to new environment. But attention is often particularly developed along lines of certain senses. Thus man is indifferent to changes in slight odors, doubtless most marked to the dog, whose brain functions more largely through the sense of smell. Through hearing, the chauffeur detects faulty operation of his engine unnoticed by his passengers; the savage sees game signs that the white hunter passes over. This ability springs from the appropriate instinct or training.

In the military sense, " attention " means the focusing of mind and increasing the receptivity to suggestion on the duty about to be performed. It is intended to promote correctness and promptness in the act to result. The mind is made alert and freed of distractions which might minimize or becloud the matter in hand. In all military relations between superiors and subordinates, the position of attention is assumed by the latter. This is not an attitude of inferiority, but one which is required as the outward expression of the mental state of interest and concentration which favors the

receiving and understanding of orders. Bringing the body into the state of attention carries the mind into the same state. Slouchy soldiers are inattentive ones.

Interest in a subject indicates, creates and illuminates differences. Certain other races look much alike to us, which means that the factor of interest extends only to the general type; prolonged association with them and the interest which this carries gives individuality to their units. The full beauties of fine workmanship appear only to the expert. This principle holds true either in matters of art or the effective functioning of a military force.

Interest may be negative as well as positive. Here the motive may be to escape unpleasant sensation rather than to gain a material reward. It may be necessary to introduce into the environment certain factors that will deter from one line of conduct, while others invite toward the behavior desired. These deterrent factors are founded on pain or the instincts of fear and repulsion. They animate punishment.

Interest and attention are indispensable to good results. In war everything depends on concentration on purpose and speed of action. A favorite method of German propaganda was to attempt to start a series of side-issues on any conceivable subject that might arrest and divert the public mind, so as to distract attention and weaken the community of interest and effort of the Allies in their main purpose. The check to this was allied counterpublicity emphasizing the importance and necessity of the main purpose. Similarly the commander who gets things done makes his men put their minds on their work. Often a few words of explanation as to its nature and necessity will accomplish this. The drill sergeant overcomes the fortuitous distractions by commands and shifts which keep the men's minds from being diverted. Fairly well trained troops do poorly under monotony of exercise and spiritless leadership; but organizations which have almost lost efficiency under such conditions may be stimu-

lated within a single drill period into exercising their full ability through the forceful, energetic personality of a new commander, who compels interest and attention in what had become perfunctory.

It is common knowledge that during the war men learned as much in a few months as had previously required a much longer period. This is to be explained especially by the fact that there was the incentive of greater attention and interest, born and nourished by the need of self-preservation when brought to grips with the enemy. There was a mental concentration which can never be expected in peace training, and which must be discounted in any estimates thereon.

The way to arouse interest in a matter is to get the man thinking about it. This can be done by bringing within his environment the idea which it is desired he should consider or the object which is to stimulate such idea, with the proper degree of emphasis. If there is too much interest along undesirable lines, its strength similarly can be sapped and destroyed by introducing new and more powerful interests and distractions. Publicity, by word or print, is often a powerful aid in promoting the desired result.

Where monotony exists and interest flags, the latter can again be aroused by a novel object, experience or suggestion. Successful commanders endeavor to "keep their men interested." Indifference generates inefficiency and listlessness and is wasteful of potential man power.

Inhibition and Repression. Inhibition and repression represent the assertion of factors which balance instincts, and which are necessary to civilization so that instincts may be repressed or controlled within the extent permitted by accepted standards. They are the results of experience systematized by deliberation, whereby intellect and reason may assert themselves. They embody the sentiment of caution, and in their higher form those of ethics, coolness and impartiality. Inhibition in due proportion represents the quality of self-control, so essential to the successful handling

of men. It goes with a disciplined mind and acts as a check on hasty and uncontrolled behavior. By it, the probable results of acts are weighed and calculated. Where act is inhibited, the emotional state may remain, as where anger may show in the face though the blow prompted by it be not struck.

Yielding to every impulse, distraction or whim is evidence of a weak or undeveloped mind. Children show it. So, too, do certain adults who seem to lack mental poise and self-control. They are said to be "impulsive," and may perform acts the consequences of which later may be regretted. Punishment, or the fear of punishment, with constant supervision and training, perhaps best meets the needs of this class.

There is another form of inhibition due to emotion, as where the embarrassment of the untrained speaker interferes with utterance, or fear renders an individual temporarily incapable of flight.

In repression there is deliberate attempt to thrust some feeling, thought, memory or sentiment from consciousness, often at the expenditure of a considerable amount of energy. This may be done by fixing attention and interest on another motive. For example, an individual may attack a task more energetically for the purpose of forgetting a great grief, such as a death in the family. Repression is particularly important for officers, since emotion shows itself in face and manner and it is essential that appearance or example should not arouse undesirable act in those under their leadership. To a lesser extent this is true for enlisted men as well. With new troops especially, the lesson of self-repression in patience, waiting for orders, and limited action, is not readily learned; inactivity is trying. But undue impetuosity and exceeding of orders represent poor morale rather than good.

While troops in combat center attention on the enemy and have little opportunity to think of themselves, the reserves are under particularly trying strain, due to inactivity,

uncertainty, possible exposure to fire which they cannot return, and subjection to depressing sights and sounds. There is repression of acts normally flowing from the emotions aroused. New troops may disintegrate under such conditions without having come into action. The problem of the officer is to maintain or restore relative unconcern by belittling the situation and then creating a new line of thought calculated to take the men's minds off themselves.

Military organization requires repression of sentiments of like or dislike for those of superior rank, and such repressions are particularly trying when those who are personally disliked are the ones by whom the many necessary restrictions of military life are imposed and enforced. Here the common purpose must be put above individual interest, and annoyance passed over and put out of mind as one of the unavoidable necessities of the service. It is easier done with men who have accepted the obligations of the service by voluntary enlistment than by those on whom it is forced by the draft.

Stimuli and Sensation. Sensation is the result of conscious stimulation of an end-organ and the transference of this stimulation to appropriate brain centers. It implies perception, and perception is due to experience added to the original sense material. Sensation is necessary in order that there may be conscious reactions to induce behavior. All sensations come through the sensory organs; consequently all sensory organs may be used to affect behavior. To influence behavior, sensations must have the qualities of intensity, duration, definiteness and clearness. Attention to the stimulus apparently increases its intensity and influence.

Definite sensations result when certain stimuli come into operation. This varies with the individual and marks the limits of efficiency which cannot be passed, no matter what the amount of training. We say that the soldier "has his limits" when further stimulation ceases to bring increased results.

The original basic tendencies of man rarely act at one time in isolation from each other. Life is complex and stimuli of diverse character press in from all sides. Every influence is registered in the brain, whether the exciting agent is tangible or intangible. With the various stimuli come the inhibiting influences necessary to the harmonious relations of men in groups. Thus the behavior of man, through its excitants and restraints, tends to be a compromise of multitudinous combinations. Where two opposing tendencies neutralize each other, action is paralyzed or the mental stress may be expressed in hysteria.

Stimuli create pleasant and unpleasant sensations which are translated into states of mind. The latter are important, because the acts which they induce are most important. There is receptiveness to pleasant stimuli, and effort in varying form to remove unpleasant stimuli or pass outside their influence. The control of many of the important stimuli, affecting subordinates for good or ill, rests not in themselves but in their superiors. Some officers do not seem to realize this, either in nature or importance, nor their obligation for watchfulness to detect early any unpleasant stimuli and to take measures for their prompt removal when practicable.

Of different stimuli, some will assume a relative importance, while others will be crowded out. This means that the individual will incline to some pursuit or act rather than another. But if the stimuli can be modified, in nature or relative intensity, the inclination will be varied accordingly. This lies largely within the power of the officer to accomplish.

Reflexes are automatic bodily responses to stimuli affecting the sense organs. They exist in all living organisms and are essential to the preservation of life. In many ways they are instinctive. Responses to hunger, cold, light or pain are examples of primary reflexes. Will does not control them. Involuntary winking of the eye occurs if an object passes it quickly, suggesting injury. The kicking of the dog's hind

leg when his back is scratched in a certain place is reflex action.

As already mentioned, the unnoticed stimuli play a strong part in the functioning of intelligence. From them spring motives which are unrealized as to their existence, yet which largely control conduct. Minor stimuli, in themselves of no great individual power, have in the aggregate a strong cumulative force. The moral of this is that, in handling men, any agency which promises helpfulness should not be left unused.

Nature implants contrary impulses as to action and leaves it to slight alterations of the individual case to decide which shall carry the day. Hesitation is usually due, not to the lack of incentive, but to the fact that there are so many incentives that they block each other's paths. The wise administrator removes those which are undesirable and strengthens those which promote good order and the desired purpose.

The permanency of impressions left by stimuli is relative. Some, either pleasurable or painful, are long remembered; others are soon forgotten. Part of this is due to hereditary make up; part to the intensity, extent or repetition of the impression. Some persons have far better memories than others. In a general way, pleasant stimuli are longest remembered. This is embodied in the well-known advertising adage: "The recollection of quality remains long after the price is forgotten." This tendency is fortunate, else grief over death, or unhappiness caused by misfortune, would linger indefinitely to cloud future existence. The old man, looking backward, recalls with joy the pleasant features of his boyhood. Similarly, in the discharged soldier time far more rapidly effaces memories of the difficulties and hardships of the service than of its pleasurable experiences.

Suggestion. Suggestion is the entering into the mind of an idea originated by some external fact or word and tending to produce an automatic response or reaction. The idea

may be accepted almost unconsciously, or it may meet with more or less opposition in the mind of the recipient, but in the end it is received uncritically and is realized unreflectedly and almost automatically. Through suggestion, there may be acceptance with conviction of a communicated proposition even in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance. Action following the conviction is practically automatic. Thus the idea and the act are largely forced upon the subject; for they may or may not be based on his desire and his compliance may be almost unconscious. The value of suggestion in controlling act is demonstrated in its highest form in hypnotism.

Impression depends on the volume, intensity and the repetition of the stimulation. It also depends on the mental plasticity or receptiveness of the individual. Most men in the army probably act through suggestion and imitation rather than through ideas of their own, by reason of the powerful influence which the military environment has upon them. Also it is probably true that not the least valuable part of military training is what the individual unconsciously acquires from the military atmosphere through suggestion. The same is true in respect to civil industry. Obviously it is important that this suggestive atmosphere should be correct.

Suggestion is the offensive arm of morale work, not only in meeting conditions of the present but in preparing for problems to come. Suggestion need carry no intimation of purpose. Its agency is thus invisible and it will be accepted unconsciously where direct methods of approach might arouse opposition. A concept of desired application to a specific purpose may be so developed in the individual that neither its source nor purpose nor the fact of acceptance may be recognized. In this way a man accepts and supports an idea as his own, not realizing that it came from outside and was not of internal and individual origin. This is because impressions of all kinds flow in upon him and all

exert their influence upon ideas and acts. The individual does not have the power to automatically receive only such mental impressions as he might have decided he would like to accept. Those artificially and deliberately created present no difference in appearance or result than they would have if they had been the product of chance. But if suggestion is so clumsily conveyed as to show its artificiality it is at once resented.

Individuals tend to adopt more readily any suggestions and ideas that serve to fortify existing habits and feelings. In the army this trend is strongly directed by the common military purpose and mutual interests. The soldier inclines quite readily to believe what his environment has made him want to believe. This can be used to promote his self-respect and efficiency. On the other hand, when things are not going as well, it takes but little harmful suggestion to cause the most improbable rumors to be accepted as fact.

Suggestion must be carefully formulated and presented on the basis not only of the impression to be produced but of the kind of mind to be acted upon. If this is not done there is liable to be misinterpretation which will lead to undesired action. Ordinarily, the use of suggestion should not be an involved or complex matter — a number of separate, simple suggestions are better. With men who can think for themselves, as the average American soldier, a successful way of using suggestion is to state facts which are their own premises and let the men draw their own conclusions. Increased knowledge and the processes of logic thus influence will.

Suggestion is not necessarily applied in formal language. Any of the special senses which can convey an idea may be used as an agency. It can be implied in the individual by facial expression, gesture, interjection, intonation or emphasis. The suggestion of example is powerful. Attitude and manner may belie words and by superior emphasis overcome the suggestive effect of the latter. Physical environ-

ment inevitably teems with suggestions for good or ill. Pictures and posters carry their lessons. Words, both spoken and written, are powerful channels. It is important, therefore, that speech and literature shall be such as to inspire right ideals of ambition, living and conduct. There is a psychological time for suggestion, at which it exerts its greatest power. What might be of the greatest value at one time would be equally out of place at another.

There is such a thing as contra-suggestion, by which, in a few individuals of strong self-assertion, a result is created which is the opposite of that intended. This is ordinarily due to personal dislike of the person making the suggestion, rather than to the suggestion itself. In soldiers it can usually be traced to a superior, who, while very likely efficient in method, is of offensive personality. But persons who repeatedly react in this way are usually soon eliminated from the service.

Suggestibility. Reaction to suggestion is a normal quality of mind. The measure of suggestibility is the degree of receptivity of the subject to suggestion. Such receptivity in the same person is not the same at all times, varying with the topic, the source and the mental state of the individual. Among factors of suggestibility may be mentioned attention, interest, freedom from distraction and prompt execution. The degree of response to suggestion bears a close relation to will-power; in an inverse ratio, however, for those less stable in will-power respond more readily to outside influence. The least degree of suggestibility is found in the alert, self-reliant man of strong convictions, who possesses a store of systematized knowledge which is brought to bear in analyzing statements made to him. This type is best reached by logic and reasoning and can usually be safely trusted to work out satisfactorily the problems presented to it and not be swayed by the illogical.

The converse of this type is the man of less intelligence and of weaker personality. Here suggestion, if faulty, may

lead him astray. On the other hand, it furnishes a tool which the company commander may use in the promotion of good conduct and in off-setting wrong ideas in the ignorant, sluggish mind and in those of more submissive character. This class may accept the most extravagant proposition with child-like credulity. Likewise, it will accept the views of the commander with unquestioning faith.

The influence of one person over another may sometimes be semi-hypnotic in that it brings about a certain paralysis of the volitional powers. Here the susceptibility of the controlled is as important as the strong will of the controller. An interesting point here is that an individual charged with being readily influenced by others may often strongly resent this statement, even though the evidence indicates such susceptibility. The phraseology used on such occasions is curiously much like that used by the subjects of post-hypnotic suggestion; in other words, the individual influenced to do a certain act says, at a later date, that he only did it because he desired to do it.

One practical lesson from this would be to take the more impressionable man, who is being influenced to his disadvantage, out of the neighborhood and away from the influence of the soldier of strong personality but undesirable standards. Similarly, the latter should be put in a group of individuals of strong personality whose influence on him will be corrective. A salutary environment is thus created for each type. The moral of all this is that the squad should not be formed alphabetically nor on the whim of the first sergeant, but its members should be carefully selected for an intelligently calculated beneficent influence on each other.

Suggestibility is also increased where there is deficiency of knowledge or conviction, or imperfect organization of knowledge relating to the topic on which the suggestion is made. This explains the ease with which the illiterate and uninformed are acted upon by suggestion and moved to un-

desirable act by false impression. It further indicates the need for good commanders to make special efforts to reach those of weaker intelligence and will and to implant suggestion that will counteract those which are undesirable. The most effective way to do this is by personal contact.

Suggestibility is further increased by the impressive character of the source from which the suggestion comes, or by a desire to please or to appear at an advantage. This means that suggestibility in soldiers, in response to suggestions from superiors, is greatly heightened by the prestige, rank, status, power, uniform and other attributes of such superiors. Suggestions from persons believed to be inferiors are little regarded, for here the instinct of self-assertion comes into play. All this tremendously facilitates the successful use of this power by the commander, if he will but employ it. By a little exercise of it he can set at naught the evil influences operating on the weaker element in his command.

Suggestibility further depends on the individual peculiarities and native disposition of the subject. This implies intelligent observation of the soldier as an individual, with a view to estimating his degree of receptivity and the best method of approach. Here, too, the officer's personality has a powerful influence on the men. The physical subordination to the leader combines with psychological subordination to promote psychic control. If this relation of superior and inferior is used wisely and to full extent, and the officer has a strong personality to sustain his part, most potent results for good may be expected. This is especially true in relation to the recruit, because of the further well-known suggestive influence of the old-timer upon the neophyte.

Some persons are abnormally susceptible to the influence of one individual only. This is a relation which may be used for good as well as evil. The great value of personal attention, as found in the " Big Brother " movement in civil

life, has its source in social susceptibility, or the influence of one person upon another. The counter-part of this relation in the army is found in its close " buddy " friendships. The good officer will seek to recognize such relationships and bring suggestion to bear through the one wielding the influence.

Soldiers are inevitably suggestible because they are trained to accept without question the statements of those in authority, because of their relative lack of knowledge as compared with better educated and more mature officers, and also because of inferior organization of such knowledge as they have. Still further reason is that the whole plan of the military organization, with the superior rank, power, knowledge and reputation of its officers, is calculated to evoke the impulse of submission and a receptive attitude. By virtue of this susceptibility to suggestion, the men rapidly absorb the knowledge, beliefs and especially the sentiments of their military environment. It therefore becomes the duty of the commander to make the environment such as will evoke the suggestions which he desires adopted in the interests of discipline and efficiency.

All persons are susceptible to mass suggestion, especially when supported by society as a whole, or by long tradition. This explains the human desire " to be with the winner," and the great group whose minds are predetermined by the acts of others. It explains the ease with which new material is mentally assimilated in organizations in which morale is high and the special rapidity with which recruits are imbued with the ideals of organizations possessed of long, honorable records and traditions.

The importance of " last word " in fixing impression varies with the individual. All know the type of superior of whom it is said that the last person to talk to him is the one who makes up his mind for him. This factor has a definite psychological place, for in normal suggestibility the strength of the suggestion is dependent on the following

things: 1. Last impression — that is of several impressions, the last is most likely to be acted upon. 2. Frequency — that is, repetitions, not one after another, but at intervals separated by other impressions. 3. Repetition — this is distinguished from frequency by being repetitions one after another without having other kinds of impressions put in between. Repetition is one-third as powerful as frequency and one-fifth as powerful as last impression. 4. The strongest impression is obtained by a combination of frequency and last impression.

These factors seem to have the same relative importance whether applied to the individual or to the crowd. The authors of speeches and writings which have made a powerful impression on the world have, consciously or unconsciously, made use of this law; and curiously, the repetitions in such compositions are, making allowances for differences in rate of delivery of different persons, at about equal intervals or multiples thereof and the speech always ends with the strongest suggestion of them all. Those wishing to test this for themselves may do so by reading aloud Anthony's speech at the death of Cæsar from Shakespeare, or Patrick Henry's " Give me liberty or give me death " speech. It will be noted how the repeated suggestions are each made stronger than the preceding one. Commanders will do well to familiarize themselves with this law and make practical use of it in their contact with individuals and organizations.

Contagion. Where several or more persons are together, emotions are often rapidly transmitted by contagion, through word, attitude, appearance, example and act. The most forceful example of this is in panic, which may seize upon individuals who themselves are not exposed to the cause but to whom the state of mind is transmitted from others. They may acquire this state of mind from persons who have received it from others, who in turn may have received it

through false impression. But the resulting state of mind is as real as if it were founded on the fact of personal experience. For contagion, as the name implies, there must be sufficiently close contact. In military life, close contact and intimate relations are inevitable. The physical quality necessary to contagion is thus always present in high degree.

Thoughts are the most contagious things in the world; for it is human nature to speak of what one thinks, thereby sowing the seeds of his ideas among others. This is the reverse of the instinct of curiosity, for it tends to create and satisfy curiosity in others. If the talking quality is present in high degree, the individual becomes known as a gossip, and manifests a tendency to disseminate information often without reasonable check of caution. Loose talkers in a company may do much harm, for their loquacity often leads them to statements, the premises of which they have not verified and which result in misapprehension and misbehavior in others. These should be watched for and their propensities in this line suitably curbed; or placed in a selected group where their talking can do little harm.

In contagious disease, an incubation period, often of several weeks, may be necessary for the development of the physical infection to a point where it may be transmitted. With thought, such period of incubation is not necessary. The thought infection becomes contagious and may be transmitted as soon as received, and the greater its apparent interest the more rapid and extensive its transmission. Its most extreme and rapid form is seen in the communication of ideas in the development of panic. The great danger in unwholesome ideas is their tendency to spread. An effective way to prevent this, in addition to measures to curb the spread, is by education and information to render the general mental state unreceptive to ideas of an indisciplinary or anti-social nature in order to counteract them in case they

should be introduced or started. The measures necessary are analogous to the physical immunization and disinfection practised in contagious disease.

This tendency for ideas to spread through contagion may be turned to good purpose. The words or acts of leaders may be directly known to but few, but contagion can be used to spread their influences widely. This shows the value of well calculated announcements of facts or purposes by suitable authority, in which men are interested and which it is proper for military purposes that they should have, together with the systematized dissemination of such information. Since contagion exists as a force, it should be turned to the desired purpose.

Affirmation. Simple affirmation, without reason or proof, is an effective means of imparting an idea, especially to crowds. Neither fact nor demonstration is necessary to secure acceptance; but to be fully effective, the affirmant should possess a certain degree of prestige. Also the strength of the affirmation is increased if it be repeated a number of times and in practically the same terms, thus inducing the mind to accept the unproved statement as the truth. Most persons accept statements as facts if they do not come from sources which are themselves discredited.

Affirmation and repetition are the basis of advertising and produce an unconscious acceptance which remains even though the origin be forgotten. The sale of patent medicines, for example, is pushed solely through affirmation and repetition. They form the basis of the appeal by the politician. Assertion, like assertiveness, secures a following. Affirmation goes further, for when supported by suggestion and strengthened by imitation, it becomes the basis of public opinion.

The agency of simple affirmation is one which officers should fully utilize in handling their commands. When they have been honest with their men and their good judgment has been proven, the trust and prestige which they

enjoy will cause their statements to be accepted with conviction. Accordingly it is desirable that the officer let his ideas be known with positiveness on matters which are causing doubt or anxiety among the men. It will clear away distrust and uncertainty. But the affirmation should not be made in such a manner as to savor of dogmatism and block self-assertion in others.

Prestige. Prestige is defined as the weight, influence or force derived from past success or from character, position or reputation. It pertains both to persons and ideas. It is one of the attributes of the successful leader. It is the mainspring of authority, because its recognition implies instinctive subordination, obedience and self-negation on the part of those who come under its influence.

Prestige of person is a powerful agency in the military or industrial establishment. Rank or place confers prestige in appropriate gradation. The officer, on being commissioned, is at once endowed with prestige through the symbol of his uniform which stands for status and power. This is enhanced by the authority of the State and the army which has been conferred upon him and renders his relation to his subordinates impersonal. This artificial prestige goes a long way to support his authority. However, it is not sufficient for the better type of leadership unless reinforced by the essential personal qualities. The prestige of commanders supports their subordinates in battle, for even though the men cannot see their leaders, they instinctively realize their presence and rely on them for direction and control. The military value of the prestige of a Napoleon can scarcely be overestimated.

Prestige is also acquired by the individual who gains fame or fortune through his own efforts. Examples of this are seen in the successful business man, artist or soldier, whose achievements have won respect. It may, in a way, be artificial, as where the reputation of the man is exalted above his actual worth through publicity and affirmation, the truth or

exaggeration of which no one troubles to inquire into or verify. Such prestige of pretense shrivels in the army under the light of experience and the results of campaigns.

Prestige may be inherited, as through the name of an illustrious ancestor or the transmission of a title of nobility. To be the " son of his father " may carry a man far, irrespective of the ability of the latter. However, the high standards of accomplishment of an ancestor, which are often realized and magnified by tradition, tend to dissipate the prestige pertaining to the descendant through the relative incompetence of the latter, unless supported by such artificial distinctions of class, privilege and power as are not recognized in a democracy.

Prestige may also be individual and due neither to inheritance nor act of merit, but to the forceful personality and magnetism of the one possessing it. The so-called " born leaders of men " have the innate quality of prestige far greater than the average individuals upon whom they force their ideas and sentiments. Such natural leaders are few. History of all time reveals scarcely a dozen heroic figures of supreme power of leadership.

Ideas which are affirmed, repeated and adopted acquire in time the added importance conferred by prestige. Ideas supported by prestige are largely accepted without discussion. This makes for conservatism and entrenched tradition. Old ideas, if wrong, are hard to overthrow; if right, they have stronger compelling force than those of later date or more recent adoption. This means that military tradition and custom, rightly used, are a power for good. It also implies responsibility that military ideas and methods shall be as nearly perfect as human knowledge and effort can make them. Furthermore, it means that the highest authority available shall promulgate and promote them.

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES, RELATIONS, AND METHODS (Continued)

Emotions; their nature; stimulation of emotions; their expression. Sentiments; their source and nature; their influence on conduct; mental ideals and morale; common aims; ethical standards; some examples of sentiments. Imagination; its power as a stimulus; its control. Volition; the choice of motives; will-power and its development and control; self-control and self-regard. Motive; its relation to behavior; chance and selected motives; motive and morale work; motive from suggestion; group motives. Behavior; the methods of its development; the control of motive; levels of conduct; strength of act and intensity of motive; psychanalysis and behavior; conduct and public opinion; codes of conduct; traditions and customs. Relation between thought and behavior; examples of sequence; sub-conscious and involuntary acts; mental state and physical competency; interests and acts. Relation between environment and behavior; adjustment to environment; maladjustments; stimulants to act; creatures of environment; inter play between biological units; correction of faulty environment; control of conduct by alteration of environment. The psychological approach; direct and indirect approach; influence of personality; need of studying the human subject; use of the direct approach; positive rather than negative action; argument and mental clash; preliminary steps to direct approach; "hammering a company into shape"; methods of the indirect approach; suggestion and sympathy; the affirmative appeal; individual equations. The mechanics of behavior; sequence between environment and act; examples of sequence.

Emotion. An emotion may be defined as any of the feelings, in their various forms, aroused by pleasure or pain, activity or repose, or the type of consciousness created by such feelings.

Emotions may be regarded as exaggerations of simple sensations of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Every reaction to an environment is felt acutely or obscurely at the moment it occurs and produces an emotional state of greater

or less intensity. When emotions are marked, they produce outward signs of bodily excitement. We say that the person is "overcome by emotion," which means that he shows expression of unsatisfactory and incomplete adjustment.

Emotions are incompatible with clear thinking. In the emotional state, the consequences of act are seen only obscurely if at all, and the mental storm sweeps over all other considerations until expression by act gives relief. The frenzied mob or the company sent out as the "forlorn hope," are animated by strong emotions, though of different quality.

Primary emotions due to a single instinct are not common in man. Emotions usually are compound and derived from several instincts. This compounding is due to sentiments. Complex emotions present an indefinitely large number of qualities which shade imperceptibly into each other without sharp dividing lines. The complete analysis of emotions is not always easy and may even be impossible. But lines of demarcation are more apparent in emotions of high intensity.

As painful emotion is unpleasant, the tendency is to avoid its being evoked by the distressed and to seek the pleasurable company of the cheerful. "Laugh and the world laughs with you; weep and you weep alone." Relief may be tendered not only for the alleviation of suffering in others but, in unconscious selfishness, to relieve the sympathetic suffering which we ourselves experience.

Any emotion that is not stimulated will lose its intensity and die out, but its replacement is possible only by another emotion which is stronger. Where emotions conflict, action is paralyzed or incomplete until one emotion becomes paramount. These facts are important in the swaying of men to a desired act. Constant suggestion, duly directed and of sufficient intensity, is required.

The attainment of strong feeling turns the idea into the

ideal. Thus the anticipated gratification of further accomplishment may outweigh present desire. Transitory emotional states are readily created by a strong exciting agent. The religious exhorter or the mob leader temporarily sways the crowd. But fixed beliefs are not easily established. There must be repeated exposure to strong kindred emotions. Once firmly established, however, fixed beliefs, as for example, religious conviction or faith in military purpose and superiority, are almost invincible.

All emotional states tend to have outward expression through countenance, attitude and gesture. If strong, they fall into group expression, which, as in moving pictures, portray their nature to everyone. Darwin's "Expression of the Emotions" furnishes interesting and valuable reading on this subject. The minor emotions have correspondingly less facial or bodily expression, but these can, nevertheless, be interpreted by shrewd judges of men. Such judges can, especially with those not skilled in masking the emotions with an impassive countenance, almost literally read men like a book. Criminologists make use of this to find out truth and reject falsehood. The company commander may well cultivate this quality of interpretive observation. It will make for the welfare of the individual and the discipline of the company. Often remarks based on accurate observation and shrewd interpretation of mental state break down barriers of reticence and bring forth statements of facts.

But in order to recognize and interpret emotional state, and apply the knowledge so gained, there must be personal contact. This is another argument for closer physical relation between the officer and his men. He cannot deduce what is going on in their minds unless study has made their mental processes familiar to him and they are near enough for close observation.

Sentiments. A sentiment may be defined as a mental attitude, thought or judgment permeated or prompted by feeling. Sentiments are aroused and cultivated by ideas and

ideals of intellectual, esthetic, moral and religious objects, relations and values. There is, in general, an emotional disposition with reference to an object or class of objects. When an emotion is strongly or repeatedly excited by a particular object, the rudiments of a sentiment are created. Highly emotional persons with poor mental balance and possibly affectation tend to be " sentimental." Sentiments also express ideals, and the sentimental person is highly idealistic and of biased tendencies. All persons experience certain emotions whenever the object of a sentiment comes to mind.

Sentiments determine moral judgment. The sentiments of the individual are apt to lead him to decisions that are valid only for himself, or, as frequently said, they pervert his judgment. It is notoriously difficult to measure out exact justice to those who are liked or disliked. The right of challenge of members of a court martial is an expression of this fact — also that trial and sentence are taken out of the hands of the company commander and reposed in the summary court. From this, the self-evident fact appears that in the administration of an organization the existence of the factors of like and dislike should be recognized and deliberately kept out of consideration, lest the men feel that their destinies are swayed by sentiments of preference and prejudice instead of even justice.

In the classification of sentiments it should be clearly understood that there is no definite line of demarcation about any one of them, but rather a twilight zone in which one blends imperceptibly into another. Several may have certain common factors, as envy and jealousy. All sentiments represent complexes of certain instincts.

As sentiments profoundly influence conduct, through the efforts to attain the ideals which they embody, a study of their nature, function and methods of development, repression and control is important. Some are of great importance for military purposes, either for general application or within certain limits. Some are of little or no military

applicability, but have value in civil industry. In any case, whether they are to be aroused or repressed, there should be intelligent selection with a view to a definite object, and they should be turned to use along proper lines and developed or controlled within the limits suitable to the purpose to be accomplished.

As certain high sentiments should be aroused, so too, these sentiments should constantly be advanced to a higher plane. A dim emotion at sight of the regimental flag should ultimately be developed into the ideals of the use of military service in betterment of the nation and humanity. Men fully animated by the last ideal may perhaps be destroyed by overwhelming force, but their extermination involves appalling sacrifice to the foe.

When troops meet with reverses they are depressed and exhibit low morale, due to inertia of the qualities naturally stimulating to victory. Without ideals that stand the test of equity, defeat tends to follow. But with such ideals, volition enters and the will to accomplish masters the instinctive tendencies. It is possible to conceive of a unified handful of Greeks, determined to win or die, withstanding or defeating the Persian hordes at Thermopylae or Marathon. It is not possible to conceive of victory for troops which are armed but irresolute. Weapons are of no use if they are thrown away under discouragement or through discordance of ideas and purposes. Morale represents the exaltation of a sentiment and ideal above the influence of environment as a result of sustained volition. It is determination rising to the intensity of an obsession to see things through despite every obstacle, discouragement or weariness. The degree of the incompleteness of their information and sentiments is, in a way, the measure of the deficiency in the will of troops to "carry on" through vicissitude and to conquer.

Accordingly, war aims should be taught as expressing the common purpose through which all proper individual inter-

ests, however diverse, are defended. Until a purpose has been established, no special reason will be apparent why the war should be fought or the individual incur danger. The strongest motive of fighting in the recent war, animating the Allies, was the idea that the war must be won so that it might be the last. It was the "war against war." Here the sentiment of repugnance for war was the best stimulus for its prosecution.

When a common aim has been created, the minds and wills of the individuals composing the group can be so firmly fixed upon its achievement that common understanding, purpose and determination will express themselves in voluntary coöperation, voluntary adjustment of the relations between individuals, and voluntary obedience, cheerfulness and patience.

When definite, common aims do not exist, all this changes. Each man will tend to be for self, with clashing interests, friction in relations, and discontent because the personal desires which are paramount are not satisfied. Satisfaction within a group can only come through subordination of self to well understood purposes of common welfare. Of the truth of this, the conditions which arose in our army during demobilization, after common war aims had disappeared, furnish obvious examples.

The justness of an idea or sentiment does not necessarily imply its prompt expression in act. Evidence, if very positive, may be accepted quickly by an educated person, but he tends sub-consciously to revert to his original ideas. The untrained mind tends to be illogical and to reason slowly. But truth, if persistently brought to the attention, ultimately prevails, and sentiments thus gradually created become irresistible. The inculcation of proper sentiments should therefore be continuous and progresssive.

Where good morale, based on ethical sentiments, exists, the truth may safely be told regarding the hardships and

difficulties ahead. This was the case with the Allies, who felt that their cause had the approbation of the highest ethical considerations of mankind — that they were the defenders of truth, honor, justice and liberty.

But where poor morale exists, or where morale is brought about through sordid motives, as desire for power or plunder, telling the truth about a difficult situation may cause the disintegration of the mental forces upon which accomplishment depends. The Germans realized this, and when there were no real successes to report, the spirits of the men were bolstered up with glowing statements and half-truths. Troops on the eastern front were stimulated in check or reverse by stories of success on the western front, and vice-versa. Also the idea that the Fatherland was in some way fighting a defensive war was assiduously inculcated. Only when the German soldier, despite such efforts, came to realize that the world was against him and that he was doomed to fail did his spirits fall and he get out of hand.

The multiplicity of sentiments is so great that they cannot even be enumerated, much less discussed and analyzed. In a general way they fall into two classes, positive and negative in quality, of which love and hatred may be accepted as types. A few sentiments may be analyzed as examples.

Pleasure is a state of gratification in which there is possession of the results of choice. Joy is more than pleasure, however intense. It is a complex sentiment in which hope and anticipation are factors. Admiration expresses a sentiment which is pleasurable. It usually includes the factors of wonder and self-submission. If the object be fully understood, the element of wonder disappears. The self-assertive cannot fully admire. Admiration of leaders by their men is a powerful aid to discipline.

Respect is a sentiment provoked toward others who manifest self-respect in themselves, but over-weening pride arouses resentment, disgust or contempt. The conceit of

the Germans and their bombastic talk about " imposing the victorious German will " blocked self-assertion in others and raised many a foe against them.

Gratitude is made up of appreciation of sympathy on the part of another, with a certain self-submission toward him. Thus it is not easy for a proud man to experience gratitude. If the beneficent act is performed in a spirit of condescension, this spirit tends to neutralize the effect by promoting resentment at the assumption of superiority. Any quality of ostentation in charity or uplift work turns against it the class it was intended to benefit.

Loyalty has been defined as the " willing, practical and thorough-going devotion of a person to a cause." It is one of the corner stones of military or industrial efficiency. Loyalty is an essential to coöperation and morale. It represents adhesion to a person or an ideal. It is undeveloped in the recruit toward the army. It may be latent in respect to the country. But it can be aroused by proper stimulating conditions acting upon innate tendencies. It is ordinarily not a surface virtue, and becomes evident when stimulated by necessity. If the rights or honor of a leader, organization or nation to whom or to which allegiance has been given are threatened, loyalty develops. Loyalty is a sentiment capable of spurring individuals to their best efforts and coordination of purpose. Ability to inspire loyalty is one of the qualities of leadership. For some persons, loyalty to abstract ideals is difficult, as the latter are too intangible. Here the value of a symbol, as a regimental standard, is often very great.

Justice is a sentiment standing high in the list of desirable military attributes. It is embodied not only in equity toward individuals but in the standards of fair play controlling honorable rivalry. Every participant in a quarrel or war tries to give the impression that his action was of a defensive character, even though it was unprovoked aggression. The fable of " The Wolf and the Lamb " illustrates

this point. Thus the Germans had to try to find an excuse for what they were doing, lest the sense of equity be aroused at home and revenge abroad. The sympathy of the world at large is with fair play, which, with justice, are ideals to be striven for. When they are not present resentment is aroused in others. The ruthless force, broken treaties, unnecessary cruelty and causeless aggression of the Teutons aroused a host of idealists against them.

Some of the other beneficial sentiments to encourage among the men are those of duty, trustworthiness, friendship, coöperation, fair play, courage, ambition, honor, thrift, perseverance, patriotism and many others that these will suggest.

The analysis of the mental state progressing through resentment, anger and hatred, as evidenced in the recent war, may be of interest.

Resentment is based on angry self-assertion, sudden and impulsive. The Germans, in invading Belgium, had no feelings against the Belgians other than contempt. The temporary check given them by the Belgians aroused resentment, and only when the importance of this check in frustrating the German plans was later apparent did resentment turn to a stronger hostile emotion. There can be no resentment toward one who does one's bidding, though the former may be despised as spiritless and servile.

Anger is more intense than resentment. It occurs when purpose is blocked and resistance is serious enough to require the output of full effort to achieve the object. When the French turned back the tide of invasion at the Marne, the anger of the Teuton was aroused as a result.

Hatred is a sentiment compounded of anger, disgust and fear. It is above anger, and occurs only when purpose is definitely blocked. There can be no hate without fear of greater power. The child, restrained from doing a certain thing, very likely stamps its foot, bursts into tears and says "I hate you." Confidence in achieving the object is lost.

When England held Germany by land and sea in bands of steel, the German hatred developed. A storm of hatred swept over the country and the author of the "Hymn of Hate" was publicly honored by the Kaiser. The writer interpreted this at the time to mean that the German people subconsciously felt that they had met their match, though not admitting such fact even to themselves. German hate meant that German confidence was broken. Add to this the "Gott strafe England" motto, and it was obvious that the enemy was turning to a higher power to do what he subconsciously felt he could not accomplish himself. This country could not really hate the foe because it did not fear them, however great its contempt might be for their ideas and methods.

Revenge is based on anger, usually including with that sentiment one of self-regard. It is a persistent sentiment and lies at the basis of feuds. Public affront which is not immediately resented, and which lowers the individual in the estimation of his fellows, is especially a cause of revenge. It calls out self-assertion and desire for retribution, no matter how long delayed. Revenge has no limits, repaying an injury in more than just measure. It is blind to fact in that it passes beyond reason and runs into excess, usually of the same general type as that which originally caused it. It is the principle of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."

Revengeful feeling arises not only from the insult to the individual but to the group to which he belongs. It is a desire to "get even" as a result of degradation. It occurs as a collective sentiment in the military organization or nation which has suffered defeat and which finds itself unable to give immediate expression to its resentment. The attitude of France toward Germany after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine is an example. Pugnacity was restrained only by reason and calculation.

Envy is due to negative self-feeling and anger. There is resentment at an expression of superiority and at exclusion

from benefit enjoyed by another. The envy the Germans had for other nations was shown in their demand for a "place in the sun." Jealousy is akin to envy, but based on the additional instinct of possession. Malice springs from envy and jealousy, as shown by the malicious destruction of property by the Germans.

Reproach is fusion of anger and tender emotion or personal interest. Scorn is the expression of anger and disgust, clearly expressed. It is usually evoked by harmful conduct, expressed by underhand or dishonorable means. It implies self-assertion. If the latter is great, scorn is changed to contempt. Enemy measures against non-combatants evoked scorn, not fear, in self-reliant Americans.

Shame is an emotion with powerful influence on behavior. It expresses negative self-feeling and appreciation of failure to reach ideals. Shame comes from within the individual as a result of conduct by which he is lowered in the estimation of his fellows. It represents anger against one's self and therefore is incapable of satisfaction. There is no chance to "get even." With shame comes desire to withdraw one's self and one's shortcoming from the notice of others. After the war, the Germans felt shame though not repentance.

Imagination. Imagination is divided into creative and reproductive phases. Reproductive imagination is memory. Creative imagination relates to what does not exist in fact, but only in fancy and ideals. It expresses the power of the mind in forming mental images from concepts, feelings or physical images. It denotes plastic or creative power. Along with imagination goes credulity, and the creations of fancy become very real. It is very strong and vivid without conscious mental control in the young and in the ignorant. Thus the child lives largely in an imaginary world, in which a broom-stick that he bestrides becomes a horse, a heap of blocks a house, and the existence of fairies not unreasonable. The ignorant savage believes in witchcraft and

voodoos, and his imagination distorts the common attributes of the forest into uncanny things. So, too, the soldier on guard at night often pictures imaginary enemies behind every bush. Thus it may lead the individual far astray in act flowing from the erroneous or exaggerated thought.

But as imagination may lead to error, so it may also lead to higher things and become the stimulus for ambition. Matters of every day life may be idealized and intensified, and along these lines imagination should be stimulated. Perfection of the human form may be expressed on canvas through imagination in higher degree than perhaps ever existed in the actual experience of the artist. So, too, standards of conduct may be pictured by the imagination as the ideals of striving and become the stimuli of behavior. The speaker sways his audience through the mental pictures conjured by imagination.

Imagination can only occur as a result of sensations from without, on which to build. No one could imagine a horse without having seen one. The mind projects itself from facts. Individuals vary greatly in their imaginative power, varying from the child, to whom the darkness is peopled by strange and fearsome shapes, to the stolid, matter-of-fact person of whom we say " he has no imagination." Dreams are the result of activity of imagination during sleep.

Imagination is particularly strong in certain races, as the negro, and needs to be specially taken into account in any psychological understanding of them. Illiteracy favors it. All this is important to officers dealing with the impressionable, imaginative soldier.

Imagination is controlled by statement of truth. Simple assertion by leaders possessing the attributes of prestige is usually sufficient. The mother reassures her child by saying of the imaginary shapes that " there is nothing there." Repetition is valuable in reinforcing assertion of this kind. Education enters by building up a fund of systematized information and a disciplined mind, by which possible errors

are corrected in advance and mental vagaries are controlled.

Volition. Volition may be considered as the faculty of "willing," by which a process of deliberation or vacillation is terminated by a decision or choice. It refers to the executive function of will, by means of which a man takes himself in hand for the purpose of making a determinative choice of action. It often expresses decision rather than desire.

Through volition, it is possible to concentrate the mind by direct effort in a certain direction and prevent it from flowing in others. In the conflict of two motives, if will be thrown on the side of one of them it is in some way reinforced so that its desired end is secured over the opposition of its rival. An example of volition is where the soldier has a fear of advancing against the enemy, yet has a greater fear of incurring the contempt and obloquy of his comrades if he does not do so, and so deliberately decides to advance. A still higher type of volition would be the deliberate offer of self-sacrifice in volunteering for dangerous duty for the common good and promotion of an ideal, subordinating thereto the instinct of fear. Courage is an expression of volition rising superior to fear.

Volition is the motive force which proceeds from character. If the trend of character is bad, the decisions of volition tend to make for anti-social conduct. If good, the reverse is true, and high ideals may hold the individual to conduct which may be to his own personal disadvantage but to the welfare of others. The importance of building up character as an aid to efficiency is apparent.

Morale implies the determination of volition. If expressed, volition gains strength. Verdun was held quite as much by the declaration "They shall not pass" as by physical armament. "A man can go ahead and do anything, just so long as he doesn't know that he can't do it."

Will varies greatly in individuals; some persons never can be leaders because they cannot sufficiently make up their

minds. But the repeated exercise of will develops the powers of decision. Accordingly, the assigning of tasks requiring the exercise of volition is valuable in developing volitional powers in those naturally hesitating. Some parents make the mistake of deciding everything for their children, even in minor detail, instead of wisely directing selection. The submission thus enforced greatly interferes with the qualities of initiative and decision in after life. The wise superior will develop volition in his men by deliberately putting appropriate obligations of choice upon them. He will also, by suggestion or admonition, whichever may be appropriate, strengthen the will-power toward making the right decision.

It might be mentioned here that an officer may think that he commands act, but act will not be accomplished without the consent of such thoughts as the soldier himself entertains. If the soldier does not exercise volition in his consent and become submissive to the order, he will not perform the act which the order requires, or will perform it only in part and hence insufficiently. He may carry out the form without securing the substance. The officer is thus a " commanding " officer in name only. The response to his orders is only voluntary; he cannot command the thoughts of men, but he may induce them. Those who question this may reflect upon the result, for example, of ordering a soldier to change his religious or political convictions and worshiping or voting as directed. So, too, in military matters. Right here is the key to all successful morale work — *to make the soldier think he wants to do what you want him to do.* This is the essence of leadership.

As the individual advances to a higher mental plane, the development of the powers of volition renders him less and less dependent on his present environment, though the influence of the latter never ceases. A strong sentiment of self-control is the master sentiment of volition and resolu-

tion. This enables the individual to apply his decision in spite of the opposition of other motives. It enables him to rise superior, as it were, to present conditions, as a result of environmental influences which have been exercised before. It is an expression of self-assertion. It may even mean that self-approval or disapproval mean more to the individual than the approval or disapproval of others. This implies self-respect, the support of which is necessary for the control of a desire; otherwise an opposing moral sentiment would not have the support of will in successfully opposing it. It is hard, if not impossible, for a vicious habit to be overcome where the victim has lost his self-respect and become oblivious to public opinion. It is volition based on self-esteem and previous inculcation of proper sentiments that decides the man to do the hard, self-denying or dangerous thing because he knows it is right. Most soldiers, no matter how they have been brought up, know the difference between right and wrong; an appeal to conscience, if properly put, will seldom fail in bringing about the right decision. The self-regarding sentiment requires the soldier to live up to ideals. He feels shame when he does not; elation and satisfaction when he does. What those ideals shall be largely depends upon his officers.

The self-regarding sentiment generates a strong, well-rounded character when it becomes dominant and is combined with ideals of conduct. Every time it masters an impulse from some other source, it becomes, according to the law of habit, more competent to do it again. It is like a muscle which grows larger and stronger through use.

A further essential of strong character is the organization of its elements in some harmonious system, in which some strong trait directs behavior to a final object to which all other ends are subordinated. The extreme result is the development of a ruling passion. This is seen, for example, in the miser, the libertine or the religious ascetic. The same

agencies can be so directed in the soldier as to dominate him by the purpose of success and enable him to rise above lesser motives.

The soldier, as war continues, becomes sterner. His will is set to see it through, regardless of self. There is determination that the world must be made better to pay for the suffering he has gone through. The same forces that actuate the individual in war can be brought to bear in his every day life in time of peace to help him conquer difficulties, whether physical or mental in their nature.

Men of weak character are those whose sentiments are little systematized, yield rapidly to obstacle and are readily diverted from one thing to another by social environment. Such persons ordinarily make no sustained effort of will except under pressure of necessity and there is no persistence or lasting determination. This tendency must be combatted. Sentiments, like muscles, tend to weaken and atrophy from lack of use. Those which are not allowed to determine action progressively lose their force. It is the duty of the officer so to study his men that he will know their weak points and strengthen these as well as curb tendencies too strong or out of place for military purpose. The weak characters of the company, rather than the strong ones, need his attention. His problem is to bring the weak up to the level and standard of the strong.

Motive. In a psychological sense, motive is that which tends to excite action or change of action. It is the inducement to preference or choice. Accordingly it governs conduct, whether in its personal or military relations. Good conduct proceeds from good motives, except where premises are faulty or the method of execution imperfect and the results of intention thus mechanically interfered with. Conversely, by altering, removing or preventing undesirable motive, the anti-social conduct which would have resulted may be amended or entirely eliminated.

In every effort to modify conduct for the better, it is of

basic importance to utilize the original qualities of human nature. Attempts to suppress them summarily produce painful sensations in the subject, are resented, and usually provoke antagonistic reaction. But inherent undesirable qualities in the individual may be diverted from bad to good and from good to better. The intelligent provision of good motives, rather than leaving them to chance development, is thus essential.

The controlling effect of motive upon act is recognized by the law, which requires that intent to commit crime must be shown, or, that all reasonable precautions to safeguard the act have been taken. Accidents are not punishable unless there be contributory negligence. The insane person, without rational motive, is irresponsible.

Motive, unchecked or unstimulated, tends to be the result of fortuitous environment acting upon instinct. This is seen in the lower animals, in young children and in older persons under certain conditions. A higher type of motive is that which proceeds from sentiments and ideals of conduct which are inherent or which have been artificially inculcated. Motive springs from physical conditions or mental concepts. It thus appears that if physical conditions are changed, or if mental attitude is modified, conduct will be amended to correspond. Therefore it is evident that motive may be deliberately developed, formulated and utilized as a force in human affairs, just as the force of gravity is used in mechanics.

Morale work in the army is based on the recognition of this fact. Its purpose is to control physical environment so systematically and effectively that the motives and conduct arising therefrom will be in the interests of discipline and good order, not the reverse. It proposes also to control psychological environment, and further, through the inculcation of lofty sentiments and ideal standards, to create motives that may persist even if the environment has become temporarily unfavorable.

Motive, to be most effectively inspired artificially, should appear to arise in a spontaneous or impersonal way. If possible, its seeds should be implanted in advance of the need for the utilization, so that if the need arises a preformed state of mind, entertaining high ideals of conduct, may direct behavior. This implies the constant and broad education of the men in ethical concept and military purpose, so that the mind instinctively seizes upon the right behavior. Motive is most effective if inspired by suggestion, leaving to the man the reasoning out of the methods of solving the problem from the premises available. Only after the ground has been well prepared can a motive be effectively introduced openly by the direct approach, since this method may check the self-assertive instinct and arouse opposition.

Any given stimulus does not produce the same reaction in all. Where the general character of the result is the same, its quantity and quality varies. While one class gives the results desired, another class may respond little or not at all, and still others exhibit contrary reactions. The old idea of doing that which does the most good for the greatest number is satisfactory only for the average. It does not meet the needs of the extremes of the group. To accomplish this means that man must be studied and handled as an individual as well as one of the mass. It is recognized that methods of uniformity, desirable though they may be, are not perfect and sometimes are not psychologically applicable to all. It is true that general methods produce many good soldiers, but the responsibility of the officer does not rest there. His problem is to make all men good soldiers, and as the diversity of type makes this duty more difficult so at the same time it adds to its human interest.

It is very important for military purposes that the members of a military group link themselves so closely to it and identify themselves so intimately with it that the motives governing the whole become the motives of the individual. With common purpose and aim, the men whole-heartedly

support the general plan, submit to the strictest sort of discipline and at the same time preserve sufficient individuality. The nearer personal and group interests can be made to correspond, the better for efficiency.

It is important to make a study of the more special motives which affect the conduct of soldiers for good or ill. There is, of course, a considerable margin for error with the individual, yet in the military service, in which more or less common conditions and purposes prevail, certain motives common to all or to large groups must exist. An understanding of their nature and importance is of great value as a guide in dealing with them. It is not possible to enumerate and evaluate here all of the motives concerned. Officers should do this for themselves, according to the nature of troops and character of service. But reference in this connection to the basic instincts and to sentiments will be helpful, and many of the commoner motives will appear from the discussion elsewhere in the present study.

Behavior. By behavior is meant the manner of conducting one's self, whether good or bad, in the external relations of life. It includes relation to things as well as persons and the personal action to or toward them. The direct connections in cause and effect in relation to behavior are never open to chance. Conduct, accordingly, cannot safely be left to develop of itself, although the attitude of poor officers toward their men too often indicates their belief that this can be done, or implies indifference as to quality of result. It is of course true that unforeseen circumstances may enter to upset calculations. That is true of everything else as well as psychological matters. It merely means that the superior who exercises the most intelligent foresight and makes the wisest selection is most successful.

Behavior conforms to very definite laws. It is the expression of mental states created by stimuli of varying degrees of complexity, intensity and remoteness. Will is determined by ideals and interests. If the officer exercises a beneficent

influence on these, he effects their translation into behavior and arrives at a natural control of conduct.

It is an axiom that, other things being equal, the response to any situation will be that which is by reason of nature and temperament connected with that situation, or other situations similar to it. Some of these tendencies and reactions need stimulating and perpetuating through use. Some need elimination as undesirable. This is accomplished through disuse or by discomfort resulting from their action. Still others need to be modified or redirected.

While morale work relates to the intangibles of mind, its results are positive. They are expressed in the individual soldier, and in military organizations, by conduct. According as conduct varies, discipline is good or bad and military efficiency is high or low. Behavior shows the high morale which sends troops irresistibly against the enemy, or the negative morale which exists when they mutiny or surrender.

A financial panic affords an excellent example of the influence of a crowd state of mind upon physical conditions and behavior. During such a panic there is as much money in existence as ever there was. There is no reason why it should not be as available for purposes of finance and trade as it had been previously and as it will be subsequently. Nothing but a state of public mind, a lack of confidence, often illogical, intervenes. Yet because of this state of mind funds are hoarded, the money market fluctuates, business is depressed, production falls, and unemployment and privation result.

Behavior is usually the result of a complexity of ideas, often bringing several instincts into play. There are four levels of conduct. The lowest is that which is instinctive and influenced only by pleasure and pain; the next is conduct which is modified by reward or punishment more or less systematically applied; third is conduct largely controlled by anticipation of praise or blame; finally, that which

is based on an ideal, regardless of all praise, blame or other consequences. Man alone can rise to the highest level; the others are shared by lower animals in proportion as they represent organisms of higher development. It is obvious that the soldier should be raised to the higher grades of conduct, in which ideals and ethical considerations enter into volition.

In a general way it may be said that the strength of an act depends upon the intensity of the motive behind it. To bring out the supreme efforts required by certain military necessities requires that the motives behind them must have been developed and cultivated beyond all others. One great fault of military training as commonly carried out is that far too great importance is laid upon outward expression. This is beginning at the wrong end, for if the mind is properly molded to the purpose desired, the military act desired can almost be left to take care of itself.

Acts can be understood and interpreted as to cause only through the antecedents which brought about their accomplishment. However complicated, all acts are capable of analysis as to the situations stimulating them and the reaction and response, for nothing is more certain than that every phenomenon must have an efficient cause. Usually the sequence of relation can be directly traced; in other instances it may be reasoned out by analogy.

The behavior of the soldier or group is an indication of what is going on in the individual or collective mind. By analogy, one may usually assume that the same expression of conduct made by another as would be made by ourselves under the same conditions, indicates that he is having approximately the same mental experience. We can reason back from the bodily act or verbal expression to the thought which gave them birth and take measures to modify the latter where necessary. We meet here a certain lesser difficulty in that racial processes of thought and act are not always the same. This is discussed more fully elsewhere.

Conduct derives its values largely from the approval or disapproval of the community of which the individual forms a part. It is further based on the code and tradition of the social or military environment. Customs resulting therefrom bind society together, while they serve also to effect a more efficient adjustment of the individual to his environment.

But public opinion contains within itself no principle of progress of thought or act, but tends rather to the production of rigid customs of which the significance or necessity has perhaps disappeared. Particularly is this the case in the army, where " customs of the service " have all the force of common law, while rules of behavior are laid down and enforced despite a lessened applicability by reason of changed conditions. An example of this is seen in the Articles of War, which were practically unchanged in a century. Any inelastic tendency of the military mind, expressed in the saying that " nothing will pierce military conservatism but a bullet," is born of a combination of the psychological factors of tradition, custom and elderly commanders of fixed habit. This tendency needs the best efforts in opposition on the part of those who do not believe that human knowledge and achievement have yet crystallized into perfection.

In civil life, every nation has its own code of conduct, and within every nation there are numerous groups each having its own special standard. The diversity of code in the United States, geographically, by social class and by reason of racial differences not yet blended, is well known. Hence the civilian who changes his group and status tends, as a result of new environment, to create a compromise code of his own. Recruits entering the army thus bring with them a wide diversity in standards of thought and behavior.

But in the military service, the rules of conduct are minutely defined. The habits and conduct of recruits are more rapidly and firmly established because they result from a single inflexible code, rigidly enforced by public opinion and

superior power. The recruit promptly finds that a breach of any one of them results in official disapproval, usually shared in by most members of the soldier group. If his self-regarding sentiment has been developed in normal fashion before enlistment, he cannot bear up against such a disapproving environment and will tend to accept the code of conduct of the group to which he belongs. He unconsciously accepts the standards embodied in such phrases as "this is the way we do it in Company B," or, "in the 1st Infantry we don't do such things."

The precision of the military code provides for no deliberation of conduct, often permits no scope for judgment or choice, and in many ways tends to limit the development of strong individual character. What the soldier shall and shall not do is laid out in great detail and he comes into the army prepared to accept such rules of conduct as may authoritatively be set down for him. It is important, therefore, that the soldier shall be promptly and fully informed of the restrictions and requirements that everywhere hedge him in. If it be true that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," then it becomes the plain duty of the officer to protect the recruit against unwitting fault and see that such ignorance is not allowed to exist. The recruit, dropped into the military world where everything is unfamiliar and bewildering is, unless systematically instructed, as liable to break some unknown military requirement as would the traveler landing in a South Sea island be liable to transgress some local "taboo." One of the constant apprehensions of the recruit is his feeling of committing an unwitting fault, either through lack of knowledge or because the meager stock, more or less imperfectly furnished him, was not fully understood. It also serves as a restraint which keeps him from doing well that which he may be wholly capable of doing. Punishment under such conditions rankles in him as the grossest injustice. But if, beside laying down the rules for conduct dogmatically, the officer briefly explains their rea-

son and necessity, the factors of interest and intelligence in the recruit will work further in the interest of conformance.

While the military establishment is governed by a general code, diverse variations dependent on local ideals and customs tend to spring up in minor organizations. This is especially apparent among the militia organizations, but it also has a place in the regular regiments. Here certain traditional customs, not infringing on general requirements, add to esprit, as long since recognized in foreign armies.

The traditional conduct of any military organization lives in its most complete form in only a few of its individual units. They are the leaders of public opinion — others participate in a more partial manner and diverse degree as to the nature, number and strength of the sentiments they entertain. Since psychology shows that the individuals of strongest influencing ability are those whose power, status or achievement evoke admiration, it follows that officers should use these qualities with which they have been endowed to the fullest extent in the molding of their men. To turn over this opportunity and its plastic material to unskilful, less effective and possibly unsympathetic non-commissioned officers is one of the greatest mistakes a company commander can make. Not only is the resulting organization far less efficient, but the officer loses the pleasure and reward of molding human material along lines resulting in high ideals of conduct.

Relation between Thought and Behavior. Thought, for present purposes, may be defined as the results of thinking. It implies reason and judgment. Ideas are the result of putting together information received from outside. Men cannot change their own opinions — the factors for change must operate from without them. A mental state persists as long as no new element is introduced to modify it. This is important in relation to the control of behavior. Ideas entertained by the brain tend to transform themselves into

act. They have their well defined relations and sequence. The Scriptures say 'As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." This expresses the relation between thought and behavior and the conversion of ideas into conduct.

Thought in a certain direction tends to lead to activity in that direction. In order to undertake voluntary act, there must be thought about it. In order to carry it out there must be desire to accomplish it; consciousness and attention must be focused on it. The thought must be permanent, suppressing or inhibiting all others. For example, the crime was preceded by the mental presentation or plan; the assault followed the mental reaction of anger to the displeasing mental picture which the spoken word brought up; the temptation to absence without leave was followed by the act because the idea of immediate satisfaction was not counterbalanced just then by adequate representation of consequences.

Some voluntary acts are performed subconsciously, resulting from habit, such as walking down a street and doing various accustomed things without the slightest thought of the succession of acts. Yet all this has been impelled by operations of the mind and has left its mental impressions, as can be proven by the recollection of the sequence of acts thus performed. There are also certain involuntary acts, such as breathing, the movements of the intestines in digestion, or heart beats. There are reflex acts, as the knee jerk, and acts due to disease or injury, as the exaggerated movements of locomotor ataxia. These do not enter into act as part of voluntary behavior.

But certain other involuntary acts are amenable to control. It is true that the pupil reacts to light, the heart beats and the digestive processes function all involuntarily, yet the emotion of fear upsets every one of them. In fear the pupil dilates and accommodation is lost, heart action becomes tumultuous, and desire for food may be replaced by nausea. The results are involuntary in such cases, though

the basic cause of emotional state may be susceptible of control and the consequent act thereby modified or prevented.

Studies of psychology constantly tend to emphasize the importance of purely mental factors in the production of supposedly muscular inefficiency, such as loss of interest, ennui, the inhibitory action of sense-strain, work-habits, and the customary level of fatigue sensation. There is a difference between actual exhaustion and psychic inhibition. Every officer has seen this work out. On the march, with some long miles yet to go, the men begin to straggle. Officers urge and encourage them to go forward, stimulating them through the instinct of self-assertion and rivalry. These officers do not give their men new strength of body for the task — they merely give them strength of mind to use the bodily strength which subsequent performance showed was already there.

The influence of thought on physical state and behavior is well known. For example, consider the digestive processes; gruesome sights may cause vomiting; nervous shock affects digestion; grief or depression affects appetite. Men who are discontented, unhappy or fearful have a lessened desire for food. General cheerfulness and contentment in a company may thus be a factor in the degree of esteem in which men hold the company cook.

The rational conduct which proceeds from thought is the basis on which the individual is judged. He may think as he pleases and the officer and military community would have no interest in his thoughts, but he must act along fairly well defined lines if he is to be undisturbed. The importance of conduct lies in its social value or efficiency worth to the community. The community prescribes what shall be considered as proper conduct. The written word of the law is merely an expression of a state which the public mind has already reached. So, too, with Army Regulations, in which military thought prescribes the extent and methods of military acts.

Mental contentment is a primary urge to conduct. Men tend to act on the basis of self-approval. Duty is performed because failure to conform would give greater mental pain than compliance. The soldier's training makes him not content with less than soldier's duty. Martyrs must give content to the spirit even at the expense of life.

Men act according to what they themselves think their interests are, rather than according to the value which may be placed on such interests by their superiors. The moral of this is the necessity for officers to consider problems affecting their subordinates from the viewpoint of the latter if they would solve these problems to best advantage. Faulty ideas as to interests due to misapprehension may be corrected by information. Mental activities of good character may be introduced which will win the day against undesirable ones of less commanding interest.

One of the important features of successful morale work is to deduce states of mind from conduct. Acts are the indices of the mental states from which they spring. If an officer watches conduct, he can infer with much accuracy what men are thinking. By carrying on his inference, he can forecast what the men are liable to do if existing conditions continue or intensify.

Mental action is always definitely determined, whether consciously or unconsciously. If the causes for any special reaction are not reasonably apparent, it is because the conditions which brought it about are complex and the result of many impulses acting in different or perhaps opposite directions. This multiplicity may lead the inexperienced astray in his deductions, though they will not often confuse an officer who devotes sufficient time and attention to the study of his men and the analysis of their behavior. The latter implies determination of the various factors and relative evaluation as to importance, with selection of appropriate measures of correction. Results depend upon the

degree of efficiency with which causes are recognized and the proper measures applied.

Relation between Environment and Behavior. Environment means the collective surroundings of an organism, its external circumstances. These may be physical or psychological or both. In connection with act, both are important. Sometimes a depressing factor of one may be replaced by a stimulating factor of the other. Morale work is thus stimulative, repressive and substitutive in respect to immediate influences on morale. It also goes further, in that it makes use of the individual psychological state engendered by combinations of circumstance, either fortuitous or deliberately created, which have gone before and left their mental impression, together with a selective tendency to reaction through volition.

The essence of evolution is adjustment to environment. This applies not only to the evolution of the physical type but to the evolution of the mental type. The conversion of the civilian into the soldier is an example of such evolution. Adjustment is necessary.

Society adjusts itself, for the most part automatically, through the gradual development of customary ways of procedure. These show variation all of the time, selection from time to time and transmission by tradition and the influence of example. The necessity for social readjustment is recurrent and virtually constant. Life is a moving thing and equilibrium is soon lost. Maladjustment is sure to come. Yet certain massive adjustments are secured, crystallized into institutions and procedures and persist.

The signal that maladjustment is present is, in the social as well as physical body, discomfort, distress or pain. This applies to the adjustment of the individual as well as the group, and to the psychological as well as the physical environment. The only sound relief consists in securing adjustment. This is done by scientific search for the cause of the maladjustment, a cool and deliberate study of causes,

and the removal or neutralization of the factors at fault.

The moving force of all social adjustment has been public opinion, whether enlightened or not. It is the spring of emotion that leads to action, then to repeated action, these in turn becoming institutions. The canons under which society lives are institutions. The candid person will agree that if an individual or group is uneasy there must be reason for it, whether the reason affects him personally or not. All change is pain, especially to those satisfied with things as they are. The " ins " never want change — the " outs " always want it. The conclusion is that if we want to avoid change, we take as many of the " outs " as possible into the group of " ins."

The way to combat false major premises is by information. This is done by observation, by education, and through debate and books. It is rather a protracted but effective process. Usually there is time enough for it. The very great mass of mankind is reasonable and can be reached by argument. Its opinions can be swayed unless the pain produced by an environment, at the time unremedied, more than counteracts any theoretical arguments to the contrary. The few perverse elements can be suppressed or rendered powerless for harm if the healthy mass is kept in an uninflammable state.

All this applies to the microcosm known as an army in the same manner as it applies to society as a whole. The principles are the same, though their extent may be more limited and the measures for their application different. In war, adjustment takes place quickly. Old ideas and measures which will not work are promptly discarded. Imminent danger results in immediate reform, and the accompanying pain is accepted as one of the prices to be paid for victory.

As already stated, voluntary acts are sentient and are due to definite exciting cause. Conditions producing pleasure and pain are strong stimuli to acts, for in the development

of the individual he is a feeling being before he is a thinking one. His responses tend to be more of the body than of the mind, and to do that which, for the moment, it gives the greatest pleasure to do. Facts are also a convincing guide to conduct, and for this reason environment plays a powerful part in behavior. Public opinion on any given subject



Figure 12. Maladjustment of Environment to the Soldier.
A. Point of especially painful contact.
B. Moderately painful contact.
C. Mildly irritating.
D. Slight maladjustment.

furnishes the general background of the psychological environment of the individual on that subject.

The individual, as the creature of environment, is affected more intensely by factors which relate to immediate necessities. These dominate his actions. Persons and things that satisfy instinctive needs enter into ambitions and ideals. Pleasure as a factor in certain conduct tends to sustain and prolong it, while unpleasant sensations cut it short. There is always reaction against unpleasant sensation, dependent in degree on the intensity of the stimulus and modifying behavior accordingly.

Like any other organism, the soldier is always endeavoring, consciously or unconsciously, to bring about a better relation between himself and his surroundings, whereby the pleasurable factors may be increased and those which are

painful reduced to the minimum. Life is a constant adjustment to environment in the effort to avoid painful points of contact. See Figure 12. Reaction is self-defensive. Failure to adjust relations leads inevitably to needless friction, and mental friction, like physical friction, develops heat. Morale work endeavors to remove any unnecessary points of painful contact and friction, so that the function of education and duty may proceed without needless distraction and loss of force.

Matters of apparently trifling importance may, in certain states of mind, lead to disproportionately great results. An old poem says:

> "Little things, aye, little things,
> Make up the sum of life;
> A word, a look, a single tone
> May lead to calm or strife."

The dominating factor here is the element of personal interest; for matters of environment in which the man has no interest have no influence on conduct. On the other hand, the personal interest aroused by the irritation of a nail in the soldier's shoe may create a mental state which dominates all other thoughts and emotions. So, too, emotions springing from minor psychological annoyances may produce violent alterations of behavior. No difficulty of a subordinate, however apparently small, if brought to the attention of the superior, is beneath his notice. To the man himself it is very real and important — and the administrative point at issue is not its magnitude, but the relief of his mental state. It is equally important, in developing an artificial environment for special purpose, to see that proposed factors either have a natural interest attached to them, or that this be stimulated.

Various objects and conditions of the environment may psychologically mean different things to different persons. Legal testimony abundantly demonstrates this point. Here

again is implied the necessity of officers getting the viewpoint of others. There are, however, basic principles which apply to the great majority and from which procedures can be formulated which, within their limits, are capable of general application. Any main problem of morale, however, can best be approached through mental analysis of its various component human factors, for, as act is the product of a personal reaction to a given environment so the reactions of



Figure 13. Maladjustment of Soldier to the Environment.
Tendencies A B C and D E F to be diminished by relief of tension as well as repression.

Figure 14. Proper Adjustment of Soldier and Environment.
Contentment resulting from smooth apposition.

differently constituted persons may vary in certain respects to the same environment. See Figure 13. Temperament and habit cannot be left out of consideration. In any cross-pull between temperament and environment, the stronger element wins. But if the appropriate environment be fully built up and made sufficiently strong, practically all individuals will sooner or later have to yield to its influence to a satisfactory degree. See Figure 14; also the consideration of this general matter under the subject of the "conscientious objector."

Accordingly, while the soldier may be considered as a biological unit, yet his various kinds of reaction show such interplay between the individual and his environment as prevents him from being considered apart from his surround-

ings. His good or bad possibilities are developed by his associations. Change of character results from change of environment. "Evil associations corrupt good manners," and the converse is equally true in respect to reformation. But the impulse to change must come from without, and often small and accidental things may furnish the new impulse to travel along another road. Exterior influence moves, directs, commands. Further, the experience of to-day tends to serve as a guide for to-morrow through volition. In interpreting behavior, motive is habitually found to proceed from environment, either present or antecedent through its impress on character.

Environment, either physical or psychological, may be faulty in many ways, and there are as many ways in which its defects may be corrected or improved. Merely to blame the environment without altering it is, of course, thoroughly weak. Commanders are not rare who, while complaining of the character and conduct of a soldier, do too little to improve the environment which controls the conduct.

In the rectification of environmental conditions, the first knowledge required is what factors are at fault; the second, how they have affected the individual or group. Well directed procedure establishes the relation between cause and effect — it does not proceed from a possible cause to a definite fact, which may really be due to another exciting factor. Environment may often be a highly individualized problem. It is not easy to alter the personality of the individual. Usually it is easier to modify the environment and thereby indirectly change the mental attitude. But there are some conditions of environment which cannot be changed and here the mental state must be directly influenced.

In the environment of the soldier, the greatest stimulating agencies are persons. These persons are the ones with whom he is associated, especially his officers. Everyone with whom he comes in contact exercises an influence on his behavior. Accordingly, the human environment should be

built up with a purpose to meet certain recognized needs of the individual. But the relation works both ways, for the individual just considered in an objective sense is also an active agent in the emotions and behavior of those with whom he comes in contact. There is an interreaction by which each unit passes on to the others definite influences depending on the composite mental state derived from various sources. The Scriptures say "No man liveth or dieth unto himself." This means that whatever an individual does has its effect on others. Nowhere does this apply with greater effect than in the military service. Perhaps the best way to show this is by Figure 15, in which the units appear in smooth apposition, with mutual intertransference of thought and emotion, and exerting even pressure on each other.

Environment in the military service, where physical conditions are systematized, ordered and controlled, is a more stable factor than in civil life. Its common ideals, purposes and regulated methods tend to standardize its psychological factors. This makes the task of control of behavior through environment easier in the army than in civil life. Correction of environment, or the building up of special environment to meet special needs, is usually neither impracticable nor difficult. Barring occasional military contingencies, it is well within the power of officers to keep the factors of environment at a high standard of comfort and contentment. Failure to perform this obligation, whether from indifference or neglect, permits the development of factors disturbing to efficiency.

In formulating the environment for the control of act, all factors should be accumulated and developed which will reinforce the right motives. All elements should be removed, neutralized or minimized which will work against the results desired. There is no objection to over-correction in these respects; in fact it is desirable as building up a reserve of morale which can later be drawn upon in emergency.



FIGURE 15. Inter-reaction between any human unit and others which compose its environment.

How this shall be done presents a different problem in each case, to be successfully solved only through a competent knowledge of the laws governing human nature and their application in the light of common sense and broad human understanding and sympathy.

Every human being, as elsewhere discussed, is born with certain hereditary tendencies. Otherwise, the pages of his brain are blank except as they are written on by experience and the spoken or written word. The higher the scale of development, civilization and literacy, the greater the importance and extent of the latter. As the child grows up he reacts to his environment. If he favors being a Republican rather than a Democrat, it is because the former environment is stronger about him than the latter. Likewise his religion is determined by the one which predominates in his environment. If he had been born Chinese or in any other environment containing none of our religious or political factors, he would have been neither Jew nor Gentile, Republican nor Democrat.



Figure 16. Influence of the Environment on the Individual.

The relation of the environment to the individual is roughly shown in Figure 16. Here the influence of the environment colors the mental state of the subject, chameleon-

like, and he acts according to the sensations transmitted from his surroundings, and which create preferences, aversions, politics, tastes, morals and religion.

If a new factor enters the environment it affects the mental state of the subject. According to its relative importance and intensity it alters his cast of mind, colors his thoughts and modifies his conduct. This is illustrated in Figure 17.

This new factor may have been deliberately introduced with a purpose for morale work in meeting a certain situation, and hence would be controlled to the extent necessary in producing the desired behavior. It might have been the product of chance, and if desirable, should be promoted and stimulated. If tending to undesirable conduct, it should be eliminated by the removal of its cause or neutralized by some other new factor introduced later for the purpose. Thus discontent due to poor heating of barracks is removed by supplying stoves; unrest due to rumor is removed by neutralizing falsity by truth; mental stress from hard marching is relieved by having the band strike up, thus blanking the effects of a physical difficulty by a psychological stimulation. Finally, immunization enters, whereby a state of mind previously created rises above any immediate stress due to negative factors of environment, either physical or psychological.

The Psychological Approach. In applying the foregoing ideas to the control of troops, there are but two avenues of approach to the individual or group — the direct and the indirect. Both have their basis in the laws governing human nature. Both have their fields of usefulness. The field of the indirect approach is far greater and more important than is usually recognized. Choice of the two methods depends on conditions. Sometimes both are combined advantageously.

In the business transactions of civil life, the men are most successful who study the persons they sell to, whether the

FIGURE 17. Illustrates how the introduction of a new factor of environment alters mental state.

individual or group. Not only reasonably exact knowledge is required, but skill in the method of approach. This implies an appreciation and application of practical, common sense psychology.

In morale work, the study of personality is likewise essential. This applies not only to the individual but to the military group. Only in this way can any accurate estimate of probable reaction to any condition or procedure be obtained in advance of the occurrence. One of the most important factors in morale work lies in its intelligent and appropriate application so as to reach and influence the subject. Analytical study of personality indicates not only the qualities which should be stimulated or repressed, but how they may affect the choice of method to the desired end.

Obviously it takes a good order of judicial ability to winnow out the essentials from a mass of qualities or facts, to evaluate them in accordance with their relative efficiency and importance, and to turn them to practical use in the creation of machinery for the solution of new and perhaps highly dissimilar problems of life and military efficiency. But such ability, like ability along other lines, may be greatly improved by cultivation, interest and logical effort.

Any consideration of morale methods to be pursued must take into consideration the special psychology, peculiarities, intelligence and character of the troops concerned. First, there are differences of race. All will appreciate that different methods of management will be required for negro troops than for white troops. But within white organizations there are diverse racial stocks and national types, which no more think alike than they look alike. Study of their racial differences in advance will prevent the development of many problems or make their solution easier. Next, there are social differences. All classes may be brought together in a company, from the foreign-born and illiterate day laborer to the college man from the home of refinement. These differences must be recognized, not in a social way but

from the standpoint of handling the individual. With time, the social differences of civil life tend to disappear, for the organization will build up its new differences on the basis of military efficiency. Further, men should be considered as personalities and not units, since the personality of each man largely determines the most successful line of psychological approach to him.

Direct methods of approach are those which, by personal appeal, direct admonition, frank effort or authoritative control, are calculated to arouse, increase and fix the determination to accomplish the desired end. Orders and argument come under this class. The direct method accordingly savors of coercion. The mind tends to resent dictation without previous preparation, and to react by opposition just as the muscles are instantly aroused by the reflexes to produce counter-pressure against any physical force applied. The direct approach, injudiciously employed, may thus result in a mental attitude the opposite of that desired.

The purpose of armies is to apply force by direct measures. The natural tendency of officers is, therefore, to govern such forces by direct measures embodied in commands and carried out under fear of penalty. This works well as long as the subject is submissive. But states of mind cannot be commanded. Orders may be given, but their execution must be carried out by the troops. To secure the highest degree of excellence, the troops must make a voluntary contribution beyond the minimum requirements defined. That prisons and guard houses have occupants is proof that force, as a compelling agency, frequently fails of its full purpose.

When orders are given, they should be, as far as possible, of a positive nature and provocative of action. They should be stimulative rather than repressive. Willing obedience is of far higher quality than that which is forced. To forbid directly may arouse opposition, frost the bud of aspiration, rebuff genius, dampen endeavor, and repress that enthusiasm

which means efficiency and accomplishment. Determination, or wilfulness, sometimes doubles in the face of interdict. The Germans placarded Belgium with "Verboten" signs. Depressed but not suppressed, the Belgians became firmer in their resolves. The Poles were forbidden their language, the Czecho-Slovaks their history and ideals, and the very act of proscription made them more cherished and secretly held to in the numberless ways that passive opposition permits without the possibility of effective prevention. Americans are accustomed and encouraged to think for themselves. Usually it is safe to rely on their common sense and justice. To baldly forbid, where this is unnecessary, is oft-times bad policy.

Whenever circumstances necessitate the denial of a request or the restraint of an effort, it is good policy to temper the tone of the denial or the terms of the restraint. A few words of explanation, in so far as military conditions render this possible, may draw the sting from such negative action. It does not weaken a superior's authority to be considered just, fair and reasonable rather than dogmatic and arbitrary. On the contrary, the reverse is the case. Wherever possible, it is well to suggest an alternate course of action rather than to command inaction. Temperament, effect and motive should be considered. If a subordinate thinks he has a way to do a thing effectively and well, and the superior does not agree, at least he should recognize the urge and motive in the subordinate. It is posssible to disillusion without discouraging even an impetuous, unconventional man if it be done diplomatically and affirmatively.

It is never desirable to befog the issue with forebodings. The material obstacles to overcome are usually sufficient test of initiative, purpose and perseverance without the artificial creation of mental difficulties which may never arise in fact. This does not mean that a matter should be pushed blindly. On the contrary, the situation should be well surveyed, but in a form of cool appraisal in which the nature and extent

of difficulties are estimated merely so that they may be better avoided or overcome in the achievement of the final object. If warnings are necessary, they should be equipped with counter-balances of encouragement and affirmation.

The direct approach to the individual often tends to invite argument and promote resentment. The individual will not express this to his superior, for military discipline interdicts. But he will relieve his mind freely in the matter to his associates and tend to create doubt and antagonism among them toward the action of the superior. Ideas are jealously guarded, as the history of political beliefs, religious faiths and other convictions abundantly demonstrate. Argument is an expression of effort to change a state of mind by the direct approach. It is a species of mental compulsion. As such, it is often resented.

> "A man convinced against his will
> Is of the same opinion still."

Good reasons may be given an individual why he is wrong, only with the result of greater activity and determination on his part to maintain his position. Such direct methods hurt self-assertion and pride, and personality often will not yield so obviously and directly. That there is clash of wills in argument is shown in that when the argument continues an intense mental resentment is often aroused which may lead to blows. In such cases, opposition has aroused pugnacity.

In controlling soldiers, argument, except in the case of special individuals who are honest in their convictions, is out of place. Individual cases may be reasoned with separately. If direct methods seem indicated in such cases, a rapid bombardment with a mass of facts, rather than logic, is perhaps the best method of reaching the average soldier.

Appeal and admonition are similarly attempts at compulsion. If they relate to the interests of the individual and he is angered, they will frequently fail, though if made in the interests of others they will quite often succeed. Argu-

ment, appeal and admonition, if of general nature and directed toward a group, will not usually be resented by the collective members of that group, though such might be the case with the individual. It is the difference between telling a congregation that they are sinners and naming an individual of the alleged ethical shortcomings. Where a group is addressed, the remarks become impersonal so far as the individuals are concerned. They then acquire the character of the indirect approach.

The direct approach is usually applicable only after the way has been cleared by other methods, suggestibility has been aroused and receptivity to the idea is created. When this stage has been reached, the direct approach is very effective. In a general way, it is best used only in relation to physical act, the need and justice of which has been demonstrated. In its application, the statements and impressions should be positive, clear-cut, immediate and applied directly to the subject. An example of effective direct approach was seen in the Liberty Loan drives in which, after preliminary education had been secured, the community was suddenly covered with inspiring posters featuring the words " Buy Bonds." Superiors should follow this sequence, turning from the indirect approach to the direct only when, in their opinion, a suitably receptive frame of mind has been produced.

The direct approach is used in crises and particularly on masses, as, for example, the address of Napoleon to his troops before the Battle of the Pyramids. Revivalists and other orators use it effectively after the desired mental state has been suggestively produced. Battle orders to the men carry it, as for instance the famous " backs to the wall " order of General Haig, and the order of General Joffre at the first battle of the Marne. Appeal to " play the game " made to men aroused almost to the point of insubordination, has proven successful where threats or attempt at compulsion would have failed.

A too direct bringing up of a subject may defeat its object. The tactful officer will defer it until a suitable psychological moment suggests itself. Assuming that some friction has existed between a command and the civilian community, an opportunity perhaps arises whereby a soldier is aided by a civilian in some special way, or a soldier restores to a civilian lost property or renders other service. In bringing up the matter informally to the men and expressing appreciation, the officer can link with it a few remarks on mutuality of interests, to the effect that soldiers and civilians are all Americans together, that solidarity between the two exists, etc. If a theft has occurred in the company, along with efforts to discover the perpetrator, the opportunity comes to the commander to speak of it and then follow up with remarks on the peculiar community life of soldiers, the necessity of mutual confidence and dependence, and the similarity of the relations necessary in peace and war. From this it is easy transition to a few sincere remarks on comradeship, the reputation of the company and regiment, and the military value of the elementary virtues of honesty, kindliness and self-sacrifice.

The indirect approach is based upon the fact that the current of thought cannot be stopped by the dam of opposition. Ideas break all restraint; but without obvious attempt at restraint, the individual may be brought to exchange bad ideas for good ones and harmful tendencies may be diverted or drawn off at their source until they dwindle and disappear.

The old idea that an unsatisfactory organization must be "hammered into shape" is based on the idea of direct application of force. Too much "hammering" may be destructive. It is possible that the material may be plastic enough to give better form if molded under more intelligent and better controlled pressure. The application of force is an early recourse of the poor officer, who seeks in this way to remedy his own lack of qualities of true leadership.

In the indirect approach, the desires of the commander and the sentiments which support them are conveyed to the individual or group subtly in many indirect ways. Any convenient agency for transmission, publicity or influence is used, selection being made according to the special needs of the case and the relative degree of effect which the agency promises. Working through a third party, whereby the source of the inspiration or purpose is not revealed, is often extremely effective. The defense is thus flanked and undermined — not battered down — and opposition made to disintegrate. In general, the effectiveness of such approach is proportional to the indirectness, the prestige or sympathy expressed in the person of the intermediary, and to the degree to which the objects are unconscious of the influences directed toward them. In all morale work there is a fundamental psychological truism which must not be overlooked: —"The subject is more easily influenced if unconscious of the application of influence."

The basis of the indirect approach is suggestion. Certain facts are brought to the attention in an unobtrusive manner, perhaps in the nature of a parable or similar methods. The subject cannot refuse to consider them, nor is there any reason apparent to him why he should not do so. Inevitably he draws conclusions. Sometimes he may be forced to make and express such conclusions through the Socratic method by asking questions. The logic of facts in the disguised suggestion leads to a conclusion by the individual in accordance with that which it was desired to create. As far as possible, suggestion should be conveyed and ideas established well in advance of the act to be performed. Conduct should be under at least partial control before the stimulus to the act is presented. Direction is easier than correction. This implies constant and intensive exposure to suitable suggestion, whereby general ideas are established covering general matters relating to the service. The influence of the commander through suggestion should

be continuous and not spasmodic. He should use it to conjure up definite, concrete and specific mental images, each with its own particular purpose in the general object to be attained.

The instinct of sympathy is a powerful factor in the transmission of suggestion. It gives emphasis to ideas entertained by the weaker party against which compulsion is being applied. If the latter has a savor of injustice, it tends to make others adopt or develop such ideas as their own. Instead of eliminating such ideas it may spread them, as expressed in the saying, "The blood of martyrs is the seed of the church." Mind does not yield to force, even though caution induces outward show of compliance. The only effective way to combat a faulty idea is with a true one. How the latter shall be presented is a problem variable with time, place and person.

Whatever the approach, it is desirable as far as possible to take the affirmative side. It is a safe rule that anything which conveys a sense of negation should not ordinarily be used. If used, it should be immediately relieved by pleasant contrast and thereby serve to convey a warning. If such a negative phase is created, it should be ensured that the positive qualities to follow will not only completely neutralize the negative but leave a satisfactory positive surplus. Thus such appeals as "Don't be a slacker" represent a poor psychological approach. The negative is not a stimulant to action. But there is a forceful psychological pull in the slogan "Do your bit." Similarly, a negative quality, like fear, should not be brought into play where a positive one, like self-assertion, will serve the purpose equally well. Praise and self-respect bring better rewards than punishment and humiliation.

If a certain line of approach does not seem to be proving successful, its continuance is not advisable. There must be prompt readjustment to any changed condition. Any person who is not receptive is resistant. A new channel of in-

fluence, or several of them, should be opened as soon as possible lest the irritation against the method of approach extend so as to include and prejudice the subject as a whole. The objection aroused should be flanked out of its position.

One of the first essentials of approach is the matter of race, whether this be in the case of the individual or group. It is obvious that what might be quite satisfactory in the case of one race would give poor results in another. The manner in which the approach is carried out is also quite as important as the means or object in respect to the result secured. The lawyer who offends the jury has by so much prejudiced his case. Selection of manner is a matter of tact.

The best method for the approach to the individual varies with the personal equation of that individual. It also varies with time, place, mood, physical state and environment. What would be the right approach toward one individual might merely result in offending or arousing the opposition of another. Also the right combination of receptiveness and circumstance should be determined. If this is not done, the effort will be imperfect in greater or lesser degree. To do this implies tact, which means nice discernment as to the best course of action under given conditions. Sometimes, in reaching leaders of thought, the information relating to them on the cards of the personnel officer may be of considerable value in determining the approach.

In conveying impressions generally to subordinates, the channels of information to which they are accustomed should usually be used. New agencies are often disturbing, or their very novelty may take the mind off the special points they were to bring out. Wherever outside officers are used to address the men, care must be taken to handle the matter in such a way that the men do not get the idea that the officers' talents are being used to work upon their feelings and this impression largely neutralize the results obtained.

Any attempt to manipulate morale from the exterior,

other than that which is made in the utmost truth and candor, becomes subject to suspicion. Wholesome morale, begot by wholesome measures, does not yield to difficulty but reacts even more strongly. Men will face any issue for an ideal if they believe in it. They will seek out death, if, in the dying, the truth as they see it will prevail. The best efforts to improve morale are those which are not recognized



Figure 18. Diagrammatic Conception of the Sequence Through Which Environment Affects Act.

as such. Announced effort to create a spirit often defeats its own purpose.

The Mechanics of Behavior. The foregoing remarks are intended to lead up to a point where the elements of behavior can be brought together in proper relation. This may be roughly visualized in Figure 18, which will serve to clear away many psychological obscurities. In interpreting this diagram, it is perhaps better to follow it from the bottom up, or in the reverse sequence of its elements.

All are interested in *act*. If *act* can be controlled, then morale work has an essential place in the service. The diagram shows that it can be so controlled, whether for good or ill. It illustrates one of the keys for the control of morale and behavior. Its features may be explained as follows:

Act results from the impulse flowing from a mental state which we may term *conviction*. That is, immediately pre-

ceding the *act,* the individual had arrived at a state of mind which impelled him to the definite physical behavior in question. But the *conviction* from which *act* sprang did not occur without antecedent cause. This cause is found in *emotion,* or rather — since *emotion* is rarely of a single type — in an *emotion-complex. Emotion,* however, is merely the psychological response to stimulation from sources outside the reacting individual, relatively slightly modified in intensity by such pre-existing temperamental trend as may be present within him. The outside stimuli necessary to the production of *emotion* are, in turn, found in *environment,* which itself is composed of two factors, namely physical and psychological. Inasmuch as the influence of temperament is usually relatively slight, as compared with environmental factors that may be built up, it is apparent that the control of *environment* carries with it the control of *act.* Reflection will show that every voluntary *act* whatsoever is an expression of the foregoing general sequence, and follows the last one of a series of preparatory influences.

With respect to the physical and psychological factors of *environment,* they may work to a common end or be employed to neutralize each other. It is very easy to demonstrate this through example, likewise illustrating the chain of sequence. For such example we may assume two men, A and B, in a crowd, and that A is rudely jostled and has an elbow painfully jammed into his side by a passing rough. The external physical *environment* expressed by contact between the elbow and the side of A results within A in an *emotion* of pain, which generates *conviction* that retaliation for wanton injury should be had, and A *acts* by raising his arm to strike the supposed offender. If B says " Hit him," the psychological factor of the environment then reinforces the physical one and further stimulates *act* to the end that the threatening blow is struck.

But the psychological environmental factor may be used

to neutralize the physical one. If B says " Don't hit him! ", A probably drops his arm in response to emotions of doubt, hesitancy and other nature raised in his mind by this psychological counter-stimulus. But this appeal by B represents the direct approach which may be relatively ineffective and clumsy. A still harbors resentment as well as pain. A sufficiently logical motive for withholding the blow may not be apparent to him. The idea may flash through his mind, for example, " Is B afraid I will be arrested? I'd pay ten dollars to hit that fellow," and under such conditions B's effort at restraint might be ineffective.

But if B uses the indirect approach in restraint of A's intended blow and says " That wasn't the man! " A almost certainly responds to the psychological environment and lowers his arm. An entirely new set of emotions has been aroused in the confusion of original purpose by desire not to commit an injustice and in other ways. The psychic stimulus to do a certain thing produced by the jab with the elbow has been neutralized by a contrary suggestive stimulus due to the spoken word.

tended blow and says " That wasn't the man! ", A almost

It is clear, then, that control of a compelling *environment* carries with it the control of *act*.

An important point to note here is that if the statement by B as to the identity of the offender was the result of error, or if it was intentional falsehood, its effect upon A would be exactly the same as if it were truth. As long as B was not discredited by A as a source of information, his appeals would carry psychological weight in governing conduct. The practical value of this, in connection with morale work generally, is that error, misunderstanding or falsehood, through the false premises which they create, are as effective as truth in modifying behavior, and must be watched for and controverted if undesirable act is to be kept from developing from them.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HUMAN AGENTS OF MORALE CONTROL

Officers and morale; experience as an incomplete guide to leadership; submission and service spring from volition; all wise administration is good morale work; observation and practice; obligations of superiors; contact and observation; mental qualities of good leaders; relations with subordinates; administrative methods; human interest in relations; officer morale. The Commanding Officer; his position and power; force of example; direct and indirect relations with subordinates; restrictive orders; his proper use of the Morale Officer. Staff officers in relation to morale; special matters in which they may be of assistance. The Morale Officer; his purpose, functions and relations; some administrative measures; his staff relationship and selection; essential qualities of the Morale Officer; standards of efficiency of the Morale Officer; his advisory functions. The Chaplain; his particular function in morale work. The Regimental Commander; his part in the morale plan. The Company Commander; his basic relation to morale; need of understanding the problems of the men; human relations in the company organization; sympathy, advice and assistance; prevention of group problems of morale. The non-commissioned officer; his importance to morale; qualities desirable in making selection; some observed defects of character and administration; his military relationship with subordinates. Company Morale Operatives; their qualities and selection; their purpose and function. Censorship.

Officers and Morale. Officers and the higher business officials are the controlling factor in the development and maintenance of military and industrial morale. The strength of an army or business organization is measured by the degree of coöperation among its units, extending through organizations to include individuals, and this particularly applies to coöperation between superiors and subordinates. The former are the chief source of good or ill. They determine the quality of efficiency, discipline and morale, and

the results are in direct relation to the interest, effort and understanding which they demonstrate. A commission in the army, or a high place in industry, is not merely a badge of military status or personal privilege, but rather a trust conferring greater responsibility and opportunity for promoting the interests of the service and the individuals who compose it.

The essence of morale work is the development of qualities of leadership. The latter is the ability to handle men so as to achieve the most with the least friction and the greatest coöperation. It seems a curious oversight that with the vast amount of thought, money and material lavished on the military establishment, instruction in the human element which puts them to use, from the efficiency standpoint, has been so completely overlooked. Apparently this essential matter has been left to the individual officer on the wholly unwarranted assumption that example, common sense and experience will tell him the best way to bring his men to greatest efficiency. But good example is a matter of chance; common sense will not always serve for it must be based on knowledge, while experience often has not been extensive enough to confer such knowledge. The results as to leadership have accordingly been variable. Methods have been more or less unscientific, incomplete and empirical. The degree of success is largely a matter of personal equation. Naturally some succeed, others fail, and probably none do all that might be done under a thorough and clear understanding of the conditions to be remedied and the measures and mechanics of accomplishment.

No amount of technical training or knowledge can make an officer really efficient if he does not possess in addition the power of so controlling his men and of so directing their wills as to preserve harmony in the organization and bring the best out of his men. There are but few right ways of handling men in any emergency, but many wrong ones. The way should be chosen which will give the results desired with

the least interference with human instincts and interests. This should not be left either to intuition or chance. Systematic study of human nature makes both unnecessary.

The basis of an army is founded on command. Yet, as already mentioned, officers should never forget that, while they may command act, they cannot command thought. And they will command act only so far as thoughts of their subordinates recognize the necessity for such act and are willing to conform to such necessity. Thus an officer may command an act at drill and it will be performed by those whose minds acquiesce in military control; but if such minds reject the idea of compliance, there is disobedience, defiance or mutiny. Similarly, if he should command a change of ideals his orders would be disobeyed; certainly in the secrecy of the mind and probably in open defiance. The instances are countless where men have suffered obloquy and privation, torture and death itself, rather than give up their convictions. The very attempt to use force to alter a mental state often ensures a stiffening of determination and opposition. The arbitrary, tactless superior is apt to secure support which is largely outward conformance without full substance.

In respect to certain officers one may be told that they have always done morale work, even though it may not have been identified under a special name. Doubtless this is true, but it is probably equally true that many of these officers may overvalue the extent and success of their services in such respects. It is not that what they have done has been in error, but that without clear knowledge and definite purpose there is so much which might have been done and probably was not done that full standards of desired efficiency were doubtless not reached. Every good officer does a certain amount of morale work, but probably most of this is done instinctively and as an isolated matter not part of any general plan. Its relative degree of excellence has depended chiefly, if not entirely, on the personal equation of the officer. The

variability of this factor is common knowledge. Further, as no person has a monopoly of originality, creative imagination and ability, so all gain much by absorbing and utilizing the general lessons gained by the aggregate experience of others.

It is not wise to look for ideas only among the highly successful. It is true that these represent a group in which various qualities making for success predominate. It does not at all follow, however, that all or even any of these officers possess any single quality in its highest degree of possible excellence. Such may be found in others of less successful achievement, in whom the value of the good quality may be largely neutralized by one or more faulty ones. Thus one officer might be a particularly able tactician, another an excellent drill master, another a fine executive, another command exceptional loyalty from his men — yet none combine within themselves all the attributes of an ideally efficient leader of troops.

In observing the practice of other officers, a sharp distinction should be made between blindly copying the form of methods which in their hands under certain conditions have made success, and the adaptation of a fundamental principle to one's own problems. A rule will often not succeed, for it is inelastic and made to fit the needs of certain conditions, but the underlying principle will invariably be of value.

There are perhaps still a few in the army who regard any method not directly compulsive as unnecessary and undesirable, and assume that all that is required is done if the men are worked so hard that they have little time for mental reflection. Nothing can be further from the truth. That men should be kept occupied is true, but beyond a reasonable limit the activity should be a matter of selection and not partake of the nature of a task. A lesson to be learned from almost any successful personality is the fact that ideas which were at first regarded by others as dreams are by him

often made to come true. Successful officers look ahead. What is accepted practice to-day may be in a fair way to become obsolete to-morrow. Times and customs change and men change their outlook with them.

It is of course apparent that many young officers will have had no opportunity to learn by experience. They should, however, be able to have recourse to the advice and experience of their elders, and one of the objects of this study is to furnish these in composite form. Further, one of the greatest obligations of the older officers lies in their systematic training of inexperienced officers in the personal handling of enlisted men. Young and inexperienced officers and those wanting in discretion and sympathy may create difficult situations, and may have to be supported under regrettable conditions which should never have arisen.

Officers have an obligation to develop many desirable mental qualities in their men, too many to be enumerated. Among them are patriotism, loyalty, self-respect, alertness, esprit, cheerfulness, contentment, enthusiasm, initiative, truthfulness, resourcefulness, aggressivenes, determination and tenacity. Good officers will welcome suggestions embodying the experience of others in developing these qualities. One function of the morale organization is to secure and supply such material.

The best way to secure a desired influence by officers over their men is through personal contact and conversation, never losing the qualities of courtesy, consideration and persistency. Success in handling men depends on accuracy of observation, degree of interpretation and correctness of measures applied. A good officer must understand human nature, be a shrewd judge of men and able to estimate the nature and degree of their characteristics and qualities.

He should study his men so as to foresee how their minds will probably tend to function in new situations in order that they may be mentally trained in the right direction and faults of act averted. Every officer in the face of the enemy is

vitally interested in what the foe is going to do. To this end he pieces together facts of action and from them endeavors to reason out the general plan of which they form a part, and the probable ability of his opponents to carry it out. Similarly he needs to be even more interested in knowing what his own men intend to do, are willing to do, and can be induced or made to do — for on these his own plans depend.

Observation, intelligent and analytical, is one of the vital factors in every successful officer's life. It should include not only the material things pertaining to the military establishment but also interpretation of states of mind as expressed by acts. Often a mood or emotional reaction demonstrates facts needing attention long before they could be expressed in words. And all observation should be used with the purpose of so interpreting the facts observed as to make them applicable to present or future states or conditions.

The mental qualities which a successful officer must possess are those which make him not only respected but liked by his subordinates. He should not be a point of unnecessarily painful contact in the environment of his men, but a medium for its smooth adjustment everywhere with the minimum of friction. The best officer is the one to whom his subordinates look not only for commands but for advice and help. Confidence in the ability, knowledge and experience of their officers is one of the great factors entering into the morale of all soldiers. It is the result of demonstrated ability in the past whereby officers secure the trust of their men in the handling of future emergencies. Courtesy between all ranks and consideration by the higher toward the lower are indispensible to harmony and efficiency. All alike are doing the Nation's business and require mutual interest and support for highest efficiency.

In following out morale methods, the officer must be sincere and sympathetic to be successful. No men are

quicker to detect and resent insincerity than are soldiers. To stimulate the instinct of sympathy, the officer has merely to come into close contact with his men. If he shares their lot and environment it follows that he must share their emotions in understanding and sympathy. Possibly some deliberately do not share the common lot because of wrong ideas as to officer status; others through ignorance because its importance has never been brought to their attention. Morale work emphasizes the fact that one cannot get at a man without getting near him; little can be accomplished with people by talking down to them.

The attitude of every superior toward his subordinates is a most powerful factor in morale. Conduct that is overbearing and capricious will inevitably provoke discontent, dissension and inefficiency. An officer may be professionally well qualified and yet be temperamentally unfitted to command men. The human touch, discriminating between firmness and rudeness, dignity and austerity, kindness and familiarity, justice and severity, fairness and partiality, is needed to control men.

In handling subordinates, the superior should observe, reflect and verify before judging. An equable temperament should be cultivated, if not entirely natural. All of the extreme emotions such as anxiety, fear, wrath, etc., are reflected in the psychological environment and affect all others within it whether they are the direct objects or not. Ability for self-control, whether by word or deed, is an essential quality in leaders. Evenness of manner and thoughtfulness of speech should be striven for as well as forcefulness of personality and directness of action.

One essential in handling men is always to remain cool, especially when others are excited. Those who are angry are not receptive to discussion, but if given a little time to think things over their anger tends to evaporate and they see matters in a more proper perspective. The responsibility of superiors demands patience under all circumstances

and conditions. No matter how narrow or apparently ridiculous the state of mind may be, they should endeavor to get the men's point of view before decision. Ability to do this is one of the secrets of success.

Before an officer acts on any situation he should know all the facts and appraise them dispassionately. This is basic, vital and just. An honest search for the viewpoint of others creates mutual sympathy. But tolerance does not blind one to the fact that good intentions do not produce good acts if the mental premises are wrong. Misapprehension produces faulty act and what is needed in such cases is enlightenment. Punishment added to honest remorse tends to breed resentment. It should be reserved to curb the heedless and control the wilful.

An officer should never take a step from which he must back down. It impairs his prestige and control. He should never be drawn into positions which he had not intended to take, thereby being placed at a disadvantage in administration or ethics. Hasty action frequently creates this undesirable position. One should think twice before delivering an ultimatum that may make trouble, but having once delivered it, one should stand by it. In this connection, care should be taken by superiors lest subordinates put them in a position where they might support the latter and take their part merely to sustain their personal pride. It may seem that failure to support the act of a subordinate might weaken discipline, but if such act is wrong, to support it is merely to expand the error. On the other hand, if it be right, it should be backed to the limit.

The officer should avoid saying things which had better be left unsaid; they are usually regretted later. The military attitude of superiors should be impersonal; their horizons are wider and their outlook broader, and hence greater self-restraint and impartiality are expected from them. In making a decision, the elements on which it is based should be quickly weighed and final action taken. An officer who

cannot make up his mind or is changeable cannot secure the full respect and support of his men.

Habitual fault-finding and irritability in superiors are sure agents for the destruction of morale in subordinates. That officious supervision with overemphasis of trifling detail known as "nagging" makes an organization discontented and inefficient. Beside blocking the constructive instinct, it produces negative morale by the direct approach, destroying esprit and exciting antagonism. When superiors arouse resentment in this way they accomplish little, for their best intentions fail of result through passive opposition. Such little "pin-pricks," especially if apparently unnecessary and repeated, produce a sense of irritation far beyond the actual physical importance of the matter involved. What is done under compulsion tends to carry out the letter rather than the spirit of the order. The most efficient superior is the one whose subordinates work enthusiastically with and for him. Fear is only one of many instincts; the wise commander will use the others first, having recourse to control through fear only in the exceptional case or emergency.

Weakness of character and method is similarly a most fatal defect in superiors. Such tend to vacillate between extremes of laxity and harshness, thinking to cover up defects in the former through sporadic exhibitions of the latter. Discontent and sullenness in subordinates are the inevitable result. There are two classes of superiors who will fail in the handling of American soldiers; those who are martinets, harsh and unjust, and those who from weakness, inertia or personal reasons overlook dereliction of duty. Wherever possible, the wise leader will stimulate and play up the good qualities of his men. Personal interest will arouse endeavor and in many instances negative qualities will tend to disappear by themselves. They cannot flourish in the presence of honest incentive to the military virtues.

A good officer will have vision, whereby he can project himself into the future and estimate not only his probable

relations and difficulties, but also the qualities of the men under him and the presumptive influences which may act upon them in affecting the success of his administration or undertaking. By forecasting probable contingencies, he can provide intelligently for them.

Cheerfulness, especially in adversity, is an essential attribute of the officer. Not only does it inspire confidence in his ability to meet any situation, but mental state is contagious and the officer unconsciously leads his men in this respect as in physical matters. Those of morose habit and forbidding manner lose much of the support of their subordinates.

If the success-bringing qualities of a number of officers, recognized by all as exceptionally efficient, were listed, persistency would unquestionably appear in respect to each one of them. In some cases, circumstances have combined to bring a display of persistency to the fore; in fact, the quality of persistency, like muscle development, is increased by opposition and resistance. Hence in every successful officer will be found a vein of stubborn determination to make good, to win out despite obstacles and to keep steadily progressing even after the primary object is attained. There is, however, a difference between stubbornness and persistency. Stubbornness is persistency wrongly applied. It is refusal to recognize mistake and to abandon false standards. Persistency in the face of obstacle analyzes possible remedy, tries out one after another, discards each as soon as it is found ineffective, and pushes those which give continued promise of opening the way to success. Persistency is an essential quality of industry.

Perhaps no single factor in the maintenance of morale is greater than the personal interest of officers in the welfare of their subordinates. The responsibility of an officer in caring for his men, mentally as well as physically, is equal to that of commanding them. When there is open solicitude on the part of officers for the welfare of their men, it is

equaled only by the devotion of the men toward such officers. Every superior should have a personal interest not only in the welfare but in the prospects of those under him. He should never lose sight of those who have served well and should strain every effort to see that they have the recognition they have earned. Those who do this may be certain that their subordinates, assured that their interests are in safe hands, will, with contented minds, give the best that is in them.

There may be cases where ideas of interests are right and proper, but where behavior is unsatisfactory because unnecessary obstacles intervene to prevent a legitimate satisfaction of interests. Most of these are minor misunderstandings, irritations and discomforts which only need to be recognized by higher authority to be swept aside. It is the business of the officer, through knowing his men, to avert or remove these unnnecessary difficulties.

Consideration of the welfare of men is of course not to be thought of from the standpoint of a motive of obtaining popularity but as a contributing factor to military spirit.

One of the implied obligations of the officer is to " sell " the army to the recruit — that is, to make him satisfied with the bargain he has consummated by enlistment. To do this the officer has at his disposal a vast number of agencies and forces. If he uses them wisely and makes the service what it should be he will have a far more efficient organization; there will be few who consider they have made a bad bargain, to be withdrawn from by the dishonorable avenue of desertion.

The ability of officers to address their men in clear cut, concise language is important. One who can only talk in a halting way loses to a certain degree that confidence which he knows the men must have in him. He must be able to reach and enthuse his men by the spoken word. If the quality does not naturally exist it should be acquired by practise. The giving of orders is an art in itself. Method,

tone and manner give the men insight into their leader's personality.

In maintaining discipline or in instructing at drill, the soldier should never under any circumstances be touched. If this is permitted, drill masters may later more or less unconsciously shove or push awkward men and it paves the way for striking. The touch is usually resented.

In a general way, subordinates should be given clear preliminary directions along the lines they are to work on and then left to carry out their duties with the minimum of interference. Voluminous directions annoy; likewise they becloud the situation. The commander must accept responsibility along with power. To put the blame for deficiency on subordinates is destructive of loyalty and morale; to hold them accountable for efficiency in advance of the act is the basis of leadership.

Officers must be able to handle not only men who by nature or previous environment are readily susceptible to training, but also to make a satisfactory showing on less promising material. It is especially the least promising and unattractive men who need the most attention, for the reason that they must be raised the most in order to reach company standards.

The function of an officer does not cease with drill and the administration of his organization. One of his most important obligations is the development and upbuilding of the character of his subordinates. Upon this rests the efficiency of the whole organization. Together with the upbuilding of the soldierly character should go the upbuilding of ideals of citizenship.

Every officer of experience will admit instances in which labor, worry and failure in the handling of individuals resulted from overlooking important factors in the solution of their individual problems. Conversely, every such officer will recall with pride cases in which his judgment, tact and action converted a poor soldier into a good one and a pos-

sible menace to authority into one of the models of the military establishment. One purpose of this study is to indicate general ways by which the latter class may be increased in the future at the expense of the former.

Every officer should, from time to time, subject himself to self-analysis in respect to human management. If he is fair to himself, he will find both strong and weak points in his handling of men. Having recognized his weak points, he will set about remedying them. If in his own mind he has no weak points, his complacency perhaps indicates a lack of strength everywhere.

The morale of officers themselves is all important in relation to the morale of the service as a whole. The controlling status of officers in relation to enlisted men makes the latter peculiarly susceptible to suggestion resulting from the state of mind of their superiors. Morale begins at the top and extends downward. The degree of its development depends upon their enthusiasm, cheerfulness and attention to duty and demonstrates the relative efficiency of their influence and hold on their men.

The possession of rank does not imply a difference of human nature. "The Colonel's lady and Judy O'Grady are sisters under the skin," wrote Kipling. Hence any measures suggested for the benefit of the morale of the army as a whole are intended to apply particularly to officers, in so far as certain limitations of age, rank and nature of service will permit. Officers, like enlisted men, are under direction and control from above. It is essential that these forces be wise in direction and effective in execution, for as members of an educated class, officers are quick to see fault and inefficiency and resent a nagging administrative control. Ambition and desire to excel fairly are, with them, prime motives. As such, they should be directed rather than rebuffed.

It of course goes without saying that officers should be provided with proper comforts and means as well as opportunity for relaxation and social intercourse. Suitable clubs

should be provided and membership in neighboring civilian clubs promoted. Recreation and entertainment need to be stimulated. Messes are important factors. They should be part of clubs and not merely a place where the function of securing nourishment is to be performed under uninviting surroundings, as is too often the case. A higher degree of system, interest, good judgment and business management is required in messes than is usually displayed.

While the families of officers and men have no official military status, they are potent stabilizing factors in morale and for the influencing of military efficiency.

The Commanding Officer. The development and maintenance of a high state of morale is the duty and responsibility of the Commanding Officer of any command. The Morale Officer does not share this responsibility and duty nor relieve his commander of them, but under the direction of the commander merely acts as his agent in securing the desired results.

The position of the Commanding Officer is such that it permits him to contribute and direct more effectively than any and every other factor in the development of coöperation, unity and sympathy characterizing the good morale of the troops. His full support of morale work is essential to its success. He sets the example of administration and treatment of the men. State of mind and resulting behavior are as much an evidence of his management as are physical condition of armament and proficiency in its use.

The personality of the commander is directly reflected in the standards of coöperation, discipline and morale of his organization. Napoleon said: "There is no such thing as a good regiment and a bad regiment, but there is such a thing as a good colonel and a bad colonel." There is probably not an officer of reasonably long service who has not seen the truth of this statement proven under his own observation. Military organizations, like businesses, rapidly deteriorate from lack of care and through belief that they will

run themselves sufficiently. An inert, indifferent commander always has a sluggish command which displays qualities much like his own.

A commander must himself work hard if he wants to get the most out of his men. Example is contagious. Men will do their best if they get the idea that they are working with him rather than for him. If the commander is keen and energetic, his men unconsciously become so. He must be competent and forceful so that his leadership may be respected. He should look and act the soldier at all times. He must be eminently just, for his power is great and must not be misused through any personal influence. He must be sympathetic, so that subordinates may recognize in him a guardian of their interests. In every way, he must stand to his men not only as the ideal of military efficiency but of human quality.

In connection with morale, it is desirable that commanders be not changed any oftener than necessary. A new commander, like a new recruit, has to be adjusted to the new environment. A period of unrest and disquietude among his subordinates always follows the advent of a new commander. Too sudden or violent changes of purpose or method will inevitably provoke discontent, criticism and dissatisfaction. Relatively permanent commanders of experience and judgment are necessary to the best type of morale. On the other hand, the Commanding Officer who feels that he cannot temporarily leave his command through its inability to run itself properly thereby unconsciously confesses his own failure to produce an organization which could rely on itself in battle or emergency.

For morale purposes, if for nothing else, the Commanding Officer should be frequently and unexpectedly seen by the men in oversight of their duties and surroundings. It gives the men a sense of care and security which will do much to strengthen the bonds between them and their leader. A desk-officer, out of direct touch with his men and their

affairs, creates relatively less efficiency and little personal enthusiasm. Commanding Officers who are seen make their presence felt. Unexpected inspections and attendance at formations of minor organizations not only keep up standards but demonstrate interest. Individual soldiers should be talked to freely, especially in hospitals and guard-houses. The commander at such times can take a more intimate attitude toward the men than would be practicable for junior officers who come into more frequent contact with them.

Commanding Officers should also keep in close touch with their men by indirect means. These may be officer conferences, through which ideas may be received, discussed and passed down to the entire command. Camp bulletins, papers and local publications can be used to publish items or explanations which reflect the desires of the commander. Orders and circulars should be as few and as concise as possible of a positive character and of nature and wording to ensure the best results upon conduct.

The issuing of general orders or instructions of a restrictive nature, merely because a few individuals have abused a privilege, is too common. It will invariably be resented by the good men who find themselves thus penalized along with the wilful or indifferent. Officers issuing such orders will find that they lose both in prestige and sympathy and are fairly chargeable with injustice or weakness in evading the responsibility and unpopularity of directly punishing the actual offenders. If the latter be punished as individuals and with even justice, such action will be supported by public opinion which will further deter the offenders from repeating undesirable acts, at the same time reinforcing the general standards of good conduct within the organization.

Full coöperation by the commander in the work of the Morale Officer is necessary to its proper success. This cooperation is not in any sense either a favor or an obligation toward the Morale Officer but a matter pertaining to the personal interests of the commander himself. All morale

work, while primarily done for the benefit of the command, redounds to the advantage of the commander, inasmuch as his reputation rests in the efficiency and esprit of his subordinates. The Morale Officer is his agent in respect to all details in relation to morale, which are so numerous and complex as to make it impossible for him to handle them. The commander has no more time for handling these details than he has for those pertaining to property, rifle practice or other matters which are accustomed to be left to subordinates. But he should keep himself constantly informed, through the Morale Officer, of states of mind and measures being taken to improve them and exhibit the interest therein necessary to give the work its proper importance in the eyes of his subordinates.

The Commanding Officer should make free use of the facilities afforded by the morale organization to bring to the attention of the command, unofficially and indirectly, the many things concerning which it would be desirable to have the command informed, but on which it might not be desirable to issue an official memorandum or circular.

At large gatherings and on particularly impressive occasions the presence of the Commanding Officer is very desirable, since it serves to give the men of the command that appreciation of personality, interest in their welfare and sense of contact with the central authority which should be maintained for the strengthening of morale. Visits to the several camp utilities by the Commanding Officer and organization commanders are very valuable in calling attention to these activities and their usefulness. Such visits should be brought to the attention of the command, either in officers' talks to soldiers or through the camp publications, or both.

An occasional vigorous address by the Commanding Officer to the men has a very positive value in promoting discipline and morale. It brings into operation the factors of human relation and community of interest, puts personality

into his acts and creates a spirit of coöperation between commanders and their commands.

The Commanding Officer, through his position, affords the best medium for reaching civilian authorities and outside conditions which affect the camp. To this end, he should cultivate close relations with representative members and organizations of the civil community. A receptive and sympathetic attitude by him will evoke similar response by the civilians concerned. His appearance at civilian gatherings, and an occasional address on topics affecting both the civil and military communities, will be of great value.

Staff Officers in Relation to Morale. Officers of the staff have an essential relation to morale work. They are looked to for special information on which to base morale plans, and often serve as executives through which these plans, in whole or in part, are carried out.

The officers of the Inspector General's Department come in contact with troops at frequent intervals. They are especially concerned with investigations of conditions and results — but, conditions affect morale and results are only the outward expressions of morale. Morale work conceives that the visitations of inspectors shall be not so much critical as constructive; that administrative faults and virtues shall be pointed out, not so much for a chief purpose of making formal reports to higher authority, but as a basis of determining mistakes and of advising on the ground as to the removal of errors which have brought about local, undesirable results, and for the understanding and transmission to other organizations of a proper knowledge of the causes which appear to be making for greater efficiency. It considers that inspections should be recognized as being made in the spirit of helpfulness, that they should be welcomed rather than apprehended, and that their result should be the stimulation of endeavor, actuated by personal interest and organization esprit rather than official compulsion.

Inspectors can thus materially promote morale work. By

recognizing that the physical efficiency found is, after all, but the expression of mental state, they will trace back from results to cause through the relation between cause and effect. Their wide experience with diverse organizations and stations enables them to make valuable comparisons and to suggest measures found useful in one instance for application in other similar situations. They should particularly investigate morale methods in operation in a command, give the benefit of their conclusions to local morale officers and freely discuss with the morale officers at their headquarters matters which appear to need helpful correction by higher authority. It is obvious that touch with the local Inspector General is very necessary on the part of the Morale Officer to perfect his knowledge of existing conditions and to enable the formulation of any remedial measures which may be required.

The relations between the Morale Officer and the Surgeon should be very close. Not only are medical officers capable of giving very valuable assistance to the general morale work of a command, but they are themselves beset by special difficulties pertaining to the sick and their management; problems best handled by them in full coöperation with the general morale plan.

The physical and mental tests which the medical officers carry out in the command give much information as to its general health, appearance and intelligence. Also their work as sanitary inspectors brings them into contact with physical conditions affecting morale and which are not generally known. Their assistance has a peculiar value in certain fields which they alone can enter by reason of their professional and humanitarian purposes. Their relation to the men is close, individual and beneficent. It appeals to the quality of self-interest and necessarily opens up many opportunities for sympathetic contact and understanding. Because of this, the average soldier has an attitude of confidence, frankness and veracity toward the physician as to his

physical and mental difficulties that he has for no other class. This gives the Surgeon many opportunities to learn facts, either personally or through his nursing staff, especially female, and to advise in the correction of any maladjustments outside the hospital.

Diseases, and especially epidemics, mentally depress the morale of individuals or groups. If severe, they may practically destroy it. In the war with Spain, this was the case with certain camps and commands, notably the one which had just won the victorious campaign of Santiago before sickness destroyed its mental stamina as well as its physical strength. High efficiency of the medical service is a powerful aid to morale. A sick army is a discouraged one, and a discouraged army is not a victorious one. During epidemic is the period when the relation between the medical and morale services should be particularly close. There is at least some reason to believe that certain emotions like fear favor the acquirement of infectious disease, probably through interference with the normal glandular secretions which, entering the blood current, under normal conditions act as protective substances against bacterial invasion.

Medical Officers know that the morale of the depressed or neurotic soldier may be early expression of a beginning break in the morale of the troops as a whole. They should take particular pains to see that such individuals return to duty contented. They know that a neurotic talks much, and good ideas or advice implanted by skilful suggestion will be transmitted to others. They should see that the patient and the convalescent returned to duty are not only appreciative of their treatment and care but are well disposed toward the service as a whole. The morale difficulties arising in hospital administration and the management of patients are so numerous, important and characteristic that a special chapter is devoted to them.

The liaison between the Judge Advocate and the Morale Officer should be close, for the nature, extent and propor-

tionate distribution of offenses sufficiently serious to come to the attention of the former have a close relation to the state of morale. From analysis of his records, information of much morale value, difficult or impossible to secure in any other way, may be obtained. It is true that trial and sentence represent an accomplished fact, and that so far as any particular case or individual is concerned, the issue is closed. But if motive, and the causes operating to produce it, can be disclosed, it may be that similar offenses in others may be averted by removing or modifying unnecessary cause.

Court-martial cases coming to the attention of the Judge Advocate are of two classes; one representing crimes implying moral turpitude such as are found in civil courts, and another composed of military offenses not necessarily implying criminal character. The serious military offenses become such because of the special code governing the military establishment. Here irresponsibility, immaturity, undeveloped character and other factors enter to reinforce qualities in the military environment causing anti-social reactions along these lines.

Minor cases, handled by summary courts, are chiefly military offenses not classed as crimes or misdemeanors in civil life and represent infractions of the special requirements of the military environment. Study of the motives which animated them will often disclose some of the difficulties under which the soldier labors. Nor is it always sufficient excuse of responsibility to disclose a base motive for act; for the commander, in the best sense of the word, should furnish high ideals and good motives to replace those which are low and evil.

The unusual or very serious offense always creates general discussion among the enlisted personnel and the resulting disciplinary measures have a potent influence on morale. One of the results of proper morale work should be a decrease in the number of offenses arising from infractions of discipline due to ignorance or discontent. Inquiry will show

that a very large proportion of offenses arise from such causes. It may not be possible to prevent the very serious offense of the particularly vicious individual of criminal instinct, but courts-martial for the offenses dependent on the military environment will be very greatly diminished if the morale organization functions properly. In the case of disorders of considerable gravity, the first sullenness and unruliness of troops created by the conditions which resulted in the disorders would very likely have first manifestations in minor offenses requiring disciplinary action. Here the Morale Officer would recognize the premonitory symptoms of an impending emergency, and so act as not to permit it to arise. The officer commanding the Provost Guard can often furnish valuable information as to the nature and extent of current offenses and of conditions outside of the reservation, so that unfavorable influences affecting the men may be ascertained and effectively counteracted.

The Intelligence Officer is concerned largely with the life of the command as a whole rather than with any particular detail. Through his office information as to many important phases of life in the command will pass. The successful handling of any special morale problem depends upon accurate information as to persons, organizations and causes, and in many instances it is just such information which it is the province of the Intelligence Officer to secure. This information the Morale Officer can often advantageously couple up with that which he has secured from other sources.

Camp publicity, because of its effect upon morale and its wholesome interaction with civilian morale, is one of the most important channels through which the morale agencies work. In war, the Intelligence Officer is the censor of camp news, and liaison in this connection is vitally necessary on the part of the Morale Officer. Many special problems, such as "conscientious objectors" and pacifist and radical propaganda, receive the attention of the Intelligence Officer to a very considerable extent. The influence of such mat-

ters on morale is obvious. Should serious disaffection or enemy propaganda exist among the troops, knowledge of it would probably be had by the Intelligence Officer and should be used to supplement that possessed by the morale organization. There should be full interchange of information between the Intelligence Officer and the Morale Officer insofar as this relates to their respective duties.

The Morale Officer should establish and maintain close liaison with the Personnel Adjutant in the interest of morale. Changes of personnel which may necessitate alterations in educational, amusement or general morale methods or policies can be promptly secured. The relocation of misfit individuals or groups, to the ensuing improvement of morale, may also be brought about by such liaison. The Personnel Adjutant is in possession of information showing the composition of the command and the changes which occur. Naturally this matter has a direct bearing on morale work, for problems vary and their importance changes with the changing characteristics of the human factor.

Not only is it necessary to know the actual number of men in a command, but the composition of the major groups and the chief factors concerning them. Because of sectional, environmental and nationalistic influences and prejudices, the officer should know from what states his men come; the approximate number coming from cities, towns or rural districts; the approximate number of native born and foreign born, with some general idea of the racial groups of the latter. Failure to understand this general composition of personnel and the special morale problems dependent thereon, may not only cause the officer to neglect desirable means of improving morale but may result in inability to analyze and prevent in time, some group or general cause of discontent or incipient disorder.

The Insurance Officer can be of much assistance to morale work, as his functions relate to the protection and benefit of the men and their families. Government insurance is a bond

which should promote and stabilize good relations between the man and the Government. For this reason, the Morale Officer is interested in extending it in every way. Home conditions which the War Risk Act is designed to deal with can have a profound influence upon the morale of the individual, and the contagion of dissatisfaction spreads very easily.

Close liaison with the Supply Officer is desirable. Contentment is not entirely synonomous with morale, but the relation between the two is so apparent that every proper measure should be taken to secure the comfort and contentment of the command. It is difficult to produce or maintain morale if such fundamental difficulties as poor food, delayed or improper clothing, or delayed pay confront the men. If these exist, the removal of their cause is indicated. If they are beyond local control, at least explanation is possible. Men will bear cheerfully what seems to be necessary and incident to the military service but are quick to resent any appearance of indifference or incompetence. Since food, clothing and pay are matters affecting entire organizations, they create group thoughts of wide extent and great importance. A real grievance in such matters serves as a basis to which others of trivial importance may be added and the whole thus apparently justified.

The Utilities Officer has charge of certain physical components of the military environment which have much to do with the comfort, and hence with the contentment, of the soldier. Coöperation between him and the Morale Officer should be close. Insufficient, improper, or inequitably distributed accommodations are sources of dissatisfaction. Discontent arising from faulty conditions inflicting discomfort should not be allowed to continue if possible to prevent. If the cause is not readily reached, other measures intended to modify the resulting psychological reaction are indicated.

The Exchange Officer operates a public utility which comes into frequent and close relation with the lives of the men.

The scope and efficiency of its functions have a close relation to morale, as a business convenience, facility for sociability, opportunity for personal economy and company benefit. It is also an institution through which much information can be secured as to what the men are thinking and the nature of their difficulties.

The Education and Recreation Officer functions along the lines indicated by his title. He is in charge of a wide diversity of courses in educational instruction and vocational training. His duties, under the Commanding Officer, cover a comprehensive course of physical training of the enlisted men on a military schedule, together with boxing, wrestling and in-fighting. He controls all games and athletics and the selection and coaching of teams. He trains and directs in mass singing and in that of song-leaders and glee-clubs. He is in charge of camp theaters, soldier dramatics, entertainment units, concerts and moving pictures. He is in charge of soldier clubs and hostess houses or other facilities for the reception of women visitors. He supervises and coördinates matters of education and vocational training and library facilities.

Thus it is apparent that he approaches the soldier from a special angle, at times largely outside of military duty and along lines of interest and diversion. His work furnishes outlet for the expression of several of the basic instincts, and is a safety valve for the repressions which cannot be dissociated from the military life. His facilities promote local interest and contentment, and thereby do much to avert or allay threatened disorder.

The popular conception of morale work identifies it only with amusement and recreation. This is far from being correct. Recreation is merely one of the many morale agencies, each of which has its special field of usefulness and importance. Within such limits, recreation is an agency of great value.

The Morale Officer should maintain close relations with

the Education and Recreation Officer, for he will frequently wish to call on him to assist through his facilities in changing the mental state of the individual or the group. In the use of these facilities, there should be selective choice according to the special needs. While certain set features may be necessary for a general program, selection or variation may be necessary to meet special or individual cases.

The Morale Officer. The objects sought by the Morale Officer are utilitarian and practical. In regard to efficiency, achievement, output and progress his function is to bring about a better result, in larger volume, in fewer hours, with lessened strain and greater contentment. He is an aid to discipline through taking away from the men desire or willingness to engage in disorder. Inasmuch as there are practically no limits as to where his activities should end, his chief problem in such respects consists in how far he can go in offering his services without having them regarded as an intrusion into the affairs of others. He must be careful not to assume functions outside his own jurisdiction, thereby creating friction and difficulty. But to study every factor affecting efficiency and to give his conclusions to those concerned are his direct duties.

The functions of the Morale Officer fall under the following heads: —

(a) To ascertain and place at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and other officers concerned information as to the state of morale in the command and the several units composing it; also as to any conditions or tendencies in the command or neighborhood which, if not corrected, will affect morale unfavorably. This applies to matters affecting the daily life of the command and also to those arising from emergencies.

(b) Thoroughly to keep informed as to the best available methods for forming and maintaining coöperation, unity and sound morale and for ensuring their progress, and to place this information at the disposal of all officers con-

cerned. To devise plans for dealing with undesirable conditions which may arise in the deterioration of the efficiency of the command, and to submit such plans to the proper officers. To hold frequent conferences with regimental and company officers concerning the various phases of the morale problem in their units, to elicit and record their difficulties and suggestions and, where desirable, to transmit the same to the Morale Branch. To concern himself with maintaining all conditions favorable to morale.

(c) To seek out and discover causes tending to poor morale and to discordance of effort; to avert or remove them before they do harm, or to neutralize or destroy them if so functioning. The methods of improving morale are far more numerous and much less definite than are the causes of defective morale. In working out these corrective measures, personality, imagination and intiative therefore afford almost unlimited opportunity.

(d) To lend assisting coöperation in all measures for the physical and mental welfare of the command, to the end that there may be no neglect of opportunity for betterment, no unprofitable expenditure of energy and no duplication of effort.

(e) To coöperate with the authorized local agents, if any, of other governmental departments in promoting the interests of the soldier, thereby enhancing morale.

It must be reiterated that these functions of the Morale Officer do not in any sense relieve the Commanding Officer and his subordinate commanders from responsibility in maintaining morale, but are intended to assist them in attaining more completely the object desired by all.

In the handling of local problems, the Morale Officer must take into account as of first importance the personal equation of his commander. The latter himself presents a problem of individual psychology which must be solved as a prerequisite to the success of larger plans. Inasmuch as morale work implies the development or instillation of cer-

tain ideas, the first and most important duty of the Morale Officer is to secure the confidence and support of the commander. He cannot in justice expect positive morale results from subordinate agents in their spheres of activity unless he first secures them in his own. One of the best tests of a Morale Officer is to have convinced his commander, not only of the value of morale work but of the efficiency of the way in which it is carried out.

The Morale Officer is a staff officer whose duties are to look after problems and details of morale work for his commander to an extent impossible for the latter to do. He acts under delegated authority, just as other staff officers perform, under delegated authority, functions for which the commander is responsible. Only the larger problems need come before the commander for solution — and if the Morale Officer does his work well, few problems should be allowed to develop into any magnitude or gravity.

In his special staff relationship, the functions of the Morale Officer probably place him in closer relation to the Adjutant than to any other. The Adjutant group also comprises the Personnel Adjutant, the Intelligence Officer and the Insurance Officer, thus forming the nerve center of the command because it is especially concerned with facts and ideas not in the province of other staff officers who deal with the physical necessities or disciplinary aspects of military life. The latter matters are of importance, however, in adjusting the environment to the man as well as the man to his environment. The position of the Morale Officer on the staff of his commander enables him to study the effect upon morale of the functions of the several staff departments. This will always be an important duty with him.

In that morale work exists for the purpose of promoting military efficiency, it is essential that the standards and objects of such efficiency must be well known to the Morale Officer. Thus the best results are obtained when the Morale Officer, in addition to being of high character, ideals

and sympathetic understanding, is himself a thoroughly trained military man experienced in the practical handling of soldiers. For this reason, it is preferable that the Morale Officers with line commands shall be line officers. The matter is not one of ethics or sentiment, but of a calculated efficiency.

The recommendations of the Morale Officer are not rarely innovations or departures from convention. If his recommendations are to carry the conviction and weight desired, his rank should be commensurate with the importance of his office. In any large command, his rank should not be less than that of a field officer. But where choice must be made between rank without special fitness, and a junior officer possessing qualities making for success, the latter should be selected.

The Morale Officer should be of attractive and sympathetic personality, and a good mixer. Good-will between the morale personnel and all those with whom it comes in contact is indispensable. Essential assets of a Morale Officer are sound judgment, tact, discretion and ability to persuade. Attempts to force the immediate adoption of radical innovations will seriously impair his usefulness. The enthusiastic application of his ideas by officers whom he has won to a belief in their importance will be the test of his success. To this end, he must entrench himself in a place of general friendly confidence. This secured, he can accomplish through suggestion much that would be impossible through officiousness or a reliance upon mere authority.

Problems of morale affect the daily life of every line and staff officer. The Morale Officer must gain such a position of general confidence that he will be voluntarily consulted as a specialist by his brother officers in their efforts to solve their daily problems. He will never secure this place if he is officious or tactless. In general, the wise Morale Officer seeks to be known by his results rather than by his title. He will cultivate close relations with company commanders and

have frequent consultations with them in regard to carrying out his work. He will deal through them in respect to their organizations, thus transmitting his ideas through their personality and securing their adoption by officers as their own. By frequent meetings with company commanders he learns of the problems of the various organizations and familiarizes their officers with general camp morale plans and suggestions.

For the Morale Officer to be a careless talker and to say what he thinks without regard for effect, is wholly to destroy his usefulness. He can become a demoralizing influence if he tactlessly interferes and permits any impression to prevail or remain that he is a critic or a busy-body, or that he is pampering the men by measures inimical to discipline. Too strenuous measures adopted too quickly will be fatal to his ultimate success. Overzealousness weakens his position. Any tendency to detail to the impairment of the broad lines of his work as a definite part of military science, will have the same effect.

The Morale Officer himself must be fully appreciative of the value of his mission and the helpfulness of his work from the military standpoint. His personal interest in it must be such that he places it first among any duties which may devolve upon him. His missionary zeal must be such that he is always ready to inform those who are less familiar with morale matters and methods, and to seek out and convince those who, for one reason or another, are not yet won over. The very essence of morale work requires active proselyting in extending the scope and intensity of the desired ideas and purposes. Whoever does not measure up to these standards will largely fail in morale efficiency.

An efficient Morale Officer will always be busy. Opportunity, in greater or less degree, is always available for the carrying out of morale work. Faults to be remedied are never lacking. Where morale is high, it requires intelligent effort to preserve it. Serious problems are usually evidence

of deficiency in the morale methods which have gone before. When conditions are functioning well and there seems little to do in a corrective sense, he merely transfers greater attention to noting and evaluating conditions as they portend or occur as future factors in morale, and in planning to convert them into stimulants to efficiency and contentment. In practice, constant watching of the state of morale, effort to correct fault and the application of general stimulative measures will be interrelated and carried out simultaneously.

Under no circumstances would a Morale Officer remain inactive, waiting for " things to happen." The accidents of chance are exactly what his function is intended to prevent. He must be resourceful in supplying new ideas that keep the morale scheme not only moving but growing; conditions in camp are constantly changing and fluctuating, and stagnation means relative retrogression in that it implies failure to keep up with new situations. He must have a constructive imagination and possess resourcefulness and administrative ability in selecting and using the great number of agencies available in a well rounded program. His purpose and duty are to anticipate possible combinations, actions and results, and so direct them that they will move in beneficent and desirable channels.

The Morale Officer is especially charged with the study and application of measures to improve local morale and with reporting such as are successful to the Morale Branch, so that they may be employed elsewhere. He should also request the assistance of the Morale Branch in the solution of difficult morale problems. The information furnished to the Morale Officer by the Morale Branch represents principles, not rules. It needs to be interpreted in the light of local conditions and applied according to varying needs. The degree of success depends upon the extent to which its details reach a multitude of matters of greater or lesser importance.

The problems of the Morale Officer vary in degree, not

only with the number of troops, but with their quality and environment. In a small garrison of seasoned troops, well ordered and under an effective commander, the morale work, once properly organized and functioning, can be carried out by the Morale Officer in addition to other duties. In larger camps, as a division, the Morale Officer must give his whole time to his important work. Similarly, in recruit camps, or wherever there are many problems of adjustment, it requires his whole time and thought. To weigh him down with other duties means that some of them must suffer and that the desired results as to morale cannot be obtained. In very large camps he will need several officers as assistants to overlook large units or special sections of the camp. Ordinarily, a Morale Officer can handle about ten thousand men, with an assistant officer for each additional five thousand. This frees him reasonably from detail and gives opportunity for the study and consideration of the large morale problems. All staff officers are practically executive agents in the morale work, so far as the remedy for its problems lies within the fields of their respective functions.

The Morale Officer must remember that all large plans, in their final analysis, depend very largely for their solution on the personal equation of some individual. This basic individual must be sought out and placed in a favorable, or at least receptive, mental state toward the proposition to be advanced. Sometimes, after study of the "key man," it will be found desirable to delay direct approach until various individuals composing his personal environment have been won over and have been made to exert their more or less unconscious and indirect influence on his mental attitude.

The efficiency of Morale Officers should be judged by the standards of morale methods. It is expected that anything which he recommends will be carried out in full detail. If this is not the case he should consider that the fault is his own and not that of others. Failure in such cases would be due to the fact that:

(a) The proposition advanced by him would not stand the tests of logic and practicality, or that:

(b) He had failed to select the proper channels and methods for the necessary psychological approach.

Accordingly, the Morale Officer, in considering the solution of any problem, will get clearly in mind exactly what he desires to accomplish. He will then carefully consider and select the measures and agents which may seem to offer the strongest psychological appeal and best approach to the individual or group to be influenced. He will then endeavor to secure his ends by tact, common sense, great resourcefulness, quick thought and well considered suggestion. To do this to best advantage he endeavors to put himself in the place of the subject and consider the matter from that viewpoint. To depend on one's individual, preconceived judgment is to run a great liability to error.

In attaining his objects, a good plan for the Morale Officer to follow is to state opinions and describe methods clearly and forcefully, so that there may be no mistake as to procedure. He should then give others the chance to prove them, thereby drawing them into the work as coagents. It is most undesirable for the Morale Officer to place himself so completely in charge of matters of relative detail as to put others out. He is at his best when he not only attains the desired results, but does it impersonally, inconspicuously and through others. Outside the matter of standardization of organization and method in morale work, it is poor policy to give orders regarding it. The very essence of the efficiency of the Morale Officer is to get his results without orders and through willing, enthusiastic cooperation. He is the salesman of ideas which persuasion, not compulsion, induces others to buy.

For morale work to function to best advantage, conditions which appear to require remedy must be known. If known, the remedy must be applied. Both the securing of information and the offer of assistance dependent on it may

be resented by officers not fully informed as to the wholly helpful purpose of morale work. This difficulty is one which only the personality and tact of the Morale Officer can overcome. Knowledge is necessary to the application of appropriate morale measures. While securing information from any source, the Morale Officer relies largely upon the morale organization to obtain and utilize the special information he requires. He is the head of the organization and it is his duty to maintain it in a high state of efficiency by instruction, superintendence and control under the commander.

The Morale Officer should have a complete inventory of all facilities, equipment and supplies available to assist him in his work. This should be looked upon as an outfit made up of numerous units, all of which will not be required at the same time, but all of which, in diverse combination, will be required some time. Just as the physician diagnoses the case and writes a prescription, the ingredients of which are only a small fraction of the medicines contained in a pharmacy, so the Morale Officer determines mental state, either pending or present, and prescribes the nature and dosage of the remedial agencies. Neither the physician nor the Morale Officer ordinarily provides or administers his remedies — that executive work is usually left to others. Both are merely concerned that the latter are prepared to carry out the prescribed functions in a thoroughly effective way.

As with any other work, that of the Morale Officer must be systematized if it is to be efficient. His work will be handicapped from the outset unless it is surveyed as a whole and a definite but provisional program mapped out. The first step in systematization should be to prepare files, schedules and charts so that the field of his activities, his material and his sources of information can be easily visualized and his resources rendered available. Data should be compiled showing the various racial, territorial and sectional or other groups, so that they can be located and plans to

reach them in the best way advantageously formulated. He should also keep a complete list of all agencies from which information, literature or assistance can be secured for special purposes. When individuals or groups present psychological problems difficult of solution and seem more or less refractory to control, the Morale Officer should make a special study of them and turn his conclusions over to the commander immediately concerned.

The Morale Officer, while ready to give help on problems coming before him, should be seeking assistance in the best means for their solution. He should familiarize himself with the successful administrative methods of good officers, especially those of his own command, and study the underlying reasons with the view of tactfully bringing them into wider practice. Similarly, he analyzes the methods of less successful officers to learn by their failures what should be avoided. His command forms a laboratory of applied administrative psychology. To carry out this work properly, he must be in touch with officers and men and their affairs, so that the sequence between cause and effect may be apparent. In some commands, morale councils have been organized to assist the Morale Officer. These meet as required, to discuss camp morale in general and special problems in particular. They have sometimes included representatives of organizations, chaplains and representatives of nearby civilian communities, with others interested.

Effective morale work is the work of the opportunist. There is a best time for everything. The "psychological moment" should not be allowed to slip by without being utilized. The trained Morale Officer will recognize the first indications of any undesirable state of mind, have his measures for counteraction ready for employment and put them into operation the moment they seem to be required by the situation.

On the other hand, it only tends to lower morale if a measure, which earlier might have been good, is carried out with-

out due regard for timeliness. Most persons are interested in modifying obvious fault, but official routine is often slow. One of the greatest causes of exasperation in administrative service is the solemn futility of a cumbrous machine which seems more concerned with form than service and continues to function to results when the need no longer exists. One of the great functions of the Morale Officer is to speed up the machine and short-circuit its leisurely methods by personal approach, so that things may be timely of accomplishment and a small fault not develop into a large one.

The Morale Officer is particularly concerned with the prompt following up and refutation of disturbing rumors, as a part of his constant study of the various causes of discontent, many of which may be removable and some of which may be imaginary. He is interested in the causes of military offense and delinquency with a view to their removal or amelioration. Many of them can be corrected and the resulting offense prevented. Anything in the physical or mental environment which unnecessarily creates difficulties with the physical or mental comfort should be sought out and removed.

The Morale Officer has an excellent field of usefulness in helping to adjust the personal difficulties of enlisted men where these difficulties are beyond the power of their company commander to adjust. His close relations with the various organizations, civil and military, frequently enable him to do this to great advantage. These functions of the Morale Officer should be known to all concerned and should of course be approved by the Commanding Officer. The Morale Officer should also see that some sort of a weekly publication, mimeographed or printed, as discussed later, is issued.

The activities of Morale Officers, while largely confined within military limits, are by no means wholly so. Physically the troops can not be completely insulated from the transmission of outside ideas and influences; mental and emo-

tional influences from outside military jurisdiction are bound to affect the men. Such influences may, however, be controlled to a considerable extent, more or less proportionate to the efficacy of the controlling measures applied. Accordingly, the Morale Officer will watch conditions outside the camp which may affect the soldier. He will present to the Commanding Officer plans to establish and promote a relationship between the command and the surrounding civilian population which will produce harmony and good order, a particular public interest in the organization and a respect for the military individual and the uniform he wears.

When the Commanding Officer so desires, the Morale Officer should act as the representative of the command in dealing with the local and outside press, facilitating their agencies in securing facts and interesting news, and seeing that sensational stories are verified as to facts before publication.

The visitation of Morale Officers to other commands for discussion of morale matters and observation of the methods of others in meeting problems is desirable. In certain instances this has been authorized by the War Department. Morale Officers of nearby commands should consult and cooperate on morale problems of mutual concern.

The Chaplain. The services of Chaplains are of great value in morale work. They may be presumed to have had training and experience, and to have cultivated precisely the personal relations with the men under their charge, which are of great assistance in carrying out the purposes of morale work. Since the Chaplain as a regimental staff officer is recognized as charged with the spiritual and moral interests of the command, he may, without offense, appeal to the conscience and religious ideals as guides of conduct. This affords a special line of approach and one in which little active opposition is to be expected. The minds and emotions of a considerable proportion of the men can best be stirred by the Chaplains. Most men in this country have

been raised in a more or less religious atmosphere. Though they may depart in conduct from the tenets of their parents, yet the concepts of religious standards remain and may often be appealed to with success.

The Chaplain comes into close touch with the mental life of officers and men at many points, and may exert a powerful influence for good and mental uplift and relief. If he is an experienced man, of broad sympathy and understanding, he will have a large sphere of personal influence peculiarly his own. He will serve as friend, counselor and guide to the command, without regard to sect or creed. Officers and men alike will turn to him for sympathy and counsel in their personal affairs, thus opening the way of approach to the most difficult class of morale problems, perhaps beyond the reach of the commander. The Chaplain may without presumption or offense show a personal interest in the problems of the individual, with the understanding that communications are privileged and confidential. Thus in a personal and unofficial capacity by his tact and knowledge he may remove the cause of much mental stress. Perhaps more than any other officer he has opportunity to learn the soldiers' troubles, antecedents, hopes, fears, weaknesses and strength. It is his privilege to visit them in barracks or when on duty so as to keep in touch with their life, as well as to encourage them to call upon him when occasion arises. Information so gained may be utilized to formulate and apply constructive remedy for difficulty or discontent.

The wise and sympathetic Chaplain will win and hold the confidence of the men. All this enables him to understand, advise, correct and remove many of the mental difficulties of the soldier which detract from his efficiency. Aside from his paramount services as a religious guide, he can be of very great value in promoting contentment, discipline and effectiveness. Too few officers grasp the possibilities of his practical usefulness in respect to their organizations in such matters.

The Chaplain can often do much for men who are in the guard-house awaiting trial or serving sentences for infractions of civil or military law. Such often yield to the friendly approach of the Chaplain, and without abusing confidence he may be able to remove or alleviate difficulties which could not be approached from any other angle. He may bring offenders to repentance, whereby they will not offend again, and restore hope and self-respect to the discouraged so that they will make a new start in high purpose because of his appeal and support.

The Chaplain is a natural link between the Morale Officer and the hospital. The medical officer knows the sick man chiefly as a patient, but the Chaplain has met him under varying circumstances and has had opportunity to know and utilize his traits of character such as no other officer can enjoy. To the sick, he becomes a representative of outside comradeship, bringing hope, confidence, patience and consolation. In the solution of the peculiar and often perplexing morale problems of the hospital he can do much. In any case of sorrow and bereavement, the Chaplain is naturally turned to as one especially fit to deal with those who need to be comforted. Even death, with its supreme decoration of the wooden cross, may be turned by him to human betterment in arousing higher ideals in the comrades who remain.

The Chaplain should be particularly on the watch for men who are discontented, discouraged, or in danger of developing an unsoldierly attitude toward the military service or life in general. When such men seem not readily amenable to the efforts of the commander, the services of the Chaplain should be invoked. Such cases should be dealt with by personal conference of sufficient length to cover all phases of the matter, real or imagined. In many instances a simple explanation of facts from so trusted a source is all that is necessary in dissipating grievances and bringing the individual to a better frame of mind and state of conduct.

He has a special field of usefulness in relation to the recruit, who should be seen, welcomed and made at ease at once on arrival and when he most needs and appreciates a friend. The Chaplain who fails to make use of this golden first opportunity loses his best chance of establishing his wholesome influence. He also has a special mission to perform in relation to the ignorant or foreign speaking men who may not understand how to look out for their own interests. Toward all he can perform a service in the suppression of foolish and harmful rumors and in supplying correct information. As the Chaplain should be one of the first to welcome the new soldier, so he should be one of the last to wish him God-speed on discharge. His kindly interest will do much to make the discharged soldier leave the service with appreciation and regret.

In order to carry out his work effectively, the Chaplain should endeavor to know personally and by name every enlisted man of the command to which he is attached. The particular value of his relationship to the men rests in its personal nature and individual touch. He should study them and their personalities with a view to solving the diverse special problems which each presents. Indirectly, the Chaplain may exert great influence on the command through the families, doing real pastoral work among them, beneficent to body as well as soul.

Close relationship between the Chaplain and other officers, with respect to the problems of the men and the welfare of the organization, will be of great importance to both in promoting high ideals and good behavior. The discreet and energetic Chaplain will find that good officers will welcome and promote his interest among the men.

It is one of the logical fields of usefulness of the Chaplain to give information and suggestions to the Morale Officer and aid him in carrying out such measures as may be employed from time to time. This is of practical value to the Chaplain in assisting him in his work of character building.

Accordingly, he should keep in close touch with the Morale Officer and the morale activities which are being promoted. He may be sure that the Morale Officer will meet him more than half way, make use of his hearty coöperation and employ the resources of his specialty as part of the measures for accomplishing the general purpose.

Chaplains should avoid sedentary tendencies and should accompany their commands on marches, at target practice and in other exercises which would bring them into personal and sympathetic relationship with the men. Their duties imply any sacrifice of personal comfort in the promotion of the welfare of the men. Not only at work but during play such presence is desirable. Evidence of his interest may be shown by the service of the Chaplain as an official at contests and events. It is scarcely necessary to say that, by reason of his calling and status, it is especially necessary that he promote the spirit of cheerfulness, esprit and obedience by word and example.

Chaplains should specially cultivate the military viewpoint, which has been largely absent in their training toward the religious and moral end. They must have a sympathetic understanding of the ideas and difficulties pertaining to troops if they would successfully solve their problems. Impractical idealists, sentimentalists and " peace-at-any-price " men will gain no hold on the soldier. Methods which might be satisfactory enough with a mixed congregation in a conservative community will fail in the army. The same degree of failure will attend all sensationalism implied in what is known as revivalism. The peculiar psychology of the soldier class which is dependent on special factors of sex, age, environment and purpose dominates the line of successful approach. Whoever disregards this has failed in advance. Religion in the army must be positive, frank and without cant if it is to succeed. If these qualities are not observed, effort is worse than useless and only draws down criticism. Narrow and doctrinal viewpoints and emotional

appeals bring about a negative reaction from the soldier.

The Chaplain, from the nature of his service, must represent religion in its unity and not in its diversity. Sectarian activities, competitions and jealousies must be allayed if the religious sentiments of the military group are to be satisfied. Similarly, the complete separation of Church and State required by the Constitution should be borne in mind. All religious beliefs and practices should be respected and facilitated, including facilities to attend divine service, leaves for bona-fide participation in religious holidays, authority to receive sacramental articles, etc.

While Chaplains have demonstrated their usefulness as individuals in many lines of military duty, anything which is entirely divested of function bearing upon religious and personal relationship with the men is believed to be unfortunate. They naturally coöperate in matters of education and recreation. Services as burial officers and graves inspectors seem appropriate. It will often be desirable to put them in charge of mail service and make them local censors, for the former places them in close personal contact with the troops and the latter gives a very clear insight into local difficulties and needs.

In any large camp, the Chaplains should be organized. A head with a headquarters to serve as a clearing house for plans and ideas gives desirable unity of action. The morale organization would naturally link up with this group rather than with its separate components. The interchange of services by Chaplains with those of other organizations is often desirable so that the men may have opportunities for worship, each according to his own religious denomination.

The sermons and addresses of Chaplains should, before all, take the special character of the audience into consideration. They must be simple in form and verbiage and of direct application. They should be interesting and avoid prosiness. It is probably safe to say that the vast majority of souls are saved within the first twenty minutes of an

appeal. Sermons should be not only religious but treat of the ethics of nations as well as individuals. They should be patriotic and forceful and apply their analogies to conditions of the current period affecting local affairs. They should be inspirational and arouse in the men that wholesome spirit which is the foundation of morale. As they look beyond human existence to the hereafter, so they should look beyond the period of military service and hold in view the making of good citizens as well as soldiers.

One of the functions of Chaplains should be to bring about an interdenominational committee of the various churches in the community near a post or camp, with a view to securing church hospitality and wholesome environment for the soldiers and to endeavor to bring the men to make use of it. Usually such opportunities are unorganized and fail of proper use because they are not properly brought to the attention of the soldiers. The setting aside of special nights for soldiers has been found by some churches to be very successful in arousing the interest of all concerned.

Regimental and Independent Organization Commander. Circular No. 37, War Department, 1918, paragraph 1, states that: "The morale organizations within each camp will further include all organization commanders." The same circular, paragraph 3, Sections (b) and (c), states that among the duties contemplated for the Morale Officer shall be:

"To serve as the agent for the dissemination throughout the command of information and measures pertaining to the stimulation of morale.

"To instruct all officers and other suitable persons in the value of morale work and to outline and supervise, under the camp commander, the measures which they should carry out in the promotion of the morale of troops."

Since every detail of organization and training in an army touches the subject of morale, these duties, if they are to be successfully and effectively performed, must be carefully in-

terpreted by tact, discretion and a sense of the practical aspect of the situation. The measures which are outlined by the Morale Officer should be prepared only after a careful study and survey, so that regimental and independent organization commanders can be brought to understand the purpose and value of these measures, to consider the time and conditions favorable to their application, and to cooperate actively in furthering their success. Otherwise the success of measures which he will supervise, under the camp commander, will be very much less assured, and his general usefulness, efficiency and position of confidence will be below the standard easily possible for him to attain.

It should be the endeavor of the Morale Officer so to tactfully show the regimental commanders the direct value of morale work, both to themselves and to the command, that they will, of their own volition, initiate and suggest plans and policies rather than wait to have them presented by the former. It is particularly necessary that these officers should be brought to feel that the Morale Officer can be of assistance to them and that it is well for them to call to his immediate attention information which they consider should be possessed by him.

The regimental commander is particularly concerned with problems of group or organization morale. It is in such cases that the Morale Officer can be especially helpful. Cases of individual morale usually can best be handled by the company commander, with or without the help of the Morale Officer and the agencies controlled by him.

The Company Commander. The company commander is ex-officio in immediate charge of all morale work in his organization. He should function in this capacity to the fullest extent. He has direct control over, information of, and close association with the enlisted men whom it is essential to reach in morale work. As an administrative officer, he has it in his power to remedy most minor defects and difficulties. Probably ninety-five per cent. of the morale

problems in a company should, with the general assistance given by the morale organization, be solved by the efficient company commander without recourse to higher authority.

The competent company commander understands that if his company enjoys contentment of mind as well as comfort of body, it will be an efficient military organization, presenting a smart appearance, possessing snap, pride in self and community of purpose. It will create few disciplinary problems, remain cohesive under stress and exhibit fortitude in adversity. He also appreciates that the estimation of his own efficiency by his superiors depends largely upon the degree of proficiency which his subordinates manifest as a result of his control. He therefore promotes morale not only as a matter of general welfare but from the standpoint of personal self-interest. He helps make men while he makes soldiers. Once he has seen morale work demonstrated, he will be keenly interested because it gets results. He will have further interest and pride in these results because he made them himself. He realizes that in meeting difficulty the Morale Officer is not trying to demonstrate that the company commander was wrong or inefficient but is helping him toward administrative success.

The duties expected of a company commander in his function as company morale officer are such as he has heretofore always casually performed in promoting military spirit and contentment in his organization as an aid to its efficiency. It is only desired now, in addition, to systematize, extend and intensify these functions in proportion to the greater facilities, larger opportunities, more extensive funds and recreational facilities operating in the interests of the soldier, and the official encouragement extended by, and the requirements of, the War Department.

As an essential preliminary step, he thoroughly familiarizes himself not only with the military machinery for the development of morale, but with the various civilian agencies which the Morale Officer has at his disposal for the better-

ment of the men in both mind and body, and the nature and extent of the assistance which each such agency is prepared to render, utilizing these to best advantage as opportunity permits. A chart, showing the morale machinery and agencies in their relation to each other, is given elsewhere in this book. It should be carefully studied. Full descriptive data in respect to the above facilities and methods of use can be secured from the Morale Officer.

The idea of the company commander should be not only to impress his men with his own personality directly, but to have it reach them through his subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers. The former will need specific instruction in the desired methods of handling men. For the non-commissioned officers to be ignorant of or out of sympathy with his purposes and methods is to cause corresponding failure in his aims and ideals. He will accordingly select them not only because they are good drill masters or disciplinarians, but because he believes that they will also fully adapt themselves to his ideas in that effective management of the organization which comes not so much in outward acquiescence to orders as in earnest coöperation with the spirit and purpose they embody.

He will take measures, through his morale agents and in other ways, to know at all times the conditions which obtain in squad-rooms and other places. He concerns himself with what the men are thinking about while off duty as well as in the performance of duty, for he recognizes that thoughts are the precursors of acts and are the controlling factors of the latter. He desires that the men shall think along the same general lines that he does, and that their acts shall conduce to discipline and military purpose rather than weaken or destroy them. He is further expected to consider the morale and mental welfare of his company not only from the standpoint of its own individual effieciency, but from that of the larger organization or groups of which it forms a part and upon which its state of morale reacts.

The impression that an organization commander makes on his men is eventually a deciding factor in their efficiency. As an impression implies contact, the closer the official relations between officers and their subordinates, the greater the influence of the former. The most successful captain is the one who, through personal interest and direct share in its fortunes, makes himself recognized as a member of the company as well as its commander. Close contact further serves as a deterrent to undesirable acts through the greater liability of their being promptly found out.

The first thing, therefore, that a new commander should do is to establish a personal relationship with his men. Personal identification should be followed as rapidly as possible by study of each individual, both from the official data of his military records and from his appearance, personality and actions. Squad leaders and morale operatives should be questioned as to the habits, characteristics, strong points and weaknesses of those with whom they are associated. By every means he will endeavor to recognize and place a relative value upon both virtues and faults. He considers his men not as pawns on a chess board, but as living, thinking beings with interests much like his own. The wise commander recognizes that no two men can be handled to the best advantage in the same way, and that this basic estimate of his human agents is necessary to their most efficient use. Like a workman, he is familiarizing himself with the qualities of his tools.

Frequent conversations with the men are a valuable means of getting into touch. They may be called as individuals into the office and appropriately questioned on matters of general and personal interest and welfare. What transpires between the officer and man at such times should be treated as a confidential communication. It is also important that he should familiarize himself with the individual standard of the mentality of the men in his company, which can now be done with scientific accuracy. Any study of the man

should consider his probable ability to carry out any part assigned him. It is important to appreciate and take into account the great variation of human intelligence and ideas found in a command, running all the way from the highest types of mentality to those presented by the moron group.

Each individual should be treated according to his needs and with due discrimination and judgment. The individual soldier is the unit of action. He presents a problem which often only the company officer, through more intimate relations, is able to solve. The attitude of each and every individual soldier is thus not an item too insignificant to consider. Each has his influence on the military service, while his actions make his organization stronger or weaker.

Personal worries often have a profoundly detrimental effect upon general morale, depending upon the degree in which the mental difficulty is shared or shareable with others. Officers should endeavor to locate these personal difficulties and often they are in position to remove them. In any case, their interest is appreciated. Expression of a difficulty relieves mental stress. The confession of the Roman Catholic Church is based on sound psychology, in that a trouble expressed is often a trouble halved.

The men often need legal advice, and if the officer cannot give this he can usually find a way to provide it through the Judge Advocate General's Department or the Red Cross. Many matters relating to allotments, War Risk Insurance, etc., need explanation. There are domestic difficulties to solve, and while the officer should not inquire officiously into private affairs, yet an interested attitude on his part will cause many of them to be brought to him. Friendly assistance of this sort affords a valuable medium for strengthening morale.

A most important function in promoting morale is to keep any individual mental depression from developing into a group problem. The contagion of a depressing thought must be neutralized and destroyed before it can exert its

baleful influence upon others. The position of the company commander in respect to his men is such that he can do this with relative ease if he deals with the matter promptly and intelligently. It is a serious reflection upon the administrative efficiency of a company commander for serious discontent or disaffection to develop in any man or group of men without his knowledge, and without its being allayed by appropriate measures based on such knowledge before serious harm is done.

In large camps and garrisons, many of the problems affecting morale in organizations will be found largely the same, due to common conditions of the service. Meetings of company commanders, at which the current difficulties are brought up and considered, furnish a clearing house of ideas and an epitome of best measures for the handling of such problems.

To use his agencies effectively, the company commander must have reports regularly and at frequent intervals from the enlisted morale operatives and other sources of information in order to be aware at all times of the state of morale in his organization, its units or groups, and in respect to such special morale problems as are based on race, nationality, illiteracy, erroneous preconceptions or other factors. Having made his estimate of the situation accordingly, he proceeds to the solution of the problem which may have arisen.

It is most important that morale work should be regarded by him as preventive rather than remedial. He should therefore be constantly on the watch for any acts or expressions indicative of mental attitude impairing military efficiency and discipline, and endeavor to interpret them both in respect to their causes and removal and to the possible development and gravity of the state of mind which they might induce in others if the mental state of those affected be not properly influenced for beneficial change.

All minor matters he rectifies himself as far as possible,

either personally or through the morale operatives or other company agents. He identifies himself with the correction, so as to cultivate and utilize the confidence and coöperation of the men thus brought about. While taking such action at any time, he might well set aside a fixed hour weekly during which any of his men might consult him in respect to any personal matters affecting their contentment and peace of mind. In more difficult problems he invokes suitable aid from the Regimental Commander, Morale Officer, Chaplains, agents of the Red Cross or welfare agencies operating either within or without the camp, Athletic Officers and Education and Recreation Officers, indicating the nature and extent to which their assistance may seem desirable.

He keeps his Regimental Commander and the Morale Officer fully informed as to the general state of morale of his company and brings to their attention any special conditions depressing to morale and which higher authority is required to remedy. He informs them of any circumstances by which the morale of his company is unfavorably affected by outside influences, either physical or psychological, and suggests appropriate measures by which these may be removed or abated and the morale of the regiment as a whole stimulated. He also reports at once any depressing influences at work in his own company which may unfavorably affect the morale and discipline of other organizations.

He confers with the Morale Officer from time to time with a view to the more effective general maintenance and promotion of morale in his organization, and promptly and invariably consults with him in respect to any special problems in which assistance might be of value. He informs the Morale Officer of any new measures he has taken which have proved stimulating to morale, so that they may be extended to other organizations in the camp and throughout the army. His morale operatives report to him frequently without reserve as to the general state of mind in his company, both good and bad, and promptly of any state of de-

pressed morale in individuals, with the apparent causes.

The Non-commissioned Officer. Non-commissioned officers as a class are in a most important position in relation to morale, and their attitude largely controls its state. While the officer is in direct personal touch with his men only periodically and at certain hours during the day, the non-commissioned officers are in close contact with them at all times, and their status renders it impossible for the men either to escape such contact or modify their methods and mannerisms. The mental pressure which they exert is thus very great.

While each non-commissioned officer is in a position to control either for good or ill the group under his charge, the First Sergeant is the keystone of the morale arch among the enlisted men. As the official point of contact between the captain and the company, it is he to whom the men look for example expressing the standards and desires of the commander. His position is such that no fault by subordinate non-commissioned officers could easily go long undetected, and if detected, could not remain unremedied. His delegated power is very great, and if he uses it wisely it is of the greatest cohesive force in promoting group unity and efficiency. If misused, it is a disruptive agency of great potency. Various instances of company discontent have been traced to First Sergeants who abused the confidence and power reposed in them and who were successful in concealing the fact from their superiors.

Poor judgment in the selection and promotion of non-commissioned officers is always a cause for discontent in an organization. Men serve most willingly only under those for whose ability they have respect. A poor selection of non-commissioned officers by the commander not only weakens esprit by the introduction of inefficient units, but shakes the faith of the men in the commander if he is thus revealed as a poor judge of character and ability. The passing over of obviously more efficient material also de-

velops a sense of injustice which destroys interest and incentive.

A great deal may occur in the relations between non-commissioned officers and privates which adversely affects the interests of the service. It is obvious that no commander should retain non-commissioned officers in whom he has not reasonable confidence. But it too frequently happens that such confidence is misplaced in whole or in part. This may occur without the company commander being aware of it, especially in cases where he has little personal touch with his men and leaves his relations with them to be adjusted by his non-commissioned officers. It occurs where commanders are of weaker personality, poor judges of character and possess little initiative. Strong officers are not often imposed upon, or for long.

There are some non-commissioned officers who misinterpret authority as the constant exercise of force and harsh treatment. They may not only create hatred for themselves as individuals but alienate their subordinates from sympathy and interest in the military service which they represent. A common fault in the selection of non-commissioned officers is the over-favoring of a strong, aggressive type. These are most desirable qualities when properly balanced with judgment, kindliness and tact, but non-commissioned officers of this class not so balanced may become abusive, tyrannical, quarrelsome and overbearing with the acquirement of power. Their conduct may be harsh and their language profane in dealing with their subordinates and they are unaware of or indifferent to the fact that contentment and efficiency cannot be maintained under abuse. Such non-commissioned officers often exhibit marked preferences and prejudices. They may deliberately set about to " run out of the company " men who resent their treatment and whom they do not like. Under such conditions, disorder and desertions are rife. A non-commissioned officer may not only know his duties well and be honest and well

intentioned in his efforts to carry them out, and yet a poor ability to handle men may neutralize his efforts and do great injury to the interests of the service. The exercise of discretionary authority by non-commissioned officers without adequate control by the company commander is often a fruitful cause of discontent in the squad-room.

There is also a class of non-commissioned officers which, beside being surly, is critical and pessimistic. They will do much harm in destroying contentment among the men and in undermining their faith in themselves and in others. They create and maintain a mental atmosphere in which morale disintegrates. Such individuals should be replaced by others who are cheerful, helpful in word as well as deed, and always optimistic.

It is important that non-commissioned officers be made to understand that the soldier is not merely a cog in the military machine and that the willing support of the men is one of the great factors by which their efficiency may be judged. Such willingness does not in the slightest weaken authority and discipline, but, on the contrary, strengthens both. The non-commissioned officer who has to rely on rank and authority more than on personality in order to get his instructions carried out is a poor agent. Soldiers are most efficient when, in addition to asking for the product of physical effort, one can also secure the sympathetic coöperation of head and heart.

Non-commissioned officers should play no favorites. Sometimes favoritism and prejudice are acquired almost unconsciously and without actual realization that they exist. An outsider may often be a better judge of this than the ones actually concerned. Accordingly, the company commander should carefully observe the relations between his non-commissioned officers and their subordinates. The responsibility of the non-commissioned officers is always to be emphasized. When a private neglects his duty, is slouchy or unkempt, the squad leader is the one to be admonished

and in turn to admonish the offender. It is his duty to see that the man who is delinquent and all of the men in his squad conform to standards; if he does not, he has neglected responsibility.

Kipling grasped the fundamentals of proper military relationship between the non-commissioned officer and those under him when he said of the sergeant: —

> " 'E learns to do his watchin'
> Without it showin' plain;
> 'E learns to save a dummy
> And shove him straight again;
> 'E learns to check a ranker
> That's buyin' leave to shirk,
> And 'e learns to make men like him
> So they'll learn to *like their work.*"

In his " Leadership," Miller has written: —

" It is never advisable, nor is it permitted under Army Regulations to administer a rebuke to a non-commissioned officer in the presence of his subordinates. It weakens his authority, loosens the tie between him and his superior, and makes an official matter become one of personal comment through the company. The reprimand should be given privately, and a non-commissioned officer who requires many such reprimands needs replacing.

" It will often happen that non-commissioned officers report certain individuals to the company commander for company punishment or trial. In the interest of upholding the authority of non-commissioned officers such men should be punished; it only breaks the authority and grip of a non-commissioned officer to have an offender whom he has thus reported talk himself out of punishment. If any adjustment is deemed advisable in the matter it should be to the entire satisfaction of the non-commissioned officer and should at least contain a reprimand for the offender in the presence of the non-commissioned officer. The offender should be impressed with the fact that any disobedience of a non-com-

missioned officer irrespective of other equities in itself constitutes an offense punishable by court-martial and that the responsibility for the right or wrong of an order given by a non-commissioned officer rests solely upon the organization commander. Later on the company commander should have a confidential talk with the non-commissioned officer and clearly express his views as to any error he has made. In this way he has upheld discipline, backed up the authority of his non-commissioned officer, adjusted the matter without harm being done, and at the same time privately corrected the non-commissioned officer. Non-commissioned officers should not be continually upheld, however, at the sacrifice of the men or the expense of justice and fairness.

" It has been unquestionably proven that the best plan for facilitating the work of non-commissioned officers in maintaining efficiency and discipline is the permanent squad system. The squads should be formed, however, not alphabetically, but psychologically, the men being grouped in squads according to well defined ideas of purpose, congeniality, race, compatibility and influence. The corporal is made responsible to the company commander for the entire supervision of the men in his squad and for their general instruction and behavior. The corporals are told that upon their successful management of the seven men in their squads and the degree of proficiency which they attain rests their promotion and that the one who excels the others will be the first promoted. Thus is squad competition, one of the greatest assets in successful company management, established. An added incentive can be furnished every man in the organization by giving special or extra passes to the entire squad which makes the best figure of merit each week or at Saturday inspections.

" The next important link in this chain is the sergeant, who in turn should be charged with the responsibility of general supervision over the squads in his section. He should take over certain instruction and work in every way toward

having his section better than the others. In dealing with the squads in his section he should be required as far as practicable to exercise his control through the corporals. Likewise the officers in the general management of the company should call upon both the sergeants and the corporals. Therein lies the secret of the best use of non-commissioned officers and of really efficient company management."

Company Morale Operatives. The company commander selects from his own personnel the enlisted morale representatives who are required to function in his organization. He will naturally choose them from among those whom he believes best adapted to such service. It is obvious that they should be of high type and enjoy the respect and confidence of the men. They should be of soldierly bearing, experience, force, tact, discretion, impartiality, pleasant personality and broad sympathy, and shrewd judges of men and character. If they are given responsibility within the organization in respect to athletics, entertainment, music, etc., it is often of advantage. Two non-commissioned officers are required to serve as morale operatives with each company, but there is no objection to additional non-commissioned officers or others being assigned as morale operatives.

All such operatives perform their morale functions in addition, and as incident, to their regular duties. Their morale functions require little special effort, but merely the intelligent and coördinated observation of conditions, acts, words or ideas. It should be clearly understood that they are not expected to be tale-bearers in any undesirable sense of the word, or transmitters of idle gossip or matters of a personal nature, but to keep company commanders informed of any conditions of depressed morale having a bearing on military efficiency, and their probable causes as they affect individuals or the organization in part or whole. The direct connection of company morale operatives should preferably not be disclosed, as they will better enjoy the confidence of

the men in the command, even though their function is wholly beneficent both to the individual and organization.

Their morale functions require them to keep in close general touch with the men, learning their individual and collective difficulties and sentiments. In general terms, the company morale operatives keep the company commander constantly informed as to the state of company morale and any change therein; of what the men are thinking; matters of complaint and the causes thereof; the improvement of morale, present or prospective, and the agencies which might be suggested therefor.

In special terms, they particularly indicate to the company commander the existence and probable cause of any negative mental states such as discontent, homesickness, disaffection, ignorance, misunderstanding, apprehension, suspicion, anxiety, grief or other undesirable mental condition on the part of the individuals depressant to their interest and efficiency in the service.

Morale operatives within a company should make their reports to the company commander daily or at frequent intervals. Inasmuch as alteration of the mental state, either in the individual or the group, may be brought about rapidly by physical or psychological environment, it is important that the company commander be promptly informed so that he may take any appropriate measures for correction without delay. They discourage any attempt to discriminate among soldiers by reason of nationality, religion or other factors, and repress any tendency toward applying offensive names or epithets to any individuals or class. They should particularly seek out and assist those new to the service or who are not well informed as to the American language and ideals, with a view to overcoming ignorance, removing misunderstanding, allaying suspicion or apprehension and explaining the high purposes and official methods governing the military service. Particularly discontented, unhappy or homesick men may have a tendency to remain in the barracks

alone in the evening. It is part of the duty of the morale operatives to deal with such situations and divert the individual into a more wholesome mental state.

Company morale sergeants would properly have charge of matters pertaining to the enrollment of men on the sick report, to the end that the interests of the soldier and of the Government may be properly safeguarded. The relation between the Morale Officer of a camp or division and the enlisted morale operatives in a company is ordinarily indirect and effected through the company commander.

Morale operatives are appointed in all minor independent units as well as larger organizations. In barracks, operatives on each floor can keep in touch with the states of mind of the men and the causes and conditions of discontent and complaint which it is desired to remedy. Operatives in addition to keeping informed of what is going on in their own organization will often act as scouts to bring in news of what other companies are doing which would seem to be of probable benefit to their own.

Every company officer and enlisted man should, in theory, function as a morale operative. It has been suggested, accordingly, that there is no necessity for the specific appointment of enlisted operatives. The danger to this plan is expressed in the old adage that " What is everybody's business is nobody's business," and without certain individuals being charged with these duties there is a danger of their being overlooked or neglected which aproximates certainty. The imperfections of the old system have been abundantly demonstrated.

The morale operative has the counterpart of his functions in civil life in personal salesmanship, in that both handle the individual. Morale work as a whole is directed toward the mass, or many individuals at once. Both function together, especially since what was at first an individual problem may, by extension of the disturbing thought, become a group problem. The able commander, functioning through his

morale operatives, should ordinarily be able to prevent such development and extension by knowing of it early and applying the appropriate remedy promptly.

It does not serve for the betterment of morale work to have men advised that things are done to improve their morale. It is far better that these things be accomplished without the parties concerned being aware that there is a reason behind them. In this way, the human material which is the subject of morale work remains more plastic and the results are more satisfactory. However, the methods of morale work are not necessarily secret — they are merely kept less conspicuous.

The morale operatives should be fully informed as to what is expected of them. This can be done by talks and conferences. They should be informed as to the shifting phases of morale throughout the camp or organization, their attention directed to what should be looked for, and appropriate measures for remedy. Only such ideas and suggestions should be taken up as can readily be comprehended without going into great detail. In some instances, morale operatives have been assembled in classes for this purpose. They can be given special interest in their work by showing them that it uses the methods of leadership and that the knowledge they are acquiring improves them in the practical handling of men.

Censorship. The value of censorship lies not only in preventing the acquirement of information by the enemy but in maintaining morale at home and at the front. Both are equally important to fighting efficiency. It matters little as to results whether information secured by the enemy permits the massing of hostile troops in numerical preponderance, or whether lowered mental stamina in our own troops acts in giving the enemy an advantage equal to depletion of our own numbers.

Censorship in war time affords an excellent opportunity for morale work, in that it often discloses complaints and

faults which would not otherwise became apparent. Many men will put on paper for the information of persons at home ideas which they would not express verbally to officers. When letters are censored locally by company commanders, chaplains or others, the matter of reticence still applies because of the feeling that to find fault with anything might bring down opposition and punishment by higher authority. But the system which permitted the men to write one letter a week, which, if enclosed in a blue envelope, would be censored only at the base, removed many of the objections which the men had for writing freely. Their concern had been that their immediate superiors might know their state of mind or discover them finding fault. For officials, distant and unknown, they had no such sense of reticence; in fact there is reason to believe that in not a few cases the blue envelope privilege was used to bring conditions to the attention of higher authority. But whatever the cause, the result was that the gleanings from the blue envelope letters gave a valuable insight into conditions with troops as the men themselves saw them. This information was sent out to division commanders, inspectors and others, without its source being divulged, and made a subject of inquiry and any necessary remedy. Faults were corrected, abuses stopped, help given and apprehension relieved in this way directly and without delay or publicity.

This use of censorship was very much employed by the French, who went still further in its application. From the letters of the men they found out their difficulties and apprehensions regarding their families and homes, turning this information over to various relief societies which investigated conditions and gave assistance where indicated. Probably the very next letter that the soldier received from home carried the news that the matter which had been troubling him, and about which he had written was in process of rectification. The enemy army in its control of morale

among troops and at home is accused of deliberately re-writing letters passing between the troops and the people at home, with the purpose of misleading each as to the welfare of the other and the success of their common cause.

CHAPTER IX

CIVILIAN FACTORS AFFECTING MORALE

Local civilian relations; public esteem and the military service; social status of the service; the local environment of the command; social opportunities and interrelations; friends, hospitality, civilian organizations and the press; the obligations of reciprocity; profiteering and cost of living. The Community Service; its value to the command; its purposes and utilization. The Inter-Departmental Social Hygiene Board and its functions. The American Red Cross; its purpose and the use of its facilities in peace and war.

Local Civilian Relations. Behind every army stands its nation. As the two, united, represent the sum total of potential physical force, so too, they form a single mental unit, each component of which is dependent on the courage, good will and endurance of the other. Communication is prompt and interchange of ideas and mental state is accomplished with great rapidity and completeness. Thus public opinion has its effect upon conditions in the army, both directly and indirectly and in various ways which are readily apparent. It influences interrelations between the command and the civil community, while these relations in turn affect the esteem in which the army is held. Since public opinion cannot be ignored, it should be directed and molded. This can be done in the various ways through which mental suggestion may be induced.

In no way is the quality of the esteem in which the army is held more directly expressed than in the nature of the social status enjoyed by the troops. Only in war, when troops are increased in numbers and become the objects of popular interest, does public opinion give them the status desired. Here self-interest enters, for the civilian looks to the army for the protection of life, liberty and property.

Another reason is that its personnel then includes relatives, friends or men well known to the individual or of public repute. Still another is because of the general interest in military affairs aroused by publicity. Instead of being a vague, impersonal organization, the army becomes visualized as the "man next door," who in a measure acts as sponsor for the whole to the civil community at large. The war, with its draft bringing men into the service from all grades of society, has been a great factor in improving social status — and this desirable status should be maintained. What the soldier deserved during the war he still continues to deserve.

But with the advent of peace all this tends to change. As the army shrinks to its peace time basis, the number of the human ties binding it to civil life and the points of contact diminish. Its personnel is not so well known, its function is non-spectacular and the attention and interest of the public are diverted to matters of personal advantage. Through being less well known it becomes open to the doubt and suspicion which pertain to anything not fully understood. Prejudice tends to result from ignorance, with an assumption of superiority of that which is known and understood. To this is added a traditional objection to standing armies and a willingness to attribute to their personnel defects of character which, if they have existed in the past, no longer obtain among the higher class soldiery of the present. Upon this feeling of latent antagonism toward a uniformed group the political demagogue and class agitator play. Military service in any one place partakes of the transient, and the civilian community naturally tends to make its ties where they will be permanent. The result is a tendency to segregate the man in uniform and to discriminate against him in many ways, sometimes to the point of open humiliation. The only way to successfully combat this tendency is through the force of public opinion, based on a knowledge of worthy character and good conduct. If the

army, under a sense of injustice, draws within itself, matters naturally tend to become worse, for there is neither refutation of false statement nor correction of misconception by the object lessons of exemplary conduct.

In peace then, the army suffers largely as a result of not being known or understood. It needs to be placed in its true aspect before the civilian community with which it happens to be more closely associated. To bring this about is one of the important duties of all officers, for its relation to the problems of recruitment and the class of men entering the service, reënlistment, contentment, discipline and good order is self-apparent.

It is obviously necessary and desirable that the men seek part of their recreation outside of military jurisdiction. As the attitude of the civilian community has an important influence on morale, it naturally becomes a concern of the commander. It is of further importance for him to know what civilian facilities there are for the wholesome amusement of the men and to take such measures as may be practicable for the remedying of existing deficiency or fault. It is equally important that the men shall be informed about them and make full use of them as part of the plan to cause troops to be looked upon, not as a thing apart, but as the army of the people. Standing notices in the camp papers, on the bulletin boards, etc., will accomplish this purpose.

If left to self-development, the environment of the soldier, outside of military jurisdiction, tends to be bad. Commercial interests seem to prevail over altruism, while unscrupulous characters seek association with the soldier to exploit and profit by human frailty. Such environment and associations necessarily exert an unfavorable influence upon the soldier's ideas and behavior and by so much confirm unflattering estimates of his predilections and character. While facilities for undesirable conduct are thrust upon the soldier, opportunities for wholesome enjoyment, which

would largely be preferred, are more difficult to obtain. Commanders who are concerned only with repression of the former do not go far enough — it is equally important that the latter should be opened up.

It is of course true that after facilities to meet the social needs of troops have been provided, their social status will, in final analysis, depend upon the conduct of the men inside the uniform. Only in the exceptional cases, however, need this give concern. The experience of the war abundantly demonstrated that the men as a class lived up to the standards of conduct expected of them and did not abuse their social privileges. Where a community thinks well of the men, they instinctively and unconsciously accept the moral responsibilities that go with public confidence and approval and act accordingly. This is particularly stimulated through the prompt and positive rewards in public esteem, the increased number of invitations and opportunities for recreation and higher class social intercourse.

In addition to promoting discipline and contentment, close social relations have further value in that they promote sound military policy, sympathetic coöperation and cordial understanding among all who may be called upon to serve with the colors in war, and reasonable plans for preparedness in matters of organization, equipment and supply.

The influence of friends and homes in promoting morale is very great. It is clearly good policy to make due use of the home influences of neighboring communities as its agents. It means much to the soldier on pass to know that he is welcome in desirable homes. Commanding Officers can do much to cause the doors of such homes to open to the men. Similarly, entertainments and dances at which soldiers are welcome at clubs, halls and private homes are valuable morale agencies and should be encouraged as such. There are hundreds of examples of what civilian communities have done and are doing along this line. One of these was at

Camp Sherman where a day was designated as " Chillicothe Day," on which the city provided special entertainment for soldiers and opened its doors to them in hospitality.

Athletics and field sports offer an excellent opportunity to bring representatives of the army into contact with desirable representatives of civil life under particularly effective conditions. A high degree of athletic ability, especially when combined with high ideals of sportsmanship, always wins esteem. For an army team to be classed as a contestant with those of high grade educational institutions confers a certain degree of social status and is well worth considering in arranging athletic schedules. Moreover, an army team should so link itself up with local athletics as, in any competition with outsiders, to be regarded as representative of the local community.

The most powerful physical agency working for or against the reputation of the troops in influencing public opinion is undoubtedly the press of the country and particularly the press of the neighboring community. This is considered in detail later. The attitude toward troops of civilian public officials, both as individuals and in their official capacity, has a marked effect upon the community in general. If these officials are known to be well disposed and have a high opinion of the military personnel there will be much less chance of friction between the men and civil authority. This implies a moral obligation on the part of superior officers to establish good relations with local civilian officials, both for the welfare of their men and the reputation of their organizations. Chambers of Commerce should be used as one of the channels in reaching the business affairs of the community in so far as they affect the military service. They habitually welcome commanders desiring closer relations and through their agencies many difficulties may be prevented from arising or be smoothed out. One of the first duties of a new commander is to establish sympathetic personal relations with these organizations and their members.

Similarly the Rotary Clubs can be of great use to the Morale Officer in the solution of his local problems. Their motto is "Service — not self," and they can usually be prevailed upon to throw their powerful influence in behalf of any reasonable proposition. The Kiwanis Clubs and various civic, commercial and fraternal organizations can also be employed. The material advantages of, and the financial benefits accruing from, a large military camp are obvious to the business interests of the neighboring civil community. Whenever the morale of the men is unfavorably affected by extra-cantonment conditions which investigation shows are remediable, this financial relationship may be effectively pointed out and used in bringing about the desired reforms.

The churches afford very valuable facilities for the upbuilding of morale as well as the promotion of morals. They stand ready and willing to help, but ordinarily need to be shown the method and opportunity for service. Usually they can be reached as a group through a local church federation or a ministers' association. The Chaplains can usually arrange this matter, but it is a subject in which commanders may well interest themselves. Churches afford an excellent means for establishing social relations with desirable members of civilian communities. The same applies to the Y. M. C. A. and other sectarian religious societies of which it is a type. Membership in fraternal organizations is, in general, a good thing for the soldier. It means an increase in self-respect and good conduct, for in every community his fraternal ties will throw him with comrades whose influence is of the best.

The influence of reputable military societies, both present and future, on morale is very great. Membership in them by those in the service who are eligible promotes solidarity, a desirable relation with the civil community and high ideals of patriotism and service. The members are surrounded by a wholesome environment and feel that they, as representatives still in the service, are particularly honored by the

great civilian group behind them. The good influence of such societies on the men is all the more powerful because of its being indirectly exerted. Directly, they may be used to organize ceremonials, and as ex-soldier groups, to safeguard the material interests of those who are still soldiers. Various women's organizations have served a very valuable purpose in promoting contentment among the men. During the war such organizations or individual women of high character and social standing adopted certain organizations and promoted their entertainment and welfare.

All of the organizations in the neighboring civil community which have relation to the welfare of the camp and the individual soldier function best if brought together under general direction.

Beside bringing the army in closer contact with the civilian community, it is no less important that the desirable element of the general public which is always interested in military affairs should be brought into closer touch with the garrison or camp. This implies a certain degree of hospitality on the part of the commander and the garrison generally toward visitors. The general public should be made to feel itself welcome at parades, reviews, band concerts, ceremonies and field days, while on such occasions special details might take visitors in charge, showing them about, extending them every courtesy, answering questions and giving them other attention. Attendance at post entertainments, dances, etc., would of course be by invitation. Military social functions, though inexpensive, are always appreciated by civilians. Return baseball and football games and athletic events with civilian competitors, held on the military reservation, furnish an effective opportunity to bring a desirable civilian class in touch with the military. Such attendance can be promoted in many ways and interest in the military stimulated through friendly rivalry and clean sport.

When the enlisted men have been the recipients of kindness and hospitality from a community some expression of

appreciation will usually be gladly given by them, especially if the initial suggestion comes from higher authority. This appreciation may take the form of a statement of thanks for publication in the local newspapers or a complimentary band concert or parade, if approved by the commander. Receptions and dances are practicable for groups not larger than a battalion. At one camp as an expression of appreciation for courtesies shown by the local civilian community the camp entertainers gave free shows to the local school children, the use of local theaters on Saturday morning being secured for the purpose. In another instance the enlisted men's committee unanimously voted to present on New Year's Day a " small emblem to every school child in —— County, some 28,000, carrying with it our thanks, through the children, to the people at large." This was done by reason of the fact that " the generosity and liberality of all citizens, men, women and children, toward the men of the army and navy have been beyond all praise." The gifts were procured through small contributions which the enlisted men assessed against themselves.

Letters of thanks to civilians who have contributed to the welfare of the men by entertainment or otherwise are always highly appreciated by the recipients. Their writing, after all, is only an expression of common courtesy and gratitude. Often they result in further efforts in behalf of the men. The rank of the officer signing them should bear some relation to the value of the services rendered. Visits to camps or posts by representative business and professional men on the invitation of the Commanding Officer for the purpose of having them see the soldier's life at first hand, the facilities for education and special training and other things, is of great value in giving the public an understanding of the military service and removing any fallacies about it.

In this connection, mention may be made of the fact that any increase in the cost of living, due to economic disturbance or local overcharge, always reacts to depress morale,

for the modest, fixed pay of officers and men provides no surplus from which such conditions can be met. Moreover, in the military service, no opportunity exists whereby they can be offset by harder work, longer hours or greater output, as would be the case in civil life. A certain small, grasping element in civil life thus tends to look upon neighboring troops as a customer class from which no retaliatory competition may be apprehended.

It is always unfortunate for morale if the troops get the idea that the neighboring civil community is interested in them solely for their money, and especially if it is believed that prices charged soldiers are higher than those charged civilians for the same service or commodity. This always arouses discontent within the command and antagonism against the civil community believed to be offending. It has happened, especially with new troops, that this feeling has crystallized out in disorders, in which places of soldier resort have been mishandled as a result of overcharging. Jitney services which charge exorbitantly, or which charge more to get back to camp than away from it, have been commandeered temporarily by the men as a result of their resentment.

Profiteering is more apt to occur with the slackening of war time patriotic impulse. It is usually amenable to representations by the commanding officer to local authorities and commercial organizations by which their coöperation is elicited. Sometimes an appeal through the local press may be effective. The War Camp Community Service has been very useful in such matters, and merchants coöperating with it have displayed cards showing that they will treat soldiers fairly.

In respect to this matter, an "Arbitration Committee" was formed at one camp. Four members came from the adjacent civilian community and three from the camp. This committee brought about many satisfactory adjustments of matters of charging for the men in the camp. It was vested

with semi-official and conciliatory powers to adjust all complaints between soldiers and civilians, and few cases came before the committee that were not settled satisfactorily for all concerned.

If such measures as these are not effective, resort may be had to proper amplification of the post exchange and extension of its facilities in respect to the character of the business conducted by the offending concerns. Coöperative buying, with orders placed in other communities, may be employed. Individual profiteers can usually be brought promptly to task by ordering their stores out of bounds for soldiers and placing sentries, if necessary, to enforce such orders.

To help the command provide for its material wants at a reasonable price, the ordinary needs of officers and men should be carefully studied with a view to meeting them locally at minimum cost. Better stock and lower prices at the post exchange, more facilities under government control, such as shoe, tailor and barber shops, the establishment of meat, fish, vegetable and fruit markets to supplement the commissary and post exchange, coöperative buying, the securing through the post exchange of special discounts for individual purchases made at local business houses, the efficient operation of adequate post gardens, the encouragement of dairies, chicken and swine ranches, etc., under the Education and Recreation Branch or as post or company projects, the securing of scholarships for the education of army children, the operation of necessary means of communication, the securing of adequate quarters — these, and various other commercial expedients will do much to help both officers and men live in better comfort, to enable the practise of modest thrift and to make the military life more attractive.

The Community Service. The War Camp Community Service was one of the affiliated welfare organizations which during the war conducted a social service for the benefit of the soldier. It developed from the Play-grounds Associa-

tion of America, and since the war has been reorganized as the Community Service. It has many flourishing branches, of which one is usually to be found convenient to each large military garrison. Where none exists, it is to the interest of the garrison that one be established. Usually all that is necessary to bring this about are the interest and good offices of the Commanding Officer. The present Community Service is in close affiliation with the civil authorities and all prominent civic and fraternal organizations, thus forming an excellent channel through which to reach these agencies. It stimulates existing organizations and facilities and, when necessary, supplements them. It functions through " District Representatives " and local committees.

The purposes of this organization are primarily hospitality and recreation. In these it has been glad to include troops. During the war, it accomplished a most valuable work in promoting good relations between civilian communities and troops, in providing for the welfare of soldiers on leave, in improving their social status, in securing and chaperoning young women at camp and local dances and entertainments and in many other highly commendable ways. It secured and coördinated invitations to entertainment for soldiers from civilian sources, not only for groups but for individuals, including athletics, sports, shows, dances, dancing classes, concerts, dinners in private families on Sundays and holidays and automobile rides. It did this not only through its own facilities, but through those it secured from other agencies and individuals. In some instances it maintained a register of the names of soldiers wishing to meet local people. It operated many community " sings," concerts and open air entertainments to which soldiers were invited. These have been developed as a special feature.

It opened up many civic and church organizations whereby soldiers were made guests at their entertainments, gatherings, excursions, etc. In some places the churches had special " soldier nights " at which the men were made espe-

cially welcome. In some towns it arranged that the theaters or moving picture houses admitted a certain number of soldiers free weekly as guests of the War Camp Community Service. It furnished an information service, providing maps and guide books of communities and points of interest. In some places it operated clubs, lodging houses, restaurants, cafeterias, hotels and bathing establishments for the benefit of soldiers, or procured these accommodations for soldiers and saw to their continued good character and attractiveness. It assisted the law enforcement officers in the protection of morals. It helped to stop profiteering, frequently secured special rates for supplies to soldiers and furnished a shopping service, sometimes provided legal advice, conducted a drive for " slacker records " for phonographs, distributing them among the soldiers and in innumerable other ways contributed valuable service to the troops.

Inter-Departmental Social Hygiene Board. The Inter-Departmental Social Hygiene Board is an organization representing the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, and is headed by their respective Secretaries. The other members are the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy and Public Health Service.

Under the Act creating this Board, the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy are directed to adopt measures to assist the various States in caring for civilian persons whose detention and control are necessary to protect the military and naval forces against venereal disease. It also creates a division of venereal diseases of the Public Health Service, under the Secretary of the Treasury, to study their cause, treatment and prevention, to coöperate with the States for their control, and to prevent and control these diseases in interstate traffic. A special fund is provided for the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments for the carrying out of their functions in this connection, and another to be allotted the respective States for this purpose in proportion to their population. A special research fund is provided

for the purpose of promoting measures for prevention and cure.

The representatives of the Inter-Departmental Board are in a position to give effective assistance to commanding officers in controlling civilian transmitters of venereal disease who are outside of military jurisdiction. They carry on a campaign of education among girls and women, as well as one of physical control. Through them, the aid of civilian authority may be invoked and the necessary financial assistance to the civilian community provided.

The American Red Cross. The American Red Cross is the only civilian welfare organization authorized to continue its activities on military reservations with the peace time army. Its functions in this connection relate to work with the sick and convalescent, and to serve as a connecting link between enlisted men and their families. The Red Cross is really a tremendous corporation created for the business of doing good. From an administrative standpoint, the service relation toward it should be a business attitude of using its facilities to full advantage, not only materially but psychologically. The functions of the Red Cross are not only humanitarian, but furnish a valuable outlet for the instinct of sympathy in those civilians whom sex, age or infirmity deny participation in actual military service. Through it there is opportunity for the out-pouring of patriotic service and demonstration to the troops of the national spirit behind them. As such, it is a valuable morale agency, perhaps even more potent because it chiefly represents the expressions of womanly sentiment, just as the army itself expresses the aggregation of physical man-power.

Its work in camps is performed through Field Directors and assistants. During the war it assumed general assisting functions in relieving suffering and discomfort among soldiers, in whatever form they might appear. It supplied sweaters, comfort kits, bandages and various knit and other articles conducive to comfort and welfare. It maintained a

canteen service for troops in transit, furnishing, without cost, light refreshments, smokes, newspapers, postal cards, shower bath facilities, etc. It also supplied lodgings, meals, ambulance service, medical supplies and attendance where necessary, automobile service, made purchases of supplies wired for in advance, and otherwise aided in maintaining comfort, stimulating morale, facilitating the work of the army and expressing the appreciation of the people. It endeavored to meet any emergency not fully covered by military organization and even maintained a loan department from which enlisted men, with the approval of their commanding officer, might receive financial assistance in deserving cases.

The Red Cross maintains a home service department which is particularly valuable as its organization covers practically the whole country, the small communities being handled from central points. Men worried about home problems can often, with advantage, be referred to the local agent of the Red Cross, who is in a position to wire to the home town and secure from representatives of his society there assistance for the soldier's family, such as advice, financial aid, medical care, help in securing employment, etc. Often funds are forthcoming to enable the relatives of a sick soldier to visit him in camp. It also furnishes legal advice to soldiers in private matters not relating to the military service, usually through attorneys located at the place of legal difficulty and functioning as part of its home service organization. This service is free to those unable to pay for it.

It also maintains a communication service, by means of which the families of men seriously sick in hospital, or who are threatened with serious sickness, are notified. It sends bulletins during the progress of the illness, writes letters for men unable to write, and in case of death, sends a message of condolence to the family of the soldier.

Its hospital service is in charge of all volunteer aid rendered to the Medical Department by civilian societies within

hospital zones. Upon request of commanding officers of hospitals, the Red Cross furnishes supplementary supplies and equipment, provides writing materials and other comforts for patients, builds and maintains rest houses for female nurses and operates "Information" offices for the reception of visitors to hospitals. It also supervises the provision for religious services by other volunteer organizations and the circulation of books and magazines. In many instances the Red Cross has constructed convalescent houses for the use of patients recovering from illness, and equipped them with reading matter, games and accommodations for men not able to resume active duty. It assists in the program of entertainment for convalescent patients and provides accommodations for a limited number of members of families, from a distance, visiting patients.

The Red Cross organization furnishes a valuable source of aid to commanders in solving many of the personal problems of their men, especially those relating to their families and friends outside of the service. In connection with the many difficult problems of hospital morale, it furnishes very great assistance. Its generous financing by the people often removes the monetary difficulties pertaining to soldier problems. Its field of usefulness should be fully understood by all officers, so that full advantage may be taken of its services.

CHAPTER X

THE MECHANICS OF MILITARY MORALE

Consideration of the approved organization; its purpose; its subordinate elements; its appropriate application of methods; its general mechanism. The Morale Branch, General Staff; its charter in General Orders; its purpose; a planning and advisory, not an executive, agency; its chief functions; its duties in research and as consultant; its use as an agency for the public service. Morale circulars; their purpose and use. The Department Morale Officer; his status and purpose. The morale organization of the camp or post; its purpose and relationships.

General Morale Organization. A military organization is a community possessing characteristics peculiar to and typical only of itself, representing, as it obviously does, selection from a certain limited group in civil life. Its members have no selection of those given authority over them, nor can they remove or modify their control. Moreover, the nature of military life is such as to bring its units into the most close and intimate contact with each other. All this makes it particularly important that an administrative organization should exist which will insure the systematic adoption of measures to increase harmony, coöperation and efficiency, supervise the work or effect of various agencies and factors influencing the state of mind, and remove elements of discontent and points of painful contact.

In stimulating the morale of troops, the chief steps to be taken come within the jurisdiction and scope of the military service itself. However, the relation and interaction between military and civilian morale have already been brought out. Means of influencing civilian morale insofar as it directly affects the soldier should be within military control. For the effective and appropriate functioning of

the whole, a service of information and specialized study and research is necessary. In this capacity, the Morale Branch, General Staff, supervises, coördinates and assists the entire morale organization of the army.

The general morale organization contemplates that there shall be morale representatives in each camp, post, station, depot, hospital and on transports. The ramifications of this organization extend to the smallest military unit, whereby each individual may be reached and his morale stimulated, either directly or unconsciously. It is intended to take immediate psychological advantage of any change in conditions, whether they are due to physical environment or mental state. With it all should go a service of inspection, whereby morale measures will not be allowed to lapse into lifeless formulas, but continue active and potent.

In this connection it may be stated that, discussion or explanation of morale organization and methods, should not deal in generalities. Most people cannot apply them to specific conditions. Also the reasons and arguments must be practical and not abstract. They should be illustrated by special cases applicable to existing conditions and adapted to the personality of the individual in question. In the matter of application of morale work, the Morale Officer should state the case, demonstrate the machinery required, and turn the whole matter over to the appropriate commanding officer to carry out. Progressive men will voluntarily adopt and use the plans and methods proposed; others will unconsciously come to them through comparison and competition with other organizations.

Morale work, for its full success, requires that its general measures be brought home to many individuals by word of mouth. The printed word has only partial success with the class of people who all their lives have obeyed verbal orders. In its methods, morale work is much like an advertising business — constantly " selling " ideas and influencing state of mind. But it is more fortunate than the advertis-

ing agency in having its representatives in every organization, reaching the men by word of mouth and human touch. Practically no advertising campaign in civil life could have such a powerful, living medium, but must depend on the message conveyed to the eye by poster or the printed page.

Success in morale work consists in getting practical results, not in getting up schemes that either will not work through some basic fault, or else are not carried out to proper conclusion through lack of continued interest or energy. Camouflage in such matters would be one of the surest ways of discrediting the efficiency of morale work. An organization should be built up only so that it may function efficiently. When serious disturbance or breach of discipline occurs in a camp, it is evidence that the morale work and organization are functioning imperfectly.

While morale is intangible, the administrative mechanism by which it is developed and maintained is as tangible and definite as the mechanism of the dynamo which generates the similarly intangible force of electricity. All officers having morale functions must have a clear and complete understanding of the machinery used to generate morale. The exact status of the morale organization in the command, and its relation to every military or non-military agency which may be used to affect morale must be known. Every source from which knowledge may be obtained as to an existing state of morale, as well as the factors which affect it, should be clear.

There must be ready access to information concerning any cause of poor morale, any measure for improving morale, and any means for the prompt and efficient dissemination of information, plans and ideas. Finally, there must be skill in adapting and utilizing these agencies in meeting the needs of diverse conditions and problems.

Where civilians are employed in camps, posts or depots as clerks, laborers, or in other capacities, the morale organization should give special attention and consideration to

their morale and the solution of their particular problems. The reaction of civilian employees and soldiers upon each other is important and should be studied. Differences in pay, status and other matters in this respect are often a source of discontent and lowered morale. Correction of these difficulties is often a matter of local administration.

For special purposes, such as conveying to the men information with which higher authority desires that they be conversant without the issuing of official orders or memoranda on the subject, as for example, Liberty Loan drives, sale of War Savings Stamps and the promotion of other projects approved by higher authority, the morale organization serves as a convenient agent.

The mechanism necessary in morale work is much like that required in any engineering problem and is neither simpler nor less technical because its results are mental. As an engineering task, it necessitates:

1. A well-considered and comprehensive set of plans of exactly what it is desired to effect.

2. A methodical plan for the systematized use of the measures most effective in accomplishing the desired result.

3. A carefully prepared list of all existing agencies that can be employed with any or all sections of the group, indicating the mental complexes that each can appeal to, and the means at its disposal.

4. A central organized agency to stimulate, direct and control the various mechanisms for bringing about the desired ends.

5. In the absence of adequate technical experience, the careful study or rapid testing of all plans before they are adopted.

No advance information can furnish an officer with the specific remedy for any and all cases of defective morale that confront him. But cases fall into types, and general principles can be formulated of value in dealing with each type.

It is the basic principle of positive morale work that attention shall be focused and centered by directing energies and ideas toward one definite aim. Conversely, unrest or any concentrated emotion inimical to contentment and morale must be dissipated by providing many channels through which negative energies or ideas can be drained off. It cannot be too greatly emphasized that morale grows and develops, or is maintained against adverse conditions, by constant attention to the details of multitudinous major and minor factors which influence it. Almost any reasonable plan will work if interest and loyal coöperation give it the proper support. Statistics have a tremendous value in dealing with groups. It must not be overlooked, however, that statistics throw no light on the individual case.

Morale work should be carried out as far as possible by personal contact. This means that all officers should, in their own persons, be the best agents of morale. In the service, a few men do most of the thinking for the group, while the others accept ideas on trust and ready made from those mentally stronger. There should be uniform development of work; one organization should not be allowed to develop at the expense of others less fortunate.

Morale Branch, General Staff. The Morale Branch was organized, and its duties defined, under the following General Order:

General Orders No. 94, War Department, October 19, 1918:

1. There is hereby created a Morale Branch within the General Staff, which will be in charge of an officer designated as Chief, Morale Branch. It will be under the Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff, and will operate in general conformance with orders governing the other branches of the General Staff.
2. The general functions of the Morale Branch relate to the improvement of the efficiency of the soldier through the betterment of morale.
3. The Morale Branch shall have cognizance and control of the following:
   (a) The initiation and administration of plans and measures to stimulate and maintain the morale of troops.

(b) The organization, training, coördination and direction of all agencies, military and civil, operating within military zones, in so far as they serve to stimulate and maintain morale in the Army.

(c) Coöperation with any morale agencies of the General Staffs of allied countries in connection with military morale.

(d) The supervision, coördination and direction of activities in the various departments, corps and bureaus of the Army, for stimulating morale within organizations or among producers of munitions.

(e) The supervision, coördination and utilization, so far as may properly be accomplished by military authority, of all recognized civilian agencies which might contribute, directly or indirectly, to the enhancement of morale. To this end, close relations will be established, through the Third Assistant Secretary of War as Director of Civilian Relations, by the Morale Branch with all officially recognized agencies for the improvement of morale in the Army and Nation. It will not give official recognition to unrecognized voluntary agencies, though treating them with respect and consideration.

(f) The disbursing of, and accounting for, morale funds.

4. Direct communication by and with the Morale Branch on all matters concerning morale is authorized.

From the above, it is obvious that the scope of activities of the Morale Branch is very great, covering all matters of personnel, material and administrative procedure, for all of these have their reaction upon state of mind and behavior. It was therefore necessary that its charter should be drawn in a form at once loose and comprehensive. Similarly, no limitation is placed on the agencies which may be used for morale purposes.

Later changes included the termination of the office of the Third Assistant Secretary of War and the transfer of the Morale Branch from the Executive Division to the War Plans Division. The civilian welfare agencies authorized to function within the army transferred their activities to the Educational and Recreation Branch of the War Plans Division and these became militarized. The purpose and functions of the Morale Branch, however, remained unal-

tered. Their field is practically without limit, for every detail of life among troops touches the question of morale.

The Morale Branch stands in liaison relation between troops and the General Staff, and between other staff departments and the General Staff. It has the same relation with other branches of the Government and civilian agencies, so far as matters of morale are concerned. It is thus in a position between the concrete problems of camps, posts and hospitals and the agencies through which such problems may be solved.

Much of the work of the Morale Branch is done without correspondence and by means of personal visitation of its officers to the authorities of the War Department by whom difficulties may be cleared away through having the situation presented to them. Much time and misunderstanding is thereby saved. It uses itself the methods it advocates for others.

The direct communication authorized by and with the Morale Branch on all matters concerning morale is the same privilege enjoyed by the Division of Military Intelligence. It is a short cut in correspondence which is rarely used and which is discouraged except in emergency. The authority is necessary in order to meet possible emotional states which may develop with great rapidity and become serious problems of group psychology if they could not be handled except through slow routine methods of correspondence.

The Morale Branch is not an executive agency. It plans and suggests; its proposals if approved being carried out by the machinery of the other branches of the service. The material it sends out is intended to be suggestive only, and it is assumed that it will be adapted to local conditions by the Morale Officer, under the administrative control of the commander. The Morale Branch, beside being a planning and constructive agency, is likewise an agency of conservation and economy, for it capitalizes and turns to

practical military account and purpose the desirable states of mind which are created practically as a by-product of the pursuit of aims in which morale does not directly appear, but which are, to greater or less degree, likewise sources of contentment, interest, discipline and high ideals. It does not try to control or direct. It never issues orders, but relies upon the logical appeal and proper presentation of its suggestions to secure their acceptance when and where they may seem to be of value in lightening local tasks of administration. It considers the securing of desired results in this way the best test of its own methods, believing that the matter of acceptance of what it has to offer in the way of facilities and methods may be safely left to the able, progressive officers composing the vast majority of the army.

The Morale Branch does not detail local Morale Officers, or change such officers from camp to camp on its own initiative. Local commanders appoint their own Morale Officers.

The Morale Branch has nine chief functions:

(a) To secure and retain ample perspective upon the broad aspect of morale work with troops in order to fit confusing detail into its proper place.

(b) To ensure common standards of ideals and methods.

(c) To give exhaustive study to every specific problem of morale, and furnish its conclusions to the army.

(d) To serve as a clearing house to which every valuable new idea from the field or elsewhere can be sent for careful study, proper action and dissemination throughout the entire morale organization, by reports, circulars and otherwise.

(e) To propose and support the issue of suitable orders for the promotion of the welfare of the service.

(f) To act as a consultant.

(g) To formulate methods of procedure for lowering the morale of the enemy.

(h) To train Morale Officers in morale methods.

(i) To provide for office routine.

In the application of its measures, the Morale Branch works as far as possible from recorded experience. It does not deal in hopes and speculations. It is better to know that a method has worked than to figure that it must work. Few things are new. Much can be done to determine, systematize and render available methods of known success.

This preference for that which has been demonstrated does not prevent the Morale Branch, however, from engaging in research. For this purpose the army is a vast laboratory, in which methods of promise can be tried out in a limited way before being extended to the service as a whole. The success of applied psychology is based upon demonstrated reactions of the subject. Such research includes the study of all methods used in other countries, with a view to the adoption of such as seem of practical value. It also makes inquiry into and keeps in constant touch with the great group problems presented by such matters as military offenses and their diminution, especially desertion and absence without leave and problems pertaining to the discharged soldier, illiterates, foreigners, low-grade soldiers, negro troops, recruiting, conscientious objectors, etc. It includes the examination of orders, with a view to their psychological effect. It inquires into physical conditions surrounding the soldier, relative to their influence upon his welfare, mental state and conduct.

The report of a conference on military crime and the handling of prisoners, held by the Third Assistant Secretary of War, The Adjutant General, Inspector General and Judge Advocate General, included the following recommendations which were approved by the Secretary of War and ordered put into effect, states:

"XIV. It is recommended that the morale section, General Staff, or other suitable agency of the War Department shall receive from

the disciplinary barracks, guardhouses, or other places having forces, a report on a properly prepared form in the case of each soldier who is separated from the military service other than by death or honorable discharge, and shall be instructed to file them and study them critically, communicating the results of the study to the service from time to time.

"XV. It is recommended that provision be made for extending morale work to all units of the Regular Army in time of peace by one or all of the following named methods:

(a) Special morale work where necessary.

(b) Instruction of officers and noncommissioned officers in morale work.

(c) Consideration as a part of morale work of what changes are required, if any, in rules, regulations, or other matters affecting the daily life of enlisted men in order to remove such as are tending toward deterioration in morale."

Morale work in certain instances may have its difficulties. Here it should not be ventured upon unless the remedial opportunities clearly exceed any difficulties and there is conviction of being equal to the situation and capable of helpfulness.

One great function of the Morale Branch is to act as a consultant. It is prepared to give comprehensive advice and assistance on all morale matters, and to coöperate in the solution of special problems which are not being solved to the entire satisfaction of the local authorities. It can do this effectively through the large amount of data which it has collected, and knowledge of the exact measures by which similar difficulties have been satisfactorily met elsewhere.

The Morale Branch has two fundamental purposes; to adapt the man to his environment and to adapt the environment to the man. Both are equally important. In most instances, conditions are such that they need to be carried out together.

In the adaptation of the environment to the man, any agency or combination of agencies, which appears to give the greatest promise of success is used. The methods are as diverse as the problems to be solved. They rest on co-

operation by the authority with power to make the necessary correction. The physical difficulties of the soldier are transmuted into a psychological problem for the Morale Branch.

In its methods of adapting the man to his environment, the Morale Branch relies primarily upon the educational agencies. These include (a) English branches, and (b) vocational training. Despite the popular idea, it does not feature recreational activities as of first importance. In its informational activities, it uses (a) general publicity, (b) advertising, (c) posters, cartoons and bulletins, (d) publications, speakers and films. In its inspirational activities, it looks to commanders and chaplains as its special agents, though all officers exert an important influence in this respect. Its recreational interests include athletics, especially those of a mass nature; entertainments, including drama, vaudeville, boxing and wrestling contests, etc.; music, including mass singing, bands and orchestras; also social amusement and functions of all kinds.

Effective morale work is based upon a constant knowledge and analysis of human quality. Close coöperation between the Morale Branch and its representatives in the field is therefore necessary. The Morale Branch endeavors to keep itself informed as to the factors that undermine or promote morale, and to be in touch with the constantly shifting state of mind. With this information, proper assistance can be given promptly to local organizations.

The Morale Branch, accordingly, calls for reports from local Morale Officers. These, taken together, afford a fair estimate of the state of morale among troops generally. Also they contain many suggestions as to the meeting of local problems which may be useful elsewhere, or afford opportunity for offering suggestions as to measures which might be useful in solving local difficulties.

This information is also secured in part by inspectors, whose purpose is not one of criticism but of helpfulness.

They are intended to bring the latest information from the central authority, and to keep the latter informed as to new problems and methods which might not otherwise be reported. They stimulate, advise and make a survey of general conditions so that the work of the whole field organization may be improved.

The Morale Branch functions through the spread of truth. It has nothing to conceal. Its ideals are those of right, truth, honor, patriotism and justice. A false cause cannot and should not survive under the light they shed upon it, and they furnish the antidote to deceiving propaganda. The Morale Branch is accordingly interested in such enemy activity, so that it may be promptly neutralized. It is also interested in enemy morale, so that advantage may be taken of its depression and increased receptiveness to spread the truth and thereby lower hostile opposition and efficiency. Riots, strikes, mutinies and revolts within enemy territory are to be noted and studied, with a view to appraisal of the utterances of enemy statesmen as well as the decrease of effectiveness resulting. Newspapers, letters, codes, cables and wireless are studied and prisoners and neutrals questioned so that accurate measures may be taken to secure the peace of victory.

Morale Circulars. Morale Circulars are issued from time to time by the Morale Branch. Their purpose is to assist in the clarification of morale work, to show some of the current and outstanding problems of morale, their causes, and suitable measures probably effective in promoting good morale. They are intended to be practical and to embody methods which have stood the test of experience. Many of these methods have been derived from letters from representative officers of the army and from reports from camps and garrisons.

The Morale Branch serves as a clearing house for such methods, so that what has been found successful in one body of troops may be brought to the attention of others. The

Morale Circulars furnish a point of contact between widely scattered officers, and should ultimately embody the best experience of the entire army. For this reason it is desired that Morale Officers shall comment frankly upon all their suggestions, and shall further send to the Morale Branch their own conclusions, ideas and practical suggestions for similar dissemination generally.

It is possible that some of the measures suggested may be already in operation, in whole or part, in certain stations. In some cases it may be found that their application is not necessary or would not prove practical. But they offer suggestions which may be adopted and put into operation as deemed advisable. Needs differ. Morale Circulars, like a department store, carry a greater number of items than are probably required as a whole in any individual case, but selection from which, according to existing needs, affords assistance in most special problems.

Many of the suggestions embodied in Morale Circulars receive their practical trial by organization commanders and other officers, who have been tactfully furnished with the information by the Morale Officer. The function of the latter, in such cases, is merely to disseminate them.

Morale Circulars are not intended to limit or discourage the activities of the Morale Officer along lines which they do not cover. On the contrary, initiative is desired. With the approval of his commander, the Morale Officer is expected to put his own ideas into practice. The suggestions are intended merely to serve as a guide or aid. The opportunity for individual initiative is unbounded.

Morale Circulars are prepared with the foregoing considerations in mind. It is their aim to accomplish three main purposes:

(a) To deal rather fully with some important sector of the field of morale work in order to direct attention to the importance of this particular sector and to afford a heading under which immediate and practical developments affecting

that sector can be placed in later circulars. Attention given to some particular sector in each circular, however, must not be taken as indicating that the sector treated is of greater importance than others, or that attention to sectors previously treated can be lessened or relaxed.

(b) To bring new perspective to bear upon the whole field of morale work so that the individual Morale Officer, due either to conditions presented by his camp or to his personal equation, shall not become too much immersed in some one phase or problem of morale to the ensuing loss of perspective upon the broader aspects of the complete program.

(c) To disseminate throughout the entire field organization all important information which may be secured from any source, and every new practical idea of importance which may be suggested by any Morale Officer, so that each camp may profit by the work of the Morale Branch and by the experience of every other command.

Morale Circulars cannot deal with problems or conditions which are purely local. They are prepared for the camps and posts of the entire country and are designed to deal only with conditions which are more or less general.

The Department Morale Officer. The purpose of the Department Morale Officer is to assist in relieving the Morale Branch of details through decentralization and in the promotion of military efficiency throughout the Department. Circular No. 256, War Department, 1919, reads in part as follows:

1. a. Department Commanders will appoint Morale Officers upon their staffs for the coördination, inspection and stimulation of morale work at posts, camps and stations which fall within their jurisdiction as Department Commanders. Such Departmental Morale Officers will be relieved of all other duties. Reports will be rendered to the Morale Branch, General Staff, on the progress of morale work within their department.

Under army reorganization, the Corps Area Morale Of-

ficer takes over the duties above assigned to the Department Morale Officer.

The following are foremost among the duties of the Corps Area Morale Officer, under the general policy and instructions laid down by the Corps Area Commander:

To learn the state of morale of officers, enlisted men and civilian employees within the jurisdiction of the Corps Area, to keep its Commander accurately informed as to the same, to report immediately any special problems, and to make the necessary recommendations of ways and means for the attaining and maintaining of high morale.

He should ascertain whether any causes of poor morale exist at any stations within his jurisdiction, observe especially the reaction on the troops of the attitude, favorable or unfavorable, of civil communities toward the military establishment and make recommendations to the Corps Area Commander for any necessary remedial action.

He maintains close liaison with other staff officers for the purpose of promptly ascertaining and, if possible, removing any matters which might tend to lower morale throughout the Corps Area.

He coördinates the work of all Morale Officers within his jurisdiction, and maintains close personal contact with them, in order that he may be promptly informed of any local problems which arise and assist in their solution where necessary.

He initiates and administers general plans and measures to stimulate morale. He should make frequent visits to commands within the Corps Area to observe the condition of morale, evidences of morale work and the efficiency of the morale organization, and to assist with advice, where desirable, in the solution of difficult morale problems.

He makes monthly reports to the Morale Branch, General Staff, on the state of morale within the Corps Area. Special reports are to be rendered when necessary. The following subjects are covered:

Number of troops and disposition.
Changes in station.
Visits made to posts, camps or stations in the Corps Area.
Causes of low morale.
Steps taken to stimulate morale.
Any particular problem that has arisen.
Particular problems referred to the Morale Branch for assistance.
Attitude of the local press toward the military establishment.

Morale Organization in a Camp, Post or Division. On this subject, Circular No. 37, War Department, Oct. 26, 1918, states:

"Details and Duties of Morale Officer"

"I. The appointment of a Morale Officer, with the rank of major or captain, to serve on the staff of the camp commander of certain designated camps is authorized and directed. He will have no duties other than those relating to the stimulation of military morale. He will have one sergeant as assistant in his office. The morale organization within each camp will further include all organization commanders, and not less than two non-commissioned officers within each company. They will carry out within their jurisdiction all morale measures with the execution of which they may be charged by higher authority.

"2. A Morale Officer, to conduct the morale organization on the above plan, will be appointed within each division in this country, on its departure abroad, so that morale functions may be continued overseas.

"3. It is contemplated that the duties of the Morale Officer shall be as follows:

a. To keep the camp commander informed as to the state of morale in the units under his command.

b. To serve as the agent for the dissemination throughout the command, of information and measures pertaining to the stimulation of morale.

c. To adapt and extend to his camp such methods of stimulating morale, without interfering with military duties, as have proven valuable elsewhere and have been forwarded by the Morale Branch, General Staff, for his guidance.

d. To act as the direct representative of the commanding officer in coördinating the activities of non-military organizations within

the camp in the increase of their efficiency, in so far as their work relates to the development of morale.

e. To instruct all officers and other suitable persons in the value of morale work and to outline and supervise, under the camp commander, the measures which they should carry out in the promotion of the morale of troops.

f. To study the local application of methods for improving morale, to gather and make suggestions thereon to the camp commander, and to inform the Morale Branch thereof directly by regular reports and otherwise, so that any measures of positive value may be promptly employed elsewhere.

g. To be on the watch for, report to the camp commander, and seek proper measures to have corrected, conditions which may tend to depress morale.

h. To communicate directly with the Morale Branch, General Staff, relative to securing assistance in the solution of difficult morale problems.

i. In the presence of the enemy, depression of the morale of the latter will, under higher authority, be a duty of the Morale Officer.

"4. The Morale Officer will be appointed at the earliest possible date compatible with satisfactory selection. As soon as appointed, he will at once inform the Chief, Morale Branch, . . . of his appointment.

"The Morale Officer obviously should be selected as far as possible for his tact, discretion, common sense, initiative, personality necessary to successfully coöperate with the numerous and diverse agencies with which he must deal, and for a natural and practical interest of the problems of the enlisted man.

"6. It is obvious that the work of the Morale Officer, like that of the Intelligence Officer, will in many respects be proportionally more successful if carried out unobtrusively.

"7. Two copies of Morale Circular No. 1, issued by the Morale Branch are forwarded to the camps designated in paragraph 8. It explains the necessity and purpose of good morale, and affords a basis for the organization and prosecution of his work as Morale Officer. The latter will make all officers of your command conversant with its provisions.

"8. The camps at which Morale Officers are authorized are:

. . . . . ."

The foregoing Circular was later amplified by General Orders No. 84, War Department, July 1, 1919, which said:

"b. Commanding Officers of all organized divisions, camps, posts and stations, or points of activities of staff departments and special services, where appreciable numbers of officers and enlisted men or civilian employees are stationed, are particularly charged

with the establishment, operation and extension of morale work throughout their commands. They will establish definite morale organizations, in which will be included a Morale Officer, preferably an officer of the line of the army, appointed by the commanding officer to serve on his staff. The commanding officer may, in his discretion, assign such other duties to the Morale Officer as will not interfere with general morale work.

"c. Chiefs of all staff corps and departments will appoint in their offices liaison officers with the Morale Branch for the coördination of morale work in all organizations, camps, posts or stations under their jurisdiction.

"2. The purpose of the appointment of the Morale Officer is to furnish the commander with a special staff officer who, under his direction, will establish a morale organization charged with the general functions indicated in section V, General Orders, No. 94, War Department 1918; present for consideration local morale problems affecting the discipline, military efficiency, and contentment of the officers and enlisted men, together with any assisting information bearing thereon, which may be disseminated from the central office, Morale Branch, General Staff, and to carry out such measures necessary to the solution of such problems as may be approved by the commanding officer; to provide a means for systematic coördination of all agencies affecting morale; to provide the commanding officer with a definite agent, charged with responsibility for carrying out the commanding officer's local policies in morale matters.

"3. The Morale Officer should be selected, as far as possible for his tact, discretion, initiative, personality necessary to successfully coöperate with the diverse agencies with which he must deal, and for a natural and practical interest in the problems of the officer, enlisted man and civilian employee. His rank should be that of a field officer where practicable, but where the above qualifications are most advantageously found in a subordinate officer the question of rank should be waived. It is obvious that the work of the Morale Officer will, in the majority of cases, be more successful if carried on unobtrusively.

"4. Direct communication by Morale Officers with the Morale Branch on all matters concerning morale, and correspondingly by the Morale Branch with Morale Officers, is authorized. Such communication will be conducted by the Morale Officer through his commanding Officer (if such be the latter's desire), and also, in the case of Morale Officers of subsidiary commands of a department, through the Morale Officer of that department.

"5. Appointment of Morale Officers will be promptly reported to the Morale Branch, General Staff."

The above authority provides the following morale organization for a command:

(a) The Commanding General, or Commanding Officer, ex-officio.

(b) A Morale Officer on the staff of the Commander and selected by him for purposes of handling details of morale problems. He has a non-commissioned officer as office assistant.

(c) All organization commanders, ex-officio. Special importance in this connection pertains to regimental and company commanders, as these officers have administrative as well as tactical functions, and can frequently correct conditions at fault.

(d) Not less than two non-commissioned officers (morale operatives) within each company. They are selected by the company commander.

Under ordinary conditions, more than ninety-five per cent. of all difficulties affecting morale should be effectively handled by company commanders as purely individual or local problems, while perhaps some three per cent. will be problems affecting more than one group, or of such importance as to need rectification by the regimental commander. Possibly about one and one-half per cent. will be of a nature requiring action by the post or camp commander, and about one-half of one per cent. will need to be referred to higher authority for the means necessary to their solution. The local Morale Officer advises in respect to preventing individual problems from becoming group problems, and where the latter have occurred, as to the best methods for their correction. The Morale Branch will constantly investigate and periodically advise with reference to great problems of morale affecting the army as a whole, and assist in respect to any local problems referred to it.

Where conditions are particularly trying to morale, or where new or poorly disciplined troops are concerned, and especially where officers are inexperienced, the figures given in the preceding paragraph will not be applicable. Under such conditions, a proportionately more difficult task in mo-

rale will devolve upon higher commanders and require delegation to Morale Officers for comprehensive inquiry and intelligent and effective measures of handling. Under conditions of war, where the majority of officers must be trained coincidently with the absorption of recruits in vast masses, the general lack of knowledge of how to manage men will impose the greatest morale burdens pertaining to early mobilization upon high command, until such time as new junior officers acquire a better understanding of their administrative relation to troops.

The morale organization within a large camp is graphically shown in Figure 19. It shows the location of the various agencies which may be called upon in the development of morale and the removal of disturbing factors. It should be fully understood, so that in formulating any plan to meet a morale problem, all the agencies which might contribute to the desired result may be selectively brought into appropriate play. In this diagram the Morale Officer is shown in his capacity as a coördinating agency of the commander, not only with the official military relationships within the camp, but with the official non-military relationships and those pertaining to communities outside military jurisdiction. The various factors of this mechanism are manipulated according to the nature of the problem to be solved.

The morale organization necessary in industry would parallel the mechanism above outlined, in so far as local conditions warrant. The military personnel proposed would have its counterpart in industrial personnel of corresponding status.

CHAPTER XI

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MORALE ORGANIZATION

Illustration of the principles already laid down; the analytical solution of typical problems; a problem of the individual; a problem of a class group of sympathetic mental state; a problem of a company group of sympathetic mental state; a problem of the regimental or larger group of sympathetic mental state; general elucidation of principles by which undesirable reaction may be avoided.

The Functioning of the Morale Organization. The psychological laws, human agencies and administrative machinery available to the Morale Officer for the production and maintenance of a wholesome state of mind have already been outlined and brief mention made of the part, in the stimulation of morale, which each of their components may be expected to play.

But it is desirable to show how these various parts to the morale machine function together as a whole and to demonstrate the general principles of this application which may be employed, also to show how thoroughly simple and practical is its method of operation. This is best done by demonstration of the solution of typical morale problems, just as law and medicine are best taught by the application of the "case" system. This brings methods from the indefinite, thoretical and little understood to the concrete, practical and obvious.

In the handling of problems under the morale system, there is nothing mysterious or obscure. They are simply handled on a basis of common sense. The things are done which are the obvious things to do. Under ordinary conditions the measures necessary may be relatively vaguely, if generally, recognized, or they may be carried out in part according to the experience and quality of leadership of the

officer concerned, or not at all. Under the morale system they are carried out in all appropriateness to full completion. Under it the commander handles his men, not as the impersonal units of a cold-blooded military machine, but as human beings with personal problems and difficulties much like his own, which not only have not ceased to vex through the donning of the uniform, but some of which may have been directly created because of it.

The first essential is promptly to become aware that an unwholesome mental state exists either in an individual or a group. This implies the existence of an organized service of information. The next step is, of course, to investigate carefully and find out the nature, degree, location and extent of any depressed mental state. The next would be to make a careful inquiry into the cause or causes, their source, and the probable relative degree of potency with which they act. The next would be to outline the action whereby good influences would be substituted for depressing ones, and a faulty environment, whether physical, psychological, or both, corrected. The final step would be to intelligently select and appropriately utilize the agencies appearing on the graphic chart of the morale organization shown in Figure 19 to remove or neutralize the faults of the environment and to add new factors, or stimulate the old ones, which may promote a wholesome state of mind.

The following brief outline shows how the morale system might work in the solution of certain specific morale problems of diverse type and varying in magnitude from the problem of the individual to the problem of the group, company, regiment or camp. It is of course to be understood that any other problems would be handled along similarly appropriate lines. The same principles would apply in problems of industrial morale.

Type A — The Problem of the Individual.

State of Mind. A morale operative reports to the company commander that Private Smith is much depresssed.

Specific Cause. Inquiry shows that Private Smith has just received word from his absent wife stating that his baby has died and she has not sufficient funds for the funeral.

Nature and Extent. The company commander appreciates that Private Smith's mental state is obviously one which can extend directly but little, if at all, beyond Smith himself. It relates to matters which pertain almost exclusively to his personal interests. It is practically not contagious to Private Smith's associates, for its cause is of such an individual nature as to find direct reaction only in a highly limited class having a recent death in the family and suffering acute financial embarrassment. Indirectly it is a depressing factor to the spirits of his comrades and the company in proportion to Smith's contact with them, his degree of leadership, popularity, etc. But it will not spread; its depressing effect will be transitory with many, and time will cause it to rapidly diminish or disappear.

General Cause and Effect. The company commander analyzes the situation and realizes that Private Smith's mental state results from several causes. Some of these causes are psychological, as grief for his child, sympathy for his wife, financial worry, etc. But these depend on physical conditions, e. g., loss of child and lack of money. The former cannot be remedied; the latter may. The company commander realizes that the instincts chiefly concerned are the parental, sympathetic and acquisitive. Private Smith chiefly needs two things — personal sympathy and financial and other assistance at home. Both should be offered in practical form.

A Solution of the Problem. The company commander calls Private Smith in and relieves his mental tension by an expression of sympathy. If conditions permit it, he offers Smith a short furlough to go home. He tells Smith not to worry about how to pay for a suitable funeral, gives him a note to the local Field Director of the Red Cross and tells him that the latter, through its Home Service in Smith's

home town, will wire its agents there, not only to provide for the suitable burial of his child, but to do what it can to look out for and console his wife. He further sends a note to the regimental chaplain, telling him the circumstances and asking him to see Smith. It is apparent that the channel of the parental instinct has been blocked in Smith by the death of his child, and that this is irremediable. But the blocking of the instinct of acquisitiveness has been removed, while the wider opening of the channel of sympathy, together with the use of an emergency outlet through the religious instinct, relieves the high degree of mental tension. Obviously under such handling the mental attitude of Smith, and his reaction on company morale, will be materially altered for the better. The attitude of the Captain toward Smith is accepted by the other men of the company as emblematic of his attitude toward them; their mutual relations are strengthened and the esprit of the company is enhanced.

Type B — The Problem of the Class Group of Sympathetic Mental State.

State of Mind. A morale operative reports to the company commander that Private Jones is much depressed, as are a few men with whom he has been associating.

Specific Cause. Inquiry shows that Private Jones is a young recruit, a country boy just from home, who is extremely home-sick. Some of the older soldiers are hazing Jones and trading on his inexperience.

Nature and Extent. There are several young recruits who joined about the same time as Jones, and whom he is depressing by word and example. He has been heard to say: "I can't stand this much longer, I'm going over the hill." The company commander realizes that Private Jones' depression is one which is highly contagious within the group of recruits to which he belongs. It is not contagious at all for the old soldiers who have become adjusted to the military environment and some of whom are teasing

him. Their stage of susceptibility to this particular form of depression is past. The condition is like seasickness — a real affliction to the sufferer but a subject for joking by those who have passed through the seasick stage and become immunized against it. In both homesickness and seasickness the mental state is aggravated by teasing. Private Jones' mental state is such that he admits that it may impel him to the military crime of desertion. If he can induce another homesick recruit to accompany him, he will be all the more apt to absent himself from an environment which is psychologically painful to him. The problem is essentially one of temporary maladjustment. In the great majority of cases this particular type of problem settles itself with the elapse of time and familiarization with the new environment. But such cases as Private Jones' may reach a crisis, resulting in his desertion, before sufficient time has elapsed to permit a normal mental adjustment to new conditions; and his words and acts may induce others, in the sympathetic recruit state of mind, to do likewise.

General Cause and Effect. The company commander at once realizes that expulsive influences and affairs at home are liable to exert a stronger influence on Jones than attractions toward the company. When the former actually become stronger, Jones will desert. What he needs is a sufficient local interest in his new environment to hold him there, and temporary protection pending his adjustment. He also misses the personal relation and family sympathy to which he has been accustomed in his home life. It is important to know what general interests Jones has, which can be so stimulated under local conditions as to become a local interest. On inquiry, the morale operative reports that Jones is much interested in boxing: "He can't fight much, but thinks he can."

A Solution of the Problem. The company commander tells the first sergeant to see that the men stop teasing Pri-

vate Jones, and thereby stops the blocking of the instincts of sympathy and self-assertion. He himself calls Jones into his office, evinces interest in how he is getting on, the food, his friends, etc., and says a few kindly words about his opportunities in the army, etc., stimulating him through the instincts of hunger, gregariousness, sympathy, self-assertion and acquisitiveness. He winds up by telling Jones that he looks as if he had the makings of a good boxer in him, and that he will see that the Athletic Officer tries him out and gives him daily boxing lessons. If he can make good, the commander tells him, he will put him on to represent the company at the next boxing tournament. The commander has thus further called the instincts of pugnacity, rivalry and constructiveness into play. He sends a confidential note to the Athletic Officer, giving sufficient details of Jones' case and suggesting that he be tried out with one or more men whom he can best, to give him encouragement at the start and thereby further stimulate his self-assertion. He takes similar selective action relative to any of the other young recruits who, like Jones, are depressed and homesick for lack of local interest. The measures he selects depend upon the special nature of their problems. The chances are that the mental attitude of Jones and his recruit associates promptly changes. They give up any idea of desertion as a result of increased local interest and their depressing reaction on company morale disappears. A little attention to change of motive has saved to the service individuals whose previous unfavorable attitude toward it would have resulted in the commission of the crime of desertion and made them outlaws with a price on their heads, forfeiting family relations and rights of citizenship. Such attention would seem well worth while, from the standpoint of advantage not only to the service but the soldier.

Type C — The Problem of the Company Group of Sympathetic Mental State.

State of Mind. The morale operatives report to the

company commander that the men of the company are generally discontented.

Specific Cause. Inquiry shows that the mental state is due to alleged poor food, resulting from the inefficiency of the mess sergeant. It is heightened by the disagreeable, domineering personality of the latter. On investigation, the complaints seem generally warranted.

Nature and Extent. The commander realizes that here is a mental state which is highly contagious to all within the influence of its cause. The blocking of the proper satisfaction of the instinct of hunger inevitably produces profound irritation and reaction, and is operative in this instance. Further, men who hear constant complaints about the food served them, whether fully justified or not, may be unconsciously brought to a state of mind, through suggestion and sympathy, whereby they are prepared to disapprove of it even before they sit down to meals. This would tend to be accentuated by the unpleasant, aggressive personality and unpopularity of the individual held responsible for the physical fault. His attitude and actions block the instinct of self-assertion in the men. Moreover, these factors are ones which operate three times daily and in a way which directly impairs the comfort, satisfaction and peace of mind of every man on whom they act. He must deal therefore with environmental conditions which are undesirable from both the physical and psychological standpoints. But the mental state produced, while general through the company, does not extend beyond it. It is contagious only within the organization exposed to the physical disadvantages resulting from an inefficient mess sergeant and to the mental irritation produced by his unpleasant personality. It will not occur at all in any other organizations unless they have the same unsatisfactory kind of a mess sergeant.

Cause and Effect. The difficulty here pertains, in both a physical and psychological sense, to an inefficient mess sergeant who is likewise a poor handler of men.

A Solution of the Problem. The removal of the inefficient mess sergeant, or his improvement in duty and manner to a satisfactory degree, will clearly cause the disappearance of the irritating factors and the undesirable company state of mind depending on them. The instinct of hunger is such a powerful agent in the control of mental state and conduct that it needs to be satisfied in order to remove mental stress. Attempts to relieve mental tension due to hunger, by drainage through the channels of other less powerful instincts, will prove ineffective.

The sergeant may be a misfit in his present position. Inquiry of the Personnel Officer may throw light on his case. He may prove highly efficient in charge of property rather than men, or in other ways. His appropriate transfer may thus prove to his own advantage as well as to that of the company.

Type D — The Problem of the Regimental or Larger Group of Sympathetic Mental State.

State of Mind. The morale operatives report to the company commander that there is a general smouldering hostility throughout the company of a colored regiment toward the adjacent civilian community, and that this is liable to be expressed at any time by acts of violence and lawlessness, perhaps even to the extent of race riot by individuals and groups. With such a tense state of mind, these acts may result at any time from a relatively trivial exciting cause.

Specific Cause. This is a matter of alleged race discrimination against colored soldiers. Whether such discrimination actually exists to any extent or not, is not at all necessary to the state of mind at present entertained or to the acts which may result therefrom. A minor episode, perhaps of a personal nature, exaggerated, extended and fortified by assertion and repetition may produce such conviction in a sympathetic racial group in the absence of adequate premises of fact.

Further investigation by the company commander shows

that Private White says that last night, while visiting the nearby town and talking to some friends on the street corner, he was told to move on by a policeman. He stated that before he could obey, the policeman clubbed him severely, knocking him down. Also that other policemen came up, beat him and cursed him, applying opprobrious epithets based on his race, and that this morning their testimony secured his conviction and heavy fine before the court on charge of obstructing traffic and resisting arrest. White, who is regarded as a " bad actor," is saying freely through the company that the next time he meets the policeman he will more than get even with him.

Another morale operative reports that Private Green likewise had trouble with the police several days ago and believes he was treated, by reason of his race, with unjust severity. Green threatens the life of any policeman or other civilian who may hereafter attempt to lay hands on him. There are also reported the cases of Private Brown, who is understood to have had a fight with the conductor and motorman of a street car over the so-called " Jim Crow Law," and of Private Gray, who alleges he was set upon by a crowd of white men without any apparent reason. These, and other stories or rumors of alleged racial disturbances, have aroused bitter feeling among the troops, in whom the instincts of racial gregariousness and sympathy powerfully impel them to give credence to such allegations. The company commander now recalls a certain amount of general talk about such friction which has reached him from time to time during the past week or so, and the importance of which he only now realizes. He appreciates that he has, by this oversight, let matters go too far without correction, and that the earlier and lesser symptoms of this state of mind should have received prompt attention and correction.

Nature and Extent. The condition presented to the company commander is obviously one based on differences of race and psychology. As such, it presents a problem which

is not limited to any individual or small group, but is common not only to his company but to the entire regiment and all other troops of the same race. It is a psychologic axiom that any mental state in any individual which has as its fundamental factor the one of race, at once finds prompt, powerful and sympathetic response in other individuals of the same race on whom it reacts. It may be that the feeling is even intensified in the latter, and that possibly privates White, Green, Brown and Gray, who consider themselves physically unjustly treated, do not harbor such animosity as may others, who, like Private Blue, have had no physical clash at all, but who, on hearing the stories told by their comrades, resent the alleged ill-treatment on the broader ground of presumed race prejudice. It may also be very likely that these stories have been exaggerated before they reached the latter and that therefore they have correspondingly exaggerated ideas on the subject. The instance illustrates how a physical environment and a psychological environment, operating at different times on different persons, might result in a common state of mind, whereby men who were struck and men who only heard of the striking harbor similar ideas.

The company commander realizes that the problem before him is one not only fraught with most dangerous possibilities but which extends beyond his own company and jurisdiction. The instinct chiefly concerned is that of self-assertion, the expression of which has been blocked. Gregariousness enters as a further factor. Through sympathy, the emotion has spread throughout the susceptible group. Continuation of the exciting factors may produce such mental tension as will express itself through pugnacity. Just as his company possesses potentialities for infecting the entire colored regiment to which it belongs with the contagion of its ideas and mental state, so, even if he removes or alters this state among his own men, they are constantly liable to reinfection with the same general idea of race discrimination

coming from other organizations of the same colored regiment.

The remedial and precautionary measures indicated can only be made complete and satisfactory by extending them to include, not only his own company, but all other units affording, as a result of race, a sympathetic state of mind toward this particular mental concept. To so extend them, however, he will need to invoke the assistance of higher authority, beside doing what he can in his own organization.

Cause and Effect. He realizes that what is needed is a removal or diminution of any external source of irritation, whether real or imaginary, physical or psychological, and the diversion of thought within the command into new channels, whereby the present state of mind, relative to group discrimination, may be dissipated.

A Solution of the Problem. With this purpose in mind, the company commander at once does a number of obviously desirable things, based on the information he has obtained. The first relates to the physical environment. Arms and ammunition are put out of the reach of the men to limit the effect of harmful act if more intense emotional state should cause it to develop. The individuals, like Private White, who seem most liable to cause serious disturbance, will be denied or limited in respect to passes to town on one plausible pretext or another. This will keep them outside the influence of the particular factors of the environment which create the undesired reaction. Some of them may be quietly appealed to to keep out of trouble, both for their own interest and, through gregariousness, for the reputation of their company, regiment and race. Intimate associates of the men who are the more active disturbing agents should be brought to use a restraining influence on them.

The company commander then carries his problem to the regimental commander for further solution. The latter states that information has come to him that similar dangerous sentiments seem to be entertained in other organiza-

tions throughout the regiment. He further states that the source of irritation is in the civilian community and outside his jurisdiction and will therefore require action by higher authority than himself for its abatement. He calls a meeting of his organization commanders for conference in the matter, requesting the attendance of the Morale Officer. In the meantime, he orders carried out through all the organizations of his regiment the physical precautions already outlined as taken in the first company.

The Morale Officer, on being fully informed of the situation, works out and suggests in outline a general plan of procedure. It includes measures to be carried out within the camp as well as within the civilian community. It aims to reduce friction between them at the points of contact. If this cannot be satisfactorily done, the contact is to be broken. By reason of the importance and magnitude of the problem, the solution will bring into play every possible instinct which can be used to weaken the tendencies toward disorder. Some of these instincts will be brought into play in diverse ways. Accordingly, in addition to the measures already taken by the regimental commander, the Morale Officer recommends as follows:

(a) That the morale operatives in every organization promptly report to the commander the names of all men who appear to be particularly aroused in the matter and who are liable to create disorder as a result of further contact with the disturbing environment. This information, when turned in to the Morale Officer, indicates the points of greatest danger and the special individuals toward whom the necessary measures of control should be particularly directed. In order to arouse and hold in harmless directions the attention and interest of such individuals, the personality of each will be considered and each will be brought to enter some suitable activity which will divert thought from the civil community and focus it, in a personal and wholesome way, on affairs within the military service.

(b) Passes to town will be generally restricted for the purpose of reducing the number of potentially dangerous points of contact. Men in a state of high intensity of emotion will have such passes withheld, under one excuse or another, lest disorder result from the reaction of a painful environment upon a mental state of high irritability. These restrictions will be carried out in such a way as not to call attention to them, so that self-assertion and the migratory instinct may not be unduly blocked.

(c) That an athletic meet and prize competition for the regiment be ordered and that mass games and plays be especially pushed by the Recreation Officer and Athletic Officer. That competition between the regiment and others in the camp, in baseball or other contest be established. That the disaffected men whose names were listed under paragraph (a), be tactfully brought into participation in " try-outs " or as principals, in any sports in which they manifest an excellence or interest. The mental tension resulting from conditions in the civilian community would thus be dissipated in a wholesome way within the camp through stimulation of the instincts of rivalry, self-assertion, play, gregariousness, acquisitiveness and curiosity.

(d) That " try-outs " be held for company quartets and a regimental glee-club, as well as for instrumental music in company and regimental organizations. This will appeal to the instinct of rhythm, particularly strong in the dark skinned races. It will serve as a mental sedative. Such leaders of disaffection as are musically inclined will be tactfully linked up with the various musical enterprises.

(e) That a dramatic entertainment, with extensive personnel, be promoted as a regimental affair. As far as possible, the disaffected individuals should be included in the " try-outs " or permanent cast. Mental tension will be relieved in this way through the instincts of the comic, rhythm, self-assertion and constructiveness.

(f) All these recreational activities should be so arranged

as to take a large part of the time and attention of the participants while off duty. Company commanders should be active in promoting this program and in directing company thought away from the subject of irritation, creating a better state of mind by impersonal suggestion and by direct admonition in a few special cases relative to the matter of racial maladjustment.

(g) The regimental chaplain should reinforce the action of other officers through his direct interest in the welfare of the men as well as in his religious capacity. Here the religious instinct will serve as a channel to diminish mental stress.

(h) The educational workers and Red Cross agents within the camp should use their influence to reduce feeling against the civilian community, substituting more wholesome thoughts for those which tend to indisciplinary expression.

(i) Suitable articles and editorials should be published in the camp publications, calculated to promote indirectly the above result. These publications should similarly advertise the special camp activities mentioned above, thereby relieving the emotional state through the stimulation of curiosity. By featuring the participants, self-assertion in them would be directly gratified.

Outside the Camp. The foregoing plan of action relates to the mental molding of the human subjects which have been subjected to the disturbing environment. It is even more important to modify this environment itself by acting on its human factors. The Morale Officer can do much, through outside agencies, to reduce the source of friction which exists in the civil community and which reacts on the camp and its colored soldiers. He would doubtless: —

(a) See the editors of local papers and have them publish pertinent, suggestive articles showing how much the camp means to the business interests of the community, the value of mutually good relations, and the injury to the good

name of the city which would follow any breach of such relations. The appeal here to civilians would be through acquisitiveness, self-assertion and gregariousness.

(b) Address the local Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club and other commercial bodies along the foregoing lines, but in a more frank way, stating that friction existed, that it had already resulted in some restriction of passes and, if continued, might result in keeping all soldiers out of the city; that it would be most unfortunate for the commercial interests if this should happen and soldiers thus be restricted from coming to town to make the purchases that business houses were prepared to supply. It might be stated that, if the average pay of the officers and men of a regiment of 3,500 is $40.00 per month, this would amount to $140,000 per month, and that such a pay-roll for the camp of, say 25,000 men, would be $1,000,000 per month. Acquisitiveness, and the limited expression of fear through caution lest the former be blocked, would serve here to inhibit undesirable action.

(c) See prominent citizens, bankers, business men, politicians and talk to them personally along the lines already mentioned. Here the reputation of the city would add to the argument, functioning through self-assertion and gregariousness.

(d) See the pastors of the colored churches and ask them to get together and provide organized social facilities and good entertainment every night, through their congregations and otherwise, for as many men as come in town. It might also be suggested that light refreshments would serve as an added attraction to the men. Here the instincts of hunger, thirst, gregariousness, rhythm, home, religions and others would be played upon. They should also be urged to endeavor, by suggestion, to promote better feeling on the part of the colored soldiers toward the civil community, and vice versa.

(e) See the more prominent and substantial members of

the colored civil community and urge that they use their influence toward better relations between the men of the camp and the townspeople. This appeal creates a restraining influence through self-assertion, gregariousness, acquisitiveness and other instincts.

(f) With the approval of the Camp Commander, a conference will be arranged between him and the Mayor of the town at which the local Chief of Police might also be present, for these officials are the " key men " in the existing situation. At this conference, the Camp Commander might say that serious friction between his men and some of the townspeople, particularly certain of the police, is beginning to develop, and that this is doubtless as disquieting to the Mayor as it is to himself; that it would seem to him very unfortunate for the military interests if any situation should be allowed to develop as a result of which the soldiers might have to be kept away from the town and thereby debarred from purchasing the articles and amusements which they might desire; that from the standpoint of the civil community, its business interests, to whom all city officials must look for political and other support, would probably not regard with favor any lack of administrative efficiency whereby highly profitable relations with a camp, whose financial resources were equal to those of a small city, were interfered with or broken off. Also that any disturbance between the camp and town would very likely bring wide-spread notoriety and criticism on the civil community and those in charge of the management of its affairs.

The Commander might say that the Mayor presumably did not know of the belief among the men that the city police were unduly harsh, and that the latter and the city administration as a whole, doubtless would not wish to be placed in a false and undesirable position through the injudicious actions of subordinates, and that if arrests had to be made, they should be made impersonally, without undue harshness and certainly without any reference to race. It

might be suggested that, in the interests of all concerned, the Mayor himself look into the situation and take such corrective action as might seem to him to be desirable. The Camp Commander would also inform the Mayor that he would, for his part, take every measure within the camp which might seem to be helpful in promoting better feeling, and ask for a similar attitude on the part of the city authorities within their jurisdiction. By such action the instincts of fear, acquisitiveness, gregariousness, sympathy and self-assertion would be stimulated toward the various objects. It is probable that there are but few, if any, city officials who, if approached in such manner, would not take effective measures to promote better relations between their community and the camp and remove the sources of friction thus pointed out.

The Morale Officer would have reason to believe that the foregoing measures would so alter the relation and mental attitude of the troops toward the town that a greater part, if not all, of the elements of friction between them and their more important points of contact would be removed. Such measures would have reduced the number and potency of the agencies outside the camp, which had been provoking racial irritation, and, within the camp, would have instituted activities to alter the undesirable state of mind which had prevailed there, through its diversion by new interests, by the direct and indirect approach on individuals, by modification and safe-guarding of the physical environment, by the resulting numerical reduction of the more dangerous soldier units and the frequency with which they would make points of contact.

In addition, the Morale Officer would frequently verify the efficiency of these measures through his information system on the basis of words and actions of the men composing the command. If the foregoing methods should by any chance prove for a time not wholly satisfactory, as determined by his information system, and should sufficient ele-

ments of danger still remain, he still has a more direct and drastic measure to recommend to his commander.

This measure is physical separation of the psychologically affected soldier group from the environment which reacts unfavorably upon it. In case of such separation, the outside points of irritation obviously would cease to operate as such. If they cannot be suitably prevented from acting on the command, the command itself can be withdrawn from their influence by cutting off communication between the two. This might be done by issuing an order placing the civil community "out of bounds" for certain troops or for the whole camp. But such an order would be undesirable as creating a new psychological situation which would be both irritating and depressing to morale and discipline, for recollection of the cause necessitating the breaking of contact would constantly remain and rankle in the minds of both parties. As another alternative, the contact may be broken by the removal of the troops in question to a new environment, either temporarily or permanently.

Therefore, if the Morale Officer is not satisfied with the results of his preliminary palliative measures as outlined, he might recommend to his commander, as a final measure, that the troops in question be ordered out of camp on some logical military mission, such as target practice on a distant rifle range, a practice march, or field manœuvers. The new interests thus created in respect to preparation and departure, especially if stimulated by judicious publicity, together with relief from outside irritation, will promptly produce a new state of mind and wholesome behavior among the troops. Here the migratory instinct, curiosity, gregariousness and other factors come into play. During the absence of the troops, efforts will be made to allay and remove any future outside sources of irritation by further measures of reaction taken by the Commander and the Morale Officer in modifying the attitude of the civilian community.

If these further efforts prove insufficient, the Commander, on information furnished him by the Morale Officer, would properly recommend to the War Department that the troops in question be sent without delay to another station where the factor of local antagonism would not apply so strongly.

The psychological problem of group state of mind represented in Type D, shows a potential "Houston Riot," with the loss of life and property, judicial proceedings, executions, and lasting bitter feeling which that disorder entailed. It is not too much to say that, if such measures as the above were effectively carried out, such extreme conditions as resulted in the Brownsville and Houston riots would neither have been allowed to develop nor remain uncorrected, and that under the intelligent and tactful handling of the morale system, as outlined, no such racial outbreak would ever have occurred.

The foregoing problems are probably fair types of morale situations which have occurred in the past. In the absence of tactful handling, similar problems, under suitable conditions, will occur again. The same general principles and methods which have been demonstrated in their solution would be utilized in the solution of any other special morale problem, whatever its nature. The exciting conditions and mental state would never be twice alike, and the same agencies might not be used, or if used, not exactly in the same degree or application, but the general plan of procedure would, in its essentials, remain the same.

It cannot be questioned that, by the intelligent use of measures of psychological prophylaxis, depression, discontent, indiscipline, desertion, disorder, riot and worse, may be averted. By altering the undesirable state of mind, the undesirable act which is the expression of any such mental state, would not result. This is not hard to bring about. On the contrary, it is a simple matter. Effective agencies are at hand and one may, as it were, "play checkers" with the emotions by suitable selection of these agencies and their

movement into appropriate combination to function at the proper time and in the best way. There is nothing to prevent any superior from achieving a high degree of success in the control of the behavior of his subordinates if he will but bring the principles of psychanalysis and scientific selection of corrective measures into appropriate play.

CHAPTER XII

SOME ELEMENTS OF LEADERSHIP

Personality and leadership; its importance in peace and war; the individual as typifying the condition to many; expressions of personality; opposite methods of handling men; diversity in leadership efficiency; need of bringing about a common satisfactory standard. Manner, language and tact as elements of leadership. Cheerfulness, courtesy and justice. Discipline and its factors; forced and voluntary disciplines; willing coöperation. Duty; the sense of obligation; unnecessary asperities. Patriotism; its conception; its influence in efficiency. Esprit de corps; its quality and source; its promotion of efficiency; traditions, community of service; community of ideals. The negative factor of discontent; its psychology; stages of discontent; its development into delinquency; discontent as productive of inefficiency; remedies for discontent; discontent as the yeast of progress; imaginary difficulties; the removal of discontents; special causes of military discontents; introspection. Complaints and criticisms; precursors of disorder; minor difficulties and disproportionate complaints; dangers of destructive criticism; value of constructive criticism; complaint as outlet for mental stress; the receipt and correction of complaints; some service causes of complaints; chronic grumblers. Knowledge of the men; its indispensability in leadership; collective and individual knowledge; ability to turn this to practical account; means of acquiring such knowledge; ability to predict reaction from circumstance. Relation between officers and men; complexity of military relationships; social status; common sense in relationships.

Personality and Leadership. Leadership in itself is a subject, which, if discussed at length and in its entirety, would fill a volume. It has its importance to civil industry quite as much as to the military service. Everything contained in this book bears directly or indirectly on the subject, for the scientific handling of men implies the essential qualities of good leadership. True leadership elicits cheerful and willing obedience and coöperation from subordinates and is the antithesis of "Prussian militarism." Under it,

men perform acts because of a desire to do so, not merely because it is their duty or the order of higher authority.

Leadership is the creative and directive force of morale; the two are inseparable. This vital relationship might be likened to the closed electric circuit, morale being the current — the powerful electro-motive-force — and leadership the conductor which guides and transmits it to the motor. Either one without the other is of no great practical value. Morale without leadership is like the unconnected dynamo, while leadership without morale is but a dead or crossed wire. The ideal and effective organization is the one which embodies both factors.

Leadership has gained recognition and prominence in the military world far greater than the mere tactical and technical manipulation of troops in the field. The success of an army in peace or war, or the functioning of a great industrial establishment, depends very largely on the human-leadership ability of its superiors. The mere holding of a commission does not make an officer a leader. It assumes that he is a leader but it is further necessary for him to prove that he is one. The responsibility of leadership includes not only the officer but extends through him and beyond him to his men.

Personality is a powerful factor in leadership, for the success or failure of a commander indicates the worth of his personal qualities as a leader. Military organizations, like businesses in civil life, reflect, in their work or operations and the results they obtain, the personalities of those who create or operate them. There is no person of experience who has not seen the degree of morale and efficiency in an organization fluctuate for good or ill with change of administrators and the influence of their diverse qualities of personality.

The morale qualities of both officers and men, the spirit and way in which they do things, are cardinal elements in all military enterprise. Men and the human element, not

material, are the determining factors in war. In any military force, its component organizations are equally well equipped and any differences in military efficiency is represented by qualitative difference in personnel. One not only "knows how," but "does" things better than the other.

History is full of instances where some leader of men turned defeat into splendid victory because he refused to acknowledge that he had come to the end of his strength and resources and because he imbued his men with the same idea. Similarly, imminent business failure has been turned by some great "captain of industry" into business success. No man is beaten until he thinks he is; no army is conquered until it accepts the idea of defeat to such an extent that its acts transmute ideas into facts.

Thus a study of the personality of great commanders in relation to leadership would be very valuable, for it is personality which enables one man to succeed where another fails. Unfortunately, military history is faulty in such matters, giving little information on the personal equation and dealing with results rather than the attributes of the leaders who brought them about. Similarly, where failure has occurred, history tends to let the commander and his personality pass as rapidly as possible into oblivion.

The personality of superiors is a most important factor in its reaction on mental state brought about by physical conditions or environment. In many instances, the agent is more important in this respect than the system represented. The fact that the individual frequently typifies a condition is too often disregarded. Thus the child kept after school for failure to know its lessons nurses far more resentment against the teacher who enforces this requirement as a means of bringing out education than it does against the educational system itself. The latter is submerged by the personality of the teacher, against whom the resentment of the child may be manifested by epithets, caricature or disorder.

So, too, the officer or sergeant brought into close directing

contact with the soldier, and especially the recruit, embodies the military service in his mind. The concept of army life is largely based on the personality of those who are most immediately related to the carrying out of its requirements. The soldier who deserts is very frequently led astray under the idea that the requirements of the service are intolerable, when in reality it is the personal characteristics and methods of one or two military agencies that are offensive to the point of being insufferable. The same applies equally in industry.

Personality in the officer is expressed by appearance, voice, dress, bearing, expression, intonation and gesture. Every one of these factors should be considered in relation to its effect upon the soldier, for the leadership which morale work promotes is personal, not mechanical. The esteem in which a commander is held by his brother officers is known to the men and gives proportionate prestige to him in their eyes. Success breeds confidence and thereby draws and stimulates support. Few successful officers have any appearance of haste or worry. Their machinery is too well organized and their perspective and sense of proportion are correct. They do not consider that leadership ends in giving proper orders, but rather in so inspiring the men that they make a voluntary contribution toward the required purpose beyond the essentials of duty.

The officer who has to fall back on rank, authority and punishment for the accomplishment of his purposes is a driver of the unwilling and not a leader of men. Only the officer who has the power of evoking voluntary coöperation to the utmost limits can be considered a real leader.

There are two ways of handling men. One has as its object the determent of undesirable act by repression through the use of force, fear and punishment. It is the most direct way, and to many officers it is the shortest and easiest. It is the refuge of the superior who is without full confidence in self-ability to lead. It is vastly more potent in keeping men

from engaging in undesirable acts than in stimulating to good ones. By it, some of the more conspicuously undesirable qualities in some men are crushed out. The refractory ones fill the guard house or desert. Those who are left tend to be fair soldiers of more or less colorless character.

The other method is more difficult to employ and takes a thoroughly interested and able officer to carry it out. It calls for tact, patience, an understanding of the psychological factors involved, and a capacity to meet men on a plane of intellectual honesty and equality, without patronizing, bullying, or seeking popularity. It keeps the guard house clear, the absentees few, and controls conduct by incentive and stimulation rather than repression. It arouses and develops the best there is in a man.

Efficient leadership is based on knowledge of the human mind and all morale factors. In peace, the tendency is to overlook this point; in war, it dominates all other considerations. The power to inspire, as a reinforcement of proposed act, is well recognized. History abounds in stirring examples of the ability of great leaders to inspire and sway the soul of their armies to the achievement of victory. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Mohammed, Cromwell and Napoleon all possessed this ability and used it to definite purpose. The arousing of faith and conviction is one of the essentials of leadership. Faith, as the Scriptures say, will move mountains. To inspire faith is to give ability to accomplish.

The difference in the efficiency of officers in handling men has long been recognized. It varies from the high degree of success of those who are born leaders to those who, despite their best intentions, are followed through their army career by a wake of disorder and desertion. The secrets of the success of the one and the faults resulting in the failure of the other have never been properly studied, classified and made of general knowledge. One function of morale work is to bring this about, so that the methods of the successful

may be given to others for the benefit of the service as a whole and not be allowed to lapse with the retirement or death of the officer originating and practicing them.

As necessary to the accomplishment of this, morale work contemplates inquiry into the methods of handling men which appear to be good, the determination of relative values, the formulation of general methods of procedure with an exposition of the principles of which they are an expression, and the placing of the entire matter before the army as a whole. This will enable the officer lacking in administrative knowledge to educate and inform himself and correct his faults. It will enable those who are willing to learn and adapt themselves to higher standards to do as well as the best, and the best, by pooling their information and methods, to do still better.

In all matters of administration in relation to morale, supervision and advice from higher authority is valuable. It is true that a certain few individuals, left to themselves, will handle morale matters reasonably well merely because they possess a personal ability and tact in the management of soldiers. It is also true that the experience of each and any of these officers, quite irrespective of their interest and willingness, will never be as broad as that of the total group of which they are a minor part, and that if left to themselves, their efforts must fall short of what they would accomplish if given the benefit of a central clearing house of information where the best ideas and methods of all are turned in for use to the mutual advantage.

There is another class which possesses no special natural abilities in the management of men, and in whom such qualities, in the past, have been wholly the development of experience. But practical experience of this sort, valuable though it is, must inevitably result in a line of conduct based quite as much upon recognition of the mistakes committed as of the successes achieved. Most such officers are careful to avoid any sources of error which other officers have found

to exist, and to govern their conduct accordingly. Morale work points out the practical difficulties which others have encountered in a way that they may be avoided. This group represents by far the largest proportion of officers and one which welcomes suggestions looking to the betterment of their administration, weighs them intelligently, and applies such as appear of probable advantage to the extent and in the way apparently best suited to the meeting of their local problems.

Another group is one naturally deficient in judgment, tact, discretion, common sense, sympathy and other essential qualities in one or more respects. These qualities can to some extent be cultivated, but in many cases they will not be except through pressure from outside exerted through their military superiors. The morale organization is intended to furnish superiors with an efficient agency by which they may more readily determine and remedy such short-comings.

There is a fourth group, fortunately small, which is the antithesis of the first group mentioned. Its members are, for one reason or another, more or less temperamentally unfitted to command men. Some of these cases are unquestionably due to unsound mentality manifesting itself in arrogant, tyrannical, harsh, capricious, nagging or suspicious conduct. Not a few such superiors ultimately find their way via medical reports to institutions for the care of the insane. The morale organization can do nothing for this minor class other than to call attention to their mental instability and vagaries of conduct earlier than would otherwise be the case and thereby more promptly relieve the service of the burdens which they impose.

Where morale is depreciated by bad management and leadership, the superior at fault is usually quite unconscious of his part in the results. He is wholly honest in his desire to get proper results and honest in his belief that the methods he adopted were the ones most suitable and proper. To show such error and demonstrate better methods with-

out arousing undue resentment necessarily requires the utmost tact.

Manner. Manner is one of the qualities of behavior. It is usually a good index of the state of mind, even though it belie words. As such, it has an important influence on the mental state of others. Frequently it is not so much the act itself that matters as the manner in which it is done, which may denote intent. And intent is important in its effect on others, whether in word or deed. The injury which was obviously unintended is excused; the calculated slight, even if trivial, is resented. In Owen Wister's novel, "The Virginian," when the villain uses a "fighting name" the hero says: "When you call me that name, stranger, smile!" The importance of manner is expressed in the jingle:

> "It isn't the thing we do or say
> But all in the way we do or say it,
> What would the egg amount to, pray,
> If the hen got up on the perch to lay it?"

The manner of superiors is carefully watched by their subordinates. What is going on in the minds of officers may often be understood without a word being spoken, just as the moving-picture actor registers emotions without the aid of words. The cultivation by officers of a calm, dispassionate manner, under such control as to be unswayed by undesirable emotions, is clearly essential. They must possess self-mastery over facial expression, intonation and gesture. If an officer's stout words come from an apprehensive mind, he will not easily conceal the fact; some expression or act will be apt to disclose their emptiness and thereby belie their intent. Similarly, a benefit conferred in an obvious spirit of condescension fails in the results desired through the feeling of resentment and opposition aroused by manner. Austerity of manner closes the door to reciprocal sympathy and confidence. Over-emphasis may defeat its

own ends. In war or business relations, manner of superiors toward subordinates makes for or against sympathetic relations and coöperation.

Not only the thing to do, but the manner of doing it, may be conveyed by suggestion. The snap and vigor with which a command is given carry with it the implication of similar qualities in its execution. Human beings are imitative, and soldiers tend to adopt the outward expressions of those whom they look upon with respect. Gestures are suggestive in that they carry shades of meaning which cannot be fully interpreted in words. They are used not only for direction but for emphasis. They are violent and uncontrolled according as the individual is carried away by his emotions, as in panic.

Language. Language is the chief agency for the direct transmission of ideas and the control of purpose. It is one of the components of manner, and its nature and form of expression give much information of the mental state or attitude behind it. The language of the individual is one of the qualities by which he is judged, particularly by his subordinates and to some extent by his superiors. It should always be clear and to the point, yet modified by self-restraint.

Words should be well chosen for the thought or purpose to be expressed, should be short, and preferably of English derivation. Sentences should also be short, clear, incisive and uninvolved, so that there may be no mistaking their meaning. Statements should be positive and direct, rather than negative, uncertain and inconclusive. Such language as " you may be able to do it," " see if you can do it," " I doubt if you can do it — but try," should be avoided in giving instructions. It is far more effective and productive of results to say " you can do it," " you are just the man to do it," " there must be a way — find it." One produces uncertainty, doubt and wavering; the other incites confidence, self-reliance and determination.

Officers would do well to consider the phraseology of their orders, both verbal and written. Although the purpose of the order or the instructions it is intended to convey are perfectly clear to the officer himself, it frequently happens that the language of the order is capable of quite different interpretation or construction. Before criticizing men blindly for failing to comply with orders, it might be well to look into the character of the instructions they have received. When these are taken into consideration it will perhaps appear that subordinates may honestly have understood the purpose quite differently than was intended. The mentality of the persons for whom orders are intended should also be taken into consideration in formulating them.

Simplicity of language is the keynote of success in issuing orders that are effective and universally understood. The language used in the orders of famous military leaders, particularly before or after battle, is noteworthy for its simplicity, purity, forcefulness and inspirational beauty and power. Innumerable examples of these are accessible to any one caring to study them. Exaggerations and extremes should be avoided, not only as unfair, but as revealing a perturbed or prejudiced state of mind.

As elsewhere brought out, the energy pent up by the many restrictions of military life tends to find outlet through immoderate language, cursing and profanity, especially on the part of enlisted men whose instinctive tendencies are particularly repressed by their environment. This tendency was long recognized in the Articles of War, which endeavored to repress it by putting a penalty on the use of profane language by officers and men, probably not only for ethical reasons but for its effect on possible human objects. If such language is used in the handling of men the results are unfortunate. To curse a man in civil life is ordinarily to affront him through recognition of intent to insult. Occasionally such intent may be modified or shown to be absent by manner. Also there are men in whom the habit of pro-

fanity is so deeply seated and carried out so habitually as to be ultimately recognized as unconscious or impersonal. Such, however, are exceptions.

Unquestionably, one great cause of discontent and animosity, and one of the factors in desertion, has arisen from the swearing at men in the ranks by their superiors. In replies to a questionnaire by a large number of enlisted men, this matter was reported as one of their experiences in the military service which they bitterly resented. The individual subjected to it feels affronted and humiliated, and that his self-respect has been impaired in the eyes of his comrades if he makes no retaliation. As the latter is impossible in the military service, either by word or act, he feels that the offending superior has taken an unfair advantage of military status and authority. As an insult, he may brood over it in secret or with his friends. If quick tempered, he may resent it by disobedience of orders, assault, or other act of indiscipline. In any case, it will produce animosity, sullenness and a passive opposition or lack of zeal which results in inefficiency. A too common result is a state of mind in which the condition seems not only irremediable but intolerable, and absence without leave or desertion may seem the only means of relief from the situation.

Similarly, the so-called " bawling out " of men will always be resented as something personal and not warranted by higher authority. Too frequently it is not so much corrective as an expression of anger on the part of the superior. Here the impersonal point at issue is lost and the matter becomes one of mental clash between individuals.

All but a few officers avoid the foregoing faults. Many more non-commissioned officers are offenders. This is especially the case with regard to recruits, with whom such language is used under, the mistaken idea that it promotes and emphasizes military authority. Drill masters, and others handling recruits, should be especially watched to see that they are not transgressors in this respect. If violent lan-

guage ever has any basis for use, it should be reserved for the extreme emergency, as in rallying a breaking line or stopping a fugitive. A tongue lashing of this sort, like the use of the whip on the draft horse, has a stimulating and steadying effect which is lost if it be habitual.

Undue or habitual sarcasm may produce an effect similar to cursing, but to a lesser extent. The wittiness of sarcasm tends to take off the sting of the reproof while leaving the lesson. Sarcasm is not necessarily an insult and hence is not objectionable on that account. The manner in which the sarcasm is rendered denotes the quality of intent. But it is an edged tool, unquestionably useful within certain limitations and with certain individuals, but as a whole to be employed with care and never with an apparent purpose of causing personal humiliation. It should be used as a stimulant rather than a repressant.

Tact. Tact is the adaptation of method, manner, time and suggestion to the individual group personality of those who are to be acted upon, so that the best results may be secured. It implies mental perception whereby ability is secured to deal with others, not only without giving offense, but with the least friction.

Tact may put men whole-heartedly behind plans which they had not previously looked upon with favor, smooth out difficult relationships and harmonize forces which might otherwise be harmful or antagonistic to morale. Tact implies not only understanding of human nature but knowledge of how to put this insight to use. It means not only knowledge of when and how to do things but of when and how not to do them. It implies a diplomacy which leaves even prejudice disarmed.

Tact is one of the greatest assets of the good leader. Like good judgment, it is to a certain extent an endowment. But it can be taught and is susceptible of very great development in most cases. It tends to be acquired more or less

unconsciously and as a by-product resulting from human relationships.

Lack of tact is always resented, even though the absence of hurtful motive in the pain-producing act be admitted. The tactless superior alienates the sympathy of his men, substituting tolerance, resentment or opposition. He is soon aware of this through act or by sensing alteration in their mental attitude. This may in turn be resented as unfair by the officer, who feels himself to have been governed in his acts by his best sense of justice. The result is further clash of wills and undesirable effect upon behavior and efficiency. The original proposition may be largely lost sight of through the new personal element which is injected. Every officer will recall to himself individuals and instances in which tactless methods have produced results the opposite of those desired, or where the exercise of tact has been a constant factor for good or has dissipated situations which bid fair to be very serious.

Cheerfulness. Cheerfulness is one of the great objects of morale work. It is part of the mental machinery necessary to getting desired results. It is an essential to high efficiency, for when men are cheerful they respond willingly to any call and give the best effort that is in them. The factors promoting cheerfulness are so many that they will not be entered into in detail here. Suffice it to say that this book as a whole is devoted to methods and measures for its development and maintenance.

Closely allied to the quality of cheerfulness is that of optimism. There is always a brighter side of things and the successful commander will look for and emphasize it. Those who look unduly on the dark side sow gloom, distrust, doubt and despair, and create a mental state which tends to make apprehensions come true. Conversely, the optimist sees the possibilities which make for success and incite to effort.

Beside cheerfulness and optimism there is another essential factor of a similar nature which makes largely for success — enthusiasm. Cheerfulness is the only entrance into the realm of enthusiasm and is as potent a factor in an army as grimness or grit. Enthusiasm comes from the Greek and in the original means "God striving within us." It transforms work into play, hardships into part of the game, and failure into success. It is the difference between doing things perfunctorily because it is duty and doing them with vim and vigor because of a desire and gladness to do them. It underlies esprit de corps and means not only an appreciation of conditions from their better aspect, but unceasing effort for their further improvement. Enthusiasm for a task on hand ensures its successful completion. It is an old adage which says, "Where there's a will, there's a way."

It might be well in this connection to caution about over-enthusiasm. Enthusiasm cannot be too great in carrying a matter through, despite all obstacles. But over-enthusiasm is sometimes disastrous, in that it may blind to vital miscalculations. In Benjamin Franklin's philosophy occurs the maxim, "Be sure you are right — then go ahead." Perhaps it would be better to amend this by adding, "and while you are going ahead, be sure that you continue to be right."

Courtesy. Courtesy is the lubricant of human relations. Army Regulations recognize this fact when they say, "Courtesy among military men is indispensable to discipline." It will be noted that the above quotation establishes no limits as to rank or status, but applies alike and reciprocally to all in the service.

By courtesy is understood politeness, originating in kindliness and good breeding. It is a civility in which a superior cannot afford to be outdone by a subordinate. It is often expressed quite as much by act and manner as by words.

The official expression of military courtesy is the salute. This is the sign of courteous recognition between officers and men of membership in the same blood-brotherhood and

is not to be construed and enforced as evidence of the inferiority of individuals. The popular criticism of it is chiefly due to the erroneous assumption that the latter is the fact — an assumption which the attitude of inexperienced officers sometimes tends to justify.

The salute is rendered, not to the person of the individual superior, but through him to the high command, the State and the authority which he represents and which is vested in him by virtue of his commission. In its true conception it is no relic of feudalism nor vassaldom as is often held by those in ignorance. The same salute is prescribed for the General as for the private, and it is just as incumbent upon the General to return it in a soldierly manner as it is upon the private to render it in a soldierly manner. There is no distinction whatever in the manner of saluting. All officers will do well to keep this constantly in mind.

The superior may safely count on being rendered the salute in much the same manner as it is his custom to return it. Too many officers are indifferent or listless in this respect. It is just as essential for officers to return the salute, when standing still, from the position of attention as it is for soldiers to render it from the position of attention under the same conditions. Officers and men alike are often judged by the quality of their salutes. At one camp, during the war, the commander ordered all new officers to attend a courtesy school to remedy their faults along these lines.

Similar to the salute rendered to the superior officer is the salute rendered to the flag, which is an expression of support to the country and the ideals which the flag itself typifies. It is not rendered to a yard of bunting, but to the sacred standard of the Nation and the traditions which it symbolizes. Presentation of arms is symbolic of offering up self and weapon.

The rendering of the salute is one of the best expressions of military morale or cohesiveness. At the beginning of the Bolshevik rule in Russia, the Soviet Congress passed a reso-

lution as follows: "The men in the future will not salute officers." Of this Colonel Applin wrote: "Now isn't that a trifle? Yet that small trifle has led to the telegram that reads, 'The troops have left the trenches; the artillery is being sold; officers are serving as cooks and orderlies.'"

Justice. Justice is not considered here in connection with penology only. It means the rendering to every one of his just dues, whether these are rights, rewards or punishment. It is the expression of the "square deal," which gives the man "what is coming to him."

The success of any officer largely depends on the justice which he accords his subordinates. His powers are great and it is therefore essential that they be exercised with evenness and fairness. Men work well in an atmosphere of impartiality, regardless of the amount of work which they are required to do. If an idea gains ground that favoritism or prejudice exist, contentment is destroyed. This may be in the matter of advancement and opportunity, the assignment of duties other than by roster, or the inequitable award of commendation or punishment. Personalities are beneath the real administrative, who, because he is aware of their inevitable influence, takes particular care not to be led astray by them.

In any matter of doubt or conflicting interest, all aspects should receive patient and equal attention. Hasty superiors who make quick judgments often fall into error through basing their conclusions on false or incomplete premises, and so lose the confidence of their men in respect to their qualities of judgment. Decisions must be judicial, yet a sympathetic element should be present. Above all, subordinates must be convinced of a desire to be fair and just. Full credit for success, as well as censure for failure, should fall inevitably where due.

Discipline. Discipline is a word more or less repellant to American ears. The basis of our government is the fostering of individualism, and pressure from above is resented

unless in pursuance of an obligation, not only accepted but understood. As civil government rests on the just consent of the governed, so this same principle, in its essentials, applies to the military service. Thus disobedience and mutiny occur in any army where there is failure to continue to give such consent.

Discipline, under wise command, is enforced by public opinion and formed and directed by those above. It is the result of positive and not negative action, by which is meant that government rests on approval of what is handed down from above, rather than on its enforcement through painful experience and deprivation.

Experience shows that the indiscipline of the individual makes neither for his own happiness nor that of the mass. He is a misfit, out of harmony with the scheme of things and his associates. He impedes team work and coördination for a common object. Through faulty adjustment, he interferes with the effective functioning of the military machine as a whole. The soldier soon comes to see this himself; but civilian critics, in their failure to grasp the military scheme, see in discipline only an unnecessary interference with individual purposes and preferences.

It is true that army discipline is not pleasant. No discipline is pleasant, for human instincts are such that freedom from their control is generally enjoyed. But the unnecessary asperities can be so removed from army discipline by judicious officers that there will be little left to cause chafing. When an artillery harness is to be worn it can be worn best and most efficiently by the animal when well adjusted.

Careful investigation shows that the dissatisfaction of enlisted men toward the service is not due to the general requirements of discipline so much as to the manner in which such disciplinary requirements are enforced by their superiors. There is no special objection to discipline *per se,* for its necessity is recognized. Restrictions which appear to be unnecessary to the efficient performance of duty, but which

have been imposed under the presumption that they might be aids to discipline, too often have the opposite effect and arouse resentment and indiscipline through the idea that such requirements represent an arbitrary and harsh exercise of power. The martinet antagonizes those upon whose support he must rely.

Discipline is due to two factors, training and morale. One represents the knowledge and ability to fight, the other, the will to fight. Training affects the machinery, while morale is the power that makes the machine function. Both factors are indispensable. Discipline is not a state which can be brought about by rule, but by general principles only. In their methods, no two successful disciplinarians are alike, even though similarity of results may make them seem so. With common standards, each must try in his own way and with the degree of success which his individuality permits.

Military discipline is popularly understood to be a state which is necessarily created and maintained by force. The general public believes it and too many superiors practise it. Such discipline of force endeavors to compel adjustment rather than prevent maladjustment, and therein its methods are opposite to those of morale work. It is a poor method of control, for it arouses reaction and opposition. Where discipline is maintained through punishment, rather than through willing coöperation, there tends to arise a state of deception, evasion, and contest of wits between the offender and those charged with the enforcement of orders. American soldiers will not long support a disciplinary system of a wholly repressive sort. If persisted in, resentment and acts of disorder may be expected.

It is true that Prussian discipline rested on force and fear. It was an effective system for Teutons, for it was adapted to their racial psychology. Strongly gregarious and of inferior initiative, it suited them to be crushed into a state of military communism through a machine of their own making. Such a discipline is rigid and inelastic. It provides poorly

for emergency and, under adversity, it does not yield resiliently but tends to crumble apart.

A misguided soldier once expressed the idea of discipline as "doing something you don't want to do." Nothing could be more illogical,— as if, because soldiers did not want to retreat, were proof that they ought to, or, that because they would rather be anywhere else, they would demand admission to the guard house. The expression, however, is interesting because it shows the popular understanding of discipline, but the word really means something quite different. "Discipline," says the dictionary, "is the treatment suited to a disciple." And "disciple," in turn, it should be emphasized, means "a willing follower." True discipline cannot be forced, it must be induced.

Certain results are indispensable to military efficiency. That method is best which brings the best results with the least delay and difficulty. The handling of men by appealing to sentiments of honor, duty and patriotism, rather than by coercion, will usually prove superior. Human beings are best governed by the application of measures other than those of simple force.

True discipline, accordingly, is the result of volition rather than of fear of punishment. It is due to stimulation rather than repression. Such a discipline exists and functions, not only while men are under the eyes of superiors, but while they are off duty, because they are in a frame of mind heedful of admonition and are anxious to do right. This higher form of discipline is due to the voluntary submission of the individual to a common purpose. Voluntary submission of this kind is based on knowledge, reason and idealism. It is the discipline of the Allies which, after apparent defeat for four years, still held a thin line — bent, stretched, but unbroken. It is the discipline which the psychology of the American makes best adapted to our army. If a commander has built up such a state of mind that his organization trusts and supports him, the force of public opinion

largely replaces any official compulsion as the agency of discipline. He rules, not through such unlimited and autocratic power as was exercised by the German officer, but by having developed a cheerful and willing obedience, which seeks to respond to need without being driven to it. It is a spirit of mutual helpfulness in which all ranks desire to take a little of the burden off their superiors and are constantly watchful for the opportunity to do it. The organization becomes regarded by its members as a joint-stock concern, in the success of which all, as share-holders, are interested.

Although discipline means submission, it does not mean submission to officers so much as to the system which they apply. In the military machine, certain individuals must dominate their respective groups. If this authority is worn as a personal attribute, it is liable to be resented by subordinates, which, in turn, perhaps results in rebuke or threats of punishment by the superior. Here the main point becomes obscured through contest between self-assertions and, while outward conformance may be enforced, sullenness, animosity and resentment may result. This brings up the point that, while discipline is intended to control men, its measures, in practise, are usually seemingly directed more to the training of the body than the mind. It teaches rather the outward conformance with the military environment than the more important purpose of inward adjustment to its characteristics.

Practically everything in the military service enters as a factor for the promotion or subversion of discipline. Sometimes the effect is direct and obvious; in other influences the effect is subconscious and cumulative. It is essential always, however, that there be a feeling of solidarity and group support in order that there may be good discipline. When, for example, personnel is frequently transferred, a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity results that makes for disintegration. On the other hand, the probability of active service

is a great aid to discipline. The guard house tends to empty itself almost automatically when troops are ordered for active service; in other words, when the purpose of discipline becomes concrete and imminent instead of abstract and remote. The mental acquiescence resulting from a recognized military necessity alters behavior.

Duty. The sense of duty recognizes ideals and implies the acceptance of obligations dependent upon them. It is largely the result of artificial culture and in its nature and extent depends upon the code accepted as the standard. An appreciation of duty is the basis of trustworthiness and dependability. Without it, the soldier will place personal interests first and fail in a crisis affecting his command. Duty is at the basis of social organization and human interrelations.

The performance of duty should be brought to the attention of the men in such tactful way that they unconsciously come to regard it as a privilege rather than a matter of compulsion. Through the instincts of constructiveness and self-assertion, duty, well done, should bring the glow of satisfaction.

There are certain duties the very nature of which causes them to be unpleasant. But these unpleasant effects can be eliminated or neutralized by appropriate states of mind, whereby the unpleasant reaction is submerged under wholesome ones, often artificially created. Any duty that is necessary, however humble or disagreeable, is ennobled by that fact. But duties should be rotated as far as possible, lest there be suspicion of partiality. To make punishment of a duty is to pervert purpose and degrade duty. The relation of this to kitchen police as punishment is well worth considering. The restriction of privilege serves equally good disciplinary purpose.

As in industrial work, it is frequently possible to so conduct duties that the personal comfort of the men and the resulting efficiency are both promoted. In many instances

there is no reason why this should not be done. That it is not done habitually is often due to the traditional and erroneous idea that the duty of the soldier should be hard and uncompromising, even if this be unnecessary, lest he be softened by so-called coddling. Commanders should reflect that the American soldier is intelligent enough to both discern and resent the imposition of needless discomfort, whether it be due to ignorance, neglect or poor leadership. The same quality of intelligent discernment also makes him cheerfully undergo equal or worse discomforts when he realizes that they are unavoidable. In the promotion of morale, an orderly routine makes for contentment. Duties should be so classified as to have an appropriate time for everything.

Because the sense of duty implies the acceptance of obligations is no reason why it should be so overburdened and overworked as ultimately to render everything obnoxious and abhorrent which comes within the most broad conception of it. Any claim that all things unpleasant and laborious must be done just because obligation requires it merely destroys the high ideals and fine conception of duty. Therein lies a grave danger, for by persistent pursuance of such a plan men may eventually detest the very mention of the word and everything connected with it. It will become a task-master instead of an ideal or a standard to be achieved. If a task is laborious or unpleasant it is far better to give a man some real incentive for doing it than to drive him to it under a perverted sense of duty.

Patriotism. The earliest conception of patriotism consisted of a passion to destroy a rival tribe. Alexander the Great, to make his empire glorious, determined to bring under tribute every tribe and nation under the sun. Rome pursued the same policy in her ruthless destruction of Carthage. Even the ancient Hebrews were not immune from the toxin of a barbarous idea of conquest. The German menace, with its " Deutschland über alles," represented the old school patriotism — direct in its descent from the dreams

of conquest and world dominion of Assyria and Babylon, and, in its attitude toward some other nations, very much like the Roman attitude toward Carthage.

Under the old idea, patriotism consisted in doing one's utmost to bring power, honor and glory to one's own nation, even, if expedient and necessary, at the expense of other nations. The American conception of patriotism is of a higher order — to bring power, honor and glory to the United States through honest effort, through good government, through unselfishness and not conquest, through friendship toward the other nations of the earth and especially the weaker, through making the name and flag of the United States honored and respected among all nations — and all this not alone for its own sake but for the benefit of humanity and the race. Such a conception does not belittle patriotism, it ennobles it. Neither a man nor a nation can exist worthily for his own or its own sake alone. Both have a part and a duty toward others in lifting civilization to a higher plane and in contributing permanent values to the life of the civilized world. This is the true conception of patriotism — and nationalism.

Patriotism is the esprit de corps of a people — the merging of individual minds into a national, communal mind. To this is added the factor of tradition, an intangible yet vital force, which idealizes effort and stimulates and unifies action. The traditions of American patriotism are the traditions of free men — right, justice, liberty, supreme national honor and the inalienable privilege of a people to govern themselves. There is no black-letter lore in the traditions of the United States, no ulterior motives of conquest and selfish dominion, for they sprang from the principles of religious and civil liberty which still guide and determine the development of its destiny.

All interests — family, class, party and the material good of the individual take their places in the scale of values below the ideal of patriotism. It is the neutral ground of

class differences and should be an arbitration factor in all disputes between capital and labor. It should be an active quality in citizen and soldier, in capitalist and worker. Even as "Civis Romanus" was the title of honor in the days of the Roman Empire, so, even more significant today should be the title, Civis Americanus — an American citizen.

The patriotism of the Romans was not typified by the geographical conception of a Mediterranean peninsula, nor that of the Greeks by an Adriatic archipelago. The Roman patriotism was love of the Empire, its excellence, the superiority of its arms, the glory of its statesmen, the superb beauty of its art, its conquests. That of Greece was founded on nobility, physical and mental; on courage; on the love of the beautiful and the true, on freedom from oppression and domination. And so, neither is American patriotism a mere conception of a geographical area called the United States. It is all that was best of the Greek and Roman patriotism, the spirit of the Magna Charta, the courage of Bunker Hill, New Orleans, Chapultepec, Gettysburg, Santiago and the Argonne.

Patriotism may be the medium of expression of several of the basic instincts — the creative, the self-assertive, the religious and the gregarious. It is closely akin to the family sentiment, for through the nation comes protection for the home and family. In a child it may be blind devotion, but in the man it should be an intelligent love. His country's honor should be as dear to him as his own. It is the spirit of Scott's immortal lines:

> "Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
> Who never to himself hath said,
> This is my own — my native land!"

Patriotism varies greatly in different countries and with different peoples. As we understand the term, patriotism is not high among certain peoples, who do not realize a na-

tional community of interests as some other nations do. In addition to tradition there enters into patriotism love of physical environment, mountains, rivers and scenery; common language and hence community of modes of expressing thought; common customs, including diet, clothing and other expressions of habit; common history; a common form of government; common industries and other economic interests. Inasmuch as all of these factors are different, the conception of patriotism varies with the nation. One cannot understand that of another. Similarly the patriotism of any two persons in the same country is a variable.

In our country, with its heterogeneous population, a considerable part of which is foreign born, the problem of patriotism is a great one and is largely linked up with the one of Americanization. An individual must have a sympathetic understanding of the ideals of his country and a personal interest in its welfare in order willingly to encounter perils in its behalf. The immigrant of transient purpose of residence, whose life in this country is led with the viewpoint of an outsider, can scarcely be expected to be acutely interested in its defense. In inculcating patriotism, soldiers should be taught to regard themselves as selected men, charged by the United States as its direct representatives with the defense of the ideals of its government.

Esprit de Corps. Esprit de corps is a mental state which represents the resultant of all forces making for cohesion of an organization. It is as necessary to commercial success as it is to military efficiency. It is the sense of strength and pride which comes from feeling oneself a part of a distinguished and efficient organization of splendid traditions, engaged in a noble work, each member of which is giving the best that is in him to the common end.

Esprit de corps is a quality developed by the commander and transmitted through subordinates until it pervades the mass. Practical psychologists recognize the influence of contagion as of first importance in creating " a common mind

to a common end." Unusually alert, cheerful and enthusiastic officers and soldiers should be made to feel their special value and responsibility in communicating their spirit to the unit, and beyond it to the army as a whole. They should be made to understand that the degree of esprit de corps is largely in their hands.

In sublimation, esprit de corps is a valuable agent. This relates to the accepted obligation of the individual to preserve the honor and welfare of his organization, and to the promotion of a comradeship which is even more effective against fear and bad conduct than the abstract sentiments of honor and duty. Esprit de corps in peace is usually based on long service; in war, on intensive service. Battles weld organizations together like nothing else.

Organizations vary greatly in their degree of esprit. Where it is low, the commander has failed in one of the main attributes of leadership. Esprit expresses itself in efficiency.

The sentimental bonds of comradeship, though light as air, are strong as steel in holding men together for common purpose. The promotion of comradeship in every possible way should therefore be one of the first interests of superiors. It begins with the close "buddy" relationship between individuals and extends through the larger group beyond the limits of direct acquaintance. Mutual knowledge and relations between individuals and units within the same greater group, promoted in the various ways, are very valuable in bringing this about. The intimacy within a unit by the men calling each other by their first names assists in comradeship and good feeling. Reciprocal good feeling for large units and the service as a whole should be encouraged. Similarly, it should be developed between allies.

A measure to this end was taken by King George when he caused an autographed letter to be sent to every American soldier sent to England for training. The envelope was

addressed, "A message to you from His Majesty King George V." The letter read:—"Soldiers of the United States, the people of the British Isles welcome you on your way to take your stand beside the armies of many nations now fighting in the Old World the great battle for human freedom. The Allies will gain new heart and spirit in your company. I wish that I could shake the hand of each one of you and bid you Godspeed on your mission."

Where there is lack of community of interest there will be a tendency not to give the utmost and perhaps to "loaf on the job." The highest type of morale is found where each man is so imbued with the spirit of his organization that he comes to believe that his own interests and those of his company are identical.

An essential to esprit is living up to the motto, "All for one and one for all." Here help is looked for and given within the organization. If a man gets into trouble his first thought should be to tell the captain, feeling that though reproof and admonition will be forthcoming, help will be given. The sense of equity makes a man give help to the limit that he may expect to receive it in return. Where superiors are not fully trusted and relied upon there tends to be a certain amount of passive resistance, which will none the less impair efficiency because it is unconscious.

Where a high degree of esprit de corps exists in an organization, an appreciation of its high quality remains long after the efforts and difficulties that have been through are forgotten. Difficulties overcome in common are, through the instinct of sympathy, but an added bond of interreliance and comradeship.

The Articles of War embody with great precision a code of conduct as to what not to do. They are negative and repressive. Under the morale idea, it is believed that each organization also should have a positive code of its own, indicating what should be done constructively. If such posi-

tive standards were expressed in simple terms and impressed upon the men, they could not fail to have their influence on the modifying of conduct.

Traditions are a powerful factor in creating esprit. They represent the crystallized ideas, needs and sentiments of the past. They are a controlling force of the greatest power in their effect on the human race, especially groups. The splendid history and traditions of his army should be brought home to the soldier to stimulate his imagination and confidence. When we entered the world conflict, Ambassador Jusserand voiced this idea when he said: "I accept the omen; America has never lost a war."

History is similarly of great value in stimulating morale. The accomplishments of a regiment in the past set a standard for the conduct and achievements of its present members. Lectures, pictures and the celebration of anniversaries of great events are of much value. Regimental anniversaries of great achievements, with formal parades, stirring addresses, competitive sports and special dinners are very desirable.

To this end, the desirability of maintaining pictorial and other historical records of an organization is obvious. For the purpose, books of photographs, with proper captions, showing the activities, stations, services, officers, etc., of organizations should be maintained, and their looking over by the men, under proper restrictions to prevent damage, encouraged. The same applies to scrap-books containing newspaper clippings, menus, programs of special events, copies of letters commending the organization or pertaining to its history. A few photographs, suitably enlarged, showing the organization in activity, especially copies of official war photographs, might well be framed and hung on the walls of the company office or recreation room.

Community of service is necessary to esprit. One agency highly destructive of morale is the repeated and often unexplained and apparently unnecessary transfer of officers and

men, wrecking laboriously achieved efficiency, pride and ambition. In organizing new regiments, instead of creating them complete from raw material, the British increased the number of battalions as far as possible in the regiment, so that the new recruits and organizations should have the benefit of honorable traditions and high standards.

Esprit de corps necessarily implies team work developed to a high degree. Efficiency is the sum total of many things — some small, some large, but all well done. With any aggregation of men working in a common purpose and toward a common end, success is the success of team work. It is the success of getting the most out of each individual and unit and making it count most for the common purpose. In unity there is strength. With unity of purpose goes special interest in the task in hand, so that each individual seeks out and makes use of all opportunities to the fullest extent.

The problem of the superior in handling men is complex by reason of the necessity for making each man do not only what is best for himself but best for others. The stimulus of selfish interest must be subordinated to altruistic motives, for close military relationship imposes careful observation of the rights of others.

It is almost axiomatic in the commercial world that there is no friendship between business organizations, their purpose is that of self-advancement. They function on a competitive basis, with the development of trade secrets of production and management. But within a business organization, friendliness is a great asset. Fortunately outside competition does not apply in armies; instead the higher loyalty calls for coöperation. The individual must subordinate himself, or the unit itself, to the higher needs of the larger group. There should be mutual confidence for a common end. The reward for sharing a good method comes from having its merits recognized in its adoption for the general welfare. Legitimate competition strives merely

to excel in applying common methods to the common object. Mutual helpfulness creates the feeling of loyalty, which is a state of mind expressing itself in team work. One factor thus reacts with the other to increased advantage.

Discontent. Discontent is a factor with which all officers have to deal at one time or another. Although a negative element, it has such bearing on the results of leadership that it may well be discussed here. Under certain conditions of physical and mental environment discontent may become an almost continuous problem. An understanding of the psychology of discontent is therefore of great value in solving the problems in which it is a factor. It is true that they are solvable with great precision and certainty, provided the proper procedure is followed and the correct operations performed at the right time; but just as in mathematics, a wrong sequence of operations, or a wrong operation performed at the wrong stage of the problem, will produce an incorrect result.

Discontent in general may spring from an almost infinite number of causes. Whatever the cause of ill temper, a natural tendency is to extend prejudice to other things or persons with which there is contact. In the army, causes of discontent are more limited and can usually be quite readily traced to their source. Lowered morale is invariably attributable to discontent of one kind or another. It must be borne in mind that, psychologically, discontent is caused by the blocking of the denial of adequate expression or satisfaction of one or more of the basic instincts. The first step in the problem, therefore, is to determine which of the basic instincts is at the root of the trouble. With this information in hand the rest of the problem yields more readily to analysis and solution.

A psychological analysis of discontent might divide it into three stages, dissatisfaction, disaffection and delinquency. These stages are progressive in the order named. The first has its origin in the primary aggravation, while the second

and third depend mainly on the intensity, continuation or repetition of the original aggravation. The rapidity of progress from one stage to another or through all three also depends to a very large extent on the continuation, intensity, spread and repetition of the original stimulus, although the personal element embodied in the individual who is subjected to the aggravation enters in this respect; his characteristics, training, mental balance and development. At any stage of the progress or development of the problem there are one or more appropriate remedial operations which can be applied.

Dissatisfaction, the first manifestation of discontent, strikes at the individual and is what might be called a personal affection. It may spring from disappointment, mortification, vexation, annoyance, regret, opposition, pain, uneasiness, disapproval, displeasure or an unsatisfied or ungratified state of mind or being. This is the easiest time to apply a remedial operation to the problem, for here it is mainly individuals, at first relatively few in number, who will have to be dealt with; thus rendering the handling simpler than when the problem advances to the group stage. Also it is attacking the trouble at its source. If the morale organization is functioning properly, the first evidences of dissatisfaction will be reported, for this is one of its chief functions. The cause should then be removed by direct or indirect measures.

Disaffection is dissatisfaction which may pertain only to the individual, but it may have passed on to the group stage and in such cases may be called sympathetic affection. It often reaches this stage as a result of reasoning taking form in dissension, discordance, non-conformity, non-compliance, contradiction, denial, protest and repudiation, though not always. The result is expressed in terms of antipathetic reaction such as hostility, bitterness, rancor, alienation, disloyalty, dislike, ill-will, disgust, estrangement, animosity and malevolence. The remedial operation is now harder to

apply, for the disease has grown and spread. A well-established state of mind must be torn down and a new and favorable one built up. This is infinitely more difficult to do than to attack the problem in its first or dissatisfaction stage, for in addition, the original aggravation must also be removed, which in itself would have solved the problem in the first place.

Before taking up delinquency, the third stage of discontent, it would be well to consider the actual indications of dissatisfaction and disaffection, for at this point in the problem their appearance will be most obvious. Chief among them are complaint and criticism. As they represent the stage of discontent which usually precedes overt act, the importance of recognizing it and taking advantage of its warnings is obvious. Complaints are often the barometer of mental pressure and the indication of impending storm.

The third stage of discontent is delinquency, which is a bad moral condition as well as a bad state of morale. Here the disease, having passed through the preliminary stages, breaks out openly and the crisis is reached. Mental state is given form and expression in act implying disorder, dereliction, offense, misbehavior, transgression, misconduct and mutiny. It should never have been allowed to reach this stage. Remedial action now becomes a complex and intricate operation, for it is like locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen. But it must include everything prescribed for the first two stages, namely the removal of the original aggravation, destroying the existing bad mental state and building up a new and desirable one. Severe punishment may, under certain circumstance merely add fuel to the fire, but under others drastic measures may be necessary. The remedy must be constructive rather than destructive.

Discontent is thus the direct precursor of delinquency and operates as its cause. The little child, denied some gratification, throws down its toys, stamps its foot, says, " I'll be just as bad as I can be," and thus illustrates the relation in

its simplest form. The discontented individual, who, denied certain gratifications, slows down his production or practises sabotage to " get even " demonstrates another type. It is a fact that widowers, in the earlier period of their bereavement, and while not yet adjusted to their changed environment, show a higher rate of delinquency in the courts than married men of the same age and class.

Discontent, dissatisfaction, disaffection and delinquency represent a host of attitudes and tendencies which work counter to any smooth existence or performance. They are the natural sequence which proceeds from maladjustment to environment, whatever its nature. They are the instinctive reaction of the individual against painful surroundings in the effort to secure relief.

The synonyms given under the three stages of discontent call up mental states and reactions which affect physical efficiency exactly as do physical depression, fatigue and exhaustion. Both reduce snap and effort and lessen initiative and persistence. As interest and desire wane, so there develop indifference, fleeting of attention, sensitiveness, impatience and resentment, with the acts of slovenliness and indifference which express them. The discordance of thought in discontent leads to discordance of action, for the mind is diverted away from common ideals and purposes. All superiors appreciate the obvious effect of physical fatigue upon the performance of work, but many do not realize the similar influence of depressed and disturbed mental state upon the result. The practical efficiency, value of prompt recognition and removal of psychologic irritants should be better understood.

As contentment is a balance between expectation and realization, so discontent implies failure of realization to come up to expectation, with the injection of a strong emotional factor. But expectation implies standards, and these depend upon class and individual. Accordingly, what may be satisfactory to one may arouse discontent in another. The

problem of discontent, like any other phase of morale work, thus ultimately resolves itself into the problem of the individual or aggregations of individuals.

Discontent is a state of mind due to an infinite number of causes in varying number and combination. There is, accordingly, no wholesale remedy for it. Each case must be considered on its own merits as to nature, cause and severity. Thus the solution, in final analysis, usually falls on the company commander, but as human nature is more or less the same, general measures carried out by higher commanders will be of essential assistance to the company officers in solving the personal problems of their subordinates.

But as discontent is a most destructive agency to efficiency if poorly handled, so it may be made a helpful stimulus to improvement if wisely directed. In the latter case it is the yeast of progress and has a protective value. It is responsible for efforts at improvement of an environment or for the efforts of an individual to lift himself into more desirable surroundings or status. Hope, anticipation and ambition all have a basis of discontent which is thus turned into a constructive force. Complete satisfaction with a condition implies no desire for change or progress; it means stagnation.

Thus the problem in discontent is to check undesirable influences which tend toward pessimism and relative inefficiency, and to stimulate that discontent which is expressed through ambition and a higher efficiency whose purpose is betterment. Laudable discontent is not only satisfied with nothing less than the ideal but spurs the individual on in efforts to secure it. It enters into rivalry, and is a ready tool for the commander in inciting an individual or group to a desired task in which advantage can be demonstrated.

Discontent is instinctively understood and imparted. It is carried, and directly and instantaneously read, in the face and in the little hesitations and changes of manner which denote reaction to an unpleasant environment. Under the instinct of sympathy, it tends to be expressed in words, and

thus focuses the attention of others on faults or difficulties which had previously been overlooked or disregarded but which are now magnified into matters of personal importance.

Moreover, as the soldier lives under conditions of life which inevitably bring him into close relation to his comrades, the factor of propinquity favors the development of states of group discontent with a rapidity rarely equaled in any other walk of life. Further, the community and sympathy of thought into which soldiers are molded combine to accelerate and aggravate the interreaction of mental states which in many instances find their origin in causes common to all, but affecting different individuals in diverse degree.

Even a minor grievance or fault, if real, serves as a nucleus about which imaginary difficulties tend to crystallize. The importance to an organization of constantly seeking out the varying human agents of discontent, and altering their mental states, not only for their own benefit but for the sake of others, is apparent. The officer, therefore, who regards the contentment of the men as a matter not greatly concerning him, and one for the men themselves to settle, is paving the way for loss of efficiency, individual delinquency and perhaps group disorder, which he deplores when it occurs but has not taken measures to prevent.

Great causes of discontent in the military service are relatively rare. Difficulties created by the enemy are accepted as part of the inevitable of war. Reasonable efficiency of leadership and supply, and support by the people, usually keep other great causes from arising. Petty difficulties, large to the sufferer but small to the onlooker, determine most matters of military discontent. They can only be appreciated and solved by considering them from the soldier's viewpoint. It is, after all, his state of mind, not that of his commander, that needs correction.

Investigation usually shows that most of the difficulties under which a man labors are imaginary and can be cleared

away by a proper approach and adequate explanation. They create, by exaggeration, their own bad psychological state. But merely because an officer recognizes a difficulty of a subordinate as imaginary is not sufficient in itself for its removal. The man himself who is laboring under the difficulty must have it shown and proven to him conclusively that his discontent is founded on something unreal.

The final step in the alleviation of any discontent is, of course, the recognition of its existence, nature, extent and cause. This can only be secured by study and inquiry of the men themselves, using the morale operatives and other agents to full advantage. Suggestions as to the nature of problems of discontent should not only not be repelled, but should be elicited.

Immediately on the end of a war or campaign, prompt steps are necessary to combat ennui, homesickness, and belief that there no longer exists necessity for sacrifice. Here the attitude of officers is all important in its effect upon the spirits and morale of the men. In setting a good example, officers may be applying desirable methods of prevention or cure to themselves.

Pleasurable activity is the best measure against painful introspection. Interesting tasks keep thought off self and pass away time until adjustment has been better accomplished or the offending agent removed. Work alone is not sufficient. It must be mixed with play, and the character of the play should be varied. The participation of the men as actors, rather than spectators, is essential to the best results.

Complaint and Criticism. By complaint we understand the expression of pain, grief or resentment; criticism implies censure or an unfavorable judgment or opinion. Both of these express discontent and disapproval. They usually precede offense or disorder and represent the effort of the individual to put his state of mind into words and thereby relieve his mental tension.

Criticism, as ordinarily employed, is a marked depressant of morale. Used freely and captiously it tends to break the spirit of the subject. On groups it is productive of uncertainty and discord and is destructive of unity of purpose and action. Unjust criticism may rancor for months and, if spoken in the presence of others, may embitter the individual toward whom it is directed. The tendency of criticism is to direct itself less toward things and conditions than toward the persons who are held responsible. It inclines to be not only personal but superficial, often proceeding from false or incomplete premises. The proper values of perspective are often lost.

It is a peculiar psychological fact that men who are prepared to risk all and sacrifice everything are often quite ready to criticize bitterly minor faults and complain of trifles if it appears to them that these faults and trifles are unnecessary and that no military benefit will accrue from their having undergone such discomforts.

After every war or campaign, a mental reaction sets in and an epidemic of discontent, homesickness and criticism results. Marked mental depression occurs and suicide becomes more frequent. The reason for this altered mental state is the sudden withdrawal of the motive which acted as a stimulant to the spirit. Even though duties were unchanged, the force that impelled to effort was withdrawn and had to be replaced by other forces, and the progress of replacement was not always successful.

One of the greatest handicaps to efficiency in our army is the tendency to criticize to excess, for the American feels at liberty to express his views freely on all subjects. Usually this criticism is based on limited viewpoint or imperfect knowledge. The higher the rank of the critic, the greater his influence and the wider the extent of the damage done. No officer should ever criticize a superior in the presence of subordinates if he does not wish to weaken his own influence over them. They will be quick to follow his

example and, in turn, subject his own methods and himself to unfavorable comment. Moreover, the element of criticism is directly opposed to community of purpose; discordance of thought results either in discordance of act or failure to carry it out to the fullest extent. Paragraph 5, Army Regulations, is the law on this subject of criticism.

Loyalty enters into morale. There must be unswerving allegiance, absolute fidelity and unchanging support toward leaders, organization, country and cause. When once a plan is adopted by higher authority, or an order issued, it is the duty of all to carry it out to the fullest extent, in spirit as well as letter. Admiral Jervis once said: "I dread not the seamen; it is the indiscreet, licentious conversations of the officers and their presumptuous discussion of the orders they receive that produce all our ills."

Helpful criticism, used constructively, is an agent for the disclosure and correction of fault and thus serves a most necessary and important purpose. Fair criticism, if judiciously used, may act like the whip which, occasionally employed, stimulates the draft animal to proper and coördinated effort. But it must be more than the mere showing up of fault; it should carry with it the direction or suggestion of a better procedure. Human progress toward betterment is possible only by construotive criticism of things as they are; the art of war or industry will never crystallize into a perfect science.

Ordinarily, only constructive criticism, in which a better alternative is offered, is good. Such criticism should be invited rather than repelled or resented. The manner in which such criticism is given is important. Courtesy and impersonality are indispensable. These factors largely indicate the intent of the criticism and therefore determine the mental state in which it is received. Sometimes unfair criticism, by provoking resentment, may rouse to activity in the effort to demonstrate its injustice. Like discontent, criticism may thus become a power for good or for harm,

depending on purpose, method and manner of employment.

Complaints and critical states of mind on the part of the men will necessarily be found to exist and will often be reported to higher authority. It is a natural tendency for superiors to resent such criticism, especially if founded on error. But such criticism is not without psychological value, for it enables fault to be traced to its source and gives the men an outlet to ventilate their grievances, real or imaginary. Such " blowing off steam " relieves mental tension. Mental stress in any one is allayed by opportunity to get a doubt or difficulty " off his mind." Men in a depressed or critical state of mind will ordinarily seek to express it to somebody, and it is better to have it come to the attention of those who can correct fault, explain error, or give the personal sympathy unconsciously being sought than to have relief looked for by complaint to the ignorant, misinformed or irresponsible.

Having an officially available outlet for fair criticism is often sufficient in itself to allay difficulties. Officers should be receptive and sympathetic to the statements of their men, whether the difficulties concerned are general or personal, real or imaginary. An official outlet for complaints has been tried in the " want boxes," similar to the complaint or suggestion boxes in clubs, which were posted in various camps and hospitals for receiving matters of complaint or opinions regarding things which seemed to require remedy. Experience showed that as soon as a vent for public opinion was created in this way, and its existence and purpose was well understood, the complaints themselves fell off rapidly — almost to the vanishing point. The average subordinate, if he finds that his complaints are given careful consideration, ceases to make them except for strong reasons. He does not, on the one hand, wish to be found in error, and on the other he acquires confidence in the alertness of the superior in the welfare of his men, whereby he can be trusted to determine and correct most defects.

Every complaint should be carefully investigated, whether apparently sound or not. If this is done, unsound complaints will soon cease and the ones received will be those expressing facts and revealing faults which require remedy. Often action can be taken which will result in a particular complaint never occurring again. Acting on complaints is one of the best evidences of interest and builds up good will. What the complainant wants is interest and a decision; he is quite as well satisfied if the latter goes against him provided he is made to see the justice of it.

The manner in which superiors receive complaints is important. If done in a grudging or irritable way, the man feels that there is lack of interest in his problems and that there is small chance of justice being done. Complaints should be listened to patiently. Some are just, some not. But the point is that the complainant thinks he has suffered an injustice. If this be true, the physical fault should be remedied; if not true, his faulty state of mind should be corrected. A fancied ill has the same effect on the individual as the actual existence of the conditions about which he is complaining.

Any serious disagreements among the men should ordinarily be brought to the company commander. Their handling may not be pleasant, but it will generally mean the settling of differences without rancor and to the betterment of morale. In some instances the complainant is at fault. This is not due to intentional error but to misunderstanding. Any undesirable reaction which has developed can readily be removed by a plain statement of facts and an appeal to the individual from the standpoint of explanation, logic and esprit de corps.

In many matters brought up by aggrieved individuals who want higher authority committed and involved, the wise officer will transpose the words of the sign at the railroad crossing and "Look, Listen — and Stop." His purpose should be to limit trouble and disagreements in so far as may

be consonant with justice. Misunderstanding of orders is quite a prolific source of discontent and trouble. Here explanation is all that is necessary to remove the difficulty.

The apparent disregard of the importance of the time factor in the functioning of the government machinery is a frequent source of complaint. The latter is so complex and ponderous that the results desired, although finally appearing, are not infrequently delivered too late. Such instances tend to arouse bitterness on the part of those affected, and contempt for the efficiency of official methods in comparison with the more direct ones of civil life. Some of the checks on rapid action are matters of law and cannot readily be changed. Others depend on regulations requiring too great centralization, resulting in a large number of indorsements by various persons; this it may be possible to amend within the service. Still others, and perhaps the most important and annoying, depend upon failure of administrative officers to give quick decisions and see that the action prescribed is promptly carried out. Here every officer is concerned in so stimulating the transaction of military business as to overcome official inertia.

A few chronic grumblers and ringleaders in discontent will be found in every considerable group. Such pessimists represent separate and individual psychological problems and should be sought out and dealt with appropriately. They represent a type recognized as the unpleasant companion; the tendency of others is to avoid them. It is just this class, however, that should be the particular concern of morale work, not only for their own state of mind but for their reaction on others. Every such case has some reason back of it, and whether this be valid or merely fancied has no effect on results.

This type of men is not easy to handle by direct means. Usually such avoid breaches of regulations, but subtly sap esprit de corps and morale through a passive opposition to authority which is at once doubly dangerous and hard to

allay. They are in a way possessed of some qualities of leadership and strong character. The problem is to turn such leadership from a negative purpose to one of positive advantage. This can be done, and not rarely such men can be changed into pillars of strength for the organization, but only after a thorough understanding of the personality of such offenders and a careful selection and application of the agencies which are to bring about the desired change in mental attitude and outward behavior. No two such individuals can be treated alike. Some need praise, others punishment; some responsibility, others change of duty. All will need to have their personal interests and preferences considered in respect to any measures applied.

Knowledge Concerning the Men. An old Greek recipe for making a good citizen read: "Know thyself." A modern recipe for making a good officer might equally well read: "Know thy men." Personal leadership is based on an understanding of human nature. "The proper study of mankind is man."

In his book, General Ludendorff said:—"There is yet another requirement, an understanding of the morale of one's troops and of the peculiarities of the enemy. . . . The greater the task, the more important do these moral factors become. Confidence and faith in ultimate victory are the bonds which unite the commander and his troops."

In their mental make-up, no two men are exactly alike. But men as a class are much alike. "One touch of Nature makes the whole world kin." Human nature in general, on analysis, will be found to rest on certain general principles. These are capable of broad application, though particular cases require particular handling.

An officer, to have a real hold on his men, so that he can sway their states of mind, must know them and care for them. He must enter their lives, hopes, fears, joys and sorrows as much as may be proper. Then he will know what they really think and can play upon their mental state

as on an instrument of which he has learned the strings and stops. Nor is this subversive of discipline if done with common sense, any more than the kindness of the father is subversive of his son's obedience and general conduct.

The good company officer will know his men not only collectively but individually. His first duty will be to study the roster until he can associate the name with each individual. Every human being appreciates recognition of his personality. One of the greatest assets of a politician is ability to call a name and bring up some incident of identification and remembrance. It means much to discipline to be able to call a man "Smith" or "Jones" instead of hailing him as "you man." The latter blocks the instincts of self-assertion and sympathy and makes the man feel that he is nothing but a cog in a machine in whom the superior has little or no human interest. The training camp plan of having the men wear their names stitched on the left breast is very valuable in the case of recruits whose identity has not yet been fully established.

Also the wise company commander will know his men personally as individuals. He will know their racial and temperamental characteristics, their weaknesses and strengths, their hopes and apprehensions, the things they do well or ill and the spirit that animates them. He will endeavor to find out about their life before enlistment, their families and friends and their educational, social and vocational opportunities. He will constantly endeavor to know their state of mind, their attitude toward the military service in general, their frame of mind toward any local military situation and the minor factors which tend to raise or depress their morale. He should secure such information about their difficulties, desires and prospects for the future so far as may be done without offense, and should use the information thus acquired to the advantage of the soldier for the benefit that will thereby accrue not only to him but through him to the organization. He will turn it to prac-

tical account so that qualities of weakness may be removed and those of strength increased.

Such knowledge of a man and his capabilities will, in the aggregate, save a vast amount of inefficiency and friction in placing him where his qualifications and talents may be utilized to best advantage. The man himself, as well as his qualification card, should be studied. In studying men, the officer should consider not only their obvious qualities but look for latent possibilities, with a view of developing or curbing them where appropriate. If considered especially adapted to a certain line of work, the soldier should be told where his greatest field of usefulness would seem to lie. While in showing strength, it may be possible without offense to show points of weakness.

Much of the information desired can only be secured from the man himself. This may be tactfully elicited, but unless the man has confidence in his officer much will be withheld; so too if he be formally questioned. To get the best results in all matters of personal difficulty, the man should be put at ease by being told to sit down and official military relationship thereby temporarily dispensed with. The company commander should study and understand his organization from the collective standpoint, from race and temperament. Particularly is he interested in the spirit which pervades it, for upon that its efficiency depends. Contact with a number of individuals will give such information.

Where higher officers cannot know their men individually by reason of their numbers, they should recognize them as falling under certain types, which in many instances will give reasonably correct ideas as to best methods of approach and management. Superior officers whose rank is such that they cannot fully know their men can nevertheless require that their junior officers secure such information.

Leadership depends on a knowledge of human character. Successful leaders always study their men, though this is

often done more or less unconsciously and without specific purpose in view. Under morale methods, such study is to be done deliberately, systematically and thoroughly and as a means of reaching definite ends. No officer can do everything himself, and much must be left to his subordinates. His efficiency is not based upon what he himself can do personally but on what his subordinates accomplish. It is on this that he is rated, and according as the rates are high or low he is classed as a good or a poor officer. Thus the direct relation between knowing men and an officer's own efficiency becomes obvious.

The officer can predict what any soldier will do in proportion as he personally knows his character and the general tendency of his responses to stimulation. From close observation of his organization he can infer with much exactness what the reaction of his particular group will be toward its environment. He can thus forecast and create reaction and conduct.

Ability to talk to a soldier in a way that indicates a comprehensive knowledge of him as a man is one of the surest ways to his confidence and to creating the belief that, in emergency, his personal interests will be safeguarded as far as possible because they have been recognized. But the officer who attempts to handle his men on the basis of his own personal psychology is doomed in advance to failure. He can work effectively only by recognizing their own psychology through their thoughts, ideals and acts. These are the basic factors of his problem.

In determining character, everything pertaining to the man should be considered — physical, mental and moral qualities, appearance, manner and performance of duty. Attention to the subject, checked up by experience, will give a high degree of proficiency in sizing up men. In this, the psychological ratings are of material assistance. While estimation of an individual from personal appearance is useful, it is open to a certain element of error, depending on the knack of the

superior in sizing up men. Some men on entering the service are "rough diamonds" who merely need polishing to determine their sterling qualities. Nor is there any common standard of estimate, for one officer may put an overestimate on the value of certain elements where another might underestimate them. The only way to become proficient is by the systematic checking up of first impressions in the light of later acquaintance, thus perfecting the measuring rod of experience.

Another point to consider is the matter of the duty to which the individual is assigned. If this be adapted to him, the result may be the bringing out of all the qualities which were anticipated; but if uncongenial or over-difficult it may cause their repression, resulting in non-conformance to the original conclusion. First estimates should therefore be tentative and subject to modification by experience. A man who may not show up well in one position may demonstrate exceptional efficiency in another.

The proper handling of men calls for patience, tact, judgment and many other qualities. Knowledge to this end is best acquired by experience, for it includes many things not yet covered by books. Yet, on the other hand, books are invaluable in bringing up suggestions for attitude and administrative conduct which would otherwise, in part at least, be overlooked. The experiences of others form a helpful guide and help to eliminate the mistakes which would result from working entirely on the basis of trial and error.

In large commands, it is of course impossible for the superior to know all of his subordinates. Personal knowledge of this sort, like detail of other kind, can only be had by the company officer. But if the high commander cannot know all his men, the next best thing is to have the men know him by seeing him and hearing about him, thereby establishing a sympathetic understanding.

Relation Between Officers and Men. The relation between officers and men is a subject of much popular interest

in civil life. It is also a matter of the greatest military importance in its bearing on efficiency, for the extent of sympathy existing between superior and subordinate determines coördination of purpose and success in result. The administrative relation of the officer to his men is far more extensive and complex than that of persons in charge of men in civil life. The officer is responsible for them throughout the twenty-four hours. He sees that they are physically cared for, are clothed, housed, fed and kept free from disease. He has direct or implied responsibility for, and power over, their morals and conduct. He supervises not only their work but their play. Their interrelations with each other, and with the surrounding community, are a part of his concern. He not only touches every one of their official problems but many which are of a personal nature, and possesses the power to rectify much that may be bad or promote that which is good. He is thus the directing force which exerts pressure on the soldier through the military environment. The tools and agencies are placed in his hands; it behooves him to use them intelligently and effectively.

Many persons in civil life, and quite often officers newly appointed from civil life, cannot conceive that there should be any difference in the status or distinction between officers and men when not in formations. Such overlook, or choose to ignore, the fact that wide divergence in education and other qualities necessarily create differences of character and purpose. They would not expect the general manager and the day laborer in a factory always to find each other mutually congenial. It is of course true, especially in time of war, that there are many individuals of high educational and social qualifications in the ranks who have not yet had time and opportunity to demonstrate their fitness for commissioned status. Such, however, demonstrate no special desire to have social relations with superiors, but rather the reverse, and the same applies to enlisted men as a whole.

As an extreme, one finds the occasional tactless officer who, imbued with exaggerated ideas of rank and authority, uses his conferred status to impress subordinates with his military and social superiority. Such assume a caste which has no place in American institutions. Their attitude is resented by subordinates, who quite possibly may be both by birth and education their social and intellectual superiors. This is similarly true in industry.

The wise officer will set a middle course between extremes. His problem is to bring himself as close to the enlisted man as may be without impairing his status and weakening his authority. He will be on conversational terms with the men, so that they can talk to him freely and frankly without embarrassment or fear. This relation should be personal, frank and candid. It is not one sided, but mutual. Military and social status should have nothing to do with it. It is the controlling relation between the head of a family and its members. This does not mean familiarity on either side. There is an old saying that " familiarity breeds contempt," and nowhere is this more true than in military life. Officers who neglect the importance of a certain respect to be paid to rank are never fully successful in the management of their men. Too intimate association sacrifices the element of prestige, which is such an important factor in command. For this reason, relations, while close and cordial, should be sympathetic rather than social.

The relations between officers and enlisted men while off duty are those which any officer of good taste, manners and judgment will instinctively adopt, and which the enlisted men will appreciate without improper presumption. Civilians ignorant of military customs may unwittingly create situations which only tactfulness and good breeding on the part of the officer and men can save from being embarrassing to all concerned, and which should be met in ways most appropriate to the situation.

During the war, the border mobilization of militia, and

at other times, questions have arisen in connection with the patronage of civilian clubs, etc., by both officers and enlisted men. Many clubs extended their privileges to enlisted men, especially where they were members of other clubs on a reciprocating status. Under such conditions, the club usually took on the character of a " no man's land " in which military rank was not actively presented.

The viewpoint of the men on this subject is shown by their comments on the disciplinary relations between officers and men in a questionnaire filled out by 1381 enlisted men at the time of their discharge after the Armistice after an average length of service of from 10 to 6 months. It should be noted that the great majority of their officers were new to the service and inexperienced in management of men. The replies relative to existing disciplinary relations were: —

Undemocratic	155
Unnecessary	135
Harsh	140
Necessary but undemocratic	35
Necessary but need not be so harsh	34
Depends on officers	193
Not harsh	295
Democratic	278
Necessary	767
Not replying	174

To the question, " Could discipline be maintained when officers and men mingle on terms of intimacy and familiarity? " the answers were: —

Yes	275
No	1007
Not replying	99

To the question, " Does the soldier lose his self-respect on account of this relation? " the answers were: —

Yes	361
No	976
Depends on officer	74
Not replying	65

To the question, "Could treatment be fair if this relation did not exist?" the answers were: —

Yes	264
No	1004
Depends on officer	40
Not replying	73

In the foregoing replies many criticisms were leveled at the overbearing manner in some of the younger, inexperienced officers. Many of the men, however, seemed to see in this attitude merely greater inexperience in the handling of men rather than a desire to be unduly strict with them. Most of the men took the common sense ground that success in the administrative relations between officers and men depended upon the ability, thoughtfulness and tact of those in authority. This is obviously an argument for giving not only officers but civilian superiors special instruction and training in respect to human relations in the military service and in industry.

CHAPTER XIII

EDUCATION, INFORMATION AND TRAINING

Principles governing education and training; learning has value only in behavior; faults of understanding; some principles of pedagogy in relation to military training; primacy, recency, frequency and vividness; association and explanation; incentive and interest; repetition and monotony; mental and physical fatigue; memory and the subconscious mind. Education and vocational training; their value as morale agents; relation to recruiting; some necessary phases of instruction; physical means for accomplishment. Information; comparison with education; its relation to certain instincts; its necessity to common purpose; the thinking man and his need for reasons; explanations. Orders, informative and inspirational; examples of the latter; special citations. Uncertainty; its influence on behavior. Rumors; their importance and dangers; impairment of contentment; violent reactions from rumors expressed in disorder; means of preventing or neutralizing rumor. Erroneous statements; their effect on conduct and morale. Disloyal propaganda; methods for its opposition. Publicity; its value in morale work; proper function of publicity; military attitude toward it; morale results of publicity; undesirable publicity; the public press; correction of erroneous ideas; suppression of news; various agencies for publicity. Camp publications; their practical value; suggestions as to employment and administration. The library; its purpose; effect of literature on mental state and conduct; popularization of library. Pictures and posters; the universal language; special appeal to the illiterate; psychological principles of posters. Mail service; letter writing; home communication. Symbols and slogans; their value and use; special epigrammatic appeals and titles. Drills, parades and ceremonies; their mental and inspirational value.

Principles Governing Education and Training. Everything in the world is undergoing a process of change, development or progress, and will continue to be subject to it, though perhaps only in a small degree. The entire universe is operated under certain functions which we call natural laws, and from these the changing of man himself for the better is not excluded. Education and training are nothing

more nor less than intentional and systematized human effort to accomplish this progress and development along desirable lines. This is modified by a vast number of unnoticed influences for good or bad, functioning incessantly. The more these influences are recognized and controlled, the better the result. Unfortunately, results have been given the most attention, and relatively little study devoted to the scientific methods by which they may be best brought about. The psychology of pedagogy is in its infancy.

Training is the result of environment, chiefly human. It influences mind and feelings, furnishes ideals, outlines conduct, and makes the individual conform to its requirements. After a man secures a certain amount of information, he tends to form an opinion and vigorously defends and acts upon the same. The purpose of training, then, is to develop ideals upward to a point in which conduct not only contents the individual but benefits his associates.

All learning has a value only as it may be expressed in appropriate behavior. It creates a psychological factor which helps to determine ensuing act. Education means preparation for an environment which may later be imposed, so that adjustment to it may be accomplished as efficiently and quickly as possible. Military education and training are the efforts to constantly increase the proportion of the known to the unknown in preparing for the many situations encountered in combat. They represent an effort to secure desired responses when certain military conditions are presented. Special training, such as bayonet exercise, is merely the development of a special reaction to a special situation. The same applies to special training in industry.

In the stress of battle, the officer can exert little influence over the soldier, who for the time becomes almost an independent unit, mechanically carrying out the movements in which he has been rehearsed until they have become habit. The purpose of preliminary training is thus to enable the soldier to act calmly, methodically and efficiently in situations

which would naturally tend to upset standards of conduct as a result of the desire for self-preservation.

Training thus confers a facility which is more or less mechanical in the execution of acts. It makes the horrors and hardships of war much less noticeable as a result of mental concentration on a definite purpose. It gives confidence, in that the soldier vaguely recognizes that if his mind becomes confused in combat, his subconscious mind will cause his trained muscles to carry on the task and his defensive and aggressive powers thus continue. Mass training also gives the sense of solidarity and greater reliance on the group. The man does not readily yield to an individual emotional state if the group behind him is unaffected. On the other hand, it renders him more liable to react to suggestion from without, especially of the officers over him.

Ideas are gathered from an infinity of sources. Mainly they are unconsciously gathered. The latter is important in connection with the use of suggestion. Some seem to proceed on the theory that if a soldier is told something in words, he is sure to understand. In many instances this is not the case. The statement of a proposition does not necessarily imply that it has reached the man's understanding. The lower the intelligence or literacy of the individual, the more this is true. Some men have not the imagination to call up a mental picture appropriate to the words. Visualization convinces. If this cannot be employed, a suitable parable may be effectively used to embody the thought. In any case, information should be given in simple, clear language and homely illustration, with checks to see that it is thoroughly understood. The impression of the men in regard to training should be that superiors are interested in informing them in useful ways for their own benefit.

Errors made by subordinates are not rarely due to faulty instructions given them by those over them. The art of teaching and imparting instruction is largely based on the science of psychology. This is so true that a working knowl-

edge of psychology is now usually required of those who would be teachers. Yet the army, which is a vast educational establishment, overlooks this fact. This does not mean that the drill sergeant must be a psychologist; it does mean that beside a knowledge of the mechanics of drill he should have a natural aptitude for understanding and handling men. The inability of the recruit to do a certain thing reasonably well in a reasonable time may or may not be his fault; sometimes it may be due to an instructor who does not possess the faculty of imparting information. The requirements of a good instructor include sound knowledge of the subject, confidence and method in approach, an understanding of the difficulties of the instructed, ability to judge individual differences, and a sympathetic attitude. He should also furnish a desirable example.

Pedagogy has long recognized that one of the most important factors in teaching is the art of asking questions in such a way as to bring to light the knowledge and ability of the student. This principle is too greatly disregarded in military training. Men are told to do a thing without being informed as to its reason or purpose, while inquiry as to these fundamentals or the methods of carrying them out is rarely instituted. If the man learns blindly and unintelligently, the results are slow in development and success is mechanical, not intelligent. Accordingly, questions should be used to emphasize facts, test knowledge and stimulate thought. Questions should be clearly expressed in novel form, be heard and understood by all, asked before designating the individual to reply, be directed to the bright and dull without regular order and should be of sufficient scope and not too difficult for the group. They should relate not only to memory answers but thought answers, any necessary assistance being given in the latter, often through appeal to other students.

Some men fail in a task, not because of actual inability to do it, but because they lack confidence in themselves and their

capacity to carry it out. The moral strength of this class merely needs reinforcing by suggestion or reassurance. Others are so nervous as to be unable to do their best under excitement. In such cases, simple tests should first be given in matters in which the individual is best informed, to serve as mental "shock absorbers" and thus replace excitement by confidence.

Moral qualities are not always absolute and inseparable. Often they are relative and depend upon a variety of conditions. It has been found repeatedly in industry that apparent listlessness or laziness was not necessarily due to moral defect but to the fact that the individual did not like his work or had not the qualifications to pursue it effectively. Such an individual, transferred to a task more nearly corresponding to his inclinations and capacity, may develop an admirable degree of industry and energy.

The foregoing is true in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense. For example, an individual may undertake a task with a considerable degree of natural enthusiasm and industry. If he succeeds at this task within a reasonable length of time, he is likely to maintain and even increase these qualities. If he fails, he may gradually lose them. Here enters the factor of exhaustion of moral resistance and energy due to difficulty or unfitness for the task to which assigned. It may be that the task should be changed — or, on the other hand, an accession of moral strength to master the situation may suffice.

The planning of instruction should be carried out in respect to necessity, the points to be covered, the review, advance and future assignment, with division of time for each. The aim and method must be worked out in advance and not left to development. With all this goes the need of showing those under instruction how to profit best by instruction and study, through a clear understanding of assignment, a knowledge that results depend on aim and purpose, ability to organize and judge the value of the subject

matter, effort to supplement information by individual thought, and development of memory by compelling its action through volition.

In respect to the processes of learning, a few general facts need to be considered. It is as important to efficient results to reduce mental action and shorten its processes as it is to abridge physical acts by cutting out unnecessary movements. Learning is a matter of memory, which depends in turn upon the phenomena known as retention, recall, association, correlation and recognition. Retention means memorizing; recall, association and correlation are association with something with which it has been connected; recognition means remembrance only when the thing is presented.

Certain laws are important in respect to the making of mental impression. These relate to primacy, recency, frequency and vividness. Primacy means that early impressions tend to be definite and lasting. Recency means that, other things being equal, the last impressions are best remembered. Frequency means that the most repeated are best remembered. Vividness means that what makes the best impression is longest retained.

Hence in impressing a point, the original assertion should be followed by repetition and frequency. Explanation should be added, for the more interest that is excited in the subject, the greater the desire for knowledge. Association is strengthened by explanation, which gives logical learning, for it creates a number of associated lines of thought which lead to the original. The direction of approach should be varied; if possible the channels of more than one instinct should be used, and in any case its form should be changed. The approach should be brief, clear and to the point.

Mere facts, as such, have no value in the control of conduct. It is only when they have some worth and appear valuable to the individual that they lead to action. There must be feeling, desire, approval or opposition in order to

make fact the starting point of action. Therefore, it is of little or no use to teach men unless their interest can be aroused in the subject taught. A knowledge of military organization does not make a good soldier unless he is interested in playing an effective part in making the machine function. To form a habit for training purposes, consciousness must be focused on the movements to be made automatic, there must be attentive repetition, and repetition must be allowed to occur until the habit is formed.

The value of experience chiefly depends upon analysis of certain results and methods, whereby general principles may be recognized which can be applied to similar, though not identical, situations in the future. Thus the value of experience rests mainly upon the analytical powers possessed by the individual, for only matters resulting in great perplexity and embarrassment are usually brought by the individual to others for their comment and advice. It follows that superiors should constantly bring the relation of cause and effect in military procedure to the attention of their men, especially those of poorer mentality.

In training, mere repetition is not fully effective. There must be attention. This means that if an exercise or drill becomes lifeless and mechanical, it should be stopped or varied. As the power of giving attention is limited, the fewer the objects of such attention, the better the result. Too many such objects, and too complicated methods, merely confuse. In the same way, distractions have a disturbing effect upon mental state and concentration. Training should, accordingly, be carried out under conditions where distractions are at a minimum. Novelty of environment serves to distract, while distraction decreases with greater familiarity. Disciplined will-power can often overcome outside distractions. The noise of battle may be practically unheard by those who have set their minds on the accomplishment of an object.

A most important factor in learning is the maintenance of

interest and the will to learn. Training should stimulate a disposition to acquire new facts and habits, for this inclination is as valuable to final results as the facts and habits actually acquired. Men will take to drill and training with avidity as long as there seems a motive for them, but as soon as they seem purposeless, excessive or unnecessary, they become drudgery and vexatious. There must be a motive by which work and sacrifice may be shown worth while. The degree of interest and attention evoked is judged by results and not by the acts of the instructor. The latter must be prompt, prepared and enthusiastic in purpose. Attention relates to the changeableness of consciousness, physical position, movement, change in tone, tempo and point of view, simple methods of approach, visual instruction, grouping work about interesting problems and stimulating initiative and emulation.

If the soldier's interest is not evoked, his movements are mechanical and mental impression is relatively slight. He must have his mind on his work in a pleasurable and absorbing manner, thus introducing the factor of personal interest. The little benefit which men derive from irksome, monotonous, mechanical drill is proverbial. On the other hand, the recent war has shown how unexpectedly good results can be rapidly obtained when the men are interested in knowing and doing. Only the things that the man wants to learn are likely to be remembered. As an example, inability to describe the face of a watch that is looked at many times a day for years, but for a different purpose, may be mentioned. On the other hand, the individual making his way over unfamiliar country for the first time and impressed with the necessity of finding his way back, is able to describe in considerable detail the salient features of the landscape.

While work is novel, interest is instinctively excited. This explains the zest with which children enter into a new game or the recruit attempts an unfamiliar drill. Too continued practice, however, results in spontaneous loss of in-

terest, and a feeling of monotony, perhaps amounting to disgust, tends ultimately to arise. Men chafe under continued instruction in matters in which they are reasonably qualified. Where monotony is great the attention wanders and the soldier becomes absent-minded and his movements more automatic. Proof of this is found in the fact that accidents, due to inattention, occur most frequently at the period of maximum productivity in certain industries where movements are few.

Monotony, from the psychological point of view, is due more to the state of mind than to the environment. In the soldier it is due largely to absence of incentive and interest. If these can be artificially stimulated and restored to tasks of repetition, as in drills, for example, by music, the idea of monotony is lost. Variations in military duties are very valuable in relieving monotony and adding interest. Field problems are particularly useful in this respect, especially if the enlisted men are given sufficient information as to what they are trying to do and how well the results are accomplished. This brings in the factor of personal interest which makes each human unit, however humble, do his best.

In its lowest form, learning is acquired for the meeting of immediate needs, and the incentive is found in attaining pleasure and avoiding pain. Curiosity, however, enters as a higher and much more important incentive to learning facts of perhaps no immediate value or application. It is important in training, therefore, that curiosity be not blocked, but that it be satisfied by explanation and stimulated to provoke further inquiry. Similarly, where there is learning by doing, the instinct of constructiveness is satisfied. If the final result is reasonably creditable, self-assertion is gratified — and the latter is enhanced if external recognition of success is recorded.

In training, skill wanes as interest falls off. The combination of monotonous drill, tired and confused men and a sarcastic drill sergeant is productive only of poor results.

An irritable instructor, captious in his criticism, slows down the very efforts he was endeavoring to hasten. The sting in biting sarcasm often draws attention away from the act being criticized and makes the result more unsatisfactory. What is wanted is enough of a stimulus to arouse attention, but not antagonism.

There is a tendency for reactions resulting in a satisfying state to make a more lasting mental impression than those reactions which temporarily annoy. This is recognized in the advertising adage, "The recollection of quality remains long after the price is forgotten." The plain lesson for officers is to see the desirability of voluntarily promoting pleasurable sensations as an offset to the unpleasant ones which necessity may impose. Where the element of pleasure can be incorporated in a military function, as music with drills, it should be done.

If the instinct of play can be utilized in drill work, presentation may be varied while principles remain the same. This avoids monotony and loss of interest, which tends to neutralize the effect of repetition. In all training, the element of competition should, as far as possible, enter,— man against man, group against group, and organization against a like unit. This gratifies not only rivalry, but self-assertion, gregariousness and other instincts. In fact, teaching seeks out the expression of any instinct to furnish a congenial motive for learning.

Fatigue is usually expressed by a decreased capacity for work. To the individual it is an unpleasant introspective state. The latter reacts upon the body to reduce physical exertion, even though the body may be actually capable of far greater effort. As already mentioned, men ordinarily fall out in marches, not because they can no longer march but because they think they cannot. Nervous fatigue should be differentiated from physical fatigue, though it includes the latter. Physical weariness reacts on mental state.

Men cannot well learn if they are uncomfortable. A burning sun will take the thoughts off drill.

Physical fatigue among soldiers is usually local. That is, certain groups of muscles, which have been in steady use, become tired and their contractions unpleasant. If the exercise be varied, so that fresher muscles come into play, and especially if the formerly contracting muscles be allowed to extend, the total amount of fatigue will not be less, but the shift of movements will allow the mind to divert from those which are painful, while relief is experienced and introspection is diminished or disappears. Long standing at attention is thus both physically and psychologically painful. Accordingly one group of movements should not be continued too long, but as soon as they become irksome others should be substituted. It further means that rests are necessary and should be more frequent among those whose muscles are not yet strengthened by use, as in the case of recruits. The length of the rest needed depends upon the nature of the work and the length of its periods. In drills, it should be only just long enough to permit proper recovery from fatigue.

In physical training, the beginner finds much difficulty in correlating muscular movements with mental stimuli. He is awkward, not only making movements not adapted to specific ends but many movements which are unnecessary. All this implies the diffuse and wasteful discharge of physical and mental energy until new channels of association between brain and body have been cleared. Until this is done, there may be a wide breach between knowing and doing. During training, brief intense effort ordinarily produces results which become standards and inspire confidence. Self-competition is thus created. Also intense efforts, through the high degree of concentration required, are of especially effective educational value. But speeding up should not be continued if errors occur, lest bad habits be formed.

It is easier in the end to learn a thing as a whole rather than piece-meal, for new connections and mental associations must be created and perhaps old habits broken off. This applies especially to drills and formations. Even though the novice does not make an early good showing, there comes a time when there is a rapid development of a harmonious whole.

A matter for consideration is the value of a general training for a specific function, just as the colleges have insisted that higher mathematics and dead languages should be taught for an alleged value in "disciplining the mind." The fact is that the best results flow from practise of the act itself which is to be performed, in the way it should be done; other acts are of benefit only as they are common elements in both. Learning by doing is the best way, after the underlying principles are understood.

There is a psychological limit to learning, just as there is a limit to physical speed or endurance. This is set by the original character of the nervous make-up. Psychological researches into the quality of mentality, as elsewhere discussed, show this very definitely. Certain so-called "plateaus of learning" are recognized. The obvious deduction from this is to watch training very carefully, and lessen its intensity and progress in those showing evidence of mental malassimilation.

Variability in amount of training gives no indication of final results. The old soldier, who may be near the peak of his own efficiency, and that not of a high order, may be shortly surpassed by the intelligent, alert recruit. Some men also learn slowly, but retain what they learn. This indicates need for watchfulness, lest non-commissioned officers relatively slip back, while the higher qualities of new-comers are overlooked.

In the complexity and multiplicity of mental operations, the human mind, in matters other than those of great im-

portance which create a vivid impression, forgets easily. Permanence of learning is a variable, depending on character and relation to personal interests. Some men naturally have an especially retentive memory; all tend to retain information which they particularly expect to use. It is important to note that the process of forgetting is rapid shortly after the act, but functions much more slowly thereafter. Tests show that about twenty per cent. of information is forgotten at the end of twenty-four hours, while seventy-six per cent. is forgotten at the end of thirty days. Thus during a period thirty times as long, only about four times as much is forgotten. This shows that only one one-fourth of information may be expected to be retained under ordinary conditions, and demonstrates the need for more effective methods of securing mental impressions in training. It also shows the importance of refreshing the memory by cumulative impression during the critical period after learning, when much of the benefit, if not thus reinforced, would be lost. Inquiry and test would show the nature and extent of the deficiencies to be made good.

Study of the subconscious mind reveals the fact that what we ordinarily call our memory is in reality a " forgettory." The subconscious mind has a complete record of all our past, which can be reached in dreams or delirium or under hypnosis. But if such a record were always crowding into our conscious minds, we should be so bewildered by the consciousness of the past that we would be unable to focus our attention on the more important present. And so it may be assumed, for purposes of analogy, that the two are separated by a barrier in which there is a door, and at that door there is stationed a guard whom we call " memory." When we want anything out of our past, we call for it, and memory summons it up from the inner room. But when we consciously repress a thing from our thoughts, we give another guard an order never to admit the matter to our conscious-

ness again. He obeys us as long as we are conscious. Not only does he keep out the repressed matter but anything connected with it that might bring it back.

Due distribution of time and effort is necessary if learning is to be economical. This varies with circumstances and individuals, but it is definitely known that too great concentration or distribution is wasteful. Both fatigue and too long time in warming up for the task should be avoided. Moderate distribution of time gives better results than continuous periods. This means frequent rest periods of brief duration, during exercises or drills, rather than one or two long ones.

The relation of morale work to training has to do with the placing of men in such mental state that they will respond to instruction with maximum efficiency. If attention and interest are efficiently stimulated, and the men's " hearts are in their work," they will be more quickly and better trained. Training and education result in character building. Started early and continued intensively, they so mold the mentality of the individual as practically to make it possible to forecast the result of stimulus in consequent act. Training and education are thus powerful factors in the purpose of morale work to control human behavior.

Education and Vocational Training. Opportunities for training, either educational or vocational, are important factors in promoting contentment, for they introduce the factors of self-interest and ambition, affording the privilege for their expression and realization. They satisfy the instincts of curiosity, constructiveness, self-assertion and acquisition. Many men will seek them directly; many more will do so under judicious stimulation by having the advantages indirectly shown them. But education and vocational training should not be directly forced on the few who do not desire them; reliance rather should be had on indirect measures of appeal, for compulsion converts privilege into task. Those who desire education should receive every en-

couragement. Knowledge of any kind not only tends to increase efficiency and earning capacity, but promotes self-respect and confers better status. It helps develop character, which, in itself, is a military asset.

The too common idea in civil life, and one which existed in some military quarters, that because a man is a soldier in the army he is necessarily illiterate and rough, is to be deplored. The best way to offset this idea is through the mental capacity and conduct of the soldiers themselves. To this end, they should be educated above the ordinary educational standards of civil life, which school statistics show are not as high as desirable, so that they may be regarded as relatively cultured men.

Under the old system of military service, when a man entered the army he gave up all opportunities for education and vocational training. When he went back to his community he was behind the other men of his age in education and technical ability. He found most of the positions taken and, if any were vacant, he was not adapted by training to fill them. The new system proposes that the soldier returning to civil life shall, as a result of his military training, take with him a greater earning capacity and ideas and standards of conduct which will make him a more useful citizen. Accordingly, the new educational system should go hand in hand with military instruction and training, under a well balanced scheme in which the primary purpose of an army — to make soldiers — is not overlooked or obscured. Time, experience and the development of a fully worked out plan will doubtless result in something satisfactory to all concerned.

It was early apparent during demobilization that some special appeal must be devised if the voluntary recruiting of the new army was to be a success. Under old methods, no more than 40,000 men had been recruited in any one year, while the existing need was for five times that number. Educational opportunity offered the only prospect of effec-

tive appeal and so it was featured extensively. The results justified the need and the plan. The few officers opposed to educational work may accept it as a fact that without such appeal they would have had insignificantly small forces under them. The choice was not wholly one of election but partly of necessity in order to popularize the army and attract recruits.

Vocational training offers many opportunities for enlisted men to benefit themselves. Investigations made shortly after the Armistice showed that more than six hundred vocations were being carried on in the military service within the United States to meet military requirements in camp utilities, special technical services and the like. Accordingly, they furnished a basis and a going organization which, with relatively little change, could easily be adapted to vocational instruction purposes. The morale organization saw and utilized in them a ready agency for establishing a higher state of morale and a corresponding state of discipline and contentment at a time when the unrest pertaining to demobilization needed to be allayed. Thus at one of the camps there were at one time 4,000 men taking an intensive course in agriculture. At another camp 4,400 men enrolled for thirty-seven different courses. Night classes were organized for men who were unable to participate in day classes. In this work instruction was given by officers and men who volunteered for such service, by the welfare organizations and by volunteer civilian teachers and others.

Similarly, various courses pertaining to a literary, scientific and business education were established and put into operation. The welfare organizations agreed to provide instructors, books and equipment for any course for which a sufficient number of students presented themselves. Vacant barracks, welfare huts and other structures were used for classrooms. Many thousands of men enrolled under the authority and support universally given by commanders, continuing under instruction until they were discharged.

The work thus begun by the Morale Branch in November, 1918, was continued for about eight months on a decreasing scale as troops were mustered out and its need as a factor to control unrest diminished. It was then taken over by the newly organized Education and Recreation Branch, systematized and expanded and funds provided to carry it on. As the functions of the Education and Recreation Branch in connection with the development and operation of this work are fully covered in official orders and circulars they will not be discussed here.

The educational work in the American Expeditionary Force was developed early in 1919 under the Young Men's Christian Association, which standardized methods, books and courses and provided expert advisors and assistants for schools for officers and men. A school officer was appointed for each army, corps, division, regiment, post, school and special unit, and schools were established wherever there was a constant population of 500 soldiers or more. Instruction was given in common school subjects, modern languages, history of the United States, history of modern nations, civics and citizenship and other authorized subjects.

Attendance was voluntary, except for illiterates and non-English speaking soldiers, but students once enrolled were required to complete their course. Record cards enabled courses which had been interrupted to be resumed as opportunity offered. Certificates of proficiency were issued.

Higher education and occupational training were later provided. For this purpose, divisional educational centers were established, one for each army, corps, division and section of the S.O.S. A large number of subjects were authorized for vocational training. Higher education, including courses usually found in high schools, agricultural colleges and business schools, was provided. Selected officers and men were also sent to universities of the nations associated with the United States. An A.E.F. educational center was also established to act as intermediary between universities

and the divisional educational centers. The course was three months.

The reports on the educational and training work since its establishment have been overwhelmingly favorable. The men appreciated it, not only by reason of the personal benefit to be gained, but because it was evidence of governmental interest in their welfare. It filled up time which would otherwise have been idle and gave a new interest which bound as well as attracted men to the service. It has probably won the support of the civilian community to the army as nothing else could do.

A report from one hospital states that: "The educational and vocational work is the best morale factor that could be devised. Patients who before sat in their beds, cursing their fate, the army and life in general, are now interested in making some toy or trinket. Those who can get out, forget themselves in the more serious shop work. Patients have been heard to remark that they did not care if they were kept in the army if they could learn something. They get tired of being entertained; work and study are the solution."

Probably some few men took vocational training believing that it would mean less effort and responsibility on their part than as if purely military work were selected. Those actuated by any such motive soon found that they were doomed to disappointment, for the work is carried out seriously and requires the greater part of the time and the best efforts of every man who goes into it.

Any system of education and vocational training in the army should be sufficiently comprehensive in scope to meet any reasonable desires on the part of the recruit. Further, the recruit, once enlisted, should be given such station as will enable him to pursue the course he elects. This is not difficult, but merely a matter of administrative bookkeeping. The course thus elected should be carried out in sufficient detail, should be standardized for the military service as a

whole and should coördinate with the requirements of educational institutions and trade schools so as to fulfill their standards. It should be elastic so as to conform readily to the varying requirements of the service as affected by military necessity. The general subjects in which instruction is given, and the general purposes and methods employed, will not be gone into here as they are covered in various official documents of the War Department. But certain special subjects may be briefly touched upon, as they have such a close relation to fighting efficiency, contentment and esprit.

War aims must be clarified for the soldier. He must know for what he is fighting or preparing to fight. He must be made to recognize himself as the potential force for the ideals of right and justice of the people he represents. The less literate cannot well reason out such matters for themselves, and it becomes necessary to formulate them in simple ways that they can understand. Such instruction is of particular value in establishing a background upon which stimulation of the personal interests of self-assertion, pugnacity, etc., may later appear. In General Pershing's report he says: —" The earnest belief of every member of the Expeditionary Forces in the justice of our cause was productive of a form of self-imposed discipline among our soldiers which must be regarded as an unusual development of this war, a fact which materially aided us to organize and employ in an incredibly short space of time the extraordinary fighting machine developed in France. . . . Without the . . . willingness and enthusiasm displayed . . . the successful results we obtained so quickly would have been utterly impossible."

In the " War Issues Course " of instruction given to the Students Army Training Corps, the value of its relation to the upbuilding of morale was reported upon by 127 commanding officers. Of these, five reported negatively, four as doubtful and 118 were enthusiastically in favor of it as a promoter of morale. One officer reported that students be-

gan the course as "unwilling soldiers," but at the end were "crazy to get into the fight."

In educating men in war aims, any agency is useful that can transmit the necessary ideas. Addresses, songs, posters, cartoons, moving pictures, the drama — all are valuable. But the best agent among literates is the printed word. By this agency, the volume of material, methods of approach and pressure induced are what one chooses and is able to make them. In case of another draft, part of the work of the Draft Boards should be the elementary but systematized information of pre-inductants in respect to military and camp conditions and national war aims.

The teaching of military tradition is one of the most potent agencies in the building of morale and the strengthening of character to meet the shock of unusual circumstances. Knowledge of the high quality of behavior of other soldiers in our service, either in our own or former times, furnishes standards for emulation and conduct under similar trial or hardship. It should be given to the recruit as part of his early training, especially that relating to his own organization. It would be well for company commanders themselves to give instruction in it, as being something so fine and lofty as to require handling by the highest practicable authority.

Mention should here be made of the great value of stories and other matter interpretative of army life in relation to military morale. Kipling, through his army stories and poems, has been one of the great benefactors of the British army. Such epic poems as "The Charge of the Light Brigade" and "The Loss of the Birkenhead" stir the soul not only of every Briton in uniform but stimulate ideals for every fighting man. Through imagination, men may be made to mentally visualize themselves as heroes and to respond in emergency to the high standards of conduct thus developed.

Beside teaching men how to die for their country, the

army will not do its full duty toward them unless it teaches them how to live for their country in the sense of better citizenship. An effective appeal, after the Armistice, to officers who did not get across was, "If you couldn't help smash Germans you can help make Americans."

One of the great aids to soldier morale is in showing him his true status as the strong arm of the Government and informing him in the history, institutions and ideals which he has been chosen to guard. This should be one of the first things taught to the recruit as a military factor. So, too, on returning to civil life, the soldier should carry with him clear ideas as to the organization of his government, the ideals of a democracy, sound and patriotic citizenship and his civic responsibilities.

The Americanization work in the army should coördinate with that being conducted in civil life, though naturally going much further and securing better results than would be possible in civil life under its more scattered opportunities and less intensive methods.

The development of a lecture service holds forth great possibilities as an aid to morale. The professional lecturer should be suitably utilized, though it does not follow that he is always more interesting because he may have a more finished technique. It is the timely lecture on the current topic which is frequently the most valuable. The appeal of subjects of importance to the soldier, both as a fighting man and potential citizen, is always great. The officer who has a real message also commands more attention than the civilian. However, the great value and influence of lectures delivered by men of nation-wide repute and power should not be overlooked, for their very reputation and personality in themselves are matters of interest and add tremendously to the influence of what they might say.

The utilization of soldier speakers to make addresses, both in and out of camps, is a valuable morale agent, especially in reaching members of a civilian community. It is

also important in respect to troops in camp and particularly recruits. A policy as to their selection and choice of subjects, together with the furnishing of programs and material, would be desirable.

The discussion of topics of interest in formal debate or open forum has a desirable educational value. It is of course desirable that the men selected to represent the diverse ideas should be serious minded and not apt to inject difficulties into the proposition by captious criticism or the arousing of antagonisms based on differences of opinion.

Competitive essays for cash prizes on subjects such as "What the Army has done for me," are often valuable in focusing the attention of the men on the advantages of the service.

Information. Information is particularly understood to include knowledge capable of application to current affairs. It satisfies the normal instinct of curiosity, which is a powerful and natural urge in all men. It is true that in the military service an order must be obeyed without the necessity of giving reasons for it, but it is equally true that the indiscriminate reliance on such arbitrary power is not always wise. Information and explanation do much to predispose the mind to receive, without great shock or objection, requirements which may otherwise seem to the soldier, and especially to the new man, as harsh, unnecessary and even belittling. Hence, if there is no reason why information should be withheld, it not only should be given, but the giving should be systematized.

In addition to its influence on the control of conduct, through the satisfaction of the instinct of curiosity, it is an extremely important factor in relation to self-assertion, one of the strongest instincts of the fighting man. The issuing of an order which, on the face of it and in its application to the men, may seem arbitrary, tyrannical and as imposing unnecessary hardship and restriction on personal liberty and enjoyment, would tend deliberately to block the instinct of

self-assertion and the result may be sullenness, smothered resentment or, under certain conditions, open antagonism, depending on the mood of the men or individual and the drastic or painful qualities of the order. But if judicious information as to the necessity for the order were given, the psychological reaction produced would be totally different. Instead of being blocked, the energy of self-assertion is diverted into the channel which reason points out as the proper one under the circumstances. Perhaps the giving of information as to the necessity for the order will call other tendencies of greater force into play, such as self-preservation. Or perhaps the herd instinct will come into play and dictate that compliance with the order is for the good of the group or organization.

Let us see how this works in practical application. Suppose an order is issued peremptorily canceling and restricting the passes of an organization. The reaction on the men is resentment, keen and immediate. But suppose that with the order goes the information that a number of cases of contagious disease have been discovered in the nearby civilian community. The chances are that the men will gladly accept the terms of the order, for self-interest tells them that the town is not a safe place to visit. Or suppose the information goes with the order that within the next twenty-four hours the camp or post is to be inspected by some prominent personage. Here the herd instinct comes into play and prompts each man that it is for the good of the organization that every man should be at his post and make the best possible showing for the entire group.

The giving of information applies not only to orders but to conditions to which the men are temporarily obliged to submit. Suppose that a consignment of warm clothing, which is greatly needed by the men, is long overdue and has not yet arrived. Grumbling and discontent may manifest themselves throughout the post and there is general criticism of the service. But, under these conditions, suppose that

authoritative information is given out to the effect that the shipment of clothing has been held up in a freight congestion, but is now on its way and will arrive in a few days. Men will endure much if they understand there is a good reason for it or if relief is in sight.

Information in the war made this country mentally homogeneous as never before in its history, despite every effort that fraud, chicanery and propaganda could devise. Through information by publicity, the people were educated by Germany itself in the moral rottenness of its ideals as demonstrated by its official acts. As a result, when the issue of war came, the feeble pipings of scattered treason were overwhelmed by the diapason of national wrath. Soldier and civilian alike gave the best that there was in them to a united purpose.

All recognize that in time of war and particularly in the face of the enemy, the reasons for many acts must be confidential. In peace, this does not always of necessity apply. Nor is repeated information necessary concerning the routine duties which form the vast majority of the soldier's requirements. But to give it in exceptional instances allays misapprehension and serves to show the men that their officers have a personal concern in them.

Soldiers do not object to hard work in a military way when they can see a necessary purpose in it. An unattractive duty will be performed far more effectively if its reasonableness is understood; if it is not reasonable it should not be made a duty. In a difficult situation, it is sometimes well to put the matter squarely up to the troops, to let them know of the arduous and perhaps dangerous nature of the work ahead and thereby make them partners in the endeavor.

The exigencies of the military service render it impossible to equalize conditions and opportunities in many instances. These may rankle unless explained. Similarly, soldiers will not so much resent having their personal tendencies or de-

sires frustrated by military orders if the need of good discipline for the protection of themselves and comrades, and the promotion of the common purpose, is explained to them. Conversely, the stories of enemy deserters and others, regarding hardships in the enemy forces equal to or greater than our own, can often be used to promote morale. When the enemy is false to the ideals of humanity, it should be very clearly set forth. Knowledge that he himself is championing truth, honor, justice and other high ideals gives strength to the soldier.

Explanation can remove most of the vague terrors of an unfamiliar environment in advance of contact with it. Men going over seas, or into hostile territory, should be systematically informed as to the conditions which will be encountered, steps to be taken to meet them, and as to other matters liable to affect their interest and adjustment to the new environment.

Many resent the so-called "red tape" of the army. Their attitude would change if they understood that the interlocking interests of a great military force require a definite, common method of procedure in order to secure community of purpose and action. Informing the men that any steps looking to the betterment of matters affecting them get quick action has a beneficial effect upon morale. Men often fall into error through ignorance and heedlessness. To them the facts should be pointed out. The various agencies and methods for the transmission of information are covered elsewhere.

Orders. Orders, besides being informative, should, in time of supreme endeavor, be inspirational. By reason of the vast numbers of men in modern armies, it is no longer possible for the high commander to make such personal appeal as Napoleon made before the Battle of Pyramids. The men must be reached by subordinates through the agency of the printed word. The following are examples of actual inspirational battle orders:

"Order of the Day"

"Soldiers of the front line, —nd Division:

"A few hundred yards to the north of you the remnants of the decimated crack divisions of the German army are clinging desperately to the pivotal point of their bruised and broken line, on which hangs the fate of their emperor and empire.

"The —nd Division was sent to this sector to shatter that line. You are shock troops. 'Les Terribles' the French call you. 'Fightin' Sons o' Guns' the Americans call you. You are the very flower of our army. And you who remain up there in front have been tried by fire. The skulkers have skulked — the quitters have quit. Only the men with 'guts' remain.

"Machine guns? You have captured thousands of them. And you took them standing up. The only way to take machine guns is to take them. No use lying down on the ground. They have plenty of ammunition and they aim low.

"Shells? Shell casualties are only 3 per cent. of the total.

"Tired? You have been in the line two weeks. Your enemies have been in five weeks — prisoners say they have gone through hell.

"The —nd Division is going ahead when the first American army attacks. We're three regiments abreast, with one in support. Each is echeloned in depth — one battalion behind the other — except the one on the extreme right. That one mops up Romagne. The others go forward.

"It is not enough to say 'I'll try.'

"Your resolve must be 'I will.'"

"———, Brigadier General."

"Memorandum to Officers"

"I have just seen the corps commander. He and the commander in chief attach the utmost importance to the operation we are about to undertake. We must go through. For that reason we have been strongly echeloned in depth, to give driving power. If for any reason, the front line is held up, the next must go through. We must not be stopped.

"Please see your battalion commanders and impress upon them this fact. Keep in close personal touch with the situation and order passage of lines if it becomes necessary. After reaching an objective is a suitable time.

"I desire the inclosed 'Order of the Day' to be communicated to every man in the command before the 'H' hour.

"The —nd Division has never failed. It must not fail this time."

"———"

"Cautions:

"Panels.

"Wire cutters.

"Keep close to the barrage. It is a slow one.

"Don't let it get away. It is your protection."

In the "Ten Commandments" of Marshal Foch is an inspirational as well as a practical message to the troops. As slightly amended by an American division, they read:

"1. Keep your eyes and ears ready and your mouth in the safety notch, for it is your soldierly duty to see and hear clearly, but as a rule you should be heard mainly in the sentry challenge, or in the charging cheer.

"2. Obey orders first, and if still alive, kick afterward if you have been wronged.

"3. Keep your arms and equipment clean and in good order; treat your animals kindly and fairly and your motor or other machine as though it belonged to you and was the only one in the world.

"4. Do not waste your ammunition, your gas, your food, your time, nor your opportunity.

"5. Never try to fire an empty gun, nor fire at an empty trench, but when you shoot, shoot to kill, and forget not that at close quarters a bayonet beats a bullet.

"6. Tell the truth squarely, face the music, and take your punishment like a man; pity and shield the children in your captured territory, for you were once a helpless child.

"7. Bear in mind that the enemy is your enemy and the enemy of humanity until he is killed or captured; then he is your dead brother, or your fellow soldier beaten or ashamed, whom you should no further humiliate.

"8. Do your best to keep your head clear and cool, your body clean and comfortable and your feet in good condition, for you think with your head, fight with your body, and march with your feet.

"9. Be of good cheer and high courage; shirk neither work nor danger; suffer in silence and cheer the comrade at your side with a smile.

"10. Dread defeat, but not wounds; fear dishonor, but not death, and die game, and whatever the task, remember the motto of the division, 'IT SHALL BE DONE.'"

The Field Service Regulations of the United States Army, paragraphs 84 to 95, cover the subject of orders quite fully as to form, composition and context. It is therefore unnecessary to go into general details here. Orders may be expressed in letters of instruction, field orders, general orders, orders, special orders, verbal orders, and messages either oral or written. Orders must be clear and concise; precise as to time and place; expressed in correct and simple

language; written legibly; positive, avoiding expressions of a conditional nature, such as " at dawn," " if possible." As stated elsewhere, the officer who can express himself clearly, forcefully and concisely in orders has a great advantage over the officer who cannot. The officer who can write an order so that there can be only one possible interpretation of its meaning will obtain corresponding unity of purpose.

Every officer should study his own orders after writing them and before issuing them to avoid mistakes, dual meanings, complex construction, unnecessary words and vague expressions. It is easier to take a few minutes to study over an order before it is issued to the organization than it is to have to correct it afterward. Clear and accurate expression is a habit which practically every one can acquire by application and practise. Even the commonplace company order can be made a channel for dignified, clear and concise expression. Nearly everything that applies to expression in written orders also applies to verbal orders.

In time of war, orders frequently contain citations of various kinds, some for deeds of bravery in the face of the enemy and some for especially meritorious and efficient work. Citations may be either a recommendation for the award of a decoration, such as the Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Medal, or the Distinguished Service Cross, or they may be merely a recognition of exceptional service with conferring of honor which is made a matter of record of the individual. In form, citations in orders are limited to plain statements of facts, in clear, crisp, official language, divested of all eulogism. All officers should keep in mind the intrinsic morale value of citations and, when appropriate occasion arises, make use of them in rewarding exceptionally worthy service and valorous conduct.

Uncertainty. The mental suspense of uncertainty is hard to bear and inevitably depresses morale, especially with new troops. The Germans grasped this point, and part of

their propaganda was calculated to create uncertainty in both the civil and military elements of their opponents. In many instances uncertainty is unavoidable, but when possible it should be intimated to the command that this is so. In other cases, higher authority may be in possession of information which would tend to allay uncertainty, and which it might be perfectly proper to give out.

Uncertainty and apprehension of the unknown are greater depressants of morale than usually understood. Further, uncertainty prevents proper preparation to meet any given situation. Many men are contented to accept any contingency provided they are able to make plans, tentative though these may be, in their future interests. But all resent an apparent uncertainty of military intent which does not seem to know its own mind, or an apparently purposeless secrecy which, in time of no military exigency, serves merely to irritate and discontent. Indifference is sometimes a factor in failure to inform, but probably most preventable cases depend on lack of realization of what a little information to the soldier means to his peace of mind and efficiency. Uncertainty in civil industry similarly operates as a depressant to spirits and productivity.

Rumors. Any great aggregation or organization of men, with incomplete or uncertain information as to their future, naturally becomes fertile soil for the development and growth of rumors. If information is not supplied, rumor will develop to supply the mental lack which demands satisfaction. The combatting of rumors has been one of the most arduous, continuous and important tasks of the morale organization.

Ignorance is the chief cause of army rumors, with their disturbing effect upon contentment and discipline. Some false reports that gain currency often have no foundation in fact, but originate in ignorant gossip and idle jest. Other rumors spring from a germ of truth, but these rapidly become exaggerations in passing from mouth to mouth. In-

terpretation of conditions may have been wrong in the first place. Class-room tests on highly intelligent individuals have shown the great diversity of evidence for the same condition or act, even under average conditions. Hence, in war, when the critical faculty is in abeyance, the most unexpected and absurd ideas readily gain credence.

Enemy sympathizers find depressing rumors an effective means of propaganda among troops and civilian populations. The systematic use of them did much damage in Russia and Italy. Taken up and repeated by persons who may not be disloyal, but whose propensities for gossip are ignorantly harmful or are made use of by enemy sympathizers, rumors travel rapidly, causing discontent among the soldiers. Moreover, they shake the faith of the people in the proper functioning of the military establishment and its ability to cope with or overcome the enemy. There is a vibration between the extremes of hope and fear in which mental agreement is impaired. The results are a loss of morale, a lack of confidence, and a feeling that the enemy is more formidable than he really is.

The war hysterias of civil life are important factors in the development of rumors within as well as outside the military service. They develop in the neurasthenic, emotional and imaginative, whose state of mind is one of credulity and exaggeration. Women seem particularly susceptible to their influence, and the garrulousness of the flighty, ill-balanced type makes them most effective agents in spreading their ideas. One special danger with respect to rumors, false information and misunderstanding is that they create honest dupes who create difficulties through believing themselves to be champions of truth and right. The remedy is to furnish accurate information, whereby a new point of view is established.

A good example of the disturbing effect on contentment is shown in the correspondence columns of service papers. Here are printed communications which are mostly critical

and, to those who know, are very obviously due to lack of information or to misinformation. Such letters spread dissatisfaction and promote criticism throughout the service. Many would never have been written had facts and reasons, in proper cases, been disseminated in the service.

During the war, a vast number of rumors received more or less credence. In this country, some were to the effect that the tongues of American soldiers were cut out by the enemy; that medical officers who were enemy agents deliberately inoculated the men with disease; that powdered glass was put in food; that hospitals were full of "basket cases," men who were both legless and armless; aspersions against the character of nurses, etc. In France, after the Armistice, our troops believed such rumors as that they were to be sent to Russia, to West Africa, to the Balkan States, etc.

It has already been shown that appropriate act tends to follow belief entertained, irrespective of whether the latter is right or wrong. No better example of this exists than in the Indian Mutiny, the outbreak of which sprung from the uncorrected rumor and falsehood that the cartridges of the native troops were lubricated with pig-fat for the purpose of indirectly breaking down the native religious aversion to it. Such examples demonstrate that rumors of an unfavorable nature should be watched for and refuted as soon as possible. They should not be allowed to secure credence through unopposed affirmation and repetition.

One important function of the morale operatives is to keep the company commander informed of the rumors current in his organization, so that measures may be taken to neutralize them. The best agent for combatting rumor, falsehood and enemy propaganda is truth. American ideals have nothing to conceal; they invite publicity. How the facts can be best furnished is a local problem.

To determine the source of a rumor, the limits of its spread and the rapidity of its transmission takes time. A

remedy applied late fails of full effect. The indirect method is not to deny the truth of the rumor, but to bring certain facts to the public attention which would show clearly that the allegations or the rumor must be false. This can be done under the guise of interesting news, and may safely be used as widely as desired.

In using direct methods, the rumor is stated and its allegations specifically denied and controverted by facts. In combatting rumors directly it is an excellent rule not to apply the proposed remedy to an extent greater than or a place different from that to which the rumor itself has spread. There are times when minor rumors are best left unrefuted, rather than to bring them up afresh in the public mind. To handle a more or less local rumor by general measures of contradiction is often merely to sow the seeds of faulty idea broadcast, for some minds seem to work by contraries and would accept in a positive sense the statements which were being presented only for the purpose of disproving them. Also there are persons of suspicious character, whose mental operations are along the line of the old, and often faulty, simile, " Where there is smoke there must be fire."

Another way to stop rumors is to hold narrators responsible for their truth and trace them back to the original source. This will check the loose talkers and rumor spreaders in a command. Men of great verbal capacity may often become great trouble makers, not because of intent but because they talk loosely and too much. It is of interest, in this connection, to note that there is a strange class, fortunately not large, of pathological liars and accusers whose warped mentality has a natural tendency to untruth. In the work of combatting rumors, the use of ridicule, in the so-called " hot air " bulletins, has proved very successful. This is a space on the regular bulletin board, which is given some title such as the " Pipe Dream Gazette," " Wild Rumor News," etc. The individual in charge of the bulletin board, on hearing

any of the numerous rumors which float about camp, immediately bulletins them, usually with some humorous comment. In cases of serious rumors, he endeavors to get into touch with headquarters and secure a denial, which is immediately posted under the item and verbally passed out to the men. These bulletin boards are very popular with the men, and the mere fact that a rumor appears on them under such a heading discredits it at once.

Erroneous Statements. In all morale work, it is important to remember that rumor and falsehood, if believed, have the same influence on act as if they were the truth. It follows, therefore, that these agents may deliberately be used by the unscrupulous to create a temporary morale to tide over an emergency, as has happened in certain foreign armies. Their use, however, is not only to be opposed for ethical reasons, but because they are dangerous.

To attempt to buoy up morale by false promises, or by announcing as a certainty what is uncertain, and which later fails to materialize, is sure to be followed by sharp reaction and fall in morale as soon as the deception is realized. Not only does the original cause return with increased force and in wider extent, but confidence is shaken and an added source of depressed morale is created for the future.

The unauthorized statement by some officers to men retained in the service during demobilization, that their retention was temporary only, eased their minds for a period, but was followed by profound disappointment and bitterness against the entire military establishment.

Statements in error by those in authority create a unique feeling of distrust for the whole military organization. The stronger the expectancy of truth from any given source, the greater the emotional upset and reaction in behavior toward any appearance of deceit. The American soldier responds best to squareness and openness. Absolute frankness, if explanation is appropriate, is a supreme requisite in the military service at all times.

Disloyal Propaganda. It is important that efforts to undermine the patriotism of the soldier and his loyalty to the Government, whatever the purpose, source or method, should fail of intended effect. This can be accomplished by counter-effort, probably exerted in advance. As to when or how evidence of disloyal activity may appear, it is impossible to say. In war, it may be expected to appear early and continuously, either by direct and more or less obvious efforts of the enemy or by the more guarded propaganda of enemy sympathizers in our own territory, whose influence may be even more potent because exercised through innuendo, insinuation and suggestion. In peace, certain groups of disorderly purpose may attempt to introduce the yeast of unrest within the service. A main purpose may be partly screened as well as promoted by a specious issue. A constant duty of the morale organization is to exert vigilance in respect to such matters to the end that the harmful mental infection shall be excluded, isolated, neutralized or destroyed and the command immunized against it.

The greatest dependence can unquestionably be placed on the loyalty, steadfastness and devotion of the American soldier and on his ability to think for himself and draw the right conclusions if all facts are fairly presented to him. No question, nor inference of a question, as to the possession of these qualities should ever be raised. Belief therein can be built up by assertion, reiteration, tradition and esprit de corps. Then if the test comes, the individual is proof against it.

After forming this background of patriotic loyalty, the next step is the matter of educating and informing the soldier as to the fundamental principles of Americanism and its purpose, good government, good citizenship and the basic truths of civics and sociology. In presenting them, the attitude should be that of showing the error of false doctrines by which he might be confused or misled without proper understanding. This should be done in the simplest lan-

guage and clearest logic, so that the less literate may be able to draw their own conclusions.

Much disloyal propaganda draws its support from ignorance, delusions and false ideals. The answer to this is truth, education, information and replacing the false ideal with a true one. Idealism is a definite and strong component in the make-up of most men. Once imbued with an ideal, men will make any sacrifice and endure any punishment for it. It is essential, therefore, that such ideals shall be right. But they cannot be forced on the soldier; he must be brought to accept them through suggestion, or create them from the raw material of information furnished him and the deductions to be made therefrom. This method should show not only that only one ideal is right but that the opposing ideas are wrong.

The methods to be used in the dissemination of anti-disloyal ideas include educational talks, inspirational addresses, the " open forum " for discussion, articles in newspapers, the use of constructive books, special attention to human agents of disloyalty within the military purview and other means which will readily suggest themselves.

Publicity. Publicity is one of the most valuable agents of morale work, since it relates to the physical dissemination of ideas. It is the basis of the information and education of the masses of human beings, whereby they are brought to a common state of mind resulting in unity of action. It places emphasis on certain facts and purposes, embodying ideas, opinions and ready made phrases which are adopted by their readers without the necessity for inquiry and various processes of reasoning things out. It plants the desired idea in the individual's mind and, when he encounters the situation to which the idea relates, he unconsciously yields to its influence and the preconceptions it has created. The results, in number and extent, generally correspond to the degree and intensity of the publicity. Thus, through publicity during the war, funds were raised in inconceivable

amounts, the dietary habits of a nation were changed, and opinion itself toward the war was largely reversed.

Publicity within the military service has usually taken the direct form, such as is expressed in orders, circulars, memoranda and similar more or less mandatory matter. It has also been restricted in its field, to a very great extent, to the official functioning of the military machine. But the usefulness of publicity extends far beyond such narrow limits. It is the mechanical means for the stimulation and satisfaction of human interest and curiosity and, to a less extent, other basic instincts. Information as to what others in the service are accomplishing is necessary to comparison and emulation. It promotes achievement by bringing into play the desire to excel in order to stand well in the estimation of the public, the larger group, or the class as a whole. Understanding of the accomplishments of the great numbers whose energies are being bent to the common task gives encouragement and fortitude.

The army as a whole has seemed, in the past, to have a general trend against publicity as being something lowering to dignified ideals. But because it has been, or may be, abused by a few self-seekers is no reason for neglecting its use. Within proper limitation and direction, it is wholly good. Publicity which redounds to dignity, reputation, public esteem and esprit de corps is a great asset, for it is at the very basis of the regard and respect in which a group or its work is held. Reputation depends, not only on the performance of certain acts or the possession of certain qualities, but upon the knowledge of them by others.

Publicity is thus the natural by-product of good work. A reputation which comes through character and deeds is perfectly legitimate and desirable; it cannot be bestowed or bought. It stirs the individual or organization on whom it is based to continue to excel, while stimulating others to surpass. If the men do well, they would like their friends and those interested in the same calling to know it. In time

of peace, publicity is almost the only reward available for exceptional efficiency. Legitimate sources of publicity are two,— special military excellence as part of the general military plan, and identification with public movements of a military, patriotic, educational or charitable nature. This is especially true in peace with regard to athletic contests, either partly or wholly within the service. The best publicity is that which is indirect and due to identification of the organization with great historical deeds, public service, or local military or other enterprise.

It is most important to military efficiency that the service should have a background of good reputation. Legitimate stories of a favorable character should be given out to offset the effect of any adverse publicity which might appear. This credit account will not be established properly unless due efforts are made to that end, and they will not be made in the face of official indifference or inertia. But they should be made. A military force tends to receive a certain amount of undesirable publicity through the appearance of its members before courts and in other ways. The uniform gives prominence to incidents which, in civilians, would be disregarded or given casual mention. As a result, the whole service suffers from the faults of the few, and men who later don the uniform shoulder the obloquy for faults committed by their predecessors and for which they themselves were in no wise responsible. Only through proper publicity can the public be educated to regard the military offender as an occasional individual and not a generic military type, and the stigma of offense be attached to the individual and not to the service.

Judicious publicity creates a friendly and favoring attitude on the part of the general public toward organizations known to be doing good work. Others may do equally good work, but if the community has no special knowledge of it, its attitude is naturally one of indifference. Where a community takes pride in an organization, it places it under

idealistic standards to which it instinctively endeavors to conform. Human nature is such that organizations, like individuals, endeavor to prove themselves worthy of public trust. Practical benefits accrue; as in recruiting, which tends to come from a larger and better class because the public knows about the organization and its achievements and esteems it accordingly. A proper use of general publicity, both in publications of the civil community and in soldier papers, is the prompt means of correction of any false impressions which may have become current about the camp, desertions, absence without leave, prevalence of sickness, or any other matters of error about physical conditions or matter of administration.

Undesirable publicity is that which, through ignorance, misunderstanding or malice, constantly features conditions in the service in an unfair light and creates in the public mind an unfavorable idea of the army as a whole, with correspondingly bad effect on morale, recruiting, discipline, social status and a host of lesser items. There is also an undesirable publicity founded on sham, pretense, assumption, half-truths or falsehood. It is the publicity intended to influence the ignorant or credulous through claiming merit which does not exist and of magnifying mediocrity until it appears as excellence. Such notoriety usually overreaches and defeats itself, for it is ultimately recognized as based on appearance, rather than on substance, and brings about a negative state of mind toward the matter in question by those in position to be more accurately informed concerning it. The difference between fame and notoriety should be clearly kept in mind. There is no reason why creditable publicity for honorable endeavor should not be accepted, and, on the other hand, there is every reason why the facts should be known to the public, so that the commendation of the latter may be at least a part of the proper reward of effort. For any state of public mind toward it, the army

itself is largely responsible. Aloofness and assumed indifference to public opinion allow allegations to go unrefuted while making little effort to see that virtues and successes are brought to public attention.

In many instances, news items are published regarding the military establishment which are in error and at variance with facts. These items are based chiefly on ignorance, incomplete information, misunderstanding, or hearsay evidence, itself in error. Doubtless in a few instances, also, known facts are intentionally ignored or distorted. However, most persons are disposed to be fair, but if false information is furnished them they naturally come to wrong conclusions.

It must be reiterated that a state of mind, whether it be based on false premise or not, tends directly to expression in behavior and act. It is reflected, relative to the service, in social relations or other attitude toward it, and in legislation concerning it. As the attitude of the public toward the military service, and its consequent acts, can result from error, it is equally true that the effects of error can be forestalled or neutralized through their correction by truth. As a matter of business efficiency, as well as of morale, the military establishment should take steps to protect itself against the consequences of erroneous statements by promptly correcting them. Such statements appearing in the press, reflecting unjustly on the military establishment, or similarly in the case of industry, should be systematically followed up and offset as soon as possible by statements, in the same community, and preferably in the same publication, of the actual facts in the case.

For this purpose of correction of error, and the development and maintenance of proper publicity, the morale organization is best adapted. In the correction of an erroneous newspaper statement, due regard should be given to the following:

(a) It is obvious that discussion of matters bearing on War Department policies, politics, race, religion, or industry, should not be indulged in.

(b) Any appearance of controversy should invariably be avoided.

(c) The effectiveness of an effort to secure correction ranks: 1. Personal visit; 2. Telephone; 3. Letter.

(d) The approach should be made without any evidence of resentment and without complaint, the assumption being that the person responsible for the erroneous item acted in good faith and that undoubtedly he will be pleased to have the correct facts and give them equal publicity.

(e) The proper person, that is, the reporter, city editor, managing editor, or other official, should be reached without giving offense by appealing over the heads of those below.

(f) It will pay to alternate methods of approach and sometimes to employ more than one.

(g) Uniform courtesy and an attitude of helpfulness are the most effective agencies for establishing friendly relations with members of the press.

(h) The press officials should understand that the correction of the error is a matter undertaken at the direction of the Commanding Officer.

(i) The error should be corrected at the earliest possible moment. Special effort should be made to secure the correction in the newspaper publishing the erroneous statement in order to reach the same readers as far as possible. A newspaper might be unwilling to print a correction, but agreeable to publishing a new article on the same subject in which the facts could be brought out as desired. Similarly, an error in one publication might be offset by a new article in another publication issued in the same locality.

(j) The officer making the correction should in no wise let his name appear in print as the giver of the corrective statement or facts. The Commanding Officer should be the

one and only person to whom the authority of the correction is accredited.

(k) Absolute verification of all facts should be obtained before giving them to the press. "Press agenting," guessing and exaggerations in either direction should never be indulged in.

(l) If written statements are prepared they should be terse, accurate, clear, confined to the bare facts to be presented and shorn of all flowery language and unnecessary verbiage.

(m) If effort is made by the press to obtain facts or verify a story before the military authorities are aware of its existence or have had time to investigate, every courtesy and aid should be extended to bona fide newspaper representatives and no obvious effort made to cover up, obstruct or conceal. It should always be remembered that newspapers have a way of getting a story if they go after it and any obstructive attitude will merely serve to bias reporters and tend to make them suspicious, often leading them to believe that more is being concealed than really is the case. At such times a spirit of frankness and helpfulness will do more to influence reporters in favor of the military establishment and tone down a story than anything else.

(n) The confidence and personal friendship of newspaper reporters is invaluable in publicity work, especially if possessed by the Commanding Officer himself. Despite anything that may be said to the contrary, a newspaper man will not violate a trust nor print what is told him in confidence, particularly if requested not to print it without the permission of the person disclosing it. Newspaper men do, however, appreciate things told them in confidence as clearing up many points in their minds, and consider it a matter of honor not to violate the trust placed in them. In exceptional cases where a reporter has violated such a confidence he has been promptly ostracized by his colleagues and cut

off from all legitimate sources of obtaining news when the matter became known. The Commanding Officer who is always accesssible to reporters and who invites them into his office and talks to them in a frank, man-to-man way will have no trouble with the press in his locality.

Information and news are as much of a factor in war as are munitions. Of this, General Ludendorff's memoirs give ample evidence. Troops are always more or less affected by enemy propaganda. Counter publicity, vigorously exposing the enemy falsehood and fallacy, is necessary. Similarly, suppression of certain information through censorship has an essential place in war, so that the enemy may be kept in doubt as to purposes or results.

But suppression of news for the sake of mental control of subordinates relates in its success to racial temperament. It undoubtedly had its place with the German troops, whose psychology seemed to include willingness enough to die in a winning cause, but not for a losing one, and who had been trained to a state of egotistical conceit that cracked under known reverses. On the other hand, the American's temperament is such that ignorance or uncertainty is more depressant than bad news. He resents undue concealment of facts. Publicity gives him new ideas and opportunity to think and follow appeals along proper lines.

Some of the media for publicity are newspapers, magazines, bulletins, circulars and other agencies which are discussed elsewhere. In writing, pungent paragraphs are a powerful agent in controlling public opinion. Mentality tests show that a large proportion of readers do not fully comprehend long or unusual words or involved sentences. The idea should be positive, clearly expressed as briefly and simply as possible, and presented forcefully and attractively. It should be presented as an entity in its own paragraph, so as to be emphasized as a whole.

The bulletin board is a valuable morale agency for the creation of interest and dissemination of information, which

is too often overlooked. Bulletin boards should be made attractive by carrying, not only copies of official schedules, orders, circulars and details issued for the direction of troops, but also matters of information about the military service and other subjects in which the soldiers would be interested and which it would be valuable for them to know. These might include notices of current events, entertainment programs, news items, scores of games, athletic meets, bowling and pool tournaments, jokes, photographs, posters, cartoons, maps, letters, military poetry, clippings, etc. Such bulletin boards might be given a heading like, "The Daily Dope," or similar title, and should be located in a sufficient number of suitable places. They should be posted daily so as to avoid staleness and be so attractive as to cause systematic resort to them by the men. The Morale Officer should charge himself with systematically furnishing a certain amount of material of a general nature, and with securing from camp, regimental or company headquarters any items of local interest or value.

But publicity through the printed word uses only one of several channels. A well recognized medium of advertising publicity is through demonstration of the implements of a trade or calling and their actual use. This valuable agency should not be overlooked in the military service, for the advertising value of a well ordered post or command is very great. The people of the country are always interested in the excellence and use of arms and equipment and welcome an opportunity for information given by military exercises or demonstrations. The very unfamiliarity of it attracts and pleases. This furnishes valid reasons why the attendance of troops at civilian fairs, civic celebrations and other functions where people congregate is of practical value to the service. Such attendance always results in wide publicity of personal, official and commercial nature.

Visitors at posts are valuable agents for publicity, especially that of a verbal nature. The clean, light, comfort-

able barracks and buildings with good sanitation, the military shops, schools and utilities, the beauties of the surroundings, the men at drill and recreation — all these furnish innumerable topics for good publicity through conversation as well as the press. Every person favorably impressed praises the organization and thereby increases its morale. While visitors sometimes create minor administrative difficulties, the good that they can do will far outweigh the disadvantages that their presence as sightseers or guests entails. It is well to note, in this connection, that business firms have found that about seventy per cent. of new customers come to them through personal recommendations of friends.

The value of oral publicity should not be overlooked. The printed word expresses the letter of morale work, while oral publicity brings in the spirit as well, and in a personal way. The things which are said about an organization or its work spread rapidly by word of mouth through divers channels and help largely in creating its reputation and molding public opinion in its favor. Oral publicity to a great extent influences written publicity, for what the people are talking about they are interested in and want to read about. Newspapers are quick to sense this and as a result will be disposed toward printing interesting stories on the popular subject.

All sorts of stories about troops, military equipment, developments, achievements and army work in general, form attractive features for the Sunday papers and supplements, especially if well illustrated. Local photographs are easily obtained, within the necessary military restrictions, while the Signal Corps has an almost unlimited supply of pictures from which selection can be made to illustrate practically any story. What is to the command an insignificant matter of common knowledge may often be an item of news interest outside — progress in training, evidence of efficiency, improvement in health, activities of the men when not on

duty, are matters of human interest to the people at home. Women writers, anxious for " home folks " copy to reassure mothers and others about camp conditions, can be of great value.

With the allocation of regiments to certain districts, close relation with the newspapers published in such districts should be maintained. This should develop into a systematized correspondence service, including not only local and personal matter, but stories of general interest and special feature articles on the work and conditions at the camp. Local photographers should be interested in taking the pictures which such publicity plans imply.

The morale organization acts effectively in serving to disseminate information as well as to secure it. Clipping arrangements should ensure that articles of compliment or criticism are brought to attention. Stories to meet special conditions should be prepared, or the material furnished to those who will prepare them. " Fillers " of a few lines or a short paragraph in length, of morale value, should be worked up for the camp press.

Newspapers of high class contain many matters of publicity that the soldier should know about. To this end, subscriptions to them should be pushed and facilities for the distribution of copies perfected. This can be best carried out by the Post Exchange, which should maintain news stands and newspaper delivery routes reaching all parts of the command promptly.

Some of the camps have published attractive little booklets of information about the camp, its personnel, utilities, educational work, recreational facilities, and civilian surroundings. In preparing anything of this kind, the typographical make-up and appearance is a strong factor in its appeal. Such make excellent souvenirs for the men to send home and, in addition, are valuable in recruiting work.

Camp Publications. Nothing is more potent in the wide dissemination of ideas and the creation of public opin-

ion than are newspapers. These great agencies for good have been largely overlooked and neglected in the military service. They tend to satisfy the normal instincts of curiosity, gregariousness and other natural tendencies, and in so doing they mold thought and influence action. The ideas which they can sow broadcast among troops are the seeds of endeavor. Rightly directed, they can be made invaluable in the development of Americanism, patriotism, the military spirit, high ideals, good conduct, friendly rivalry and efficiency.

Even a small civilian community finds its local newspaper a necessity in satisfying its needs and promoting its common interests. Similarly, every large business organization finds its "house organ" a valuable agent for informing its employees in matters of policy, solidarity and unity of purpose. The same applies to every aggregation of troops, which combines within itself the elements and social requirements of the civil community and the factors of a great, special business organization, even though its purpose is protection rather than industry.

The average soldier takes great pride in his camp or post paper, if it be a creditable one. No matter how small it may be, or how apparently unimportant some of its news items, it still wields much influence. The idea that "I saw it in the paper, so it must be true" holds good in the majority of cases. Accordingly, camp papers should be recognized as military adjuncts of a social and administrative value.

Camp and other papers may be made of great use by publishing official bulletins sent out from camp headquarters with explanatory remarks thereon which could not appropriately be part of the order. They enable commanders to get their ideas indirectly to the command and without the appearance of official compulsion. By published interviews, messages, news items and editorials they furnish a direct channel through which officers may be brought into close

relation with their men. Problems of discipline diminish in proportion as the men more fully realize the ideals and methods of the military service. The paper is a bond of mutual understanding, through which the Government, officers and men speak to each other.

Short and timely articles having a bearing on morale, through the conveyance of information, ideas or suggestion, have great value, the men being left to draw their own conclusions from the facts presented. The handling of publicity of this sort is, however, a delicate matter, for while the printed word often carries authority beyond its true worth, it is liable to a misconstruction which is not readily rectified. As with other powerful weapons, there lies danger in its manipulation if handled without due thought and care. Through the personal columns and interesting news items, a hold can be maintained on the readers so that they will read the editorials and heavier articles and unconsciously absorb and adopt the principles they express.

The personal columns should not be overlooked, but be made as full and as attractive as possible. The men want to know what organizations are doing and what individuals are doing. The columns of the small town paper reflect the intense interest which the average human being has in local happenings and the added importance which anything assumes which is a component of local environment. To see his name in the paper, no matter how trifling the context to others, may be a matter of much importance to the individual concerned as a recognition of endeavor or social status.

The great success of certain newspapers having a large rural subscription list is stated to be due to their rule of printing the name of each subscriber every few months. This should not be overlooked by those in charge of camp papers. The importance of an item to the community should be further considered in the light of its importance to the individual concerned. The viewpoint of the reader

group should be recognized and catered to in such matters. A good sentiment is created in all concerned if the soldier preserves and sends home the paper giving account of his experiences and doings.

In some camps, regular clipping bureaus have been maintained which clipped items from the camp paper about the men and their surroundings and sent them to the home papers of the men concerned. The men, their relatives and the home papers greatly appreciated this service, and actual knowledge of the facts prevented much of the criticism which tended to arise in the period of emotional unrest following the end of the war. Such personal publicity obviously has great recruiting value, especially now that regiments are recruited from certain districts.

The Morale Officer is the logical military representative of the commander to exercise supervision over these papers and it should not be difficult for him to secure such authority in the degree that appears to him desirable. They should be studied by him to see, first, whether they are sufficiently well written and edited to hold the interest of the men; second, whether they are too special in their appeal, too religious, frivolous or serious; third, whether items of general morale interest occupy sufficient space in them. It is essential that the papers be interesting, very human, and that their tremendous potentialities for constructive influence should not be wasted. To this end, he should make assisting suggestions of morale value to correspondents, writers and cartoonists, so that general conditions and special problems may be satisfactorily handled. No other single agency available to him can be used so effectively to disseminate ideas or to exert a more direct influence on the educational and informative aspects of morale work.

Similarly, he should make efforts to provide for as wide a circulation as possible, not so much from a business standpoint as that the influence of the publication may be exerted throughout the command. These imply measures for dis-

tribution as well as standards of preparation. Where legislative restrictions interfere with publications within a camp, arrangements for their printing by civilians outside the camp can usually be made. The business possibilities in a large camp will usually make such an enterprise commercially profitable.

Where no camp paper is practicable, the local papers may be utilized for a similar purpose by having special columns set aside for the publicity of camp activities, for which news items will be systematically furnished by the news collecting and preparing organization in the camp. This naturally has a value in promoting close relations with the civil community.

Souvenir numbers of camp papers, devoted to special organizations and features, should be issued from time to time. These would naturally contain photographs of officers, organizations, men specially prominent in certain activities, buildings and facilities, biographies, histories, write-ups, descriptive articles, poems, witticisms, etc. Every effort should be made to have the men send copies to their relatives and friends.

Camp papers should exchange with each other, not only for comparison, but better to understand general service sentiment and for republication of interesting matter. Mimeographed bulletins do not ordinarily attract like the printed and illustrated sheet. If used, they must be very carefully and clearly printed and posted most advantageously. They do not catch the eye and must be given every advantage in order to be read.

The Library. The army library is intended to give the military personnel the same service as is rendered civilian communities by the public library. It provides books, magazines and other publications for study, recreational reading, reëducation and vocational training. Its purpose is to be a practical utility and give helpful service, its personnel being trained to that end.

The library hours should include the periods when the command is off duty. Making them correspond with the official schedule is merely for the convenience of the attendants, for during the duty hours the average soldier has little time to spend in the library. Open hours on Sundays and holidays should be ensured. The function of a library is so important to the service that sufficient assistance should be provided to make its usefulness a fact rather than a name.

Of the books turned over to the army by the American Library Association, about two-thirds were fiction, the remainder being for class-room use, study and reference. Foreign language books are so selected as to relate especially to civics, United States history, and English study. School books and those on vocational training are supplied to supplement the ones on hand. Books required to carry out athletic and recreational programs are also supplied.

A proper library is, for morale purposes, far more than a mere collection of books. If well selected and properly handled, it is a powerful agency for the promotion and maintenance of good morale, for anything which contributes to mental state has a corresponding influence on behavior. By suggestion, literature arouses the factors of imitation, emulation and other instincts. Bad literature exerts its influence by arousing mental imagery which incites to undesirable action. Similarly, literature of good character makes for beneficent results.

Acts result from sentiments, ideals and purposes that books may be largely instrumental in creating. Through books, standards and ideals are presented which are more or less unconsciously adopted by the reader, serving as guides for later conduct. It follows that libraries should not only be available and fully used, but that judicious selection of their literature should be made, so as to upbuild character and direct and stabilize conduct. Books are a powerful morale agency, for there is such a popular

respect for the printed word as to render the mind especially receptive to the ideas it conveys. To a certain class, seeing a thing in print is a guarantee of correctness, as any advertising expert will testify. The old words, "It is written" are the finality in law and religion.

Books and reading matter are particularly valuable for morale work in that they not only pass away idle time pleasantly and profitably, but that they especially reach men who, for one reason or another, cannot at the time take advantage of other recreational facilities. The soldier who cannot or does not wish to leave his barracks finds amusement and profit in the books he can use there. The proper distribution of reading matter is thus important, as in hospitals, recruit barracks, guard houses, etc., for even short periods of respite from duty, if frequently repeated, come to have a large aggregate and are well worth consideration.

Men whose duties require much physical exercise tend to take their amusements and recreation quietly along lines of mental activity. When the soldier is reading, he is beyond the direct influence of his commander and comrades. It is highly proper that the indirect influence exerted through books be guided by facilitating reading along desirable lines. When reading good books men are in no danger of thoughts or acts relating to indiscipline or disorder. Moreover, the lasting ideals conveyed by such books materially help to relieve any apprehension concerning their conduct in the future. The same applies particularly to the sick in hospital, whose infirmities largely curtail participation in physical activities and other pleasures, and whose minds rebel at vacuity and monotony. A good selection of books in meeting such a situation can scarcely be overestimated. Restrictions on the use of good books by prisoners in the guard house should be relaxed as much as possible. The present discipline and future conduct of many prisoners can be benefited by permission to use vocational books and

well selected literature of morale value. The better nature of prisoners can be reached in this way by suggestion, when a direct appeal or approach would be unsuccessful.

To all, books open up a new vista of opportunity, thereby bringing into play, as a constructive force for military efficiency, the factor of self-interest, which is one of the mainsprings of individual endeavor. At the same time, they stimulate and satisfy the natural instinct of curiosity, which is at the basis of all human purpose. Books thus bring contentment to the soldier and his friends, since all know that through their use he is being improved for duty within the service or for the life of a citizen after his discharge.

If left to themselves, soldiers read much the sort of literature that is popular among males of their age and class in civil life. Adventure is a popular subject, especially that expressed in fiction. Certain books pertaining to some of the technical duties of the military environment, such as hygiene, military engineering, etc., are much read. In time of war, much reading is done on war aims if suitable literature is provided and judiciously advertised. During peace, and especially under vocational training, books on agriculture, trades, accounting, business methods, advertising, philosophy, etc., are more largely called for. The use of special books, newspaper and magazine articles, which have a value for morale purposes, should be furthered by the Morale Officer.

The library should contain books suitable for every man and every mood. This implies a full understanding of the degree of literacy in the army. Under the draft, one man in every four could not pass English literacy tests of an equivalent of the second grade. Probably another fourth had too limited an education to enable them to seek out and benefit by high class reading. It thus followed that about half the soldiers, including all of the ignorant and illiterate and most of those of alien ideas, could not be reached in

this way. The tendency of libraries is toward books of high intellectual plane which are valuable only to a relatively small proportion of readers, and to overlook the needs of the less literate class which it is particularly important to reach as being the weakest link in the morale and disciplinary chain.

In civil life, the tendency of libraries, besides catering chiefly to the educated and student class, is to assume an attitude of dignified helpfulness from which assistance needs to be sought. The reverse should be true. The average soldier cannot be expected to seek out books voluntarily; hence the books must be brought to him, or at least their availability and value brought to his attention.

Books should be freely distributed in small libraries in accessible places, in barracks, hospitals, etc., as an extension service, and should be regularly changed at frequent intervals. This has been found to double the book demand. There must not be any material restrictions on their availability and use. A few more books will be mishandled or lost, but their far greater use will more than make up for it. A book looks better and does far more good on a man's bunk or locker than on the library shelf. Circulating libraries in camp, and book-carts wheeled through the hospital wards, greatly promote reading by facilitating physical contact between the book and the reader. Proper effort should be made to get overdue books back, not only to prevent wastage, but to prevent cheapening them and their value in the eyes of the soldier.

But besides making books available, a systematized and persistent campaign of aggressive publicity should promote their use. The man must be put in a frame of mind where he will seek out and read certain books. The necessary advertising publicity would include sign-boards, special posters, slides at moving picture shows, articles in camp papers, handbills, weekly announcements of new books, addresses to organizations by effective speakers, personal

visits to libraries by commanders, appeals to officers, publication of special lists of books suitable for reading or study by officers or enlisted men, lists of books pertaining to certain courses of vocational study, straw votes on the most popular books in the library, reviews of new books, perhaps written in the soldier vernacular, placards in the library recommending certain books, selections of certain books on tables near the entrance, the opinion of the commanding officer on certain books, etc. This advertising plan, as carried out in some camps, doubled the per capita use of books.

Posters and Cartoons. All the world loves a picture. Thought expressed in posters and cartoons is of great value in influencing military or industrial morale. It supplements the printed word and, in many cases, substitutes the latter, affording an effective channel through which the object may be reached. If men can be induced by posters to enlist, buy government bonds, and do other things, it is safe to assume that they can be equally influenced by them to other forms of conduct less difficult to inspire, whether in relation to the military service or the administration of a great industrial concern. The written or printed word in our language is not understood at all by the wholly illiterate or the foreigner; to them the alphabetical symbols are meaningless in nature, though their form may be distinctly perceived. The partially illiterate see them, but are able to interpret their significance and transmute them into ideas only slowly and with difficulty.

Posters are particularly valuable in reaching the illiterate, those of sluggish intellect and those relatively unfamiliar with English. The reason is simple. Pictures are the universal language. The first effort of primitive peoples toward a written language was by crude picture writing in the endeavor to record thought, and this can be understood at the present day by individuals of any race or language. The child's picture book, the illustrated primer which

teaches the child words largely through the accompanying pictures, demonstrates this fact. Also the eye is the most trained of all the organs through its greater use. The savage, the prospector, the mountaineer, the farm hand, and others leading more isolated lives hear relatively little of the spoken language; the ear is correspondingly untrained, the brain interprets more slowly the significance of the words heard and vocabulary is limited.

But the picture carries an idea which is not only understood by all, the intellectually high and low, but which is readily grasped. For general purposes, the poster is the best exponent of the picture language, and the most successful advertisers more or less unconsciously make use of this fact. A good poster can be so displayed that the individual cannot escape reading it and coming under its influence, even though it were desired to do so, and its effect is thus made cumulative. It should be posted conspicuously, without anything to mar its environment. It should be attractive to the attention and pleasing to the eye. If the wording is forceful, witty and epigrammatic, it appeals directly to the intelligence, reason, and perhaps to the sense of humor. Every poster embodies instincts and sentiments.

A poster should be to the eye what the suggestion or command is to the ear. It should make the passerby stop, look and think. It should express practically only one idea, lest it become too involved and its direct application lost. A poster also should present the ideal.

The effectiveness of a picture depends upon its appropriateness to the idea it is desired to convey, its artistic beauty, force, and terse explanatory features. The subject of a poster, then, should be carefully chosen for the needs of the morale problem, its appearance should be timely, and its artistic expression made such as best to bring out the effect desired. The whole story should be conveyed at a glance. It should stimulate and never offend the class to

be reached. The idea should be simple and the words and lettering plain so as to be instantly understood. The phraseology should, if possible, be in epigrammatic form. Colored posters are far more attractive to the eye and impressive to the mentality than black and white. Coloring is a matter of psychology; red is the color that attracts attention, while blue or green is soothing to the eye.

All subjects pertaining to our country or forces should be pleasing and treated in a positive way, with the figures determined or smiling in appearance. Though inarticulate, such pictures often have the power to stimulate to action equal to battle cries or slogans. The humorous cast capitalizes the value of an outward or inward smile, but it should never be flippant. The satirical subject should be employed only against the enemy, to ridicule and belittle his efforts and lay bare his faults and weaknesses.

The expression of the subject should be such as to bring out the " this means you " idea, but in such a way that the individual will get the impression by suggestion rather than by direct statement. Often an idea will be given personal application through poster suggestion better than by long addresses.

The reaction on the group of the individual poster cannot be fully forecasted. None will satisfy all. But if carefully worked out, experience at camps has shown that they have more influence on the men than any other form of mental approach. The men regarded the " Service Series " posters of the Morale Branch, issued weekly for the past two years, with interest and respect. What has been found valuable in the army will apply similarly to business life. Small posters carry the idea about as well as larger ones. Size is merely an effort toward meeting the requirements of reading distance imposed by environment. Small posters are more apt to be preserved than larger ones, and those for the service are best made of a size suitable for posting on company bulletin boards.

Posters should not be left on the bulletin board after their appeal to the attention has been outworn. They should, however, be given further effect by posting in company clubs and barracks, so that their result may be cumulative and reach new recruits. All of this applies in a general way to cartoons. The latter, however, find their particular usefulness in enlivening printed publications, and accordingly reach a much smaller class and in a less effective way. They serve particularly as a vehicle for humor, ridicule and caricature.

Picture postal cards, with military subjects and inscriptions of morale value, make useful souvenirs for the men to send home. The descriptive captions should be so phrased as to give the indirect suggestion of high military quality. These cards give the people at home an idea of the soldier's surroundings, and should be sold as cheaply as possible so that their use may be promoted. Photographs of attractive local environment and of the various organizations are valuable for this purpose. For the same reason, the use of cameras by the men, as far as compatible with military restrictions, is desirable.

Mail Service, etc. This subject has a very direct relation to morale. It must be remembered that the mails offer the chief and often only contact which soldiers have with their relatives and friends, and that a letter does much to prevent worry and create actual light-heartedness. Conversely, a poor mail service inevitably creates doubts and worries, and ultimately a profound resentment. A letter means much to the person to whom it is addressed, even though it be a matter of comparative insignificance to others. Every effort should, therefore, be made to facilitate the forwarding and distribution of mail.

It may here be mentioned that the indifference of mail orderlies and some others in charge of the mail, sometimes seems to approach the malicious. It may be withheld, distributed at inappropriate times, or in ways which make it

difficult to get. Another cause of exasperation on the part of officers and men is the delay often involved in the reply to letters by high authority. Sometimes this delay is necessary; at other times it seems due to a leisurely official routine which might well be speeded up.

The importance of letter writing to the men by their relatives and friends at home was early recognized in morale work. It was also recognized that the tone of such letters should be stimulating, to offset depressions due to rumors, lack of news, or conditions pertaining to the service. As one effort to meet this need, the illustrated advertisement, "Write him cheerful letters," was prepared and widely published.

To increase letters from home, the initiative must be stimulated from within the command. Some camps set aside a special night as "home letter writing night," to promote the writing of letters by the men. At several camps, mimeographed form letters were given to assist the less literate men in writing home, as some of them seem unable to develop their own ideas. The men should be led to write home in a cheerful spirit and encouraged to send home photographs of themselves, their friends, surroundings, copies of camp papers, programs of entertainments, menus of holiday dinners and the like. The provision of adequate writing facilities, with free stationary carrying the organization heading, should be a part of the equipment of every company recreation room.

In recognition of the need for men to communicate with anxious ones at home, men arriving overseas were furnished with a printed post card announcing that they had arrived safely. Some company commanders send a letter to the family of every recruit, explaining a few of the difficulties of adjustment, matter of desertion and absence, urging the writing of cheerful letters from home, and asking that the family communicate freely with the company commander on subjects of interest to the welfare of the soldier. The

results of this plan more than justify the trouble by producing a greater degree of contentment and good order. Similar letters have been sent to the families of soldiers about to be discharged, commending faithful service, making note of betterment, and expressing good wishes for the man's future. Here too the results have been excellent.

When a soldier is dangerously sick, has met with serious injury, or has died in the service, no act is more appreciated than a letter of sympathy in case of death, or a letter setting forth facts in case of illness or injury, written by the company commander to the soldier's nearest relative. When a man has been killed in action, a similar letter should be sent by the War Department, but it should not be couched in cold, official phraseology, which might block sympathy and so stir resentment. There should be some expression of human interest and regret which will help lighten the mental burden of the bereaved and not add to it. It is perfectly possible to find clerks who can write such letters.

One of the great causes of dissatisfaction, which is quickly reflected into the military establishment, is delay in reporting casualties to relatives and friends. This promptly finds expression in bitter criticism, which strikes a responsive chord in the sympathetic mind of the general public.

A clearing house for Chrismas mail packages was established at one great camp, where the morale organization took upon itself the task of prompt delivery through the use of the file cards in the Personnel Office. Experience showed that many Christmas packages lay unclaimed the previous year until long after Christmas on account of poor addresses.

A notice system in camps, for men who cannot be reached at the time a telephone call comes in, should be worked out. In large camps, one way of facilitating delivery of telegrams in the evening is to have the names of addressees flashed on the screen at moving picture entertainments.

Symbols and Slogans. The psychological value of symbols is very great. The popular mind does not really grasp the abstract, while symbols give concrete expression to intangible ideals and sentiments. Logical thought involves symbols, and hence their value in representing the ideals with which they are associated. The best form of symbols are those which actually portray the idea to be conveyed. These especially appeal to the illiterate. Thus the symbols of certain guilds, as the boot for shoemakers, the horse-shoe for blacksmiths, the tooth for dentists, etc., has come down from a period when few could read. But in symbolism, anything may symbolize anything else, if only it be agreed upon. In some instances, as society regalia, the only way to find out the meaning of a symbol is to make inquiry on the subject expressing it. Symbols of this sort may mean one thing to one person and something different to another.

The flag is a typical symbol which needs no argument. It stands for, represents and symbolizes the nation. That is about all that can be said for it in general, but further than that it stands in each individual's thoughts for what the nation means to him. The idea of the nation, itself a symbol, means one thing to one person and another thing to another. To one, it means protection; to another, community of interests; to another a geographical area; to another, ideals; to another, a military unit, and so on. For each man the flag has a special meaning. Yet it is able to unite all that is held in common, outside these individual concepts. It sways the crowd with practically the same feelings and emotions. It liberates a vast amount of energy that has been bound up and can be released only through the stimulus of the symbol.

Officers should recognize the ancient and general human demand for more concrete symbol of any general object or abstract service, institution or principle. Political or

religious groups cannot exist abstractly; each has its name, motto and symbol. Colleges have seals and colors, societies have badges, states are represented by flags, professions by attire and commodities by their trade marks.

A trade mark in business is often worth a tremendous sum. It is an asset, convertible into money. So, too, a trade mark in the military service, as distinctive emblems, insignia, motto, slogan, name, song, or the like have a real value. They are likewise assets convertible into military efficiency. They not only stand for ideals but create a sense of group unity which is part of the foundation of effective morale. It must be understood that the military trade mark, like the commercial one, stands for excellence and quality. The military organization and each of its members stands behind it, like a guarantee, to make it good.

Decorations, badges and insignia are emblems which give outward and visible evidence of the nature and quality of honorable service. As such, they have a strong psychological value, through the prestige, unity and comradeship which they confer. They reach a large class of persons whose heroic or distinguished acts could not be rewarded by promotion, yet to whom the Government desires to demonstrate that it recognizes special achievement and entertains gratitude. As such decorations cannot be bought, and represent special service, they have a value beyond all price. Divisional and other insignia are of great value in promoting esprit de corps in an organization and increasing its efficiency.

A slogan or catch-phrase embodies an appeal to one or more instincts. Its relative efficiency depends upon the number of instincts stimulated, the strength of the appeal to each and their application to the purpose at hand. The clearer the idea is expressed in the fewest words and the greater the number of suggestions to instincts that it conveys, the better and more effective the catch-phrase. Such

a phrase is the popular "Let's go" which practically replaced the formal command in many organizations during the war.

These little words "let's go," include in laconic form an exceptionally large number of the appeals of good leadership. Its analysis is simple. It implies collective action and hence evokes the strong instinct of gregariousness and the sentiment of comradeship. It expresses mutuality of purpose which can only be based on the instinct of sympathy. It admits all to equal partnership and share in the work in hand and develops pride of workmanship through the creative instinct thus stimulated. It is a challenge to action and hence arouses the instinct of self-assertiveness. The idea of movement which is proposed stimulates the migratory instinct. The overcoming of possible obstacles which, by inference, may be necessary, creates a spirit of combat against them. Over all there is a provoking of the instinct of curiosity and the sentiment of adventure as to what may be encountered at the journey's end. It breathes decision and confidence. It embodies an invitation which is stronger than compulsion. It gives an appearance of desirable election to a matter of necessity and coördinates all ranks and grades to a common purpose without weakening authority. It has none of the cold compulsion and individual application of the command "Forward, march," which drives the soldier forward as an unit. It lacks the implied inferiority of the soldier, with the checking of self-assertion, when the leader commands "follow me." It is without artificiality or pretense. It will succeed where other measures fail because it is an appeal which is scientific, strong, simple, direct, comprehensive and human.

Organizations, whether military or industrial, should develop slogans, titles and catch-phrases symbolical of their spirit or that of the service. Catchy epigrams are very useful in developing or fixing decisions. The approach

should be varied at intervals to increase the efficiency of attack and response.

The designation applied to organizations and duties has a direct influence on the state of mind and the efficiency with which the duties are performed. Mottoes and slogans represent high ideals and stimulate to endeavor. They develop pride in organization. The British make special use of distinctive regimental names in addition to the official designations of the units; every one has heard, for example, of the "Black Watch" and the "Gordon Highlanders." The adoption of special names for divisions has similar value. A divisional motto like "It shall be done" is a military asset which adds materially to efficiency. So, too, the name of "Devil Dogs," assumed by the Marines, or the inspirational slogan of the Tank Corps—"Treat 'em rough."

The converse of this was seen in the designation of "Labor Battalions" which was changed to "Service Battalions" as a result of the discontent and indifference with which their members performed duties which seemed to be recognized as drudgery not implying military status, and as leaving little to be proud of as a share in the war. For the same reason, any opprobrious designation or epithet applied by the men to any military duty or those who perform it should be promptly suppressed. When duties are necessary to a common military end, all are equally honorable.

Drills, Parades and Ceremonies. Drills and parades are usually considered chiefly from the standpoint of instruction. But they have a great morale value, since they recognize, in their mass formations, the gregarious instinct of men. They give the individual a sense of coördination with, and pride in, his organization, and at the same time serve a powerful inspirational purpose. Especially is this true of recruits, and particularly if the exercises are con-

ducted in the presence of spectators. Here the tendency is to strive to demonstrate the high standards of the organization, the ideal and the dramatic. Such formations are particularly valuable for morale purposes with organizations whose technical duties are such that their military drills are few and whose cohesiveness and esprit suffer accordingly. The participation in drills and ceremonies of such organizations as service battalions, certain engineer units and others, during the war, was found to add greatly to their content, discipline and efficiency.

Forms and ceremonials have a strong psychological value, creating respect, inspiration, awe and stimulating community of thought. Guard mounts, retreat, dress parades and reviews should habitually have these psychological factors as their object. Troops should participate in all gala occasions and national holidays for the purpose of stimulating their patriotism, loyalty and pride.

The success of all parades and ceremonies, from the morale standpoint, consists in having them regarded as desirable by the participants and not considered as irksome tasks. Accordingly, they need to be "sold" to the men. This implies judicious suggestion by high authority and proper publicity.

Parades in nearby communities, for purposes of morale, should be carried out from time to time. They serve, not only to stimulate the morale of the men, but increase interest in the troops on the part of the local civilian population. But such participation should not be allowed to an extent which is fatiguing to an unnecessary degree, thereby neutralizing the advantage which it is desired to gain. If the soldier gets the idea that he is being deprived of his holiday for the diversion of others an undesirable reaction occurs. When troops parade in a town, steps should be taken through the city authorities and civic bodies to secure as much decoration as possible along the route of march.

Every regiment should have designated, in accordance

with War Department orders on the subject, a certain day each year as the regimental memorial day, which should be observed with all dignity and ceremony. There should be formal parades, exercises at which soldiers should receive honor and encomium for any meritorious or distinguished service rendered during the past year, distribution of prizes, addresses on the history of the organization and other fitting ceremonials. Former members of the regiment might be invited and, if possible, transportation furnished to those who by special conduct and reward have honored the regiment.

The presence of death affects the human mind as nothing else can do. Well cared for cemeteries, giving evidence of interest and reverence, do much to improve morale in the living. The occasional military funeral, in time of peace, has a very considerable morale value for those of the command who do not experience the sense of personal loss, as well as to assuage the sorrow of personal friends of the departed. The honor, unity and comradeship of the service toward its members, as expressed in the simple but dignified funeral ceremonial, cannot fail to be appreciated. Military funerals are a depressant to morale when numerous. Particularly is this the case in time of epidemic, when the reaction on patients in hospital and well men outside is alike undesirable. In such cases the funerals should be conducted simply and removed from the hearing of the sick.

In time of war, the bearing of those killed in action to their last resting place, and the simple military ceremonies at the grave, may add materially to the fighting spirit of their comrades through resentment against the enemy. Panegyrics of those dead in battle exalt patriotism. No greater stimulus to such endeavor was ever framed than Lincoln's Gettysburg address. To be of the heroic dead brings a pride and resignation which combine to remove much of the apprehension of danger.

CHAPTER XIV

RECREATION

The need for recreation; play as outlet for mental tension; value of the play instinct for military purposes; wholesome recreation as a constructive agency; sports and entertainments. Military athletics; physical development through play; character building through play; mass athletics; competitions. Dramatic entertainment. Moving pictures; their selective influence on mind and conduct; "flashes." Music; its value for morale purposes; its influence on the psychological state; songs; mass singing; musical selections. Dances and socials; usefulness in contentment and discipline. Soldier clubs. Trips, hikes and practice marches; their psychological value. Post Exchanges.

Entertainment. In recreation, the play instinct is used as a safety valve for the dissipation of energy which, if allowed to discharge itself through the channels of other instincts, might result in harmful acts. Wholesome recreation and play afford relief from mental stress, break monotony, stimulate interest and ambition and benefit both mind and body. Through exerting a favorable influence on mental state, they make the individual work better and promote efficiency, interest and good conduct. Accordingly they should be officially encouraged, systematized and controlled so that their agencies will be used to best advantage.

"Recreation is a military necessity," said General March, "for the production of well-rounded and symmetrically trained officers and enlisted men. It occupies as definite a place in the activities of the army as do such matters as food, clothing, medical attendance, and tactical training. It is a commonly accepted standard of life that the human being should be given an adequate period of time for recreation. The army will conform to this standard in so far as military necessity permits."

Morale work is not merely entertainment, as has been widely assumed as a result of the emphasis laid on recreation during demobilization for the purpose of maintaining the interest and contentment of the men. But entertainment is one of many valuable morale agencies, and has the virtue of being usually available, in one or another form, for the relief of mental tension.

Recreation differs from work not in the obstacles surmounted nor the energy expended, but in the spirit in which the activity is carried out. A task may thus be converted into pastime if the proper spirit is created, and the wise officer may endow a duty with the qualities of interest and amusement.

Recreation is any form of pleasurable mental diversion. Since it implies relief from mental strain, it also allows the nervous system to recuperate and strengthen itself for a new task, just as the periodical winding of a clock is necessary to make it go. Some persons need more recuperative recreation than others; young men need more than older ones, but all need some, and the wise officer will see that it is made available in due character and quantity.

Most of the work of the enlisted man is physical. During his hours off duty his brain is active and his mental attitude receptive. If left to his own resources, the average individual tends to fritter away his leisure time, either in useless trifling, or harmful dissipation. This is where wise authority may continue to function, though without seeming to do so, by opening new opportunities of interest, recreation and betterment, and by providing alternatives for undesirable means of relaxation. It is the greatest of mistakes to assume that training stops with required duties. Whether the leisure time of the soldier shall be valuable or dangerous, and whether it is to be turned to making him better or less efficient, it is within the power of commanders largely to decide, through opportunity to instil the mental qualities and build up the sentiments which are the main-

spring of harmony, loyalty and efficiency. The same applies in industry, and group entertainments afford opportunity to bring all grades, with their families, together in the promotion of harmonious good feeling.

Recreation should embody the qualities of variety and novelty. Amusements involving competition and requiring much preliminary preparation, thus maintaining interest over long periods, are especially to be sought. Prizes heighten interest and rivalry. That recreation is best in which the participant actively shares, for in time men tire of being passively entertained. That recreation is also best in which large numbers engage, especially if there be eliminative competition. Contests in which but few are active do not supply a full substitute for mass activity.

Vigorous outdoor sport, because of its physiological effect, is preferable to indoor amusements whenever there is choice between the two. Until its appeal becomes outworn the " military tournament " appears to be the most effective form of entertainment, since it permits continuous qualifying competition to select the best shots, the best drilled company, battalion or regiment, or the best drilled platoon. An indefinite number of variations, moreover, are possible. For the sake of variety, the bringing in of outside entertainers, from time to time, is desirable. In dramatic and musical entertainment given by local entertainers, it is often useful to secure feminine talent from nearby communities.

When troops are very close to the attractions of a town, the featuring of local post entertainments is of less importance, and the problem becomes more one of creating such close relations with the civic and welfare organizations in the town as will tend to the provision of wholesome recreation for the men while off duty. But the point should not be overlooked that one great advantage of entertainment on the military reservation is that the men prefer to remain at home, and are thus safeguarded against undesirable outside influences.

In connection with entertainment, it should be remembered that no one program could please all. It must necessarily be a compromise. The officer in charge should not be dogmatic in deciding what the soldier wants, but inquiry, study and observation of previous success in a small way furnish the best basis for larger plans. By frequent change of program, something appealing to each one will ultimately be provided. Surprises are always well received, while "fool championships," such as intercompany huckleberry pie-eating contests, burlesque prize fights, etc., can occasionally be used to advantage. As elaborate entertainments as practicable on Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years, when the thoughts of the men instinctively turn toward those at home, are desirable.

A weekly camp calendar should be prepared, showing a complete schedule for each day, giving time and place of all events such as amusements, athletic contests, dances, socials, lectures and special military events. It should be published in the Monday issue of local papers, appear in camp papers and be placed on company bulletin boards.

In promoting entertainment, intensive effort to develop local talent will be well repaid. Recruits, on arrival, should be questioned as to their entertaining ability. Every large organization has within itself nearly all the factors necessary for its own amusement. Moreover, the men are especially interested in the doings of themselves and their comrades. The seeking out and training of entertainers in the command is important and gives status to the performers as well as credit to their organization. They should be card indexed and organized into entertainment teams with balanced programs.

In any matter of entertainment, the policy should be, as far as possible, to let the men themselves plan and handle all details. They take more interest in it if they are allowed to work it out and consider the final result their own. Official supervision should be of a general nature and more in

the form of encouragement, interest and promotion. Entertainment has a desirable state of mind of the men as its purpose, and this is interfered with where a superior imposes his own ideas on the project, whether coincident or not with those of his subordinates. The men are inclined to resent any tendency toward an attitude of superiority and uplift, and too much supervision gives this impression and introduces a factor of negative morale in what would otherwise be wholly valuable. There have been instances where this tendency toward close supervision, in the honest desire to help, has been carried to an extent which the men regarded as meddlesome.

The great variety of available pastimes offers wide opportunity to make suitable selections to meet special needs. Some aid directly in developing the soldier, mentally or physically, so that he becomes better able to perform some military task. Into all of them can be skilfully worked a great amount of suggestion, calculated to put the soldier in a proper frame of mind toward his duties, as well as divert him from his troubles, real or imaginary.

It is of course necessary in encouraging various means of entertainment that proper facilities to carry them out should be provided and made available. These run all the way from athletic equipment to well equipped company clubs and post amusement halls for indoor sports, social gatherings, dances, moving pictures and dramatics. The statistics of the welfare societies operating during the war testify to the tremendous popularity of such facilities.

Amusements should be in the open air as far as possible. Not only is there novelty and attraction in this, but larger crowds can be handled, they are much more comfortable in warm weather, and there is far less chance of transmission of infection, especially of the respiratory diseases. The only exception to this plan is in the case of troops located in the malarious regions, where attacks by the night-flying, malaria-carrying mosquito must be guarded against. Out-

door amphitheatres and "air-domes" can usually be arranged almost anywhere with little trouble or expense. If well planned they can accommodate a whole brigade. In many instances, natural slopes of ground can be readily utilized to do away with the need for seats. Some camps or posts have ravines in or near them, which form natural amphitheatres with little or no work of adapting them to the purpose. In all indoor entertainments, the proper capacity of the building should not be exceeded. This should be a matter of official information, and plans for attendance should take this into consideration.

The morale value of recreation, while often great, must nevertheless be considered as of a temporary nature. Its permanent value is the degree in which it develops desirable qualities of character, for the supreme test of morale comes when recreational facilities are of necessity absent. Similarly, amusements will not serve indefinitely to maintain morale in units which are living under bad physical conditions, though they may temporarily render the latter tolerable by drawing attention away from them. Too much recreation, and especially that of the same character, cheapens it and defeats its own object. The men become saturated and lose interest. A just balance between duties and recreation must be maintained. Only that is prized which is not too easy to obtain.

Military Athletics. Athletics have the value of promoting not only physical excellence and fitness for military task but also desirable mental qualities, and, at the same time, relieving mental stress and affording recreation. The relation between a sound body and a sound mind is proverbial, while both exercise a twofold but inseparable influence on morale. Athletics create an interest in a present occupation which causes unwholesome or depressing thoughts to disappear. They develop originality, spontaneity and self-reliance, at the same time teaching men to be good sportsmen, good team men and good losers as well

as good winners. Recreational exercise is probably the most effective agency in bringing about a physical development which is turned to direct account in the performance of military exercise.

The character of athletic activities is so diverse as to give opportunity for far wider and more vigorous normal movements than do formal exercises, drills and marches. They bring about a more vigorous and better balanced functioning of the organs, especially those of circulation and respiration, and they accomplish this with the least expenditure of nervous energy.

Athletics greatly stimulate the competitive, assertive and fighting instincts, thus helping to develop soldierly character. This applies particularly to such sports as boxing, wrestling, competitive games and various exercises requiring speed, skill, strength and endurance as well as mental discipline. All games are based on one or more instincts, combined in various ways. Their rules are habits, discovered by accident, selected by intelligence and perpetuated by tradition. They should be played correctly, energetically and in the proper spirit. They should have simple rules and be of such nature as to admit a large number of players. There should not only be opportunity for the men anxious to participate, but also vacancies to which the sluggish or retiring may be sent.

Effective work in athletics can only result through proper organization and supervision. Qualified instructors are necessary, for men do not take readily to new sports or those in which they are awkward. The duty of athletic instructors is a military one and of an importance equal to any other. Adequate gymnasium facilities in every post are necessary, and their care and use are important. In many instances too little advantage has been taken of them, and no attempt made to promote interest by gymnastic exhibitions, contests, etc. The selective use of the various apparatus in remedying physical fault should be understood.

Every military station should have a sufficiency of prepared play fields, athletic grounds, outdoor platforms for boxing and wrestling, and suitable gymnasium facilities for winter use. For summer use an outdoor gymnasium may be provided. The athletic field might well include diamonds for outdoor and indoor baseball, football fields for soccer and Rugby; volley-ball, cage-ball and basketball courts, tennis courts, cinder track, walls for scaling, trench jump, high jump, broad jump, horizontal bars, parallel bars, vaulting horses, etc. Once provided, they should be systematically used. This implies the constant maintenance of an adequate supply of proper equipment and apparatus.

The men themselves will take readily to play if the necessary incentives and facilities are provided. Certain games are especially needed by some men in order to modify individual defects; by others to enable them to gratify self-assertion by showing special excellence. They should be selected and varied accordingly. The tactful commander will find some plausible explanation for the contests particularly desired. Officers add to incentive by their presence, even though the limitations of age and other factors prevent active participation, thus showing themselves not merely as task-masters but as one with their men in play as well as work.

All games should be under direction of an officer, though this should be nominal rather than active, not depriving the game of the sense of spontaneity. Ordinarily, the impression should be given that games, once started, are run by the men themselves. Company officers should carefully watch the performance of individuals during games, as the best opportunity to size up the real qualities of the man is when he forgets himself at play.

Speaking generally, the best military athletics are those which bring the greatest number of men into activity and competition. This requires organization, the training of leaders and a varied program. In mass athletics, large

numbers of men engage, the novice as well as the expert. Little or no equipment is required and no special uniforms are necessary. Large numbers of men can be quickly handled and kept busy; the rules and regulations are simple; the play idea and spirit are predominant; every man's performance, no matter how mediocre, counts for his team.

Mass games are also of the greatest value in breaking down barriers due to shyness, foreign parentage, class distinction, newness to each other, and the disabilities due to unfamiliarity with the English language. Particularly is this true of recruits, who are undergoing adjustment to their new environment. Mass athletics may include as the participants the entire available personnel of organizations, from the platoon to the regiment. As a means of promoting mass athletics, semi-weekly play periods might well be authorized, in which all enlisted men would be expected to participate. In some competitive events, not only individual success, but the number of men contesting from an organization might receive consideration in determining the winners.

Suitable games and contests include boxing, wrestling, volley-ball, baseball, football, soccer, Rugby, handball, indoor baseball, basket ball, tennis, la crosse, hockey, cross country runs, swimming and aquatic sports; the various track events such as sprints quarter, half and mile races, relay and hurdle races; field events such as high jumping both standing and running, broad jumping both standing and running, shot putting, pole vaulting, discus throwing, javelin throwing, hammer throwing, the hop-skip-jump; military events such as wall-scaling, equipment races, litter races, heavy marching order races, squad hikes; and novelty events such as obstacle races, potato races, shuttle, tug of war, leap frog, three-legged races, shoe scramble races. In the cold climates in the winter, coasting, skiing, skating and ice hockey should be encouraged. To all these may and should be added any contests that may seem suitable to any

organizations. The men prefer the more strenuous athletics to mere childish games.

Camp baseball leagues are desirable. Inter-company games should be played, and the best material grouped in regimental teams. After competing for the championship of the camp, the best players should be organized as a camp team to play against other camps or civilian teams. The same plan applies to football, basketball, or other teams. Soccer football is better than Rugby as a military exercise, as any number can play it and injury is less liable to occur. For winter and indoor recreation, basketball serves a very useful purpose. Teams to represent the several organizations on a competitive basis greatly add to interest. Bowling is another indoor sport in which large numbers can participate, through the organization of representative teams. Regimental cross country runs are excellent to develop fortitude and persistency as well as physical hardness. The twenty-five or more men in first might be given passes.

Boxing trains muscles used in bayonet fighting. A premium should be put on aggressive tactics. A few tricks of in-fighting may be of great value in personal combat. Aside from technical proficiency, the man versed in such matters acquires a large amount of confidence, aggressiveness and resourcefulness. Boxing " tryouts " should ultimately lead to finals. This also applies to wrestling. Where possible, mass swimming and life-saving should be taught and practiced. All-point company championship contests should be held, with a trophy for the successful company and prizes for the individual winners.

The relative popularity of various forms of athletic sports among the men is indicated in a general way by Figure 20.

Compulsory exercise, preferably in some specified form of athletics, should be required of all men on sedentary detail, for its effect in improving mental state quite as much as to prevent physical deterioration. There is no reason

why such athletics, in part at least, should not be considered as a duty and taken in Government time.

To promote interest in athletics, there should be yearly



Figure 20. Athletics in the S. O. S.— Week Ended March 27, 1919. Participants in athletics under supervision of the Army and the Y. M. C. A. Source of information: Y. M. C. A., Athletic Director for S. O. S.

contests in suitable events, with the award of local championships. All these contests should be conducted on an elimination basis, with finals to decide the championship. Corps area and army contests should then follow to determine the final championship in the approved sports. To perpetuate the morale value of such competitions, prizes should be awarded, and these should be symbolic and embody a military sentiment of local interest. The records of such contests should be given the widest publicity, to promote interest and effort and to confer distinction where deserved.

Cheering for athletic contests puts purpose and determination in them, and knits the organization behind them closer together. It should be organized and supported. The ideals of good sportsmanship should be inculcated — never to admit defeat until the game is over, and to be cheerful, whether winning or losing.

Dramatic Entertainment. The drama is one of the highest forms of recreation. It can be made to instruct as well as entertain, and it should be judiciously used in both capacities. Subjects can be selected, ideas put into words and acts, and impressions conveyed to and adopted by the audience through the instincts of sympathy and imitation. Much morale material can be given outlet in this way, and in an indirect manner which leaves the impression without the subjects being conscious of it. Clean, wholesome and often inspiring amusement of this sort diverts the men and offsets undesirable attractions outside, thus preventing the acts of indiscipline which may spring from them.

The general principle of having the men provide within themselves the chief means for their diversion here holds good. One of the chief values of dramatic directors is to discover the latent talent in every organization and develop and train it. When a number of garrisons are near enough, and no particular one is large enough to support its own dramatic organization, it may be possible to organize "players clubs," carrying their own orchestra, to tour a post circuit, using local talent to fill in vaudeville and other acts.

Competitive " local talent nights " may be tried, in which all units are invited to have their representatives, with ability to entertain, participate. These contests would be open to singers, dancers, instrumentalists, monologists or readers, acrobats, and men doing stunts or novelty acts of any description. Small cash prizes, awarded on the basis of the applause given the act, would be desirable. Play writing among the soldiers should be encouraged whenever any special talent in this direction is discovered. In time of war, special plays should be written and programs prepared for morale purposes. The programs of theatrical and other entertainments may be used as vehicles for lines of morale value.

Preferably the character of dramatic entertainment should be light rather than heavy, and gay rather than serious. Pretty girls and catchy music attract, and assistance in this connection can usually be secured through the local welfare organizations. Farces and "take-offs" by the men on the military service, with witty local allusions, are greatly relished. Vaudeville shows, with a mixture of singing, dancing, acrobatics, music, boxing, etc., are always popular. As a change, some more ambitious piece may occasionally be tried. Sometimes a production of a patriotic or historical nature may be desirable. Minstrel shows, although hackneyed, will draw if made bright through the introduction of new jokes and catchy music. But in any case, the program should be so constituted or the lines so cleverly written or rewritten as to bring out by suggestion a good deal of morale value. All material of an injurious nature should be eliminated. The Morale Officer should keep in touch with dramatic plans so that suitable morale suggestions may appear in dialogues and songs.

The accumulation of stage materials, costumes, wigs, props, etc., permanently in the camp is desirable. The assistance of local civilian organizations can often be secured in promoting dramatic work in procuring costumes, personnel, halls for shows outside the reservation, etc. Photographs of rehearsals, performances and members of the cast, can be used effectively for publicity purposes and as souvenirs.

Some camps worked out a very excellent movable stage, which could be transported about on a truck for open air entertainments. It cost about $400.00, which was no more than the profit which might accrue from a single soldier performance in a civilian community. Benefit performances in civilian communities, with the permission of the commanding officers, furnish desirable means of promoting good relations with such communities.

Moving Pictures. Motion pictures are a morale agency which should be used to the utmost. They entertain and at the same time educate, conveying morale qualities in an indirect way which is most effective. Even the most untutored mind can grasp the idea conveyed by moving pictures, which, after all, are merely the modernized version of picture writing. Hence moving pictures offer a most ready and effective means of reaching and influencing the illiterate as well as those of high intelligence and good knowledge.

The censorship of moving pictures required by law in the various States indicates the recognition of their possible influence on character and conduct. Similarly, the character of moving pictures is of great importance in respect to morale. Too much of the material which has been shown in camps has no morale value and serves no other purpose than pastime. That pictures which depress morale and patriotism and have other undesirable reactions upon the soldier mind should be excluded is of course obvious. This applies, not only to those frankly addressed to such undesirable object, but perhaps in even greater degree to those in which the suggestion is indirect and subtle, and, though camouflaged, the effect of which is none the less potent.

Selection of films should be as carefully considered as the subjects of lectures or of books to be read. The low standards of certain classes of the general public and of many scenario writers should not be allowed to apply indiscriminately. Every film should be selected and judged according to its probable effect upon the soldier audience and the mental impression which it is desired to create. During the war, such films as "Hearts of the World," "The Unbeliever," "The Cross-bearer," etc., did much to fan the spirit of patriotism, just as "Fit to Fight," "Damaged Goods" and others promoted morality.

Moving pictures in which the men see themselves or other soldiers are always interesting to them. Frequently they may acquire historical importance. Good films showing the

regiment or other organization in some formation or function, and especially in battle, should be secured and preserved among the archives. Their periodic display will always arouse interest and pride, and they become progressively more valuable with the lapse of time. This also applies to the " Living Photos " of great masses of men grouped to represent some military insignia or design, such as have been staged at many camps. These awaken interest, local pride and form desirable souvenirs to send home.

A very effective means of reaching the soldiers in putting across a series of ideas is by " flashes " written on lantern slides at the moving picture shows, expressing the idea in epigrammatic or witty form and conveyed with surprise and novelty. Some of the epigrams may well give advice which is timely, and be shown at suitable intervals. Others may touch on some special morale problem which for the time being is giving particular concern.

After the Armistice was signed, the men were anxious to get home, and absence without leave and desertion increased. One camp helped to meet this problem with " flashes " such as the following:

" *Uncle Sam Says:* It's not *where* you soldiered for me, but *how* you did it."

" *Uncle Sam Says:* You haven't been a soldier long. You won't be one again soon. Be game while you are one."

" *Uncle Sam Says:* Where are my boys to-night? All that are worth havin' are on the job."

" *Uncle Sam Says:* The feller that goes ' over the hill ' ain't a soldier — he's a mistake."

Slides for motion picture shows for the Morale Officer to promulgate ideas or to advertise the library or other facilities may be made to deal with an immediate problem as follows: " Use Higgins waterproof ink and #303 Gillett pen. Make a diagram on white cardboard the size of a slide and rule same. Place mica on diagram and print any sizes desired, but keep in bounds. Place printed mica sheet

face down on thin glass (slide size) and paste slide tape evenly around edges of glass with mica between."

Music. Music is one of the potent aids to morale. Of it, General Linevitch said: "Music is one of the most vital ammunitions of the Russian army. Without music, the Russian soldier would be dull, cowardly and inefficient. From music he absorbs a magic power of endurance and forgets the sufferings and mortality." Its importance was realized during the war as never before in our service and it is now more extensively recognized among military measures. It is, of course, developed from the instinct of rhythm, which is a potent force in stimulating or organizing activity. The drumming of the savage produces an exalted mental state, in which one response is cadence of motion. With civilized man, the harmony of the band tends to make the individual fall in step and stimulates to motion and concert of action with others. The very instruments for music determine their use for special purposes through their quality. For arousing strenuous effort, brass instruments and those of percussion are more appropriate than the reed or lute. The ancients charged their foes amid the stimulating blasts of trumpets and horns, as the modern savage is stirred to fight by the clash of gongs or the throbbing of the war drums.

Music is the interpreter of the psychological state. The pianist, playing in half revery, unconsciously reveals, by his choice and expression, the feelings, emotions and attitudes he entertains. The converse of this is true, for, by selection of music, the troops may be swayed from the martial to the sentimental, from thoughts of war to those of home. Expressive and humorous words, appropriate to the music, carry a subconscious lesson. They add to power of resistance and ability to brace up exhausted muscles and nerves and to offset anxiety and homesickness. Any theme may be used which serves to stimulate one or more of the basic instincts and direct it to the purpose intended.

Popular songs are, in a way, the expression of communal

mental state, both in origin and use. The gradual alteration of our national mental state, from the time when the craven "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier" was the popular song of the music halls, through the intermediate psychological steps that resulted in the stern challenge "Keep your head down, Alleman'!" and the stirring "Over there," is a curious study in itself.

Men instinctively change their selection of music to the environment. Camp-fire songs are in a class by themselves, and are evoked when marching songs seem out of place. The soldier sings little about patriotism, perhaps because band music in itself is so often patriotic as to surfeit. In the recruit camp he sings of war, but after baptism by fire, the themes have more to do with home, love and humor. In a general way, the subjects tend to run along lines in which there is an existing repression. Songs and music are also interpretative of racial psychology, as for example the work of German, Russian, Polish and Italian composers, or the native Hawaiian or Negro music.

Music, and especially mass singing, promote good fellowship and unity and make the hearers and participants forget their difficulties. That "music hath power to soothe the savage beast" is psychologically true, for it is a by-pass through which emotional tension may be relaxed. The use of mass singing of a few appropriate songs, to put an audience on a basis of common sympathy and receptivity to suggestion before the addresses are made, will be found a measure of practical efficiency.

With mass singing now recognized as a military measure, periodical exercises will be carried out. Periods should be so arranged that all available men in an organization will be present. Singing should be carried out as a required exercise and hence during working hours, or else it should be voluntary and carried out after hours for the pleasure of the soldier. To force men to attend singing, when some might prefer to be away on pass, is to impair interest and

participation. Mass singing is best taught by a few simple songs that the men know and enjoy. After the spirit and ability for singing are acquired, more difficult and higher class music may be tried. It is particularly valuable in making recruits feel at home, and in making foreign speaking soldiers attempt our language. Examples are common in which soldier groups have been roused to such enthusiasm in singing that they applaud the results of their own efforts.

Company " sings," of a few minutes duration, in the mess hall after the evening meal, are often popular. Two or three songs will usually be sufficient, so that the singing may not be too drawn out. The songs thus learned will be useful as marching songs on hikes and in camps, as the men will know, not only that they can sing, but what to sing. As a natural outgrowth of the company " sings," the company quartet should be developed. It should perform at company " sings," both in leading the harmony and singing independently. It serves as a nucleus, not only for the furnishing of music but as an example and intiative to which other singers informally respond and gain in confidence and practise. As a directing agent along such lines, every company should have its song leader.

Competitive regimental "sings " have been held in some camps, either out of doors or in the Liberty Theaters. They were held daily, a new organization at a time, and it took a week or more to complete the roster. The pauses were used by " Four Minute " speakers on various subjects, " how to use the camp library," " vocational training," " what the army has done for you," etc., varying with each completion of the roster. In some instances, buglers were included in the contests, and cups and other prizes given the best singing regiment and regimental buglers.

A singing contest which proved very successful as a morale factor had the following program:

1. Each military unit entering the contest was limited to 100 men.

2. Points for the judges to consider were: volume, quality, rhythm, spirit, harmony, expression, accuracy, enunciation (words).

3. Songs to be used: First and last verses of the Star Spangled Banner. Each unit being prepared to render one verse and chorus of one of the following songs: "Old Black Joe," "Old Folks at Home," "Old Kentucky Home." One verse and chorus of its own choosing. Unison songs for all contestants: "America," "Long Trail," "Good-morning, Mr. Zip, Zip, Zip." One original parody by each unit. Each contesting unit to be led by a leader of its own choosing. At this camp, the song leader distributed 17,000 song books in one week.

In a camp with high morale, the good spirits of the men dispose them toward singing and the problem is not so much to evoke singing as to direct it. Conversely, when men are depressed and discontented the tendency is to remain silent, and this is particularly the time when they need to be brought out of themselves. This brings up the matter of leadership in singing. Men who are interested in singing are usually willing to take a prominent part in it for the good they can do. Beside a good voice, personality is of basic importance, for one man may sway the crowd in sympathetic understanding, while it would remain largely mute under the efforts of another. They must know how to select songs in accordance with the mood of the audience, and gradually carry it to the state of mind desired. They should be quick and deft in repressing songs or parodies which express discontent with the service or create invidious distinction between any classes or groups.

Bands are a great aid to morale. Where the official allowance is not sufficient to provide them, the difficulty may usually be surmounted by organizing the available musical talent into volunteer bands and orchestras to play for the recreation of themselves and others. Authority to supply band instruments and music has been given in the case of

volunteer bands where no organized bands exist, with provision that the instruments shall be kept in good condition and that there shall be no expense to the Government. Small "jazz" bands or orchestras are very popular with the men, especially the colored troops. They were organized at some camps and were allowed to play outside when their services could be spared. In some instances they were paid for this outside service, as the local civilian musicians offered no objection.

Whenever organizations change station, or any considerable number of discharged men are to leave in a group, it is very desirable to have the band play them off to the strains of "Auld Lang Syne" or any appropriate air, and thus make them feel that their departure is regretted. In connection with this last act, the psychological fact should be recalled that the mental retention, due to "last impression" is usually greater than that produced in any other way.

The use of music as a morale measure in industry, by periodic "sings" and the organization of bands and orchestras, is a valuable aid to contentment and efficiency.

Dances and Socials. Dances exert a strong appeal to the men through the instinct of rhythm, and socials through the opportunity to make friends of the opposite sex. As a morale factor, the value of dancing and the social relaxation accompanying it, has been found to be very great in promoting contentment. The following quotation from a Morale Officer is typical: "It is my belief that dances have had a more marked effect in raising morale than anything we have attempted. . . . I believe special emphasis should be laid on dancing in every camp and, that with adequate supervision, it should be encouraged in every way. Beside being a social asset, dancing helps to remove awkwardness, adds to gracefulness of carriage and increases self-confidence."

Dancing by itself is a pleasant and wholesome amusement if properly safeguarded. Unfortunately organized vice generally chooses public dance halls as its liaison with the

soldier. But the remedy for this condition is simple. The low class of dance hall should be discouraged, either through public officials or public sentiment, or by declaring them out of bounds, and places where soldiers will meet the respect due their uniform and become acquainted with the proper kind of girls, under suitable chaperonage, should be encouraged and advertised in the camp.

Periodical dances for the men on the military reservation, held at frequent intervals, should be carried out under adequate supervision and with the invitation list safeguarded by a suitable committee. At some camps, dances have been given by the men to which an adequate number of girls, carefully selected and duly chaperoned, have been brought by hostesses designated by the War Camp Community Service. In one camp, a special train brought some two hundred girls to an enlisted men's dance which was held in a building temporarily turned over and decorated for the purpose.

Dances given by the Red Cross in the Convalescent Houses at hospitals have been made a special feature in many instances, and helped fill a need for entertainment among the personnel of the hospitals — a need which is perhaps more apparent in hospitals than in many other organizations with more active outdoor duty.

Arrangements whereby men can secure dancing lessons, either at a moderate charge or free, have been tried out and were much appreciated, more men responding in some instances than could be adequately taken care of at first. Dancing classes and dancing matinees have been successfully held on Saturday afternoons. Military balls of some pretension afford excellent opportunity for the return of hospitality and for the stimulation of interest, morale, and good social relations with the civilian community. Camp dances are often so popular that attendance by the men needs to be limited by passes awarded for good conduct.

Unit dances are naturally invitation affairs, best held in barracks, mess halls and club rooms.

Soldier Clubs. Soldier clubs do much to add to the social life of the soldier and to increase his interest and contentment. There are two kinds, one of a general nature and the other pertaining to company organizations. All club-rooms should naturally be fitted up with the usual equipment of comfortable furniture, games, phonographs, player pianos, pool tables, writing material, reading matter, etc. The men take great pride in their upkeep and decoration, which latter may well include photographs, souvenirs, athletic trophies and other articles promotive of morale. Management of these clubs should, under the commander, rest in the hands of a committee of enlisted men.

The rules for these clubs should be as few and simple as possible. The men enjoying them are under prolonged military restraint and repressions and appreciate such liberty of action as may be open to them in their leisure hours. The men themselves and their elected officials may be relied upon to ensure proper conduct and care of property. One fault that the men found with the welfare huts during the war was that they were too closely supervised. The fitting up of clubs may be provided for from Government property, augmented by company and other funds, through subscriptions of the men for certain articles, by donations from outside persons or organizations and in other ways.

"Company Nights," for which the club-rooms are decorated, and to include a smoker, supper and musical and other entertainment, are very effective morale agencies in the promotion of contentment, interest and esprit de corps. The cost is inconsiderable, being merely that of a few smokes, extras and mild beverages in addition to the usual supper, served an hour or so later. They should not be held so often as to lose the attraction of novelty. Whether they are held exclusively for the members of the company,

or whether those of one or more other companies are invited guests, are matters of local convenience and immediate policy.

Such small entertainments possess many advantages over larger ones, where the greater number interferes with real informality and enjoyment. Smaller entertainments are more easily arranged and supervised, are less expensive, and appear to satisfy the men better than larger ones. The men will take great pride in them and their success if the arrangements and plans are left to a committee of themselves with such encouragement and suggestions as may assist and facilitate.

Trips, Hikes and Practice Marches. Trips, hikes and practice marches offer an opportunity for expression of the normal migratory instinct which is so strong in young men, especially in the late spring and fall when the weather is particularly favorable, the country is most attractive, and the natural tendency of all living things is to move. They afford relief from the monotony of barracks life and stimulate and satisfy curiosity and other basic instincts. Great distance is not necessary to satisfaction; change of scene and novelty are the desiderata and these may often be found near home to a sufficient extent.

An essential point of practice marches is to arouse interest and anticipation in them in advance, so that they may be regarded as pleasurable privileges rather than a mere continuation of tasks which have become onerous. For this reason, they should be preceded by due publicity as to their attractiveness and opportunities to the men participating. Any military functions which may also be contemplated are then regarded by the men as natural incidentals to a more or less recreational purpose. There is no reason why such marches should not be made tactical manœuvers between camps, but in such cases the interest of the men should be aroused and maintained by having the reasons for the formations and dispositions fully explained to them.

Accordingly, it is desirable that in seasonal weather the troops be not confined to the post, but be sent frequently on short hikes over the various roads in the vicinity. Longer hikes, with over-night encampments in places having special points of interest, attractive scenery, facilities for swimming, bathing, fishing, etc., should be carried out every few weeks and all proper effort made to inform the men as to facilities and advantages and how to make use of them. It is important that the men should not be overloaded on such marches, especially in warm weather, lest the morale benefits of the trip be impaired by an unnecessary element of drudgery.

Recreational camps may often be established with advantage and organizations sent to them in rotation. Hunting and fishing trips should be encouraged for small parties, especially for the week end. In the old days, the results of such trips materially helped the mess and so were of advantage financially. That an abundance of game no longer exists is no reason why such trips should not be encouraged, but as matters of pleasure rather than profit.

Organized week end trips to local points of historic interest have been carried out with excellent results. Places figuring in the Revolutionary War, Civil War, etc., may often be visited and their points of interest demonstrated and explained. Such trips are not only interesting and instructive, but stimulate thought and pride in American traditions and the achievements of the military service in the past. The chaplain might have charge of such sight-seeing parties and secure the coöperation and assistance of civilian authorities and organizations. Such trips can be made so inexpensive as to be well within the means of the enlisted men desiring to participate. The diversity of service in our army is such that many opportunities to satisfy the normal instincts of young men in this way are nearly always practicable.

Where distances to a desired point are too great to be

readily covered by marching, the men will often gladly pay their own railroad fare for the sake of the trip. One regiment, for example, paid its own way to the Yellowstone Park, and then marched through it by easy stages so as fully to see its many attractions. The use of motor and other transport equipment by week-end camping parties is very desirable in reaching attractive points at some distance. The class of men who particularly need such trips are those in the more sedentary staff services, whose duties largely confine them to the military jurisdiction and are chiefly performed within doors.

Men at stations should be watched for signs of restlessness and symptoms of discontent, and those in whom such indications are becoming marked should have special trips suggested to them. Chafing under restraint of movement is unquestionably an exciting factor in absence without leave and desertion. Participation in all hikes, trips and hunting expeditions should be made contingent on good conduct and held out as rewards for merit.

The practical advantages of such trips should not be overlooked. As a result of them men work better on their return, manifesting new interest and vigor, and the sum total of their output for the year is increased rather than diminished. Commanding officers are really in the position of employers of labor, and the experience of industry is that vacations from an incessant routine are profitable.

Divisional and other manœuvers naturally offer opportunity to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Permanent change of station of course satisfies the requirements set forth, in so far as the bulk of the command is concerned. For those with strong family ties and obligations, special factors of expense and separation occur with change of station which correspondingly detract from the morale value of the whole.

The Post Exchange. The Post Exchange, efficiently conducted, is one of the great aids to contentment and good

morale among troops. Its analogy in civil life is the co-operative store. As the commercial center of the command, it becomes a common meeting place and a popular resort, possessing some of the social qualities of a club. It renders accessible many of the articles which soldiers want, is a potent check against profiteering, and the profits which accrue are of great assistance in procuring valuable means of comfort and enjoyment for the men. By supplying articles that soldiers need, it becomes a local attraction which keeps the men under discipline and control and away from possible outside influences.

The Post Exchange should aim at efficient management combined with the greatest volume of business and a small reasonable profit. Its true object is to serve as a practical utility and save money for its customers. It is an erroneous conception for it to consider its purpose to be primarily to pile up profits and secondarily to serve as a convenience and a kind of a half-way economizer for the garrison. Success in Post Exchange management is not found in securing the greatest dividends in the shortest time. Rather it is represented in a large volume of business, indicating maximum service; small dividends, showing that its service has been economical to its customers, and in shrewd, careful buying and efficient and economical management, whereby the greatest benefit to purchasers may accrue. In a general way, profits should come chiefly from the articles classed as luxuries. Staple and necessary articles should be sold near cost, thus affording real economy to the families of officers and married enlisted men.

Stock lists should cover all articles in reasonable demand, so that officers and men should not be forced to make such purchases outside or go without. Articles once listed should be kept on hand by judicious anticipation of sales and orders in advance. It serves no practical purpose to have them listed if not available for purchase. Deliveries should be made and the good will and satisfaction of customers sought

as in the businesses of civil life. Effort should be made to obtain on special order articles not carried in stock, giving the benefit to the purchaser of the discount of the large commercial houses.

Various utilities, such as barber, tailor and shoe repair shops, are best operated under the Post Exchange. Similarly it is in position to secure special rates for laundry, provide for collective buying and assist financially in other ways.

It is important that the Exchange should be so attractive that the men will seek it. Naturally its hours should suit the needs of the men, who have little opportunity to resort to it during the official period of the day. This matter is mentioned because it has so often been disregarded. A well run Exchange is always a matter of interest and pride to the command which it serves.

CHAPTER XV

THE RECRUIT, RECRUITING, REENLISTMENT AND DISCHARGE

The special problems of the recruit; mental adjustment and suggestibility; the importance of first impressions; some administrative measures for the recruit period; information of the recruit; early handling of recruits; self-interest; prepared environment for recruits; use of home influences. Recruiting; a problem of applied psychology; difficulties of the recruiting problem; shortage of personnel and lowered morale; influence of morale on vacancies; success in recruiting implies actual attractiveness of service; enlistment as an opportunity and not a job; recruiting from a select class; relative success of recruiting approaches; recruiting and esprit de corps; regional recruiting. Re-enlistment; an index of relative morale; re-enlistments like "repeat orders" in civil life; failure to re-enlist and labor turnover; some causes for non-reenlistment. Discharge; importance of last impressions; political and social dangers of demobilization; historical examples of post-war disorganization; recognitions for good service; interest, sympathy and suggestions; assistance for future welfare.

The Recruit. The component units of an army drawn from a civil population, however willing, are sensitive to the altered conditions encountered in the military service. With the donning of the uniform, the recruit passes into a physical and mental atmosphere quite unlike anything he has previously known. The new appearances, routine, methods, ideas, surroundings, activities, restrictions and comforts are powerful influences in creating impressions. It is a natural, instinctive tendency to assume that the new is unfriendly and unsafe until its harmless quality has been demonstrated — as illustrated, for example, in the familiar phrase concerning the anxiety of "a cat in a strange garret." So, too, the recruit tends to respond to this primitive impulse of caution, especially if the military service was com-

pulsory and not sought, or if a previously isolated or protected life causes the individual to be flooded with a volume of new sensations in which there has been no previous experience. Such conditions naturally place the recruit under an exceptionally high degree of mental tension in endeavoring to accomplish many new and difficult mental adjustments. It will aid efficiency if difficulties be smoothed away when practicable so that adjustment to the military service may be accomplished with the least possible mental stress.

But with this increased mental stress, the whole mental make-up is put in a state of flux and heightened receptivity to suggestion. The individual is anxious to accommodate himself to the new conditions in which he is placed, especially if he voluntarily put himself under them by the act of enlistment. Volition enters, and new habits, ideas and points of view are readily and unconsciously adopted, even though at variance with previous ideas and standards. The individual usually responds by losing a sense of individual responsibility but by gaining in self-respect, dignity, ideas of coöperation and in other helpful ways.

All this is important not only in respect to novices in the military service but to apprentices and new employees in civil industry. Similarly, what follows has its parallel applicability to the latter classes.

In the handling of recruits, the principle of primacy is most important. This means that those experiences which come first in a series of related experiences are especially likely to be remembered. First impressions are persistent. It is especially important, therefore, that they should be correct, and that proper mental as well as physical control over the recruit shall be established. It follows that the latter, from the moment of his entry into the service, should be studied, advised and directed. False impressions and a wrong attitude formed during the recruit stage can be, and doubtless are, ultimately modified by fuller experience under wiser administration, but it is better that they should be

avoided altogether and that the recruit should start right without the later need for effacing wrong ideas previously created.

As an essential to such a start, the recruit should be made to feel that he is welcomed into a service and an organization, and under officers, that are friendly to him and interested in him as a human being and not merely as a piece of military material, and that later will expect much of him. For the young recruit, the early period of service is particularly likely to be the time of homesickness because of painful emotional strain due to temporary incomplete adjustment. This is particularly the time when kindly advice and inspiration from his company officers, the chaplain and others is most appreciated and effective.

At one camp during the war every recruit, as his first military exercise, was marched to an information center where a series of talks, later continued, was begun. At this time he was given a printed tag with his name and address on it, ostensibly as an identification tag until he got into uniform. The chief purpose of the tag, however, was to carry the following inspirational message printed on the reverse side: —

"You are now a soldier of the United States — a soldier selected by your Country to fight for the freedom of the world.

WALK like a soldier —
THINK like a soldier —
ACT like a soldier —
BE A SOLDIER!

"This is not easy to do at first and there may be many things that you do not understand. Never mind — all good soldiers have learned to do the same thing that you are learning to do. Remember you follow a flag that has never led in an unjust war. Remember that the American Army has never yet been defeated. Do your part now and it never can be. Keep your head up, your eyes open, and SMILE!"

During this formative period the newcomer should be made to understand that the military establishment forms a society having its own codes, and there should be explained

to him the purpose and necessity of the many rules and restrictions with which he was unfamiliar in previous life and which otherwise might be regarded as arbitrary and irksome. At the same time he must be made to understand that, as a beginner, he cannot expect to understand the reason for everything required of him, and that unquestioning obedience, which is his duty in all cases, is in itself a necessary and reasonable requirement.

The recruit also should be informed as to some of the traditions of the service and of the organization which he is entering, so that this knowledge may add to his pride in his initiation and membership. At the very outset he should catch the spirit of the service and some beginnings of an esprit de corps, not only from the officers over him, but from members of the enlisted personnel who represent the service at its best.

Finally, he should be clearly informed that the military establishment, in the necessity for military order and discipline, distributes reward and punishment, praise and blame with impartial justice and irresistible power. If this is fully explained at the outset, the necessity of learning to shun difficulty by tedious and painful experience will be largely avoided.

During the first fortnight, systematized explanation of military conditions should be given the recruit. Among these may be mentioned personal hygiene and venereal disease, vaccination and inoculation, camp boundaries and important features, military courtesy, rank, personnel and organization, military terms and definitions, Articles of War, orders for sentries, seriousness of desertions and unauthorized absences, such details as fatigue and kitchen police, information on pay, insurance, stoppages, fines and effects of misconduct on pay; discipline, passes and furloughs, opportunities for self-improvement, friendly attitude of officers, citizenship and patriotism, traditions and customs of the service, war aims, character of the enemy, etc.

Physical well being has much to do with morale. It is therefore particularly important that the food and accommodations of the recruit should be attractive. Men arriving after meal times should be served good hot food, whatever the hour, and comfortable sleeping accommodations made available for them. It is desirable to get the recruit into a good fitting uniform as soon as possible. Singing is especially to be promoted among recruits in making them feel at ease and in giving an idea of homogeneity.

Entertainment for the recruit should be carefully systematized. There should be something attractive of this sort available during the early period of service when off duty so as to take the man's mind off himself and build up his local interest as rapidly as possible. In this entertainment work, the recruit, if he possesses any talent, should be encouraged to take part.

If, in this adjustment period, the instruction and development of the recruit is carried out with interest, kindliness and tact, it is highly probable that he will become an enthusiastic, valuable soldier, imbued with loyalty to his superiors and comrades and anxious to do his best.

On the arrival of recruits, the Morale Officer should look them over and see the kind of material with which he has to deal. The company officer can go much further, and by observation, inquiry and experience gain a fair idea of mental make-up. Upon the latter, the problem of rapid adjustment to the military environment is based. While the ideals are the same for all, their divergence from previous standard implies divergence in result. Many deep-seated influences for good morale start in the home and reach their highest development there.

If the original material be good, the task is relatively easy; if poor, so proportionately greater is the success attained. The more unpromising the material, the greater the attention and effort it needs to receive. Military requirements demand average standards to which all should

attain. A company marches and fights as a company — and the exceptional excellence of a few does not compensate for the deficiencies of others. The adage that " the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link " applies with certainty to organizations.

Time is an important factor in solving the recruit problem. It enables the painful points of contact between the recruit and his environment to be smoothed away, new interests to be created, and self-confidence to replace ignorance and embarrassment. This painful period should be bridged over by a definite program of development and adjustment, not only in relation to the mechanics of drills and duties, but in respect to the reasons which lie behind them and many matters of less direct application to the military service. All recruits entering the service need to undergo a period of quarantine, for the sake of their own health as well as that of others. During this period much can be accomplished in promoting adjustment, particularly in respect to giving information as to duties, rights and contingencies to be met.

The early handling of recruits, while necessarily largely done by non-commissioned officers, should be very closely supervised by company commanders. The non-commissioned officers in charge should be carefully selected with a view to carrying out the officer's ideas, for they are in a position to mold the mental attitude of the recruit at the most impressionable period of his service. The old ideas which sometimes " break men in making soldiers," or endeavor to create a subservience to non-commissioned officers based on fear rather than on respect for ability to properly administer authority, should not be tolerated. An over-rough handling of recruits, especially in the mounted service, means poor morale, bad discipline and desertions.

It is a psychological fact that every human being is intrinsically most interested in himself and his own personal affairs. It is important to bring this influence into play as

early as possible upon the recruit with a view to making it one of the controlling factors of conduct, and offsetting other elements of the new environment which are inevitably depressing. At present it is too often allowed to go by default. The recruit should be made to understand fully the good things and opportunities for self-interest and advancement which the service opens to him, in order to keep up his spirit, neutralize depressing influences and develop enthusiasm which will ensure diligence in duties to come. These advantages may be made the subject of formal talks to the recruit group, or used in the case of individuals who present special problems of discipline and morale. Also an appreciation of benefit may be brought out by inquiry after some experience in the service. It is interesting to note that 89.5 per cent. of men questioned, on the demobilization of a certain division, stated that their army service had benefitted them in one or more ways, and 88 per cent. favored universal military training, although half of the questionnaire blanks were intentionally given to men supposed to be dissatisfied with the service. After making the recruit appreciate the possible advantages which the service offers to his individual interests, the next step is to present them as being indivisibly associated with those of the military group of which he is a part.

The secret of good morale among recruits, even more than among older soldiers, is to keep them thoroughly occupied with diversified military duties and athletic exercises during the day and afforded systematized entertainment at night. They should not have too much liberty, lest this promote self-reflection and homesickness, or carousing. Both work and play should be carefully supervised as to hours and quality. But the liberty of the recruit should not be unduly restricted to the extent that he is made to feel himself literally a prisoner. If passes are withheld, the reason should be very clearly explained; if it is apprehended that by granting the recruit a pass to go to town he may get into trouble

through bad company, it would be far better to permit him to go to town with good soldiers who will start him right than to withhold the privilege. If he feels that his officers have confidence in him, he will then come nearer to doing right so as not to lessen the faith reposed in him.

Drills for recruits should not be too long, and there should be plenty of rest in the intervals. Recruits are often soft and readily tired, while military drills require them to use special muscles which are weak and undeveloped from not being ordinarily called upon in the avocations of civil life. It is easy to overdo, and a check should be kept on this matter. Drills missed at a recruit depot should be made up, so that all who leave it shall have reached a common standard.

In many instances, recruits have been given an undue share of the hardest and most disagreeable work, being thus discriminated against to the advantage of the older soldier. This extra work not only interferes with the training which is so important, but it tends, at this impressionable period, to render the man, who enlisted with the idea of making himself a soldier, discontented and disappointed with the whole service. He is put in a potential frame of mind to join the grumblers and those who, by the passive opposition which they dare not express openly, hamper the efficiency of the organization. Orders may well require that no recruit be assigned to kitchen police, extensive fatigue or similar duty until he has had a reasonable period of military training. In recruit depots, the entire work of administration should be performed by members of the general recruiting service. Recruits are sent there for instruction and the time is already too short for the full accomplishment of this purpose.

The recruit must have confidence in his own competency. During the war, it was common to hear soldiers called "boys" and not "men." This is of course wrong from a physical standpoint, in that soldiers do men's work. It is

also wrong psychologically, in that the word " boy " carries with it an idea of undevelopment, immaturity, and irresponsibility.

In the handling of recruits, it is important that they shall be kept away from the influence of older soldiers of an undesirable type who may give them wrong impressions of the service. Later, when their own ideas are better organized, such influences are more effectively resisted. The converse of this is also true and, in the adjustment of the recruit, a direct, official relationship with selected older soldiers is of advantage. Here the recruit is assigned to an older soldier as the particular charge of the latter to inform, instruct and guide, and the veteran is told by the company commander that his is the responsibility and credit for the kind of a soldier into which the new man develops. The arrangement is much like the " Big Brother " movement in civil life, and the calculated introduction of contented, enthusiastic old soldiers into the environment of the new men will stabilize both the recruits and the organization. Morale operatives should pay particular attention to recruits with a view to ascertaining their difficulties and reporting them to higher authority for abatement.

The morale of the recruit is affected not only by his army environment but also to a considerable degree and, especially during the first few weeks of service, by home influences. Until military ties have been created which equal or replace those of the home, he is particularly responsive to the sentiment and opinions of his family, friends, home town and neighborhood. It is the part of common sense to use such influences in favor of the military service rather than in indifference or in criticism toward it. By form letters from commanders to the nearest relatives of recruits announcing the arrival and welfare of recruits, by sending home camp papers, programs, menus, etc., it is possible to build up and utilize home interests in stabilizing the soldier. One of the first things the recruit should be encouraged to do is to have

his picture taken in his new uniform to send to his home and friends. It is well worth while to have the Post Exchange arrange whereby this can be done economically. Every recruit arriving at a new station should be required to write at least one letter home within a week after arrival, and if he is favorably impressed with army life he can readily be led to express this to his correspondents and thereby unconsciously but firmly establish his own attitude toward the service.

A friendly form letter from the new commander of the recruit to his "home folks" which proved very valuable during the war in creating the right attitude toward the service was along the following lines, and was sent by the recruit as an enclosure in his first letter home:

Station

Date

Salutation

——— ——— has arrived safely at this camp. He will remain here for some time, getting used to army life, and learning the first simple things that our soldiers must know.

The Army supplies him with clothing, shoes, good food, comfortable quarters and medical attendance. But in another way your help is needed. Give him the support of your confidence and cheer.

Write to him often! Getting mail is a big event in a soldier's day, and getting none is a real disappointment. If pleasant things happen at home write him about them. If you are proud of him, tell him so. *Let him know that you are back of him.*

Don't be worried if your first letters to him are delayed; that is bound to happen sometimes. Keep writing just the same and we will see that he gets all you write, even if it takes a little time.

Remember always that you, too, are a part of the American army — you are the army of encouragement and enthusiasm. Write letters filled with these things to your soldier and you will help us to help him.

Signature

His address is

——— ———

——— ———

———

New troops arriving at a station should, for purposes of reception and first impressions, be regarded as recruits. A

receiving personnel and band at the station, barracks fully prepared for immediate and comfortable taking over, condensed information as to the facilities of the station and neighboring community, publicity in the newspapers as to arrival and the military record of the new organization, reviews, smokers, receptions — all help to make the new organization feel at home and to adjust itself to its new surroundings.

One of the essential factors at recruit depots is the permanent party. If the personnel cannot be imbued with the idea of welcome to the recruits and teamwork for the glory of the service, all else done for the recruit direct will be of little avail. This cannot be accomplished in a day, but intelligent and enthusiastic work will bring it about. The idea of " Ease them in — don't break them in " might well be kept constantly before every one having to do with the instruction and training of recruits.

Recruiting. The matter of keeping an army recruited up under a system of voluntary enlistment is purely a problem of applied psychology. New thoughts and purposes must be instilled into civilian minds where they did not previously exist and others modified or removed in order to culminate in the act of enlistment. In its essentials, this problem consists of making the sum of the attractions toward the army greater than the sum of the attractions to remain in civil life. The former should be set forth in all completeness and sufficient detail, but they should not be overstated lest there be later reaction as a result of promises which are not realized.

The seriousness of the recruiting problem is shown by the fact that during the five years of peace, 1912–1916, the army was habitually short more than ten per cent. of its authorized strength, and in 1916 it was short more than twenty per cent. Such a shortage of man-power in any commercial enterprise would represent an uneconomical relation between personnel, capital invested, equipment available and output

of product. The same relation holds good in the military service. The efficiency with which the ranks are kept full is a matter which thus concerns every officer. Shortage of personnel not only interferes with the efficiency with which work is carried out but it impairs morale through the excessive proportion of duty which is thus imposed on the individuals in the service.

The Adjutant General is charged with the responsibility of keeping the ranks full. But this responsibility is just in part only; for the military service as a whole has a proper function to perform in decreasing leakage back into civil life of the human elements which the recruiting service has, with much difficulty, been able to secure. The problem is not merely one of securing new recruits by persuasion; it has to do also with the retention of certain individuals already in the service through making it more attractive. If the latter is accomplished, there will be fewer new vacancies to fill.

Vacancies in the army are due to (a) discharges without reënlistment, (b) discharges by court-martial, (c) discharges by order, (d) desertions, (e) discharges for disability, (f) retirements, (g) deaths. The last three classes are clearly legitimate sources of deductions. The first four are matters not entirely beyond the reach of morale influences indirectly exerted through administrative measures within the activities of all officers.

Losses by sentence of courts-martial very frequently express reaction by the individual against military conditions and requirements. Wise administration will often bring about a state of mind whereby the individual will be inclined to support military authority and requirements rather than clash with them.

Discharge by order, in the great majority of cases, is the expression of desire by the individuals concerned to leave the service which is not so unattractive as to produce desertion yet is sufficiently so to make the applicant desire to escape completing his tour of enlistment.

It is of interest to note in this connection the various reasons which a number of prospective recruits gave as their excuses for declining to enlist. In all there were twenty-two distinct reasons, which are classifiable into seven main groups, in which objections in detail appear in order of frequency, as follows: —

(a) Poor living conditions, thirty per cent.: unattractive quarters, unpopular camps, unattractive neighborhood, too far from large cities.

(b) Low pay, twenty per cent.: low pay of enlisted men, low pay of non-commissioned officers, high pay of civilian post employees.

(c) Excessive or disagreeable duty, eighteen per cent.: too much fatigue duty, too much guard duty, too much and too intensive drill, too long working hours.

(d) Low morale of recruiting parties due to financial difficulties, eleven per cent.: low morale of recruiting officers, low morale of enlisted recruiters.

(e) Unpopular uniform, seven per cent.: clothing and shoes ill-fitting; varicolored and salvaged, uniform lowered by ex-soldiers who wear it.

(f) Activity of military police, four per cent.: interference by military police with men off duty; required wearing of uniform inviting inspection by military police.

(g) Miscellaneous, four per cent.: fear lest vocational training be compulsory, failure to keep faith with recruits, recruit depot objectionable, recollection of camps in war time conditions.

Recruiting, from its nature, is a problem of the individual, like sales in business life. The prospective candidate should accordingly be studied, not only from the standpoint of approach, but with respect to the special appeals, and their presentation, which seem likely to be most effective. Accordingly, officers and men selected for recruiting service should possess qualities of salesmanship. They should be carefully selected, further instructed and held on probation

until of proven efficiency in his duty. Only an alert, active and progressive personnel of attractive appearance and pleasing personality has any place in this work, for they are accepted as human standards of the service they represent. It has happened that individuals have been transferred to the recruiting service because of such glaring fault that their organization commanders desired to be rid of them.

Success in recruiting means that a sufficient number of individuals must come to the conclusion that the army is more attractive than civil life. This implies:

(a) Actually making the service so attractive in fact.

(b) Creating a service of publicity sufficient to inform the general public regarding the military service, to the end that it will support rather than oppose enlistments.

(c) Developing a recruiting machine that will efficiently reach and influence a sufficient number of potential recruits in civil life.

In order to get a man to enlist in the service it is necessary to appeal to his judgment and give him cogent reasons for the action desired. What chiefly interests the potential soldier in peace is what the army is going to do for him. If he puts on the uniform, that act does not make him a less rational being nor less concerned in his own welfare.

An insuperable obstacle to keeping full any large volunteer force in this country will exist so long as the military authorities or the public regard military service as a "job," competing for a poor class of unskilled labor. A job which is merely a living, does not fit a man to take a satisfactory place in business or industry, and leads nowhere except to the calling of the professional soldier, will never appeal to any great number of Americans. The old civilian idea that a man enlisted in the army because he could not do anything else, was lazy or derelict, must never be allowed to return. Such conception of the service must inevitably operate to de-

ter men of high class, which the army wants, from entering it; for no individual of ambition, confidence and self-respect desires to associate himself where contrary sentiments prevail.

The army must be featured as an opportunity in which small pay is to be more or less compensated for by education or vocational training which can later be turned to business or industrial advantage in civil life. Opportunity of this sort at once furnishes an effective appeal to a high type of young men. Whether further appeal should be made particularly through adventure, travel, education, vocational training, promotion or otherwise is purely a matter of the personal equation of the potential recruit. It is true that a certain number of recruits can be obtained as a result of the lack of detailed knowledge and experience of the service, just as persons will purchase goods which appear attractive but on possession are found unsatisfactory; but no legitimate business could succeed if the vast majority of its customers purchased in ignorance and were later dissatisfied.

It is further essential to successful recruiting that a general service of information exist whose function it would be to systematically disseminate information to the general public relative to the army, its conditions and opportunities. This organization should work from a single center under a definite purpose, systematically, continuously and unobtrusively. How it should transmit this information is purely a matter of preferential method. On this background of favorable understanding and good will, the special recruiting campaign must be developed. The latter calls for advertising talent of the highest order.

The comparative efficiency of various agencies in recruiting is shown by the following data relating to 1374 applicants for enlistment as to the means which induced them to apply for the service:

Form of reaching the man.	Number of applicants accepted.	Percentage of total.
Soliciting	687	50.00
Recruiting flags and "A" signs	256	18.63
Posters	293	21.32
(At R. R. stations..... 89)		
(At post offices..... 103)		
(Other places ..... 101)		
Total 293		
Newspaper articles and advertising	115	8.36
Service literature	15	1.00
Personal letters	8	.56

It thus appears that half the applicants were obtained by direct solicitation, that posters and recruiting flags reached two out of every five, and that the printed and written word influenced only one in ten.

If the army is made attractive from the standpoint of the soldier, the difficulties of the recruiting problem will be very greatly reduced. Willingness to repeat an experience is the best test of its popularity. It is an axiom in business that the best advertisement is the satisfied customer. In retail stores it has been found that more than seventy per cent. of new customers come through recommendations of old customers, less than fifteen per cent. come from printed advertising, and the balance just "drop in." There is no reason to doubt the general applicability of these figures to the recruiting problem. If the soldier himself is satisfied with the results of his enlistment contract, he will become a living advertisement of the benefits of the service. Word of mouth, and the personal argument and influence it conveys, has just been shown the most effective of inducements. Satisfied soldiers on pass or furlough will operate to bring in recruits, while discharged soldiers will send the rising generation to get the benefits of a military service that they themselves found pleasant and profitable.

The fact that certain excellently managed military organizations accumulate a high proportion of old soldiers and

that men flock to them to reënlist indicates that if the whole army was run on an equally high plane of efficiency, its deficiency in military man-power would be greatly decreased.

Morale has a close relation to recruiting and enlistments and, conversely, the latter have a close relation to morale. Under a voluntary system of recruiting, organizations which have a high morale have far less difficulty in securing an abundance of higher class recruits. The best men are attracted by, and desire to identify themselves with, organizations of high reputation and recognized efficiency. Once so enlisted, these high types of men instinctively charge themselves with upholding and enhancing the high standards, esprit de corps, reputation and state of mind which originally attracted them. The same principles apply in civil industry in respect to the employment situation and labor turnover.

Recruiting men from certain areas for special organizations should be of value as capitalizing home relationships and local interests. Through the newspapers, it affords an excellent opportunity to keep the people at home in touch with the individuals and organizations which represent them in the service. When military posts are in the vicinity of recruiting stations, it is often of advantage to take prospective recruits on personally conducted tours through them, so that they may see the life and its advantages for themselves.

The treatment which prospective recruits receive at depots has much to do with their acceptance of enlistment. Some men refuse to enlist at the last moment because of unfavorable presentation of military life as seen at recruit depots. Such men, returning to civil life, become centers of negative influence against the army. Moreover, it is expensive, inasmuch as it is like selling goods and having them refused at the last minute and returned to the vendor. A satisfied and contented permanent personnel at recruit

depots causes favorable first impressions of the service on which the potential recruit makes his final decision.

Community coöperation is important. Parents, friends and other civilians should be encouraged to visit the post and acquaint themselves with its facilities, witness its military functions and participate in appropriate social activities. Recruit detachments about to leave should be addressed by the commander at the time of his inspection and an interest in their future welfare displayed. The departing recruits should be encouraged to write back to their friends in the post and at home about their experiences in the service.

When men have been physically rejected for enlistment, a brief talk expressing regret at their inability to join the army, and indirectly bringing out some of its advantages, will in the vast majority of cases send the men away in a kindly frame of mind rather than as critics of the army. In some instances, men so rejected have been given cards by the recruiting officer as possible aids in securing employment and so promoting their good feeling toward the service. Men sent away in such a frame of mind will very often send desirable men as applicants for enlistment in their places.

Reënlistments. The proportion of reënlistments in any military organization, or in the army as a whole, is an excellent index of the state of morale. In a company, for example, it is an expression of the efficiency of its commander. That great variation exists in such respects is common knowledge; men may refuse to reënlist in their own organization while another in the same post may have a waiting list. Such a state of affairs, other conditions being equal, is evidence of something wrong — clearly the soldier is not a booster for his former organization. Army statistics invariably show an inverse relation between desertions and reënlistments — where one is high the other is

low. Reënlistment in another organization is usually evidence that, while the military service itself is attractive, the former organization is unattractive. Such preferences indicate that men unconsciously shift from where morale is poor to where it is good.

Reënlistments in the army correspond to "repeat orders" in business life. Both are expressions of satisfaction with commodities or conditions. No business of a legitimate nature could hope for success if customers, after making one purchase, refused to make more. When men leave the service on discharge it is apparent that the army has, for one reason or another, been demonstrated to them as less desirable than civil life.

Failure to reënlist is also like labor "turnover" in civil life, which is recognized as one of the greater causes of industrial inefficiency. Labor turnover means the loss of a skilled workman, whose expertness and industrial value have been gained at financial expense, and replacing him by the unskilled laborer, whose industrial adjustment to machinery and environment means a lower output of product at a time when expense from the ignorant handling of machinery, liability to injury, etc., is at its highest. Labor turnover also interferes with team work by change in units which have become adjusted in their relation to others. The above particularly applies to the military service, where even a higher degree of coördination is necessary.

It is of course true that the reënlistment of all soldiers would be undesirable, as tending to create a small class of professionals instead of serving as a training school to many soldiers of fair qualifications. This does not alter the fact that far fewer experienced soldiers remain in the service than is desirable for both numerical strength and administrative efficiency. A further point of importance is that the unduly high proportion of men who, on completing their first enlistment, find they "have had enough of the army,"

is an unflattering comment on the ability of the army to hold those whom it has had under its direct influence. The data in Figure 21 are of interest in this connection.

	DEPARTMENTS							PER CENT OF TOTAL
	Eastern	No. Eastern	So. Eastern	Central	Southern	Western	Total	
Tired of Army	137	23	138	100	71	25	494	34
Want civil employment	177	24	46	33	81	110	471	32
Army pay too small	15	36	5	54	64	25	199	14
Unpleasant conditions	147	7	0	2	19	3	178	12
Dependent relatives	7	19	36	3	5	9	79	5
All others	22	0	6	12	5	2	47	3
Total	505	109	231	204	245	174	1468	

Figure 21.

It appears from this that by far the more important causes interfering with reënlistment relate to the army itself — as " tired of army," " pay too small," " unpleasant conditions "— and are in themselves expulsive. In " want civil employment " the army suffers by comparison. Obviously some of these factors are preventable or remediable. The pressure outward which they exert is largely susceptible to control by commanders.

Discharge. Last impressions tend to be vivid and permanent. For that reason, the opportunity to have the discharged soldier leave the service with feelings of kindliness and interest toward it should not be overlooked. To him, separation from the service is one of the events of his life. Whether he goes out as a supporter or as a captious critic has an important bearing on recruiting and the degree of esteem in which all soldiers are held by the civilian community so far as his individual influence is concerned. Men discharged from the army should be regarded in the same light as colleges regard their alumni. If this is done, their sentiments will be reciprocal and the army will build up for itself a powerful support in civil life which will aid military betterment.

When a single soldier, or a relatively small group of soldiers, is discharged, little direct effect may be had upon

the life of the community to which they return. But where large numbers are discharged together, in the state of mind induced by military service, great danger is present. Men cannot be safely turned loose to shift for themselves after becoming accustomed to a life of tension, restraint and reliance on others to produce the necessities of life. Demobilization must be accompanied, not only by military and economic considerations, but psychologic considerations as well.

The folly of abrupt and wholesale discharge is shown by history. Carthage lost all she had gained in the first Punic War and opened the door to her destruction in this way, for the swarms of mercenaries which had fought Carthage's battles found themselves with no place to go, arms in their hands and nothing to do but start another war. Most of the pirates that infested the seas in the 18th Century were old privateersmen of the Wars of the Austrian Succession, who, after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, found themselves out of jobs and without inclination to return to the unprofitable and unexciting life of traders. The bandits who haunted parts of Italy, France and Spain during the last two generations were developed from old guerilla bands that had fought on one side or the other during the Napoleonic Wars. Men accustomed to excitement are loath to return to the placid routines of peace, particularly when continued excitement offers opportunities of richer reward.

So all great wars are followed by periods of disorganization and readjustment to new conditions. At such time, lawlessness raises its head and greed seizes its opportunity. The mosaic of society has been disrupted and its integral units present unadjusted points of painful contact to each other. Former relations and balances are permanently lost. The older generation sees its standards modified or permanently set aside. With the interference with production and the inflation of currency, commodities rise in cost and certain industries and classes profit disproportionately

at the expense of others. Personal discomforts develop personal discontents. The disloyal, lawless and predatory see opportunity. Out of all tends to come mass discontents with things as they are. Men tend to go back to first principles in their thoughts, with inquiry into the soundness of all institutions and traditions — political, religious, social, domestic and economic. Industry and its share of products is always a subject for contention and revision. Of the truth of this, the chaotic social conditions which have developed in countries whose political and industrial balance was overturned during the recent war furnish abundant evidence. Demobilization, then, is both a military and political problem. Like all such problems, it begins with the individual and due consideration of the interests of the individual is important.

The fact that our demobilization of nearly four million soldiers at the end of the recent war was accomplished without disorder, and that they were rapidly and smoothly absorbed into civil life, was not mere accident. In no other army in the world was demobilization free from disorder, riot, mutiny and bloodshed, in many instances of a very serious nature. In the desirable results of our own service, the morale organization, which worked intelligently, comprehensively and ceaselessly from the day of the Armistice, using every possible agency which might contribute to the desired end, can lay just claim to a large share in bringing about this peaceful reabsorption.

For men about to be discharged there should be some sort of official recognition. For the average individual a friendly farewell by the company commander, with good wishes and advice, would be sufficient. For men of exceptionally long and faithful service, or in the case of sufficient groups, the procedure should be given the dignity of a ceremony. Such men may fairly be assumed to have merited a last " Retreat," a few words of appreciation and advice as to future obligations of citizenship from a reasonably high

officer, and perhaps the receipt of the honorable discharge presented like a diploma as evidence of work well done. The reviews of the command sometimes given old non-commissioned officers about to be retired for long and honorable service are greatly to be commended as morale agencies.

After the Armistice, men about to be discharged were given the following address at their last retreat:

"MEN:—

"You have been gathered here to-day in the presence of your comrades to pay your last formal tribute to the Flag, before your final separation from the service.

"This is the Flag for which you have sacrificed so much. This is the Flag which has been glorified and sanctified by your sacrifices and the blood of your fallen comrades 'Over There.' Behold your Flag, the emblem of a just and glorious victory.

"As you return to civil life remember the ideals of liberty, of good government, of law and order, for all of which this Flag stands and ever will stand, and to all of which it has been dedicated by you.

"At all times pay it the honor and reverence which you, as soldiers, pay it now." PARADE REST.

When men are being discharged, a smoker or other entertainment given them on the night before is evidence that they are leaving a service that has esteemed their comradeship. The matter should not be handled from the standpoint of a celebration of return to civil life, and consequently in the nature of release from an irksome task under military restraint, but as a recognition due to honorable military service.

Before a man is discharged he should be called into the company office, his future inquired into in a sympathetic manner and an offer tendered of such assistance as his company commander may give. Any difficulties pertaining to his service or future may be frankly discussed and smoothed out and the man sent away with the idea that his superiors are and have been interested in his welfare. War Department Circular No. 167, Dec. 23, 1918, directs that the Commanding Officer of the camp, post or station

at which men are to be discharged " will require each group to be assembled and addressed by an officer, preferably by the trained representative of the Morale Section, if one be present, to invite their attention to the privilege thus granted them by Congress to wear the uniform of their country and to appeal to them as men to wear it with honor, as they did as soldiers, and to be particular about their conduct, appearance, association and habits." . . .

Some commanders have prepared a brief memorandum of good wishes and advice, attractively printed, which is handed to all soldiers on discharge. Besides a formal discharge certificate, a special letter of appreciation from his immediate commander should be given a man leaving the service after duty well performed. Of much value also, in enhancing the army in the eyes of the public, is a letter sent by the company commander to the nearest relative of the man shortly before his honorable discharge. This letter should contain such commendation and good wishes as may be appropriate and such information as will ensure understanding that the Government had performed its full part at the time of discharge. Following is a suggested form for such a letter:

My dear Mr. (or Mrs.)

In a few days your soldier will receive his honorable discharge and start for home.

He is bringing back many fine qualities of body and mind which he has acquired or developed in the military service. The army has done everything it could do to make him strong, fine, self-reliant, yet self-controlled. It returns him to you a better man.

You have been an important member of that great army of encouragement and enthusiasm which helped to make him and us all better soldiers. You can now be a great help in keeping alive the good qualities he is bringing back from the army, in making him as good a citizen as he has been a good soldier.

Funds for his fare and necessary expenses to his home will be paid by the Government. He will receive all pay due him. The Government will also allow him to keep up his insurance at a very low rate, for the benefit of his family.

His return to civil life will bring new problems for you both

to solve. The qualities he brings back will help you now as your encouragement helped him while he was away and in your hands and his rests the future of our country.

As his Commanding Officer I am proud of him. He has done his duty well. I, and his comrades, will bid him good-bye with deep regret, and wish him every success after he returns home.

Sincerely yours,

When possible, men on discharge should be furnished transportation to the railroad station for themselves and their effects, so that their final impression of the service will be one of interest and coöperation.

In the case of a soldier shortly to be discharged, the Chaplain might well send a notice to the Y. M. C. A. or similar organization of the town to which he is going, giving the name, address and former organization of the man and suggesting that he be extended such fellowship and privileges as may be practicable. It is desirable to confer upon the discharged soldier as much opportunity and status in his home community as possible.

When numbers of men are being discharged, male and female harpies will tend to flock to the vicinity to take advantage of the new found liberty of the soldier and relieve him of his money. At these times, police surveillance over such parasites tends to relax, and suitable representations by the local commander to the local civil authorities are often of value.

The demobilization of a great military force is linked up with the placing of its individual units back into civil life under conditions in which they can be rapidly and effectively absorbed by business and industry. This is necessary, not only in the interests of the men, but to promote their morale and tractability during the trying demobilization periods and to quicken their appreciation and loyalty to the Government thus taking practical measures for their welfare. The Morale Branch appreciated the great importance of this matter and immediately after the Armistice took steps to bring together all agencies, governmental and civilian,

which might be used for this purpose. A very elaborate and efficient organization was at first formed under the Department of Labor, but this was subsequently taken over by the War Department. The latter, therefore, has the germ from which similar activities may spring as a routine measure in time of peace.

The guaranteeing of a job in civil life after an honorable discharge would do much to promote interest in and appreciation of the military service. The same reasons which apply to the desirability of finding employment for discharged soldiers after war apply equally in peace. The problem, in the aggregate, may be smaller and less disturbing to the public, but so far as the individual is concerned it is an one hundred per cent. problem in each instance.

CHAPTER XVI

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL

Substandard men; their disabilities for service; standards of intelligence; their relation to inefficiency and delinquency. Mental defectives; low mentality; relation of mental state to military offense; special handling of dullards. Army mental tests; their value and limitations; relation of mentality to morale. Mental misfits; their classification; selective assignments; individual adaptability; occupational needs and specifications; trade tests. The non-English speaking soldier; a special American problem; its magnitude and importance; difficulties relating to the barrier of language; mental isolation; measures for solving the problem. Americanization. Illiteracy; high proportion of illiterates; the military value of education; regional distribution of illiteracy; relative racial illiteracy; illiteracy and irresponsibility. Naturalization of non-citizens; psychological value of rights of citizenship; induction as citizens. The development battalion; its use and disadvantages. The colored soldier; his special morale problems; some special mental qualities; administrative methods. The "conscientious objector"; difficulty of problem; classification of objectors; reactions of objectors; sincere and spurious objectors; methods of handling objectors; special measures for alteration of mental state; the prepared environment; compulsion through suggestion; social pressure.

Substandard Men. The word substandard is used here in relation to mental capacity and not physical deficiency. Present extent of knowledge may often depend upon past environment and may bear no relation to innate ability to conduct correct mental processes. Differences in mentality between soldiers due to education and opportunity are true only in part. Some have had little chance to learn, others refuse to learn and still others cannot learn. It is this last class which is considered here. It is not capable of logical thought or involved consideration and may perhaps be considered to be made up of mental dwarfs who never can be made to attain normal mental stature.

Unless this substandard class is deliberately searched out and excluded from the service at the time of enlistment, its number will be large enough in any considerable military group, even in as small an organization as a company, to create special problems of discipline and morale. To demonstrate this point it is only necessary to call attention to the charts of desertion, absence without leave and other offenses in which character appears as an always large and often dominating factor.

The psychologists have classified the average intelligence in the so-called better classes of the United States on the basis of an approximate mentality of sixteen years. Army draft figures show that, for the military class taken in cross section from the community, the age of sixteen is too high, and that a standard of about thirteen to fourteen years is correct. If this be the average, then there must be as many below this mean as there are above it. The latter class offers no difficulties from the standpoint of intelligence, but the mentally substandard group proves, as might be expected, to be an undue source of trouble and disorder. Some of these men, on investigation, were found to be as mentally deficient as a six year old child. Those from eight to twelve years of mental equivalent fall under the moron group, and those below a mental standard of twelve years are really not competent to run their own affairs with fair judgment.

Probably for military purposes it would be better to consider the mentally substandard men not as in a way equal to children, but actually as children. If an eight year old child shows irresponsibility in leaving a task, poorly performing a duty, or being late at school, the incident, while annoying, is condoned by the idea that the offender is "only a child." But the same rule applies to the substandard soldier whose adult body shelters only a child's intelligence. If such a man quits guard, sleeps on post or goes absent without leave, these acts may depend upon mental

immaturity in the offender, who while perhaps twenty-five years developed in body, has attained only a third of that development in mind and discretion.

All of these substandard men are naturally inefficient and operate to interfere with the smooth running of the military machine. Some of them, without ambition, are satisfied to drudge and are content with little for themselves or company. Others not only slow down efficiency but increase military offenses through inability to comprehend orders or appreciate or accept responsibility. Often they are ready tools for evil in the hands of brighter men. Others, of nervous and sanguine temperament, instead of drudging, will steal or commit other crime to satisfy their desires, without understanding of moral standards of conduct or active realization of consequences. Such men are thus not only a drag but a menace. The further fact that a low mentality does not readily adapt itself to environment is an argument for discharge when the material is so poor that an efficient, reliable soldier cannot be made from it.

As showing how relatively unimpressionable this class is to environment, it may be stated that war experience indicated that where men of high intelligence were under prolonged fire, their recollections became blurred and indistinct, while the less sensitive mentality of the stupid, stolid man did not so readily yield to the influence of high explosives and could give a very coherent account of happenings. Recruits coming from the floating class of unskilled labor present a much more than average proportion of substandardism and should be examined and investigated with particular care.

It may be mentioned that scientific measurements do not bear out the theory of Lombroso that physical conformation and stigmata reveal criminal tendencies that can be diagnosed by pure observation. They do show, however, that the criminal man is largely a defective man both physically and mentally. Nature and nurture both enter.

The average criminal ranks markedly below the average of the general population in stature, body weight and physical development. More can be foretold of a recruit's probable efficiency by a general scouting of his appearance than by any physical details, with a psychological examination as to his mental capacity to check up the conclusions drawn through conversation. All the above applies, along its proper parallels, to industry as well as to the army. Low grade men are less efficient as workers and more liable to accident.

Mental Defectives. The army psychological tests have shown that of a typical company, twenty per cent. of the men are incapable of rapid learning and ten per cent. have about the mental age of a ten-year-old school boy. These facts have an obviously most important relation to training, performance of duty, responsibility, breaches of discipline, and other matters.

Low mentality may have a "dormant" phase. Certain men learn slowly. Here patience will bear fruit, for many such men will in time become good soldiers. Mental sluggishness may also be due to physical condition, such as hookworm infection. Here a course of medical treatment will greatly increase mental alertness and power.

Certain qualities of brain cells must exist as an essential to the efficient performance of duty. There is truth in the homely adage, "You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." Even after the preliminary elimination by the draft boards, the army medical officers rejected one recruit in every hundred for mental defect.

The relation of military offenses to intelligence is important. Men of low psychological ratings are prevented by their limitations of intelligence from fully profiting by training and information, and from having such restraining sense of judgment and responsibility as is possessed by men of higher mentality. They tend to commit offenses of irresponsibility rather than of moral turpitude. The sub-

standard man is proportionately more liable to commit petty misdemeanors and become a guard house case, where the man of higher mentality is less apt to commit fault, but if the latter does so it is of more serious nature and more frequently brings him before a general court.

In one camp, out of 479 white offenders, twenty-one per cent. were classified as D-minus or E, being in the lowest decile of the army so far as intelligence is concerned. Thirty-seven per cent. of the deserters were also of that lowest mental grade. Also of the deserters, eighty-seven per cent. were of less than average intelligence. In another camp, 92.4 per cent. of all prisoners in the stockade were of less than average intelligence.

It is obvious that for such men the rapid reading of the Articles of War, orders or addresses, as ordinarily carried out, is ineffective. Their minds move too slowly to keep pace with the rapidly spoken word, and do not grasp the meaning of what is said. These disabilities are accentuated if there are distractions by sound, sight or bodily fatigue. Ignorance, misunderstanding and faulty action are the result, while duty is poorly performed. With them, infractions of discipline often occur from mental incapacity rather than from intent. Such instructions should accordingly be given at a time when there are no distractions, so that there may be full mental concentration on the subject in hand. Speaking needs to be slow and distinct and if necessary important points should be repeated. More than that, so as not to hold back and annoy the company, the men who are dull should be specially taught by themselves under conditions suitable for reaching their sluggish understanding.

In mental defectives, it is not so much their own concepts that give rise to delinquency as that, through their lack of judgment and balancing power, influences and suggestions, coming either from within or from the external world, lead to impulses and mental pictures which determine the misdeed. They are not so much deliberate offenders as they

are individuals swayed by impulse springing usually from persons or things outside. Often they are the tools of stronger personalities.

It has been shown that one out of every seven "unemployed" men applying for charitable relief in a certain inquiry made during the winter had an intelligence coefficient of seventy per cent., or less — that is, they were definitely feeble minded. This is important for recruiting officers to remember, for it is just this class which would seek enlistment for the shelter and care it would bring in cold weather. It is also the class which, when warm weather comes, would tend to vagabondage and desertion through vague impulses and irresponsibility. It is a class with which employers of labor are confronted.

Army Mental Tests. Army mental tests are intended to aid in the discovery of low grade men whose lack of intelligence is such that they should be eliminated from the service, and of others whose mental inferiority requires special assignment or training. They permit of the early recognition of men who are mentally slow and whose undesirable acts are not necessarily stubborn and disobedient. They also indicate men whose superior intelligence marks them as worthy of consideration for advancement or special assignment to duty requiring high mental capacity.

A psychological rating furnishes a fairly reliable index of the ability of the man to learn, to think quickly and accurately, to analyze a situation, to maintain mental alertness and to comprehend and follow instructions. The rating is relatively little influenced by schooling. Ratings among drafted men were as follows:

Class A.— Very superior intelligence. About four to five per cent. of total. Officer material if endowed with other qualities necessary to leadership.

Class B.— Superior intelligence. About eight to ten per cent. of total. Mentally qualified as officer or non-commissioned officer material.

Class C-plus.— High average intelligence. About fifteen to eighteen per cent. of total. Includes material for non-commissioned officers.

Class C.— Average intelligence. About twenty-five per cent. of total. Excellent material for privates and lower non-commissioned officers.



Figure 22. Distribution of Intelligence in Army Groups.

Class C-minus.— Low average intelligence. About fifteen to eighteen per cent. of total. These men make good privates in routine work.

Class D.— Inferior intelligence. About fifteen per cent. of total. Make fair privates, but are without initiative and require much supervision. Many are illiterate or foreign.

Classes D and D-minus.— This group is divided into Class D which, while of deficient intelligence, may be retained for certain kinds of service; and Class D-minus, which requires rejection, discharge or special handling. This group includes about ten per cent. of the total. The majority of men in this group are below ten years in "mental age" and approximate the grade of moron or feeble minded.

The mental contrast between these several grades is shown by the fact that while class A can excel in college or university, the Class D men can scarcely go beyond the third or fourth grade in grammar school, no matter how



Figure 23. Proportions of Low, Average and High Grade Men in Typical Army Groups.

long they attend, while Class C men are rarely capable of completing a high school course. The accompanying charts (Figures 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26) very clearly indicate the diversity of mental capacity and conditions associated therewith.

It is not always easy to translate the psychological rating of an individual into exact terms of equivalent mental age. But this may be done approximately and with sufficient accuracy for practical results. In making psychological ratings, the maximum age limit is placed at eighteen years, since dependable data have not been secured beyond this age. There is, of course, mental growth beyond this period, but figures for it are not sufficiently accurate for practical pur-

poses. The accepted classification for mental age is as follows:

Class A.= } Class B.= }	18 years
Class C-plus=	16 years
Class C.=	13-14 years
Class C-minus=	11-12 years
Class D.=	9-10 years
Class D-minus or E=	8 years, or less.

In interpreting the tests, if a nineteen-year-old recruit makes a record such as the average ten-year-old boy makes, his mental age is ten. "It is by no means uncommon to find seven-year-olds who can do intellectual work at which one in twenty seventeen-year-olds would fail. And it is still less uncommon to find a twenty-five-year-old person with the mental age of a boy of twelve." For psychological purposes, mental age rather than chronological age is what counts.



Figure 24. Intelligence Rating of Men of Poor Military Value as Compared with Complete Draft for a Certain Camp.



Figure 25. Intelligence Ratings and Success at Officers Training Camps.



Figure 26. Intelligence Ratings and Success in Non-commissioned Officers Schools.

The value of psychological tests, especially of low grade men, is very great in respect to morale. They give at once an insight into the quality of mental material which is the subject of morale work, and point out the individuals whose low mentality is indicative not only of sluggish mind and defective information, but also of an accompanying irresponsibility apt to express itself in lapse of duty and heedless breach of discipline. It indicates at once a presumption that such a substandard individual not only will never make a non-commissioned officer, but that he represents a weak unit in the organization which will need special development and watchful oversight.

The converse, however, is not true, for it does not necessarily follow that men with high mental rating will be good administrators. The "very superior intelligence" manifested by a class A rating does not preclude possession of other personal traits which would seriously interfere with the efficient handling of men. It merely means that the man has a very alert, agile and accurate mind, giving no information as to other qualities. A man may, for example, be bright and at the same time lack courage or tact. The mental test gives no measure of loyalty, power of command or other traits that fit a man to carry on. But in the long run, these qualities are more apt to be found in the man of superior intelligence than in those who are intellectually inferior. Next to physical fitness, intelligence is probably the most important single factor in soldier efficiency.

A class B man, with intelligence rated as "superior," has a mind which works more slowly than that of a class A man, but he can have certain qualities of disposition and energy which render administrative success assured. On the other hand, his decisions will be less rapid than the higher rated man and not so often accurate, for, contrary to the popular idea, both mental tests and educational experience show that speed and accuracy go together.

Mental tests thus demonstrate the weaker elements and permit of the prompt elimination from the service of the

unfit, and also permit of intelligent assignment to duty within the capacity of the individual to accomplish success.

It is interesting to note here the number of soldiers found to have a paucity of mental interests. Of themselves, they do not read to any extent nor enter into wholesome games and sports. They have no special point of mental focus nor pastime. With many this mental inertia is pernicious. Higher authority should not permit inactivity to this type, either mental or physical. "The empty mind is the devil's workshop" means that mental vacuity permits the development of pernicious imagery.

Mental Misfits. The selective assignment of personnel to appropriate duties has close relationship to morale. There will be found in every organization individuals who offer special difficulties in its upbuilding. Some of these difficulties may be due to individual maladjustments because of slowness in learning or trend to indiscipline. Such men should be given a psychological examination. Others have special eccentricities or other qualities that give rise to suspicion of mental disease and these should be examined by a psychiatrist. Still others are merely misfits in their assignments to duty and the difficulties of these are readily corrected by giving the man the work for which he is best adapted. The less marked cases of all these present problems for the company commander to solve. It not infrequently happens that men whose performance of duty in one company has been unsatisfactory, do very well if transferred to another organization and come under different management and conditions.

Not every kind of work can be done equally well by any individual. Hence, without special attention to this matter, misfits will occur in any occupation. The constructive instinct is strong in human beings, and in each individual it seeks its expression through certain preferential channels. There is a just pride in satisfactory workmanship. Without fitting the man to the job or the job to the man is to invite the discontent which accompanies misfits. Incom-

petents may be placed in positions of responsibility, and competents faced with tasks for which they have neither aptitude nor liking. Beside inefficiency and friction, the result may include punishment for unsatisfactory service or the commission of such military offense as desertion for lack of local interest.

But a modern army, like a great business concern, offers such a multiplicity of duties that the special adaptibility of each individual to a particular function is not hard to satisfy. Few regard an infantry division as much more than a group of some 28,000 fighting men, yet for its proper functioning 10,895 trade specialists are required. In an average company, about thirty per cent. must have special occupational ability. The point here is that the trained man can be given an assignment which he is best fitted to do and the duties of which are more or less familiar and probably congenial to him. The result is not only one of the higher administrative efficiency but of morale.

A certain number of technical positions in an army have to be filled. If there is any virtue in training and any value in saving time in getting troops to the front, it is the part of wisdom to fill such technical positions with men already qualified, in whole or part, to carry out their functions. It has been objected that the selection of highly trained men for special technical work tends to lower the general standard of first line troops. This is regrettable, but the problem is one of relative values for the army as a whole and it may be accepted that the military machine will function more smoothly and powerfully if its component parts are operating at maximum efficiency. However, the results are relatively compensatory in that organizations which may lose in class standards gain in satisfaction of their needs for individual technicians.

Temporary smooth running of a company should not be put ahead of future efficiency, for the ultimate results, under discriminating assignments, will be more valuable. For the same reason, the assignment of the men to duties within or-

ganizations should not be left to non-commissioned officers, but the company commander himself should study his men with a view to making assignments that in the end will get the most effective service out of them.

As to the results of selective assignments, it is stated that, whereas nine months were required to fit the early divisions for overseas work, only three months were required to similarly fit the divisions last formed, largely because the personnel was distributed among tasks for which each individual was specially fitted by experience, education and inclination.

Every authorized unit in the army has a table of organization. The same is equally necessary for proper organization of any great industry. The occupational ability required of each man authorized must be known if its needs are effectively to be supplied. Further, only by this means can the special occupational needs of an organization at a given time be forecasted. The tables of occupational needs for each organization together with the qualification cards of soldiers or employees form a clearing house whereby the requirements of work and fitness may be promptly satisfied. The military qualification cards cover the following facts: — occupation, trade skill, previous experience, former employer, nativity, citizenship, schooling, linguistic ability, mental ability, physical ability, leadership ability, military experience, kind of service preferred. From this, a very clear idea of the qualifications and abilities of the soldier may be gained.

Claims of special ability are checked up by practical trade tests to ascertain the actual amount of skill possessed. At the time of the Armistice, seventy per cent. of soldiers claiming trade ability had been trade tested. The results showed that of such claimants, only six per cent. could be graded as experts, twenty-four per cent. as journeymen, forty per cent. as apprentices and thirty per cent. as inexperienced. These facts should be highly suggestive to those having to do with employment in industry. To fill deficiencies in many trades,

soldiers with natural talent in a certain direction were sent to trade schools for appropriate training. The present educational and vocational training opportunities in the army make it no difficult task to find out what a man is interested in and his capacity for it, and to give him a chance to perfect himself along his chosen lines of vocational expression.

The Non-English Speaking Soldier. The problem of the foreign speaking soldier is one which is essentially American. No other army in the world is beset with such a Babel of tongues. European nations, with the exception of Austria, were relatively homogeneous and their troops were composed very largely of men speaking the common language of their country. The reason for the difficulty in this country has been that the civil communities neglected the problem of Americanizing the immigrant. The interchange of thought and establishment of common ideals through a common tongue, which the United States had realized was necessary, for example, to the reconstruction of the Philippines, had received no adequate official attention in respect to human beings at home, though every other advanced nation had handled it as a matter of the highest political, industrial and economic importance.

The magnitude of the problem of the non-English speaking soldier in relation to the army of the United States, especially in time of war, is shown by the fact that in the census reports for 1910 more than fifty countries were represented. These reports further showed that there were at that time more than 13,000,000 foreign born whites in this country, with more than 20,000,000 more who were American born of one or both parents born in foreign countries. Up to the time of the war, immigration was occurring at the rate of about 1,000,000 per year, which would make the present foreign born population aggregate about 16,000,000, or nearly one in every six of the entire population. Fifty per cent. of foreign born males were of voting

age. Of foreign born above ten years of age, 3,000,000 could not speak English and 1,650,000 could not read or write in any language. These figures are suggestive of the language problems to be met under a draft act which, in 1917, called out aliens in the proportion of 14.85 per cent. of the total, and of which 7.23 per cent. were accepted. In one draft taken from New York City, out of 2,338 men taken at random, 1,619 were found to be native born and 719 foreign born. Of the latter, 48, or 6.6 per cent., or about 2.2 per cent. of the number taken, could not speak English well enough to tell their name and occupation, except through an interpreter.

This 16,000,000 foreign population forms the bulk of the laboring class of this country, a fact which indicates the tremendous importance of their problems to industry. In many places they have colonized, living apart from the American world and having little knowledge nor interest in the welfare of the country as a whole or in its ideals and policies. Their ideas were largely molded by some 1,500 foreign language newspapers, with a total circulation of about 10,000,000 within the United States.

The existence of this great body of potential recruits speaking no English, and the need for Americanization, has brought about authority for their enlistment. With the double purpose of filling the ranks and making good citizens, a considerable amount of recruiting energy is being spent in enlisting them, and the problems which they present may be regarded as permanently continuing in the service on a relatively large scale in time of peace.

The practical military difficulties created by lack of understanding of the English language are evident from the fact that during the war there were at one camp 2,190 men of twenty-seven nationalities who could not understand commands, while at another camp there were some 4,000 of such men, representing forty-one different nationalities. It is true that many of these men were intelligent and literate

in their own language; yet for military purposes they presented mental problems as difficult as if imbecility were involved, in that mental relations could not be established nor ideas imparted. Inability to understand begot curt treatment. Inevitably the alien fell behind in drill and everything else, and when his regiment went abroad he was left behind to pass through the same experience in another regiment. Ultimately great numbers of these men, whom nobody wanted, accumulated in all large camps and finally found their way to Development Battalions, with apparently nothing that they could do for the country except perform fatigue duty. Similar conditions exist in industry.

During the six months, June-November, 1918, the Development Battalions handled about 28,000 illiterates and non-English speaking soldiers. Many such men had been sent to the colors without being able to understand why America had joined in the world conflict, though well able to appreciate why the countries of their birth were at war with Germany. Nor was this information systematically furnished them for many months. They were not well informed as to allotments, compensation and insurance, and hence each was particularly apt to think that neither his dependents nor future was being considered by the Government. Deductions for the aforementioned purposes were not understood, while many believed themselves discriminated against and required to do laborers' work for a mere pittance.

The barrier of language shut out such men from participation in the life, ideals and purposes of the military service, while at the same time it made them an easy prey for agitators speaking their own tongue and exposed them to doubts, misunderstandings and suspicions which only foreign language speakers could sweep aside. They felt that they were looked upon as inferiors by the English speaking groups, and this was heightened by offensive " nicknames " of the thoughtless and asperities by non-commissioned officers irritated by their inability to learn.

The result was the physical, social and mental isolation of such men. A gulf existed between them and their superiors and their English speaking comrades which prevented understanding and consideration of their needs and difficulties. To this, food problems, based on national, religious or other customs, added complications. They felt that they were discriminated against; and this was probably a fact, though not through desires but by reason of the language difficulties involved.

The problem was of such importance and magnitude that the Morale Branch worked out a very successful plan for dealing with such soldiers, known as the " Camp Gordon Plan," which was put into wide operation. This was followed some nine months later by the establishment under the recruiting system of permanent Recruit Educational Centers, in which illiterates and non-English speaking soldiers are taught to speak, read and write the English language as part of their elementary recruit training and to an extent to permit them to profit fully by the latter. The results have been extremely successful, and the " All American " detachments which have toured the country have shown the gratifying results of a few months systematized training. At the time of this writing, the Recruit Educational Center at Camp Upton contains some 1,800 foreign speaking recruits, representing forty-eight nationalities.

In carrying out the instruction, several methods have been tried. In all, military instruction and language instruction were correlated. In some, there was no grouping of the men along racial lines except for the first few weeks of adjustment and while they mastered the simple elements of English. In another, they were organized from the start without regard to language or race distinction. Both had the purpose of recognizing them only as Americans from the start and reducing the intensity of the soldier's environment in respect to his previous racial language, customs and ideals. By making up mixed squads and platoons, it became

necessary for the men to develop English as a common means of communication. Self-consciousness and racial consciousness were replaced by group unity. Only English was permitted in the mess halls, at military formations and general gatherings of the men. Even instruction, except in elementary classes, was given in English. In drill, the men were required to give their own commands, creating unison of mind and body. The officers and non-commissioned officers were selected for special qualities of leadership rather than linguistic ability. However, a corps of teachers and interpreters, most of them non-commissioned officers, was available in overcoming difficulties.

It is stated that, under this general plan, men who could speak little or no English became in three months' time sufficiently proficient to fulfill the functions of soldiers both in organizations and on separate missions. The troops developed good discipline and proficiency, while the spirit of Americanism became so marked that, almost without exception, all aliens took out citizenship papers. It may be mentioned here that the law authorizes citizenship in a minimum period of one year to aliens enlisting in the military service instead of the five years required by civil channels.

The results indicate that, whatever the method employed, any problem of this sort can be satisfactorily solved by an efficient commander who will give it the interest and attention which its importance deserves and sees that the necessary machinery is in sufficient quantity and functions effectively.

Illiteracy. In the sense used in this discussion, illiteracy means the lack of sufficient knowledge, or the inability to express and apply it, for military purposes. Its causes relate to inferior intelligence whereby there is inability to learn, to lack of educational facilities or failure to use them, which opportunity and volition control, and finally to foreign parentage in which the man may not be ignorant but in which he is uneducated in the accepted linguistic chan-

nel of the English language, through which his knowledge would be used.

There is no record of the number of illiterate men in the army during the war. The census figures for 1910 gave a percentage of 5.5 for whites and 25.5 for colored races, or an average of 7.6 for all males of ages from twenty to forty-four years. However, these census ratings can scarcely be considered as scientific for they probably relate to complete illiteracy and are very likely underestimates of fact since they represent the aggregate of statements of interested individuals not subjected to test.

Much more accurate data were secured on this subject through the psychological examinations which were given to 1,552,256 men during the war. These tests are of two kinds, one for literates and one for illiterates. The usual basis of differentiation was " ability to read and understand newspapers and write letters home." This test was in English. Men able to conform to such requirements were given the so-called " Alpha test " and those not able to conform to this were given the " Beta test " for illiterates. It is interesting to note that in an early total for the army it was found necessary to use the tests for illiterates in 24.9 per cent. of all recruits, and that in a later group of 94,000 whites this rose to 29.7 per cent.

Tests made of 112,895 men indicated that the percentage of colored soldier illiterates is 2.35 times that of the whites. Combining these figures leads to the conclusion that the men who served in the army should be classified as shown in Figure 27; the term " relatively illiterate " meaning some ability to read and write English, but not well enough to understand a newspaper and write a letter.

This extent of illiteracy in the material of which soldiers are made is striking and indicates the extent to which education is desirable in the service. The extent of illiteracy in a group is often dependent upon the number of negroes in it; also upon the part of the country from which the re-



Figure 27. Proportion of Literacy in the Draft Army.

cruits were derived. Hence the widely varying degrees of illiteracy at various camps are not properly comparable. The lowest percentage at any camp, in respect to the necessity for the Beta examination for illiterates, was 13.5 per cent. at a western camp, while the highest was 37.8 per cent. at a southern camp. "At Camp —— 44 per cent. of northern negroes and 72 per cent. of southern negroes were given the Beta examination. Of the latter group, 30 per cent. had already been eliminated by the physical examiners."

SCHOOLING OF RECRUITS

White native-born	Foreign born	Negroes	4 States Southern	5 States Northern	Did not reach grades as follows:
(60,250) %	(9,498) %	(9,192) %	(4,938) %	(4,254) %	Grade
2	12	13	19	7	1st
4	16	21	30	9	2nd
6	21	29	41	14	3rd
10	30	40	55	23	4th
17	41	55	70	36	5th
27	51	67	81	50	6th
37	63	76	88	60	7th
51	74	83	93	70	8th

The proportionate degree of literacy among males of the military age in this country is shown by the foregoing figures, which were based on a large number of psychological rating cards made on three drafts and intended to include all sections of the country. The groups were large enough and representative enough to avoid statistical error.

Native born white and negroes represent actual illiteracy. Foreign born illiteracy represents illiteracy so far as the English language is concerned, though doubtless a number were literate in their own language.

From psychological tests, it appears that under present methods of recruiting, in which educational and vocational training opportunities are featured, the volunteer recruits are, in each case, much above the men of the draft in intelligence and thus represent a materially higher degree of mental capacity than the general civilian class from which they come. This absolutely controverts the too popular civilian idea that enlistments in the army are drawn chiefly from a class of comparatively less mental capacity and competency. Not only is a larger proportion of high-class men coming in but a considerably greater proportion of mental dullards is being excluded. This should help morale, facilitate training and promote efficiency in many ways.

In respect to the number of illiterates from European countries, the following figures are of interest. They show the percentage of foreign born given Beta examination at Camps Devens and Custer.

Country	*Camp Devens*	*Camp Custer*
England	7.4	——
Scotland	7.1	——
Ireland	39.2	——
Canada	57.0	——
Norway	48.6	61.6
Sweden	41.7	58.0
Denmark	27.3	62.5
Holland	——	17.0
Belgium	——	73.0
Germany	12.7	——

Country	*Camp Devens*	*Camp Custer*
Austria	48.8	39.0
Portugal	83.6	——
Italy	81.7	77.8
Poland	84.0	66.7
Lithuania	89.5	——
Finland	60.9	41.0
Russia	73.6	62.8
Greece	75.6	53.0
Turkey	81.3	83.4
Armenia	72.9	——
Syria	74.2	——

The following figures for illiteracy by localities in this country are given for Camp Wadsworth:

Locality	Date	Number Examined	Number Rejected	Per cent of Illiteracy
A Northern State	May 25, 1918	8,965	1,484	16.6
A South-eastern State	July 5, 1918	981	487	49.5
A North-central State	July 24, 1918	4,692	670	14.2

"These figures are significant in the fact that the drafted men from (a Northern State) included many foreigners. In spite of that fact the percentage of illiteracy (16.6 per cent.) seems to be very small when compared with the percentage of illiteracy found among the men reporting from (a South-eastern State). In fact the percentage for the latter group was found to be so high as to make us doubt the accuracy of the data. A check was therefore made as follows: — The records of all of the (South-eastern State) men in one company were analyzed with the result that of the 177 men in the company, 109, or 61.6 per cent. were illiterate. It seems from this check that the percentage of illiteracy (49.5 per cent.) for the whole group from (the South-eastern State) is probably correct."

It is apparent that the factor of illiteracy has a very definite relation to the degree of responsibility which should attach to an individual. A printed order, for example, could carry with it no sense of responsibility to a man who cannot read, because it conveyed to such an individual no

information or obligation. Further, illiteracy checks the transmission of ideas and the dissemination of information by the printed or written word and thus closes a channel of the greatest assistance in training and the accurate performance of duty in the carrying out of orders. Illiterates with a knowledge of spoken English only can be reached only through word of mouth or example, thereby materially adding to the burdens of superiors. Moreover, their knowledge is not only limited but poorly organized, by reason of the fact that the vast fund of general information which is available to those who can read is denied to them.

Finally, illiterates with no knowledge of the English tongue have only the channel of example open to them, and this may be productive of inefficiency and error if it cannot be accompanied and checked up by explanation. Furthermore, with all illiterates, there is inability to comprehend instructions and advice with an increased proportion of offenses committed through ignorance or misunderstanding. It needs no argument, therefore, to demonstrate the vital interest which superiors have in the educational qualifications of their men. A certain degree of knowledge, an effective ability to use all the usual methods for the exchange of thought, and a reasonably orderly procedure of mental processes are necessary prerequisites to developing a satisfactory soldier or worker along anything more than simple lines. Where these do not exist, education and training should go hand in hand.

During the war, schools for illiterates were planned by the Morale Branch and put into local operation in many places. Usually they were held in welfare huts, and teachers came from the educational staff of the welfare organizations, from the morale organization and from civilian volunteers. Books were supplied by the American Library Association and it is interesting to note that one divisional camp had 4,000 first and second readers in use and had reported that 5,000 more were needed at the time of the

Armistice. Subsequently the work was taken over by the Education and Recreation Branch of the General Staff and was thoroughly systematized.

Naturalization of Non-Citizens. At the present time, men are accepted for military service who have taken out their first papers in citizenship. In time of war, the draft will bring in many men of foreign birth who have not become declarants. It is obviously important that such men should be given every opportunity and encouragement to acquire citizenship, thereby securing joint title in the country and Government which they are called upon to defend. No man can be expected to fight his best for a country and institutions which are not his own.

A proper function of the Morale Officer would be to secure full information as to non-citizens, recommend as to a course of informative instruction to prepare them for citizenship, and make arrangements to carry out the ceremony. A course of short lectures, covering the subject of Americanization, in lieu of drill periods, should be carried out. These should cover briefly the reasons for service; the American form of government and election of officials; the ideals of the United States with reading and explaining excerpts from the Constitution; the geography, magnitude and resources of the United States; the protection afforded by citizenship and the fact that it is no bar to temporary residence abroad and that confiscation of property or penalization of relatives could not come from it. Opportunity for citizenship should be presented as a privilege, without appearance of proselyting.

In reaching foreigners, use should be made of foreign language speakers and of the loyal foreign language newspapers. Mention should be specifically made by name of the nationals of their own country who participated with distinction in the upbuilding of the nation. The ceremonies of naturalization should be made as impressive as possible, with flags, music, mass singing and short, stirring addresses

by the Commanding Officer and others. The declarants, being usually emotional and temperamental, are affected by pomp and ceremony. Other soldiers should be in attendance, so that those already Americans may aid by applauding and welcoming their new fellow-citizens. All this applies in appropriate importance to civil industry.

The Development Battalion. The Development Battalion idea was an effort to meet the many practical difficulties which occurred during the war, with respect to the handling of personnel which, while capable of salvage for some character of military duty, was at the time unfit for incorporation in organizations preparing to go overseas. While the satisfactory handling and reconstruction of such cases was beyond the power of the organization commander, it was obvious that their aggregation would enable the taking of suitable measures in behalf of groups and individuals, as well as relieve organizations of the incubus of their presence. Corrective measures could be carried out under specialists, more satisfactory training accomplished and better esprit de corps developed.

On the other hand, some of the disadvantages of the Development Battalion are obvious. The very name carried the idea of subnormality and was resented by many. Another lay in the fact that all unfit for service, from any cause other than active illness, were grouped together. Thus the high class college man eager for service but whose flat feet needed strengthening, the illiterate, uncouth alien learning English and of no great loyalty, the stupid moron perhaps of low personal habits, and the coarse-fibered individual recovering from venereal infection were here brought under the same classification and into close physical contact.

The morale of Development Battalions was accordingly a serious problem, composed as they were of elements of the most dissimilar character and occupying a position savoring not only of the ignominious but the ridiculous. It is

perfectly possible, however, to preserve the good qualities of the Development Battalion and at the same time remove its obvious faults by replacing it with separate smaller organizations, each having to do with certain defects only. This has already been done, for example, in the case of the non-English speaking soldiers, by establishing Recruit Educational Centers to give the benefits required along such lines.

The Colored Soldier. The colored soldier presents morale problems of a special nature, in addition to about all those which confront the white soldier and his officers. A wide variation in educational qualifications contributes to complexities. The temperament, character and psychological processes of mind differ in various races, and the white officer, by nature, finds it relatively difficult to understand the workings of the negro soldier's mind. This is reason for special effort to do so, for the officer who gets the highest efficiency out of the colored soldier is the one who best understands his character and mental make-up. Methods that have proven successful with white troops may be more or less failures with colored soldiers.

Military service tends to represent physical and social benefits for the colored soldier, resulting in reënlistments and the leavening influence of a high proportion of old soldiers. With this goes a high degree of pride in the uniform and personal appearance. Drill is liked and increases self-respect. All combine in the furtherance of good conduct. The colored soldier naturally respects higher authority. He is accordingly particularly swayed in his ideas and acts by what he thinks is the attitude of his superiors toward him. No class of soldiers is more observant of its officers nor more strongly influenced by the outward appearance of the latter. By reason of their reliance on superiors, it is particularly necessary that they be well led.

The colored soldier needs to be met in a spirit of fairness, firmness and especially of sympathetic personal inter-

est. He is particularly appreciative of such interest in how he is cared for and the provisions made for him to spend his leisure time, and responds quickly in the better performance of duties which at once seem to him to be less irksome and monotonous. But if colored troops get the impression that their superiors are not interested in them and do not understand the elements of their racial characteristics, a falling off in effort on their part occurs and disintegration of discipline is apt to follow.

One evidence of the respect in which higher authority is held is the bringing to it of difficulties and complaints which, in white troops, might be withheld. These may seem trivial and at times childish, but they need to be listened to particularly, for they are very real to the complainants. The mere ability to bring such difficulties before higher authority goes far to allay perplexity, irritation or depression. Usually they represent chiefly a craving for reassurance and mental support, though sometimes real faults requiring rectification are found.

Colored troops are particularly receptive to ideas of discrimination. As they are by nature relatively emotional and impulsive, ideas of this kind should be looked for and allayed in the prevention of indisciplinary act. Among the less literate, the most exaggerated stories may gain credence unless offset by truth, while this condition is favored by the fact that they secure their information less by reading than by word of mouth.

The mixture of white and colored troops at the same station creates potential difficulties which at all times require the particular attention of the Morale Officer in preventing their development. Conditions particularly favorable to misunderstanding and trouble happen when such contact occurs between white and colored soldiers drawn from districts crossing the geographical distribution of the civilian population.

In connection with the handling of the colored soldier,

one of the things of first importance is to make him physically comfortable. He needs to be warmly housed and clad, and his appetite for good wholesome food should be satisfied. The latter is relatively easy to do because of an often high culinary aptitude. He will work faithfully and well if properly handled, but resents what he may consider as being overdriven. Account should be taken of the fact that he is pleasure loving and particularly appreciative of opportunities for enjoyment. Accordingly it is especially desirable that suitable facilities for the latter be provided. The love of the colored race for rhythm and harmony, especially mass singing, should be fully utilized. Parades are of special value in dramatizing the military matters in which colored soldiers play a part, while their anticipation and remembrance both go far to replace undesirable factors in their state of mind.

Colored troops respond readily to suggestion, advice and appeal to pride, and these should be fully used by the officers over them. As they may be swayed by glib talkers to their disadvantage and the impairment of the service and discipline, so they respond even more strongly to information and advice from superiors in whom they have confidence. Addresses to them by representative men of their own race will often be useful and appreciated.

The "Conscientious Objector." By reason of the extremely great administrative difficulties which this class develops — perhaps more perplexing to commanders than those which arise from any other cause — and the type-example which it may afford for scientific psychological handling, this subject will be discussed more in detail than would otherwise be the case.

The so-called "conscientious objectors" are a serious problem in morale, arousing resentment, if they are able to escape service, among those who accept the obligations of conflict; serving as examples of successful evasion to those who would welcome opportunity to cloak cowardice or dis-

loyalty in the false front of alleged conscience; creating sympathy and posing as martyrs if handled by force. Not a few, by inclination, tact and adroitness, are insidious propagandists of peace, even though it be a peace of defeat and dishonor.

The problem is one which naturally cannot develop in an army recruited by voluntary enlistment, but every drafted army will have to face it. The proportion of such objectors in our army was not large, aggregating only about 6,000 in the two drafts, but the problems they presented possessed difficulties out of all proportion to their numerical strength. Of these, some 1,800 persistently refused to accept noncombatant service, and 527 were sent to the U. S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth.

While with troops, and later at Fort Leavenworth, these men were a constant source of difficulty and disorder. Resistance to authority was the common expression of state of mind. Sometimes this was active, but usually it was of a passive nature. There might or might not be refusal to obey an order. Usually the objectors simply failed to obey it. The refusal to serve took many forms. They would not drill, salute, work, or sometimes even cook their own food. If left in bed, some lay in their own excreta rather than get up, or refused to bathe. A common means of displaying opposition was by " hunger strikes."

As a class, they were vociferous in verbal complaints and profuse in written ones. Their charges of ill-treatment were repeatedly found to be false, but were reiterated with all the exaggeration characteristic of individuals with an exalted ego. Complaints and allegations of injustice were necessary to their assumed role of martyrs, and in this they received the constant support of outside sympathizers. They were of course objects of bitter dislike by troops, and much of the alleged brutality of which they complained was really hazing at the hands of men who wanted to be soldiers, were ready for any hardship or sacrifice and had no

sympathy for men who, while apparently willing to share in the benefits of a victorious peace, would do nothing to help bring it about.

The so-called "conscientious objectors" were really divisible into two classes; those who objected to military service from religious convictions and those who opposed it through political belief. Under the law, consideration was required only for those whose objections rested on religious grounds. Its extension to political objectors was through executive interpretation. Further, exemption from service did not include all duty, but only from combatant service. In the Presidential Order of March 21, 1918, the following was declared non-combatant service: Any service in the Medical Department; in the Quartermaster Corps in the United States and in various of its organizations of the service of the rear abroad. So far as feasible, assignments were to be made to the Medical Department except on request of the man for assignment to some other service.

There were degrees of conscientious objection, ranging from refusal to accept combatant service only to a point of refusal to do work of any sort in the military service. This was particularly true of certain religious objectors, whose tenets of faith sometimes ran counter to army requirements in curious ways. Thus certain sects forbid the use of clothing with buttons. Some do not shave or cut their hair. Some believe that if they eat animal fat they violate the teachings of the Holy Writ. Some sects are wholly vegetarians. Some do not bathe. Some limit their members to the occupations of farming and husbandry. Some will not use telephones, railroad trains or any device or thing not known in Biblical times. Some believe that no life of any kind, even that of an insect or worm, may be taken deliberately.

Ideas of this sort, early implanted, deliberately fostered and honestly believed in, are not easy to alter or eradicate. They also illustrate the profound influence of ideas on con-

duct. The moral to be drawn is that methods of mental control, demonstratedly so effective in such cases in opposing military purposes, may also be employed in bringing about a mental state favorable toward the latter. As to type, the list of those sent to Leavenworth included the following: religious objectors 294; non-religious objectors 103; non-citizens 130. The last class includes those of German or Austrian parentage or descent who refused to fight against their kin, and those who alleged enemy citizenship but could not prove it.

The religious objectors at Leavenworth were classified as follows:

Mennonites, General Conference	92
Mennonites, Amish	16
Dunkards	21
International Bible Students (Russellites)	18
Church of God, Apostolic	17
Holiness Churches	12
Seventh Day Adventists	12
Church of Christ (Campbellites)	12
Baptists	11
Quakers	9
Church of God	6
Molaken	5
Roman Catholic	4
House of David (Israelite)	4
Lutheran	3
Free Methodist	3
Free Missionary Association	2
Methodist	2
Greek Catholic	2
True Life	2
Huttrien Brethren, Disciples of Christ, United Peoples, Plymouth Brethren, Assembly of God, Mission Church Association, Episcopalian and Jew, each one, or total	8
Independent and miscellaneous Christian	33

Officially, the non-religious objectors were classified as:

Socialist, I. W. W., radical	69
Humanitarian, Agnostic, etc.	34

The last group is not listed as politicals simply because

they did not identify themselves with such radical groups, though they exhibited the same scruples as the declared politicals.

In most of the practical difficulties which occurred, it was the political element which, opposed at heart to the Government, carried on the agitation. This radical class had much to say about religious objectors, but no religious organization took up the matter except in occasional individual cases. The very creeds of religious objectors make them the most peaceful and inoffensive of men. But political recalcitrants found support in various societies, whose high-sounding names were intended to camouflage the disloyal or sinister purposes of their members. One society had an apparent purpose of defending the objector in each and every respect when the purposes of the individual and the laws of the country came into conflict.

While most of the conscientious objectors were not men of high mental caliber, there were a few of bright, if ill-balanced intellect. These men acted as leaders and crystallized about themselves the support of their mental inferiors. Some of these were college men and one or two were ordained ministers.

That some conscientious objectors are honest in their beliefs may be conceded, however irrational these may seem to others. Yet most of them can probably be won over by judicious handling. On the other hand, faulty handling of this class is almost certain merely to strengthen their convictions and to arouse self-assertion to a point where the individual is willing, if necessary, to die for his ideas. Some apparently seek the role of martyr for the publicity and notoriety attached. It must be remembered that constant compulsive effort against an idea, if it does not break will, so strengthens the latter that the idea in question may become an obsession. The honest objector is especially an evader of responsibility. He refuses to accept obligation and transfers it to a higher power. If a divine providence will

not keep away the enemy and his evil works it is not worth while for him to attempt to do it. He is committed to a sophistical logic and distorted psychology.

But for every conscientious objector whose scruples are sincere, there are many whose convictions are superficial and born of cowardice or personal motive. The latter fact, however, does not lessen the difficulties of handling such cases. One of the first steps with such is tactfully to strip away pretense, so that the individual may not have the benefit of sympathy of his associates — for one of the first appeals of the conscientious objector is for pity and respect. It is apparent, for example, that men who refuse service in the Medical Department at the front, or possibly in mine-sweeping, are open to the charge of cowardice rather than the imputation of humanitarianism.

The rapid accumulation of conscientious objectors in camps, with the serious difficulties which they created and which apparently were not being solved by the average commander, evoked the following Presidential Order: " all such persons not accepting assignment to non-combatant service shall be segregated as far as practicable and placed under command of a specially qualified officer of tact and judgment, who will be instructed to impose no punitive hardships of any kind upon them but not to allow their objections to be made the basis of any favor or consideration, beyond exemption from military service, which is not extended to any other soldier in the service of the United States." Later, instructions were issued for " courts-martial to try and punish all found insincere, defiant, or active in attempting to convert others to their belief."

The fact that these men were " segregated " is open to serious psychological objection. Outwardly facilitating administrative control, it really tremendously increased the problem and its difficulties. When conscientious objectors went to camp, they were thereby cut off from the support of their former associates. It was psychologically unde-

sirable to restore support of such nature by creating new groups in which they received the accustomed stimulus of sympathy and example.

When the more incorrigible were gathered together for further examination and consideration, that very circumstance stiffened resistance by making possible group action instead of individual action. The stronger wills dominated and fortified those of weaker quality, strengthened the determination of those who might have yielded if alone and unsupported, and brought about the appeals for outside assistance which resulted in the political agitation that continued many months. Physically, segregation withdrew these men from contact with outside ideas to a large extent. By grouping them by themselves it stimulated gregariousness, class consciousness, assertion and interreliance. They were in a way cross-braced in their psychological support of each other. Psychologically, it raised a barrier through which outside influences could not readily pass and which was none the less effective because intangible and invisible. This idea is graphically represented in Figure 28.



Figure 28. Shows Psychological Insulation and Internal Interrelation of Group.

It further substituted group resistance for individual resistance. A homely analogy might be drawn from an individual fence post which might be pushed over with relatively little effort and the greatly increased force necessary to push over the same post if strongly propped on all sides. See Figure 29.

Another illustration might be given of a number of posts



Figure 29.

set in the ground, each of which individually might be pushed over with no great effort, but which if cross-braced, and especially if further put under physical conditions whereby full outside force could not be exerted, would together withstand herculean effort. See Figure 28.

The morale organization undertook the solution of this problem in the fall of 1918 and, as judged by practical results in various camps, had arrived at very satisfactory methods at the time of the Armistice, the great majority of newly registered or declared objectors accepting service. There were many young radicals who came into the army and who after a period of complaint and protest changed their minds and became soldiers. Public opinion brought this about. These men, translated into a place of broader outlook and purer mental atmosphere, found themselves to be social misfits. There is an instinctive tendency of human beings to dislike to be different from associates in important matters of conduct, and social pressure, even when unorgan-

ized, operated powerfully against objection to service. But in many cases special handling was necessary.

This special method was based upon recognition of the fact that the state of objection was an artificial and induced state, that present objectors were men who at one time had no ideas on the subject, and that, as they had been talked and influenced into adopting them in the first place, so by the same agencies, in reverse, they could be influenced to change their minds later and discard them. Men who change their opinions do not yield mentally to force and fear but through inability to withstand the pressure of public opinion against them. This pressure was brought about by environment, and thus a special environment, to bring about the desired change, may be built up in each instance and made specially effective in respect to the individual concerned.

The application of this method is best explained and understood through practical, illustrative example. For this purpose, we may assume as a problem an alien draftee, born in Russia, of Hebrew birth and faith, unmarried, a member of a draft from New York's east side, and an announced objector with openly radical views. Such a case presents a special problem which might be solved as follows.

Immediately on arrival at camp the objector attitude of the man would be determined and reported to higher authority. Inquiry would be made by morale operatives and others, as soon as possible, as to the antecedents of the recruit in considerable detail, covering his former associates, friends, family, occupation or business, educational qualifications, financial state, preferred recreations and particularly his special individual interests. This would be done by friendly conversation with the man himself and with personal acquaintance. It is most important in the early handling of these men that, as far as possible, they shall not be allowed to commit themselves to a definite course of opposition. An avenue of withdrawal, without undue loss of self-

respect, should be left open. Denial of opportunity to " save face " is apt to develop obstinacy.

Based on the information secured about the man, an appropriate corrective environment would be built up by special selection of the members of his squad or group, with a view to the particular influences, in both character and intensity, which, judging from his history and attitude, it might seem desirable to exert upon him. The environmental group members selected are not told the purpose for which they are functioning, but merely carry out carefully prescribed parts. The subject himself is of course in ignorance of the organized measures taken to correct his mental attitude and physical behavior. The prerequisite of such selection is that no member of the new group shall entertain any ideas sympathetic to those of which it is desired to disabuse the mind of the recruit. In the present instance, the environment should have no " red " element in it. The recruit must find in it no moral support whatever in the maintenance of his fallacies and be able to develop none.

A considerable proportion of the men selected for environmental purposes should be of the same nationality as the subject as well as his co-religionists, for this helps materially to inspire confidence and to increase receptivity to suggestion. All members of the environmental group should be instructed that under no circumstances are they to permit violence to be used against the subject, lest this arouse his antagonism and opposition to them as individuals and strengthen his resistance to the ideas they suggest. On the contrary, they should meet him with a friendliness which disarms suspicion and antagonism, and with sympathy on all matters not pertaining to the military service. He should be physically treated with reasonable consideration and kindness, and socially as one suffering from mental error which, while serious, will doubtless be soon departed from by better understanding of ideas and facts. The suggestion is to be conveyed that, while full mental comradeship may not now

exist, it will be gladly accorded with the change of viewpoint which good sense and better knowledge will bring about.

Argument, in the hands of selected men, is a very efficient tool for mental change, but its use should be restricted to appropriate times and it should not be allowed to develop into a mental clash. It should be good humored but never acrimonious. It must invariably be impersonal and relate wholly to the abstract issues involved, lest the individual link his individuality to the matter under discussion through stimulation of self-assertion. Occasional humorous allusion, not approaching caustic satire, is valuable. Its purpose should be to convey the suggestion that the subject, toward whom his squad entertains a friendly feeling as an individual, is making himself regrettably ridiculous to his associates through the ideas which he entertains.

This general anti-" red " environment should be specifically strengthened by the inclusion in the prepared environment of one or more men, say of the lawyer type, whose fluency will be more than a match for the subject in respect to argument and discussion, whose facts and logic overwhelm one whose knowledge is less complete and well organized, who by discussion can induce curiosity, reflection and new points of view, who can evoke wholesome sentiment, and who can point the whole with kindly wit and humor. This class should demonstrate a psychological superiority in such a way as to make the subject of their influence distrust the accuracy of his own original premises.

A second element might include one or more men of the same race and religion, of the ministerial type, whose chief approach to the subject would be through the sympathetic channels of common birth and belief and who would be able to draw upon racial customs, ideas and scriptures to support their corrective ideas.

A third group would be represented by young men of the successful business man type, whose appeal would be made to acquisitiveness and suggest an expression of self-assertion

to that end. The idea that the subject is a man of such ability that, if his talents were better directed, he might easily have a good business, a family and an enviable status, would be particularly promoted by this group.

Another group, representing the side of comradeship, would stimulate gregariousness and the natural desire of the subject to be at one with his fellows. It would arouse the play instinct along his preferential channels, making his limited self-repression along the unpopular lines the price to be paid for satisfaction through comradeship and play.

The general nature and mode of approach is graphically shown in Figure 30.

In time of war, any great camp will accumulate drafted men of such diverse qualifications as to furnish suitable personnel to meet any psychological problem. The results of such psychological treatment are cumulative, and a few days more or less are of no importance if the final purpose of removing a discordant element from the organization and at the same time saving the individual to himself and the service be accomplished.

The social pressure of such an environment is far more powerful than any counter influence that the individual can exert against it. It is incessant and shifting in its nature and emphasis, constantly finding the subject off guard against a new, unexpected and scarcely realized approach. It lulls and undermines resolution instead of arousing it by combat. If deemed necessary, the subject may be temporarily exposed to the influence of one or more other prepared groups, until individual self-assertion yields to what appears to the subject to be complete mental isolation.

CHAPTER XVII

HEALTH IN RELATION TO MENTAL STATE

Health and morale; psychology in relation to physiology; influence of bodily state on emotions; sick rates as indices of morale. War psychoses and neuroses; the upsetting of mental equilibrium; the psychology of "shell-shock"; mental conflicts and hysterias; prevention of war neuroses and psychoses; their type variation between officers and men; malingering; suicide. Drug addictions. Sex immorality. Quarantines; their relation to morale; special requirements for the quarantined. Hospital morale; mental attitude in relation to recovery; hospital morale and administrative methods; the mental attitude in sickness; various measures to promote hospital morale. The morale of attendants on the sick; their special problems; suggestibility of patients; special measures to promote good mental state.

Health and Morale. Psychology cannot be considered apart from physiology. Psychological issues are always projected against a physiological background in the state of health of the individual. Bodily state exerts a profound influence on mental state. The body is the tenement of the soul, and represents the immediate environment of the latter. To abnormal bodily changes the mental mechanism is sensitive. Physical depression is thus a strong factor in preparing the way for mental depression and demoralization. Anguish may drive out all other emotions. Only when the body processes function so frictionlessly as not to draw attention to their existence can emotion, apart from the body, exert full sway. Sickness impels consciousness of the bodily self and an introspective and brooding habit of mind. It obstructs activity, hampers expression, and makes for hesitation, irritability and depression. This is particularly the case in digestive troubles and those of the abdominal viscera, as well as in the disturbed metabolism of internal secretions. If these are protracted, they may carry


Religious, sympathetic and gregarious instincts
Acquisitive, constructive and self assertive instincts
Gregariousness and play instincts
Curiosity and comic instincts

FIGURE 30. The prepared environment, specially reinforced, with its converging lines of suggestive influence modifying the mental color of the subject.

on to a permanent condition of peevishness and invalidism, even after the original cause has been removed.

The converse is also true. Any high degree of mental excitement, whether anger, terror, pain, anxiety, joy, grief or deep disgust may disturb the functions of the sympathetic nervous system and the functions of all the organs of the body which it innervates.

Health is an essential to the active temperament in deriving joy of living, and implies a reserve of physical and mental vigor. In general terms, condition of body is reflected in condition of mind—"Mens sana in corpore sano." It is true that men may be healthy without morale, also that, at times, the steadfast purpose of a strong character may dominate the shattered body. But in groups, never. A sick army neither has the physical ability nor the will to fight. Its initiative and fortitude are lost. Slight reverses have serious results and disintegration accelerates.

Health rates thus form one of the very best indices of morale. High rates usually express the results of poor discipline and control, personal carelessness and lack of consideration for the rights of others. The man who has sanitary regard for others may be counted on to watch out for himself. A good soldier is a good soldier everywhere and at all times, and not on the drill ground alone.

This is the field where it becomes the function of the Medical Department to enter with precept and advice, but it is the organization commander who must give force to such hygienic counsel and transmute its tenets into good health and spirits through proper behavior. Conversely, an army of high morale will respond to sound sanitary advice and avoid the lapses into indifference or carelessness which are characteristic of troops in whom discipline and spirits are low and which entail the inevitable consequences of disease.

Even an apparently minor and temporary cause of physical depression reacts on mental state in the individual.

Such a cause, for example, may be found in simple constipation, in which pessimism and bad temper may be an expression of the toxic load which a clogged intestinal canal imposes, often with headache or malaise. Every mother knows that when a child is nervous, irritable and depressed or wayward, the simple household panacea of castor oil often promptly works wonders in altering state of mind and conduct. Some of the serious diseases often profoundly affecting disposition have already been mentioned. Often a physical ailment on the part, say, of either foreman or worker may be the cause of loss of equilibrium in their personal relations.

Experiments with children have scientifically demonstrated, for example, that hookworm infection affects mental development. This merely confirms the experience of officers who have had to do with the sluggish, apathetic recruits or workers from hookworm districts. Here effective medical treatment must pave the way before mental improvement can be expected. Such a vast proportion of these recruits are so infected, sometimes as high as sixty per cent., that any dullard from hookworm regions should be sent to the medical officer with the suggestion of the possibility of his being the host of this parasite.

Rest and sleep are great aids to morale. Spirits break under their deprivation. A tired army is far more liable to panic, while fear is more readily stimulated after exhaustion. Sleep not alone permits of physical renewal but acts as a safety valve for mental strain. Through it, body and mind readjust themselves after stress, recollections are blunted and emotions subside.

War Psychoses and Neuroses. Besides physical health, mental normality has close relation to the morale of the individual, especially in war. The part that actual insanity must play in mental disturbance and resulting antisocial conduct is obvious, but it is only recently that entirely satisfactory measures have been taken to exclude from

our service men coming from this poorly developed class. These include psychopathic cases, men who have at one time been insane, and constitutional defectives. Such exclusion is important, for military requirements are such that individuals of unstable mentality are more apt to break down in the army than they would have under the far lesser stresses of civil life.

Border-line individuals, with their morbid, overwhelming compulsions and impulsions, are also well recognized as having a mental equipment prone to delinquency. There are several types of border-line psychoses, the victims of which are morally responsible for their acts only in part. There is no definite wall of division between the normal and the abnormal, but nearly all border line cases will under sufficient stress demonstrate characteristics of abnormality. While company commanders cannot be psychiatrists, they can at least bring to the attention of medical officers any cases of marked eccentricity and peculiarity of thought and conduct.

War psychoses have lately received much attention, but are not new or peculiar to the recent war. Accounts of the interludes of the Punic Wars give evidence of wholesale insanity. After the Thirty Years War, it is said that nearly a fifth of the population left in Germany was temporarily or permanently deranged.

Much has been heard lately of the neurosis of war — popularly known as "shell-shock." They are usually considered to come from an antecedent nervous instability or from strain or shock. The former class should and can be excluded from the service, while the latter causes can be minimized as to effect by appropriate measures for mental hardening.

Under conditions of civilization, the instinct of fear is blocked, but as conditions are also created in which there is no great reason for fear to arise, little harm results. But war rouses the fear instinct based on self-preservation

only to find its expression opposed by ethical standards of self-respect and conduct. This mental conflict tends to result in war neuroses with functional incapacity as a result of clash between instinct and duty.

In war it is necessary to repress emotion consequent to danger. In some this is accomplished with little or no conflict as a result of schooling in self-control. In others the mental conflict produced may have outward evidence in hysteria and unsoldierly conduct. In our service, neurotic cases of this sort have aggregated during the war about two per cent. of the total number under treatment overseas.

The mental conflict begins as soon as the soldier enters the service. The instability of some is shown in the first few weeks at camp. Though physically fit, they manifest nervous weakness which makes them unfit as fighting material and they are weeded out. Others hold out until the time of embarkation, when their weakness manifests itself in one way or another. In some, their weakness does not develop until they come under artillery fire.

But others, who do not actually break down, suffer from the strain. Few soldiers can go through a long period of fighting without being nervously affected by it. Unsuspected and undeveloped weaknesses are detected. They become " sick of it." Sometimes the sense of duty is totally lost in the desire to get away from the war and its dangers and hardships; soldiers may even deliberately wound themselves to make sure of getting back to a hospital. It is also a potent cause of malingering. In some instances there is an involuntary exaggeration of symptoms which creates a state of real self-deceit. In a later stage, cupidity, as expressed in a desire to secure a pension or other governmental help, may enter as a factor to hold some cases under medical care until a disability status is well established. Here a desire for self-interest through protection becomes a desire for self-interest through material gain.

There would seem to be a close resemblance between

psychopathic individuals with criminal tendencies and the war hysterias manifested by " shell-shock " and malingering. That is, many patients with a war neurosis are morally deficient, and their presence in hospital for such neuroses is analogous to the presence in jails and reformatories of similar individuals as a result of petty crimes. Very likely many cases are consigned to the medical profession which really represent problems in psychology and criminology. It is interesting to note that war neuroses practically do not occur in certain regiments under certain line or medical officers, wise in their understanding of human nature, nor in the seriously wounded or sick, nor in prisoners of war, nor in all soldiers exposed to shell explosions. Further, they do occur in men who have not been in action or even overseas.

In preventing such conditions among enlisted men, suitable rests and changes in occupation are desirable. It is also important that they should be informed in advance of some of the difficulties and horrors awaiting them. This information should be given, not in a way to arouse apprehension, but apparently incidentally and so as to familiarize them with possible conditions so that methods of meeting the latter may be explained. They should be accustomed in imagination to the experiences which may come later.

When men appear discontented and discouraged, it has been found of advantage to have their officers talk things over with them and get at the cause of their mental stress, which may thus be allayed. Such personal relations diminish the weight of responsibility, while the assurances encourage independence and initiative along military lines, lessen suggestibility to the depressants of war, and by so much reduce liability to neuroses. This quality of suggestibility is naturally heightened in the private soldier as compared with the officer, due to more continuous and complete subjection to the commands of others.

Self-repression is especially to be cultivated in the officer

in controlling expression of emotion, so that the men may be set a good example in this respect and that those who show signs of giving way in an emergency may be encouraged. In the midst of danger, the officer must appear calm and unconcerned. Hysterias seem particularly apt to affect the private soldier, while anxiety neuroses especially affect officers. Officers break under the strain of heavy responsibility rather than under the personal hazard that tends to produce the neurosis of the enlisted man. Accordingly, much may be accomplished by superiors by carefully watching the junior officer and sending him away for any necessary rest, change of station or occupation.

Malingering is obviously due to the state of mind. In it, the instinct of self-assertion and the sense of self-respect are over-ridden by other motives. Under such conditions, it is often difficult to find the appeal which will bring the man out of his mental state. The motives are highly varied, though, in the face of the enemy, fear probably predominates. A volume might be written about them. However, the best remedy is prevention — the removal of the motive by wise handling in advance of the act. If it occurs, the best procedure is to demonstrate to the malingerer and his associates the falsity of his pretensions, and change him from a possible object of sympathy to one of contempt.

Suicide, or its attempt, is an act resulting from mental state. It sometimes stands at the border-line of criminalism as the culminating act of other criminalistic tendencies or deeds. At other times it correlates with various personal peculiarities, mental diseases or external influences. Sometimes it results from the influence of alcohol or drugs. Obviously there are an infinite number of motives for the act, representing the extremes of resentment and despair over the blocking of certain instinctive tendencies and, for the time at least, dominating the mentality.

During active operations, suicide is uncommon. The motives which operate for self-destruction are largely dis-

placed by other emotions relating to war and which press for attention. But after a campaign of war the rate rises as the individual finds himself suddenly confronted with personal problems which had been in abeyance and to the solution of which he feels unequal. The rate in peace has probably been unduly high. Many of the impelling motives could have been removed by higher authority or dissipated by sympathy and friendly advice from superiors if the mental strain had been realized. The mere fact that nearly all suicides are accomplished while alone shows the value of the sympathy of others as an outlet for mental tension and diversion from thoughts of introspection, exaggeration and despair. Under such conditions, only slight influence is needed to tip the scales against self-destruction.

Drug Addictions. The use of certain drugs, including alcohol, exerts a powerful influence upon mental state. Some drugs are directly stimulative and others are sedative. Some which stimulate when taken in small doses become sedative in large doses; alcohol, which at first may arouse both increased physical and mental activity, may, in large doses, produce physical helplessness and mental hebetude or coma.

Much might be written concerning the influence of such drugs on mood and character. The continued use of many of them completely alters mental outlook, bringing depravity of all ethical standards of thought and conduct. Drug addicts who are unable to secure their accustomed stimulant will resort to any dishonorable expedient to satisfy their craving. In view of the relative ease with which drug habits are started, the tendency of habitues to share their vice, and the catering to them by an unscrupulous class for profit, officers should be constantly on the watch for any evidence of drug habit among the men.

Of all drugs, alcohol is the most important in this respect because of its more general use. One effect of alcohol is that it tends to impair judgment and volition. Conse-

quently it directly predisposes to lowered morale, disorder and delinquency by lowering the standards of behavior. There is a certain inferior class in which the influence of alcohol just turns the balance against their maintaining themselves as non-delinquents. As soon as they drink they begin to create trouble for others and themselves, though their acts may be devoid of ill-intent or even be purposeless. As shown in relation to the components of military delinquency, the liquor problem has probably been the greatest single factor in producing disorder and lowered morale in troops. Fortunately it has been largely settled by the adoption of national prohibition, and it has become the part of all officers to take a firm stand in support of the forces of law and order.

Morale work includes the prevention of undesirable habits, including that of drinking. The beginning of the drink habit depends on association and susceptibility to suggestion, for very few novices like the taste of liquor at the outset. The beginner swallows his first drink, not from enjoyment, but to be in mental accord with the social requirements of his group. Many a man of inferior personality "stands treat" in order to gratify his sense of self-assertion, since, while he occupies the position of host, he thereby buys the privilege of commanding respectful attention.

Sex Immorality. Sex immorality is one of the great factors affecting morale. That the diseases which result from it depress their victims not only physically but psychologically, and incapacitate them for service, is well known. That the absence from the ranks of men suffering from them is a factor for negative morale in their comrades, who must perform their duties, is obvious. That this factor of depletion and depression is great and constant is borne out and measured by the mathematics of the sick report. Moreover, prostitution is an enemy to morale through the many

influences which low women exert to sap the self-respect and other high qualities of men associating with them.

It is therefore the duty of every officer to encourage and assist the Medical Department, and the efforts of other agencies for social betterment, in every way, and particularly by the creation of a wholesome sentiment against those practices which inevitably bring disease in their wake.

The official measures prescribed for combating venereal disease and immorality are so fully laid down in orders as to require no repetition here. Suffice it to say that all the agencies for promoting morale combine to furnish the best antidote for such sexual indulgence by affording congenial outlet for thought and energy along wholesome channels through other instincts. The mind and body kept fully engaged in duties, athletics, recreation and education have small time, opportunity or inclination to consort with prostitutes.

To this must be added the strengthening of the mental and moral fiber of the man himself. If of sound moral character, he will endeavor to avoid or withdraw from an immoral environment. In building up character, he must be furnished with ideals to help overcome instinct.

Youth is strongly idealistic, and young men often have a passion for the noble and beautiful. This offers a means of controlling the sex instinct by idealizing its object and inculcating the spirit of chivalry, courtesy and honor toward women.

Quarantines. Quarantines are always profoundly depressant to those subjected to sanitary restriction, whether an individual or group. So many instinctive tendencies are checked as inevitably to engender profound discontents.

Recruits are necessarily isolated by reason of the contagious diseases which they may be harboring and introduce. Similarly, men exposed to infectious diseases must be isolated during the incubation period of such infection. Such

men are, for the time at least, in good health in so far as they themselves are concerned, and there is not only discontent at the isolation and restrictions necessary, but frequently, among the ignorant, failure to be informed or inability to understand why this is required. For recruits, the environment of quarantine is strange and unfamiliar, while over all is the depressing influence of feeling themselves under the shadow of a disease of undetermined severity and danger.

The other class held in general quarantine is composed of those who actually suffer from transmissible infections, usually those of a venereal nature. They realize that the irksome restraint imposed on them is largely for the protection of others rather than for their own individual benefit, and so it is often regarded in the nature of punishment, deserved or not. In other diseases the period of convalescence, after the actual sickness is over, is trying. Fortunately we know now that, except in special " carrier " cases, infectivity usually ceases when the disease itself is thrown off.

The environment of a quarantine camp is usually less attractive and comfortable than other parts of the camp; further, the quarantined group exaggerates its grievances and resentment through the fact that its individual units constantly react on each other to develop and intensify such a state of mind. Hence acts of indiscipline and breaches of restraint are liable to occur. When quarantines have been prolonged as a result of successive crops of disease development, the mental tension is proportionately worse.

Men who are in quarantine should be given special attention in regard to amusement and instruction, so that their minds may be occupied. Here the results of morale work are immediate and positive. Full information as to the reasons for quarantine must go with provision of appropriate occupation and suitable and sufficient recreation.

Light drills, athletic sports and hikes for men who have not yet developed any active stage are often possible, for modern quarantine recognizes that in most infections the very slight physical separation necessary to avoid personal contact and the danger of infecting mediate agencies are all that is required. The selection of individuals capable of taking such exercise and the character and amount of the exercise to be allowed are medical problems.

Hospital Morale. There is much more to running a hospital than in merely ensuring good professional treatment and physical care. Mental attitude is important, for the value of morale of patients in promoting recovery is well recognized. Cheerfulness and optimism are therapeutic agents of great value. Every physician knows this — just as he knows that his bedside manner and special attitude toward the case are measures for raising or lowering morale. Sympathy enters, as when the mother kisses the hurt of the child to make it well. Sometimes inert medicaments are prescribed solely for their morale value, while many a tossing patient has been given mental relief and physical rest by the hypodermatic injection of water under the belief that it was morphine. Christian Science capitalizes this by treating imaginary ills with an imaginary remedy. Deft, sympathetic nurses are a great source of help. Probably visits from the families and friends of patients affect their morale more than any other agent. It must not be forgotten that many persons have a morbid, even though illogical, dread of hospital life.

In every military hospital, the physical surroundings of the sick are well equipped and comfortable. Its problems in morale are thus largely dependent on the manner in which its administrative methods are carried out. This has relation to the human factors of the medical officers, nurses, enlisted detachment, other patients and outside family or friends. All of these correlate in their effect upon morale. Morale problems in hospital largely fall under the following

heads: 1. First impressions on entrance. 2. Attention and care during illness. 3. Interests during convalescence. 4. Mental attitude on discharge.

Every consideration of the morale of patients in hospital must take into account the natural tendency of the patient to become critical and despondent with little to occupy his mind but his own troubles. Those in charge of hospital administration are naturally inclined to resent complaints and criticisms which are often so freely given and usually have little if any foundation in fact. But they should remember that it is a natural tendency to the ailing to disparage surroundings rather than to appreciate that the fault may lie in an abnormal self. Often the sick man, whose system repels food, is unaware of this fact and blames his lack of appetite to an alleged unattractiveness of the diet as to selection, preparation or serving. Many patients are psycho-neurotics, prone to imagine fault or exaggerate defect. It is clear that such a situation calls for patience and forbearance. If the facts are not as alleged, little may be gained by a disciplinary action which may be the starting point for group sympathy and reaction. But careful study of the individual as being psychologically abnormal will often indicate measures which will alter his outlook, perspective and attitude.

The chief purpose of hospital morale should be to keep the patient's mind off self and to direct his thoughts through cheerful channels. Interests outside himself and his personal problems should be created and maintained. These interests should be carefully selected to meet the needs of the individual patient. Many of them are naturally of a recreational nature, in which the individual is the passive observer or beneficiary of the efforts of others. But as far as possible, the patient himself should have something which he himself can do, thereby creating interest through the constructive instinct. In some large hospitals, a letter of greeting is sent by the Commanding Officer to each patient

on admission. This displays interest, giving good advice and information and tends to allay misgiving, create cheerfulness and promote coöperation.

It is important that the sick be kept in proper touch with their families and friends outside. If they cannot write themselves, letters should be written for them. In serious cases, bulletins of conditions should be sent to the relatives by the hospital authorities. When convalescent, photographs have been taken and sent home to show the state of recovery. Home folks are often kept in touch by sending bulletins on picture postals of the hospital, and by putting parents temporarily on the mailing list of the hospital publication, if there be one. Families deserve to know about the hospital facilities in which their relatives are treated. The Medical Department has nothing to hide here; the more publicity its well equipped establishments receive, the more it is to its advantage.

Visitations by suitable representatives of women's organizations outside the post are desirable within proper limits. Such organizations and individuals can do much to lighten the lot of the sick and aid the recovery of convalescents. By the news of the outside which they bring, and by the rides and entertainments which they offer, they materially reduce the problems of ennui and discontent. Little personal services are appreciated. Thus free mending and darning for patients have a morale value in addition to any material benefits involved. But such visitors should maintain an attitude of helpfulness toward the hospital and its management and not one of unfair criticism.

It is of much value to have hospital wards adopted by various organizations of local communities. The latter furnish music, entertainers, flowers and reading material and have a special interest in the welfare of their wards. They are also of use in allaying local criticism if charges reflecting on the management of the ward are unfounded. When convalescents are members of fraternal organizations

the hospital authorities should, if desired, make the fact known to the local lodge. If there are church affiliations, the chaplain will see that the desired relations are promptly established.

In military hospitals, visitation of the patients by officers' wives and others should be encouraged. The patients should feel that their own associates in the garrison are even more interested in them than outsiders. In the past, the captain's wife might visit ailing members of her husband's company, but such action was purely individual. Something organized along general lines is desirable. If the women of the garrison would form themselves into an organization charged with the periodic visitation in hospital of all those needing cheering up, bring a few flowers, reading matter and simple gifts, it would do much to promote cheerfulness, optimism and contentment. Military hospitals are places in which a high order of medical and surgical skill are provided, but it is perhaps true that the nature of the military service is such that this tends to be rendered in a relatively impersonal way and that the element of human sympathy, which is so valuable and so much appreciated, is proportionately lacking.

Some company commanders make it a practice to visit their men while sick in hospital. Most, unfortunately, do not, and completely fall out of touch with those who are sick enough to need hospital care. Sick men long remember and cherish the interest of their company commander in them in their hour of need, as will all of the men in the organization, for the latter will certainly hear of it and take it as a proof of what the captain would do for them under similar circumstances.

The general problem of hospital entertainment should be approached systematically and comprehensively. As far as possible, what the men want should be furnished. In pursuance of such a plan, the entire personnel of patients and attendants at one hospital was card-indexed as to needs of

the individual and his abilities to contribute to entertainment or instruction. In other words, the positive qualities of the garrison were sought out with the specific purpose of using them to remedy or neutralize the negative qualities thus disclosed. The Red Cross assumes the responsibility for remedying outside needs which concern the home.

Music has an almost therapeutic value with some patients. The use of the phonograph, under proper restrictions, is a convenient agency to this end. Phonograph record exchanges will give great variety by rotating the use of records through different wards. Glee clubs, quartets, nurse choruses, and organizations for instrumental music can visit the wards. Band concerts should be a frequent event. Impersonations, monologues and vaudeville acts can often be carried out. One act plays have been successfully produced in wards with portable burlap scenery painted by vocational classes.

More ambitious entertainment can be staged in the hospital club-room, amusement center, or out of doors. If the plays and programs can be worked up by the patients, with the hospital personnel in the parts, it will create greater interest through self-activity and local application. Wheel-chair contests, with prizes donated by local institutions, have awakened much interest. Playing for the hospital championship in checkers, cards, chess and other games arouses interest and rivalry. The hospital should, if possible, have its baseball and other athletic teams, not only for the physical value to participants, but for the interest of convalescent spectators. The entertainment of bed-ridden patients is a special problem by itself due to the physical limitations imposed. A series of bedside games has been worked out at some hospitals. Any recreational equipment, games, supplies, musical instruments, writing materials, smokes, etc., for the patients can be obtained from the Red Cross.

A well selected library should be in every hospital, with

its books properly shelved, classified and catalogued. Further, since many patients cannot themselves come for books, the books should be taken to them by means of book-carts wheeled daily through the wards. The librarian should also visit each patient at least twice a week to ascertain what special books are wanted and perhaps suggest some in which individuals might be interested. Now that regiments are allocated to geographical districts for recruiting, it is possible and desirable to secure representative papers from the districts concerned for circulation among the patients.

Local hospital papers are a great aid to morale. Where they do not exist, a special place in the camp or local civilian paper for hospital news is desirable. The news not only arouses interest and satisfies curiosity but opens an opportunity for the men to be encouraged in literary work and the writing up of personal doings and experiences. Ward papers have at times been carried on in mimeographed form.

Patients who are physically able to exercise should be required to do so, under proper limitations, for its mental as well as physical value. If possible, it should be taken in some form as will make it pleasurable and not appear as duty. Croquet, golf putting and quoits are examples of mild exercise. Automobile rides, trips and visits to civilian families and points of interest should be encouraged for men physically able to participate in them. The judicious use of passes for this purpose is a great promoter of hospital morale. When men are in hospital for considerable periods of convalescence, they should be taught some light occupation, such as basket making, wood carving, etc., for the purpose of bringing the constructive instinct into play and diminishing monotony. As soon as patients are able to perform them, they should be given light tasks about the hospital, of a character not to be regarded as drudgery. Tactful presentation will usually result in the man putting

himself in the position of volunteering for the opportunity. The care of the hospital flowers, vines and shrubs, for example, is a duty congenial to most men.

Morale of Attendants on the Sick. Psychological uplift, encouragement and human sympathy cannot be evoked by official order — they must express a state of mind which springs from environment and are a part of general esprit.

The patient in hospital will receive that degree of interested attention and type of care which represents the morale of those caring for him. Physically, this is expressed in a thousand little things and methods, the sum total of which materially affects comfort and peace of mind.

Patients are in a highly suggestible state of mind and react promptly and often in extreme degree to the mental atmosphere around them. In their own distress and doubt, they need to draw heavily upon the strength and confidence of those about them. If attendants are discouraged, depressed and dissatisfied, the sick in their care rapidly fall into the same mental state. Bed-ridden patients are confined to an environment from which there is no escape, hence the special importance of eliminating depressing factors from its components.

It is essential to hospital morale that the patient believes himself in good hands and that he is contented and confident under the condition to which he must resign himself. He must feel that those upon whom his very existence may depend are not only professionally competent but are personally interested in his case and recovery. He looks especially to the nurses to supply that quality of feminine sympathy which is so craved and appreciated. Some of the more popular nurses can often be made to act as ex-officio assistants of the Morale Officer. This helps to stimulate their own interest, while information secured by them and measures taken with their assistance can be of great value.

It is apparent that the morale of army nurses and attendants on the sick doubly needs attention, not only as personal

and group problems, but for the close relation which it necessarily bears to the morale and welfare of patients. This is a matter too often overlooked, as it is natural for interest and sympathy to particularly center on the sick, with little reference to the indirect influences which react on the patients from those who have them in charge.

For male attendants in hospitals, it must be borne in mind that the relatively housed existence required of them by their special technical duties is unnatural for sturdy young men and may become repugnant to many unless due outlet is afforded for the instincts thus checked. Outdoor sports, exercises and amusements should therefore be particularly promoted in their case, so that their thoughts when off duty may be turned into entirely new channels. Their recreation rooms should be entirely apart from facilities for the sick. As a result they bring back to their patients news of outside activities in which the latter are interested.

The members of the Army Nurse Corps, like anyone else, need systematized exercise to maintain good physical condition. This is not afforded by routine duties and cannot be depended upon as a matter of individual choice. Suitable daily setting-up exercise and periodic walks, rides, tennis or other exercise should be required.

With the female sex, entertainments and the social amenities of life count for much. Nurses with personal and socially attractive graces usually meet with no lack in such matters, but there may be others of sterling worth whose similar recreative needs should be given special consideration. Besides entertainments and recreation within the post, acquaintance in the near-by communities is useful. During the war, week-end invitations to private homes were found very valuable in relieving the mental strain of nurses after arduous duty.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOME FACTORS OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Physical comfort in relation to morale; classification of environmental factors of morale; depressions of environment; military control of environment; reaction of climate and weather on mental state; sunshine, temperature, humidity and morale; modifying administrative measures; housing conditions, warmth, ventilation and attractiveness; sanitary cleanliness; decoration and improvement; fatigue work; personal appearance in relation to morale; clothing; food and messing; administrative defects.

Physical Environment. The physical comfort of men is essential to their peace of mind. Comfort depends on degree of adaptation to environment. In their reaction upon mental state, physical and psychological environments cannot always be separated. Frequently the influences of the two overlap, but in the military service it is probably easier to differentiate them than in civil life. The subject is more fully discussed in connection with industrial morale. Necessary discomfort, if its inevitability is recognized, will be borne with little reaction, but discomfort believed to be unnecessary is a breeder of discontent and disorder. It is well to emphasize here that human nature is so constituted that even a minor experience, if painful, will provoke a present reaction and complaint even though the situation as a whole be preponderantly satisfactory.

Environmental causes are really to be divided into two factors, the predisposing and the exciting. The former are like inflammable material to which the latter sets fire. If either of these factors is absent, no conflagration results. Bad physical environment is productive of bad conduct only through an intermediate mental state. It must first produce

discontent, suggestions and bad habits of mind. Each camp and post thus has its own morale problem depending on the physical environment which it affords. The latter exerts an influence which is more or less stable. The troops which come and go are a variable factor.

Any physical factor entering into environment has its effect upon morale. Any object may become such a factor, and the possible combinations of such objects approximate infinity. Their enumeration in any detail is thus impossible. Some of the major physical factors are discussed in this chapter and others are mentioned elsewhere.

Morale tends to be low in organizations whose habitations and surroundings are unpleasant or uninviting and furnish constant depressants to the state of mind. This is clearly seen in the relative undesirability in the public mind of houses near a cemetery or near dirty, disorderly or noisy places. In the devastated area in France, especially after the Armistice, it was reported that the physical environment under which the troops had to live was so depressing as to inevitably react on their mental state.

In the army, the physical environment of the soldier has been largely taken out of his control. Higher authority determines it for him, and acceptance is a necessity. The more reason, then, that higher authority should not fail in its implied obligations. The phrase, "You're in the army now," so often used to put the recruit in a state of mind acquiescent to conditions as he finds them, should not serve for purposes of evasion of responsibility, for duty not performed, and for failure to secure for the men, individually and collectively, the reasonable comforts to which they are entitled.

The stations of the old army usually created a desirable and attractive physical environment, as a result of the cumulative expenditure of time, effort and money. In the new army, destined for some time to occupy structures erected to meet the temporary needs of the war, the reverse is true.

Such camps and buildings are largely lacking in both comfort and sightliness. Their basic faults are not always remediable, but in most instances they can be made far more sightly and attractive with no great effort. It is true that military training tends to teach men how to adjust themselves to their environment, but it is equally true that attention paid to modifying such environment for the better will make the task of adjustment easier.

There are certain general factors pertaining to the physical environment which have a marked influence on mental state and conduct, and the modification of which is beyond human power. Among these may be mentioned climate and weather, and, for troops on foreign service, there are special racial correlations. The continued heat of the tropics, and the daily downpour and great humidity of the rainy season, are intense mental depressants to American troops. They produce both physical and mental inertia and curtail activity. They favor homesickness and inclination to break monotony by entering into dissipation and excess. At home stations, weather conditions influence mental attitude and the physical response thereto. Prolonged confinement indoors always creates nervous tension and irritation. Thus teachers in academies look especially for mischief among their boys during the irksome period when winter is about over but spring is not established. The bright, warm days of spring, bringing invitation to outside activity, come as a relief to inhabitants of cold countries. Thus the Armistice, with its abolition of the common purpose, came at a bad seasonal time for American troops. The long, cold, wet, dreary days of winter were at hand and the uncomfortable housing and depressing surroundings added to the mental gloom.

Within reasonable limits, the amount of sunshine influences mental state. The depressing psychological effect of the long night of the Arctic is well known. Similarly, the peoples of countries and districts having much rain, snow and fog tend to be gloomy, introspective and austere in

their outlook, while inhabitants of countries and regions where there is much sunshine exhibit greater optimism, light-heartedness and sociability. That the diverse climates of Italy and Sweden, France and Russia have laid their impress on national characteristics can scarcely be doubted. The same is probably true of the north and south in this country. The difference in the degree of sunshine between Colorado and New England undoubtedly reacts on respective mental state and the conduct depending on it. Persons going from the latter to the former experience a marked sensation of exhilaration and buoyancy. A climate of relatively little sunshine acts as a nervous sedative; while in the brilliant sunlight of the Rocky Mountain plateau the tendency is to overdo, and neurasthenia, due to over-stimulation, is relatively common.

Differences in climate, in relation to efficiency, largely depend on temperature and humidity. In the white race, their rise beyond certain points interferes with comfort and efficient function by reason of racial inability to rapidly dissipate body heat. Colored races, on the contrary, have a skin proportionately more rich in sweat glands, and thus, by perspiring more freely, are able to throw off heat produced by physical exertion. If temperature and humidity are too high, heat dissipation, through evaporation of perspiration, is interfered with and physical and mental distress are produced. It is accordingly of relatively lesser value to attempt to teach men in a close, humid atmosphere. For the same reason, drills on hot, muggy days are not as beneficial to training as those held in cool, dry weather. Under the first conditions, the men's thoughts tend to center on their own discomfort rather than on what they are doing, though avoidance of over-strenuous effort and permission for frequent rests are of material help under such conditions.

Dry cold, unless it be excessive, is a stimulant to activity in persons native to the temperate zone. Clear, bright, crisp days exhilarate to action. Experiments on industrial

productivity in this country show that the maximum output is obtained when there are more or less marked changes in temperature, as in spring and fall,— such temperature changes operating to stimulate the white race. This explains why opening barrack windows several times a day during winter, requiring them to be kept open at night while the men are sleeping, and taking the men out for snappy exercise instead of letting them loll in hot, stuffy barracks, has such a value in altering mental state and efficiency for the better.

But while outside weather conditions cannot themselves be modified, conditions may be altered by which men may be able to better adapt themselves to such fixed environment. Drill hours may be changed to avoid the heat of the day, and carefully planned exercises worked out suitable for periods of storm or sunshine. The unfavorable effect of weather may be largely neutralized by taking the men's minds off it through the introduction of special psychological factors embodied in work or recreation. If a strong interest or purpose be stimulated within the environment, the attention is withdrawn from its depressing factors and they correspondingly cease to influence. It is well known that calling attention to the heat of the day at once arouses the impression of great discomfort in the person addressed. It is of course apparent that troops long in the tropics, or those housed for the winter in inclement climates, should have special attention paid to the psychological problems which they may be expected to develop.

Artificial weather conditions indoors are created by heat and ventilation. These are of course controllable. Poorly ventilated rooms are close and humid and may produce such uncomfortable physical environment that the men cannot concentrate their minds on learning nor carry out their tasks. Inattention at lectures, for instance, may not be so much the fault of the instructor as the result of closed windows.

The housing conditions of barracks exert a strong effect on the mental attitude of their occupants. This effect is exerted not only directly upon each individual, but, since privacy is impossible, the close physical relationship implied brings all into communistic relations under which escape from the words or acts of others is impossible. The best that can be done under the latter conditions is to carefully select the men in groups, the various individual units of which will exert a beneficial psychological effect on each other rather than a depressant or antagonistic one. Lack of attention to this point may throw men together who are uncongenial or antagonistic or place men of weaker natures within the direct and constant influence of men of stronger personality but undesirable predilections. In either case, an antisocial combination is created which might just as readily be avoided.

For its psychologic effect upon the soldier the environment of his barracks should be inviting. The living quarters of the soldier are his home and should be cheerful and attractive. The same instincts which operate to make the home in civil life attractive come into play in the army. This does not mean heterogeneous ornamentation which serves no purpose other than to catch dust. It does mean scrupulous cleanliness, faultless neatness, order, sufficient sunlight, abundant fresh air with suitable warmth or coolness, and all that fresh paint, soap, water, personal thought and effort can give.

Dark colored paints should be avoided. Like dismal, cloudy days, they produce a mental as well as a physical gloom. A refinement of the punishment inflicted in penal institutions is to paint in black the walls of the solitary confinement cells. Nothing darker than a light cream should be used to color walls and woodwork. In one instance, a company amusement room was painted with a high black wainscoting and walls above in a dark green " so as not to show the dirt." The men unconsciously avoided

such depressing surroundings. As soon as it was repainted in a light color, its popularity as a place of resort returned and the spirits of the men visibly improved. The great practical value of well equipped company and amusement rooms in maintaining morale and good conduct is discussed in another chapter.

While the decorating of squad rooms and mess halls is usually undesirable, the company amusement room should present an entirely different appearance and should be ornamented with well chosen decorations. These should be selected with a view to developing military spirit, ideals and the esprit de corps of the organization. As the local " hall of fame," it should contain trophies, flags, pennants, photographs, posters and other matter helpful in the unconscious development of high standards of conduct. The decoration of barracks for special occasions, especially mess halls, is desirable. Flags, evergreens or palms, and other material for adornment are usually available, and in any organization of proper spirit the men will gladly give from their spare time for this purpose. The housing conditions of married officers and men are matters in which superiors should take direct concern.

Cleanliness and neatness of the person, barracks and camp can scarcely be overestimated as a morale agent, though their importance is usually stressed as a measure of health preservation. A very accurate estimate of the discipline and esprit de corps of an organization may be gained from the appearance and efficiency of the policing of buildings and their surroundings. The effect of outside conditions will be reflected on conditions within the habitations in making them more attractive. It also has its effect on personal smartness and conduct, on the principle that every man tends to respond and live up to the standard of his environment.

The best decoration which any military premises can have is scrupulous order and spotless cleanliness, but after this

is accomplished there is still something lacking to full attractiveness. A bare, bleak and forbidding exterior is undesirable and shows that the occupants have little community of interest. Hence smoothing and improving the company street, putting in walks, planting and caring for trees, vine, shrubs, flowers and grass where desirable on the company premises should be encouraged as a morale factor of no small value. If properly encouraged by officers, there are always men to be found who will look upon the care of such vegetation as a pleasure and not as an additional burden. If put on a competitive basis, the organization will take a direct interest in it and a large amount of volunteer effort will be bestowed by its members while off duty.

The same thing applies to general post beautification, though here it is quite possible to go too far and to an extent interfering with military purpose. Excessive general fatigue necessary to keep up some of the large park-like posts in our service is a productive source of discontent, thereby offsetting the element of pride which such beautification was intended to create. Many men enter the service with the idea that they will largely be free from manual labor. Too much of it will usually result in ill-will, grumbling and lack of subordination. No more general improvement should therefore be attempted than there is reason to believe can be carried out without a too heavy demand for labor. The military tone of a command is infinitely more important than the physical appearance of its surroundings. But fatigue work which has a military bearing and purpose is not objected to, as it is then regarded in the light of military exercise. Similarly, when labor is performed with the obvious purpose of providing for the requirements of hygiene and sanitation essential to a well ordered camp, it will be performed with great cheerfulnes and alacrity.

Company areas in post gardens or separate company gardens are valuable aids to morale, not only because of the greater physical contentment derived from the fresh

vegetables, but also from the personal interest and pride which all persons feel in the foodstuffs they have created. In many instances, the men gladly volunteer to help out with such gardens, as it gives them pleasant light occupation for the long summer evenings.

Personal appearance is one of the expressions of mental state. In civil life, clothing is a very useful index of personal character. The selection of its articles, the way they are worn, their neatness and the degree of care expended upon them all indicate the kind of man the wearer may be.

The same applies in the army except that uniformity requires a common garb and similar general methods of wearing. As the uniform renders the wearer conspicuous, it is important that the civilian observation to which he is subjected should result to his own credit and that of the service. In his relations the soldier should not only be prompt and courteous, but neat and smart. The military uniform should be a trade mark that guarantees the limit of excellence in these qualities.

Personal appearance and good fitting and snappy looking uniforms are powerful factors, not only in expressing morale but in maintaining it and in influencing conduct. The child dressed up for a party finds an influence laid upon it for cleanliness and good behavior. With the "Sunday clothes" of the civilian go appropriate actions — public opinion expects something different in respect to standards of conduct and to these the individual unconsciously accedes. If inappropriately dressed, the child or adult may be mortified, resentful, shy or bashful and their whole conduct express these feelings. Within certain limits, "clothes make the man." They represent a bodily environment which not only serves for warmth and protection but has its marked influence on mood, character and conduct.

Another factor is the relative esteem in which the uniform is held by the civil population. If it be high, the honor pertaining to it is shared by the wearer, who instinctively

reacts in an effort to deserve well of public opinion. If it be low, and regarded by the public as a badge of inferiority, the spirits and standards of conduct in the soldier are correspondingly lowered.

In order to have a pride in the uniform, the uniform itself must be something in which the soldier can be proud. It must give him the sensation of being well, becomingly and smartly dressed. Much more attention has been given this matter in other armies than in our own, and comparison in this respect has been to the disadvantage of our own service. In the past, our uniform has not been cut with a proper understanding of the relative proportions of the soldiers it was intended to cover. The men resented this, and in a questionnaire replied to by nearly 1,400 men one soldier in every seven offered criticism on this point.

The question of supply also enters into the uniform problem. No matter how well cut the clothing, if proper sizes are lacking the men cannot be fitted. This implies the necessity for maintaining a full stock of all sizes at stations, and such supervision as will ensure that this is accomplished. The third step necessary, after an adequate supply of well cut uniforms has been assured, is for company commanders to see that the men selected an actual fit.

The use of renovated clothing, which is shabby, shrunken or ill-fitting, is very undesirable from the standpoint of morale. The men feel humiliated at wearing it, not only because of the poor appearance made, but in resentment at wearing the cast-off clothing of others, which no amount of cleaning can ever free from suspicion as the results of uncleanly habits or disease by former wearers. Spoiling good clothes by requiring the performance of uncleanly tasks in them or allowing too little time to prepare for drills and guard are not infrequently causes of complaint.

Facilities for the sponging and pressing of uniforms in the company will do much to aid smartness and self-respect. Some camp commanders require one uniform to be freshly

pressed at all times. The washing of cotton uniforms at Government expense should materially aid in smartness. Lockers to keep the clothes in are indispensible. Many companies have had their carpenters construct shoe-trees on which the men can place their shoes to clean and shine them.

Every man on pass whose appearance is not creditable should have his pass examined by any officer, his name taken together with that of the non-commissioned officer who inspected him before leaving camp and the facts in the case reported to the organization commander concerned. In connection with appearance, officers must remember the great psychological force of example. Officers set the standard for imitation. For the officer himself to be careless in dress and act is to encourage slovenliness in his subordinates.

Personal cleanliness and neatness add to morale through self respect as well as to healthfulness. The British acted on this idea when they required their men in the trenches to shave daily — not that they were physically better able to fight for doing so but because they were psychologically benefited.

The importance of the basic instinct of hunger in affecting mental state and conduct has already been briefly touched upon. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that good food, in sufficient quantity and variety, appetizingly prepared and well served, is indispensable to good morale. Wherever any of these factors do not exist, discontent will be present, for thoughts of food occupy a large place in the mind of the soldier. Conversely, a well fed company is usually a reasonably contented company.

That there is wide diversity between organizations in these respects cannot be gainsaid. That not enough of them achieve satisfactory standards is equally true. As reinforcing common knowledge on this subject, it may be said that of 1,400 men discharged from a certain division

and asked in a questionnaire to specify conditions which in their opinion needed improvement, seventeen per cent. complained of the preparation of their food, while nineteen per cent. wanted more diversity of diet. Clearly any such difficulties as nearly one man in five specifically criticised are readily remediable by more careful attention and supervision.

This is not the place to go into the multifarious details of the subsistence of troops, but inasmuch as his diet is beyond the control of the soldier, it follows that the administration of the kitchen and mess demands unremitting vigilance, determination and ingenuity on the part of the company commander. In order to accomplish the full purpose of Army Regulations, he must have daily conferences with the first sergeant, mess sergeant and cook, and personally pass upon the menu for each meal, the distribution of savings and the variations of diet desirable. He must be sure that the company receives all that it is entitled to, that the food is in good condition as procured and prepared, that there is no wastage and that service is satisfactory. Faults of cleanliness or service merely require attention in order to be corrected at once. Mess funds should not be allowed to accumulate beyond reason. After a comfortable sum has been saved to meet emergency, the rest should be spent on the men who have contributed to its accumulation. If this is not done, the men know it, and discontent at being economized upon for the sake of others in the future is inevitable. Waste or dishonesty in respect to the mess results in the men faring poorly, for the ration leaves no surplus to be absorbed in this respect. When this occurs, dissatisfaction and complaint are sure to be present.

Young soldiers have healthy appetites and are prone to eat outside the barracks, not only for quantity but for variety. But when this is done to abnormal extent, the character of the mess should fall under suspicion. During the war, one camp had its post exchanges and hostess house

inspected frequently at breakfast time and note taken of the organizations from which the men eating there had come, on the principle that while there may be many reasons for men eating away from their companies at dinner or supper, it is probable that the food is poor if they do so at breakfast.

There are many possible defects of administrative method which are unnecessarily irksome to the soldier and operate to reduce morale and impair confidence not only in the interest but in the efficiency of the commander. In industry, there are diverse difficulties and frictions which are unnecessary, and their importance in effect upon the worker only needs to be realized to cause their abatement. Unnecessary delays, mechanical difficulties in securing an obviously desirable result and which might be obviated, taking from the soldier his time for rest or that required to prepare for retreat or other calls, making the men stand in sun or rain unnecessarily— these and a thousand other vexations due to ignorance, indifference or want of discrimination, operate as depressant factors, the aggregate effect of which may be very great. The seasoned soldier may bear with them with a certain degree of equanimity and resignation, but with recruits such small things breed dissatisfaction, may create disgust, and operate to impair enthusiasm. No little thing which is adding to the discomfort of his men is beneath the attention of the officer. The sum total of many little things may be great. If he sees that even minor things are remedied when possible, he will find that his men will accept with fortitude and patience the great deprivations, suffering and sacrifices that are recognized as inevitable in war.

CHAPTER XIX

REWARD, PUNISHMENT AND DELINQUENCY

The incentive of reward; efficiency through pride, loyalty and ambition; the bestowal of credit and commendation; the great value of intangible rewards; approval and disapproval; the expression of appreciation; letters of commendation; honors; promotion. Punishment; control through fear; tendency to over-rate control through fear; punishment the early recourse of poor commanders; morale purpose to avert punishment by preventing occurrence of the fault; considerations of punishment; the quality of intent; purpose of punishment; character of punishment; disciplinary procedures; inflexibility of penological standards; imposition of punishment; inequalities of punishment; the deterrent action of punishment; methods in imposing penalty; reliance on courts-martial. The guard-house; restriction of its use; certain dangers in its use; an agency of last resort; young offenders and guard-house sentences. Delinquency; classification of delinquents; discontents and delinquencies; influence of war on delinquency; the recidivist or repeated offender; unsound mentality and crime; levels of intelligence and military offense; environment as a cause of delinquency; military offenses as differentiated from crimes of moral turpitude; classification of crimes and offenses; relative proportion of criminality in the army and civil life; analysis of court-martial proceedings; measures to prevent delinquency. Desertion; its relation to morale; magnitude of the problem; necessity for its scientific study; problem one of relative attractions; causes and motives of desertion; measures for preventing desertion. Absence without leave; its effect on efficiency; its relation to desertion; causes of absence without leave; measures for its control; civilian ignorance of gravity of offense; responsibility of superiors. Offenses against constituted authority. Offenses by sentinels and guards. Miscellaneous military offenses. Offenses with violence involved. Offenses of dishonesty. Offenses against decency. Miscellaneous civil offenses.

Reward. Morale work is based largely upon the fact that most men will give their best efforts if their endeavors flow from desire rather than compulsion — also that they

will behave if it is borne in upon them that it pays them to behave and that good conduct is a matter of self-interest. This implies the discarding as far as possible of the motives springing from compulsion, fear and punishment, and the substitution therefor of such factors as coöperation, professional pride, loyalty, initiative and ambition. By the latter incentives the American can through self-assertion, rivalry, acquisitiveness, and other instincts, be readily led where he could not be compelled through fear.

But in order to evoke these desirable qualities to full advantage, it is necessary for the men to feel that their work is noted and appreciated by higher authority. The consciousness of duty well performed, as its only reward, fully satisfies but few. It is not easy for men to continue in a cheerful, coöperative and ambitious state of mind if their hard labor and sacrifice seemingly go without due material or spiritual return. Credit for accomplishment stimulates that, which, in civil life, is known as pride of workmanship, while it incites, as well, to further effort.

Such a course also serves to encourage suggestions and new ideas on the part of the men. In any organization, many valuable ideas originate below, though only those at the top may have the power to get them applied. Original ideas are property. If they are parted with for the benefit of others, it is only just that an effort be made to give some return for value received. To take an idea over without thanks or credit on the part of a superior may wither ambition and loyalty.

In the military service the reward of money, which chiefly stimulates to excellence in civil life, cannot be offered. But reward can be given in honor, reputation and esteem of comrades as well as superiors and subordinates. Such reward is often in the power of superiors to bestow and, after all, it is the intangible rewards which money cannot buy that count for the most. The simple laurel wreath given the victor was the greatest reward in ancient Greece,

not for its intrinsic value, but for what it signified in public esteem.

Approval and disapproval, as expressed in public opinion, are master controls of conduct. Without praise and blame, the individual would merely tend to avoid acts which bring punishment. Human beings have an innate tendency to seek and prize the esteem of associates. Desire for approval and aversion to disapproval furnish the motive for adherence to styles and fashions. They modify manners and customs — as where "tipping," bred of ostentation, is yielded to by those who cannot afford it and strongly resent it, rather than incur the possible criticism of a few menials and onlookers. They are at the basis of seeking for social success, irrespective of any personal satisfaction of physical needs. They are a powerful cause of action for the welfare of others; the millionaire donor to a charity and the private doing something more than duty for his company or captain are not uninfluenced by this motive. The strength of desire for public esteem and dislike of disapproval extends even to posthumous fame. A good reputation is a legacy to hand down to posterity.

Approval may be manifested by words, acts, behavior, admission to companionship, and the like. This intangible reward is powerful in promoting wholesome rivalry. It may be made tangible for the military service in the form of orders, notices, honors, titles, badges, graphic charts, banners, privileges or any simple device which facilitates or establishes military or social status. Where tangible rewards are given for military excellence, they should be given distinctive military character and appropriateness. Thus, at one camp during demobilization, a bronze medal was given to every soldier of the regiment making the best showing in a tournament, to take back with him into civil life as a souvenir.

Commendation is a valued regard which is always at the

disposal of superiors to bestow. The value of appreciation comes in knowledge of its existence through an expression of approval. The return is prompt and far reaching. Probably the two words in the English language which serve greatest to promote initiative, loyalty and efficiency are "thank you." The value of commendation depends not only on its source but the extent of its publicity. Citations and medals awarded for especially meritorious service embody such publicity. Its value also depends on promptness of award, lest delay give rise to the idea that merit has been overlooked. When possible, commendation should be so given as not only to convey appreciation of an act as personal, but as one which adds to the credit of the organization to which the recipient belongs.

In every case which warrants it, superiors should write letters of commendation to officers and men whose performance of duty has been exceptional. Not only are such letters highly prized by those who receive them, but they stimulate both the recipients and their friends to better effort and give all a sense of watchfulness and appreciation on the part of those over them. Such letters should be personal and relate to individual service. To give them out in set form belittles the value of the service rendered and largely impairs their value. At the end of the war, the morale organization took measures to stop the issuing at a number of camps of letters of commendation in multigraphed form to officers being discharged from the service.

While praise for meritorious acts is a recognition of service and a valuable stimulus for further endeavor, it should not be extravagant but should bear a proper relation to merit. Those who overpraise are usually so superficial in their examination of the work as not to know how really good it may be. Like commendation, it is within the power of commanders to give passes and special privileges as outward recognition of appreciation of good service or special excellence.

Sufficient opportunities for reward by promotion for both officers and men constitute an important factor in the furtherance of morale. Except in time of war, this is practically denied to officers. The profound discontent and resentment at the temporary stoppage of promotion among officers overseas after the Armistice is well known. But for enlisted men, there is always the possibility of promotion for work well done and manifestation of ability. One of the great incentives of his soldiers was Napoleon's statement that " every soldier carries a Marshal's baton in his knapsack."

The men, as recruits, should be given clearly to understand that each of them is a potential non-commissioned or commissioned officer, and that such promotion only awaits demonstration of fitness. If no vacancies for promotion exist in the company, worthy men should be allowed to transfer out. The loss of a few extra good men in this way is more than compensated for by the greater effort of the many who are stimulated to higher efficiency as the result of encouragement and opportunity. It should be understood that promotions are based on efficiency and that, where other things are fairly equal, they will go first to those who think less of self than of their associates and organization.

The material reward of promotion usually acts as a spur to further endeavor. But there are cases in which it operates as a narcotic to those of limited ambition. The latter have no place in the service. Reward by commendation has no such possible drawbacks and serves constantly as an incentive to further endeavor. In civil industry, ability to reward — and not alone by money — is one of the greatest forces for efficiency.

Punishment. In punishment, the negative instinct of fear is stimulated. It relates to physical expressions only, for there can be no punishment for mental opposition so long as there exists conformance to requirements in act.

Thoughts are refractory toward force. In its operation, punishment arouses a feeling of fear toward and retraction from an unsocial or disorderly act. Future disagreeable consequences are made to weigh more than earlier pleasure. Temptation loses some of its urgency. All this implies that the individual must thoroughly understand what may be done and what is forbidden, if there is to be reaction against the latter.

The better ideas, in respect to punishment, tend toward the theory of " natural punishments " advanced by Herbert Spencer. That is, that the individual will so react to environment that he will acquire acts that are right and valuable and avoid those which are wrong. This is correct as far as it goes, but, in its simpler form, is the wasteful and often painful process of " trial by error," known as experience. Morale work goes further and creates an artificial environment of the character and quality required to affect behavior as a result of a clear understanding of the problem to be solved. Thus there naturally follows the obligation on the part of officers to establish and foster such conditions in their organizations as will operate for right conduct and not for promoting misbehavior.

The use of the fear instinct and dislike for the unpleasant and disagreeable as agencies for control is, within proper limits, wholly rational for children, since they have neither social standards, powers of reasoning nor experience to guide them in their conduct. The same applies to a certain small class of adults of poor mentality and sense of responsibility. But with the average soldier the case is different, and the influencing of behavior through fear is less successful than through incentives of the positive and pleasant.

In an army, organized as it is as the direct exponent of force, the tendency is to over-rate the value of force and punishment in producing desired results. Men who are driven to do a thing, or compelled not to do it; rarely give such complete results as would follow a wise choice and a

desire to give loyal service to an able leader in a just cause.

Punishment is the instinctive recourse in correction of fault which is resorted to by commanders of little experience or poor understanding of men. In some instances, the infliction of punishment has been due to misunderstanding or mismanagement on the part of higher authority and because the relations between psychological cause and physical act were not clearly realized. One reason for punishment is that it is not always easy to find naturally or instinctively pleasant objects with which to associate necessary activities, themselves unpleasant.

Attempts to rule by punishment after a fault has occurred avoid the higher purposes of preventing the fault before it developed. Relatively few men are incorrigible, and admonition, advice and character development will often do away with any need for the infliction of punishment later. The use of fear should be reserved as a last resort and not be lightly invoked. Positive plans for keeping up the good spirits of organizations, intelligently conceived and well carried out, accomplish far more for efficiency and good conduct than the irregular effects of punishment. While courts-martial and other disciplinary agencies deal with the final penological results of wrongful act, the purpose of morale work is to the end that many of these acts shall never be committed and trial and punishment therefore not occur. The handling of military offenses is a double problem. First,— is the soldier guilty; second,— if so, what shall be done with him? There is far less liability to error in the first function, for it is merely a matter of the weighing of evidence; while the second implies a broad understanding of men, human psychology and military environment. After the award of the punishment, the man should be watched while serving it out and such influences as may be practicable in bringing about the state of contrition and purpose of reform be brought to bear. Whenever this seems to have

been accomplished, the effect of the punishment, so far as its subject is concerned, has been achieved, and remission, parole or reinstatement would stimulate to good behavior. It is often as important to understand when to exercise such clemency as when to impose punishment.

Intent has a profound relation to degree of punishment. It may happen that military requirements are violated without intent of their contravention. Intention is a wish or desire to perform a certain act and accept such consequences as normally flow from it. Officers should study, accordingly, not only the circumstances of the offense, but the personality of the offender. Stupidity implies mental deficiency and want of understanding, which are not within the power of the individual to control. Ignorance of the law or of military orders is not ordinarily accepted as a valid excuse for failure to conform to their requirements. Yet the required reading of the Articles of War to recruits and to troops, under conditions or in a manner interfering with their understanding, or to men of sluggish mentality, illiteracy or lacking in competent knowledge of the English language, may not fully remove such ignorance. In these cases, ignorance should at least be considered as an extenuation, though it needs be honest and innocent and not the result of carelessness or fault. It follows that obligation rests upon all officers that all basic military requirements as to conduct are not only read to the men but so explained that they have a thoroughly clear understanding of the standards to which they are required to conform. Common knowledge and court-martial records demonstrate that this has not always been done.

The purpose of punishment is not one of remedy, for the antisocial act has been committed and probably cannot be remedied. It is not revenge, for such motive has no place in any scheme of justice. The purpose is not so much to hurt or degrade the man as to reform him. Its object is to

protect society from a repetition of the offense, either by the offender or others, and further to function in molding character.

Obviously it is the part of wisdom and justice not to inflict punishment of greater severity than will serve the aforementioned purposes. If the commander understands his men, he will know when a simple reproof may serve all the purposes of a court-martial in the modification of future conduct. If he goes further than necessary for the attaining of the proper object, he is allowing the factors of resentment or revenge to enter and his hold on his subordinates is weakened through the recognition of this fact.

Excessive severity by superiors may, instead of acting as a repressant, directly arouse such reaction of resentment as to express itself in antagonistic conduct. This may, and usually does, express itself in passive opposition represented by an inertia of a degree just short of punishable. In the young, unformed recruit, too severe punishment, particularly if it be associated with the stigma of confinement, may destroy hope, blast reform and turn the individual into a reckless offender.

The general policy in the handling of men should be one of suggestion, helpfulness and encouragement. If a man commits a fault, the first thought should not necessarily be one of punishment. Some men require punishment, but others do best if made to see their error and then allowed to take a fresh start. How to decide on the proper action in such cases is purely a matter of personality and character. It is easier and better to take some pains to instruct and get the confidence of a backward and suspicious man than to be punishing him later and trying to counteract his influence in the company.

In the maintenance of discipline, there are two modes of action. One is to treat all men alike under all conditions. This is the essence of impartiality. The other is the accurate treatment of men according to their separate individ-

ualities. This, to the outsider, may seem unjust, but it will be far more effective so far as the offender himself is concerned. The mechanics of discipline — justice, punishment and reward — are simple. But the problem of discipline is largely a psychological one, including the factor of the officer's personality, the factor of the offender's personality and the factor of the offense.

Military justice must be equitable. This does not mean an inflexible system under which the same offense should be punished alike in all offenders. Motives and circumstances should be given due consideration in the action taken. The recruit, whose first offense was perhaps the emotional result of ignorance, youth and lack of previous discipline at home more than of calculated intent, should not be treated like the repeated and perhaps incorrigible offender.

But while inflexible standards of punishment should be avoided, it should be done in such a way as to arouse no idea either of partiality or discrimination. Here is one of the greatest practical tests of efficiency in the handling of men. Leniency, reprimand, mild punishment and severe penalty may all be used for the same dereliction in such way that both the offender and his comrades recognize their absolute justice. Where leniency is practised, steps should be taken to let the men appreciate the reasons behind it.

Some offenses have, by their frequency, acquired a standardized penalty, as set forth in the Manual of Courts-Martial. Offenders who should know better and in whose cases there are no extenuating circumstances are usually best handled on an impersonal basis. The man transgresses, pays the well known penalty, receives no sympathy in his company therefor, and usually expects none.

There are obvious inequities in any legal procedure, however, which imposes sentences merely according to the degree of the accomplished offense. Of this, the safeguards which the law attempts to throw about property rights are an example. Thus a man who is convicted of stealing five dol-

lars would very likely have stolen five hundred dollars if that sum had been within reach at the time of the theft. Not motive, but physical limitation of opportunity here governs the legal magnitude of the offense if the risk of detection and consequences remained the same. However, there are occasional cases in which only enough is stolen to meet a single immediate and pressing need which, in the mind of the offender, overrides all other considerations.

Punishment, like reward, if merited, should be imposed promptly. It is important, for the sake of its effect on others, that retribution should be closely associated in the public mind with the offense which it follows. There should be no appearance of the offense having been overlooked, since repetition tends to be encouraged as long as punitive consequences are not apparent. As for the offender himself, it is his right to be spared any unnecessary mental uncertainty and anxiety, since psychological depression of this sort is in itself a form of punishment, and has often been used by despotic forms of government to aggravate the effect of physical penological measures. It is best to have the matter brought promptly to a head, get the punishment over with, and enable the soldier to start again with a clean slate so far as his future is concerned. For the same reason, it is probably better to have the punishment short and relatively severe than comparatively mild and long drawn out. It is sometimes useful, in awarding punishment implying fatigue work, to give it in the form of a task to be well accomplished rather than fixed hours of work. This calls constructiveness into play, allows the man such spare time as his efforts secure him, speeds up results and improves mental state.

Much has been said about the inequality of punishment imposed for the same offense in the military service. This is true and an effort is made here to show that there are sound reasons for it. The same condition exists in civil communities in which such critics of the army are included —

judges and juries do not punish alike and different penalties are prescribed by law for the same offense in different states. Civil law is in far worse state than military law, which at least has a single code for its government.

But the general tendency of courts-martial is to over-punish — that is, to give a greater penalty than is necessary either to reform the offender or to act as sufficient deterrent to his associates. This is especially the case in war, when courts-martial composed of inexperienced officers tend to extreme severity in the effort to strike fear into offenders. This excessive severity is shown by the special clemency board of the Judge Advocate General's Department, which in passing upon 6040 cases in confinement, awarded clemency in eighty-five per cent. and denied it in but fifteen per cent. Of the sentences reduced, the average of seven years and three months was reduced to one year and eleven months. The board completely remitted the unexecuted sentences of confinement in 1794, or nearly one-third of the number committed, authorized the application for restoration to duty of 386, and recommended the discharge, without designation as to honorable or dishonorable, of 495.

The efficiency of punishment as a deterrent varies with the psychological reaction toward it. Sympathy with the offender, or self-sympathy on his part, endows him with some of the qualities of a martyr and the effect of the punishment may be impaired or lost. Accordingly, it is important that all should understand that a wrong has been done and that the penalty imposed is fair and merited. The deterrent in such cases is not so much the unpleasant experiences pertaining to punishment as the desire, entertained by nearly all, to do what public opinion considers right.

Where punishment is offered as the only deterrent of offense, the offender may assume a sporting attitude toward discipline which, in turn, may be conceived by the men to be the attitude of discipline toward them. A game of pen-

alties is played — a gambling chance is taken on the avoiding of specified results. In such instances, morale work is of great value in making discreditable the matching of wits for such purpose.

A display of temper in connection with imposing punishment is always regrettable. It arouses the resentment of the offender and lowers his respect for his officer. A calm, dispassionate attitude must be held, no matter what the provocation. The force of the punishment is increased if the officer, while awarding it, expresses frank regret at its necessity and a hope and expectation that the necessity will not occur again, both for the sake of the offender and the standards of the organization; also that once he has served out the penalty in the proper spirit the slate is clean and it is his own fault if it does not remain so. If an individual is given the idea that he has completely forfeited his future, discouragement and impairment of effort result.

In connection with punishments, it is sometimes advisable to bring up tactfully to the men certain instances of the punishment of their comrades, the offenses, the penalties awarded and the reasons therefor. The value of punishing offenders to protect the interests of their comrades should be fully emphasized.

It may sometimes be of advantage, instead of reprimanding for relative inefficiency, to bring the individual concerned into competition with another of high efficiency in the subjects or matters in which he is below standard. This will let the individual demonstrate his own failings to himself and rouse him to greater effort through appeal to his self-respect.

If the offender is intellectually deficient, the corrective or protective measures necessary must be adapted to his own defect. Severe punishment, solitary confinement, hard labor, moral suasion or educational effort will none of them avail to change mental status and irresponsibility in the organically defective. Nor can they change the moral qual-

ity of his act except in so far as they limit opportunity.

It has already been stated that man, through the instincts of sympathy and self-assertion, has a craving for expressed admiration or objective evidences of it. On this depends the reward found in commendation. Conversely, objective criticism, reproof, scorn or ridicule are painful or intolerable. Under their influence, persons frequently react by antisocial acts of violence against others, or even by their own suicide. Reproof is thus a powerful agent for the control of conduct, varying in force and effect not only with the esteem in which the source is held but with the temperament and character of the recipient. Words may have the painful effect of any other punishment and drive to action more than physical force. In many cases, a stinging reproof is a most effective and sufficient punishment. Reproof, then, should be reserved as a disciplinary force; and trifling fault, while invariably to be pointed out, should not habitually be made the subject of captious criticism.

Courts-martial are the highest agencies for military justice. No case should be sent before them unless there is conviction that the interests of justice and correction cannot otherwise be served. They should be reserved for the exceptional cases. This is particularly the case with first offenders, in whom the possession of a clear, untarnished record is of high morale value and a great aid to the commander. But when a court-martial is necessary, the issue should be squarely met. Any weakness of commanders in the desire to avoid an unpleasant duty will weaken the discipline and control.

The excessive invoking of the aid of courts-martial in maintaining discipline is the refuge of the weak officer and poor administrator, who thereby admits incapacity to handle the internal affairs of his own organization. When courts-martial in a company are exceptionally common, it is fair to inquire if the commander himself is not largely at fault in his methods and success of control. If a company has an

undue proportion of men in the guard house, an inference may suggest itself that some of them would rather be there than serving in the company. In civil industry punishment for behavior usually takes the form of discharge from the job. But such discharge hurts the industry itself if it thereby loses the services of a trained worker. If such discharges are high, it might be well to investigate conditions to see if factors are present which — aside from individual benefits — it might be more economical to remove rather than allow their continuance as agents for labor turnover.

The Guard House. The guard house and all that goes with it in the way of restriction, discomfort and deprivation, through the blocking of various instincts, represents an environment which is deliberately created for corrective purposes. In a general way, it should represent sharp, short and disagreeable punishment. It is unquestionably a necessary agency for the handling of certain offenders, but it should not be forgotten that its function should be corrective more than penological.

The real purpose of justice is to diminish delinquency. The processes of military law, such as guard house sentences, are not necessarily deterrents to the future commission of acts of military disorder by the present offender. If they were, there would not be the too common example of the soldier who repeatedly appears for trial for a succession of similar offenses. Stronger than any repressive physical force is the positive moral force of public opinion and individual influence.

A certain proportion of guard house prisoners are there because they are innately deficient in appreciation of moral standards or in mental qualities. Some are men who have proved refractory to measures of justice and kindness. Yet it is equally true that it frequently contains individuals who are there because they instinctively responded, by acts contrary to good order, to factors of negative morale beyond their own control, but for the existence of which their su-

periors were responsible and which it was humanly possible to have prevented or corrected.

This statement is borne out by the fact of the well known wide variation in the relative number of military offenders in confinement from otherwise identical organizations, recruited from the same service, fed and clad from a common stock and perhaps living under the same roof of a double barracks under identical physical environments. It is borne out further by the fact that some officers are followed through their military career by a train of discontent, desertions and crowded guard houses, while with other officers the reverse is habitually true. In other words, the need and use of guard houses vary with the quality of leadership of commanders, and the guard house roster is an excellent mirror of the character and quality of such leadership.

The guard house represents an agency of last resort, the use of which should be minimized as far as the limits of discipline will permit. It is too often the ready recourse of poor commanders. Many of its cases might better have been handled by company discipline in the interest both of the individual and the service. Particularly is it true that the officer who puts a young soldier in the guard house for the first time has taken a serious responsibility upon himself. It should not be done unless the offense be grave, or other corrective measures have been tried and failed. It inevitably brings a feeling of discouragement and degradation together with loss of pride and self-respect which may result in turning a man into a reckless offender, when wiser handling might have converted him into a good soldier. When self-respect is lost there is little left to build upon.

Moreover, the mixing of offenders in guard houses is bad for future discipline and conduct. Here the immature recruit, who has committed some military offense without moral turpitude, already humiliated and depressed, and whose character is perhaps not sufficiently formed to resist strong impulse and to exercise self-control, may be brought

into close and prolonged contact with men who are vicious, depraved and hardened criminals. The evil influence of the latter may more than offset any effect for good to be derived from the punishment. One purpose of incarceration of criminals is to remove or limit their evil influence on society; and it is scarcely logical to expose weak individuals to such evil influences under intensive conditions that make increased response to these influences practically inevitable.

The need for the separation of the novice in crime from the hardened offender is recognized in civil life in the reformatories for youths and the separation of lesser offenders from the confirmed criminals. This is even more necessary in the army, where military justice takes cognizance not only of criminals but transgressors against a military code built upon the special requirements of a military cosmos. Penal institutions may readily become schools for criminals instead of corrective agencies, while outlet for interests and emotions may develop along undesirable lines in the natural trend to offset the rigid repression brought about by the law. Evil thoughts find fertile soil and ideals deteriorate under such conditions. Unnatural sex practices and drug addictions are the bane of large institutions. Not a few originally casual offenders graduate as confirmed enemies of society and moral derelicts. On a lesser scale, the guard house harbors these and other possibilities. They should be guarded against as much as possible by keeping the slight offenders separate from the more serious cases and especially from those who have committed acts of depravity.

The rules of the guard house should be strict and enforced to the letter. On the other hand, the parole should be freely offered as a reward for good behavior, so that in minor cases the man himself may have it in his power to modify his own discomforts and restrictions. The guard house should be devoid of all but the bare necessities, but these should be scrupulously neat and sanitary. The nature of environment operates to produce like states of mind.

Dirty, vermin infested bedding and slack police do not conduce to personal cleanliness or higher ideals of thought.

A small amount of suitable reading matter should be available. Light fiction and trashy magazines which merely serve to pass time should be eliminated, but a carefully selected set of standard books, calculated to improve the prisoner's mind and attitude toward society, would be of value.

Suitable appeals should be made to the manliness and personal interests of the offenders, along the lines of the spirit of the service, playing the game according to the rules, the foolishness of getting into the guard house, good citizenship and other practical matters. These might well be given systematically to prisoners and preferably in the evening when all would be in attendance. With men in the state of mind of the average prisoner, it is obvious that not only what is said but the manner of saying it and the spirit behind it all will determine success or failure. Above all, the spirit should emphasize the idea that though "a man may be down, he is never out," and that punishment is chiefly to sting the offender into a better sense of obligation to himself and society in general.

When a man reports back for duty on discharge from the guard house, he should stop at the company commander's office before rejoining his squad, to be perhaps more or less a subject of its ridicule and sarcasm. If the company commander uses this psychological moment to express appreciation that the punishment is over, state that the man will start clean and be given an even chance, that the lesson has probably done him good and that now all expect more from him, it should be of much morale value.

Delinquency. Delinquency implies not only the commission of offense but also fault or dereliction, as where there is neglect, failure or omission of duty. The subject is one so vitally important to military administration that much more might be said about it than there is space for

here. All officers have to face delinquency as a practical problem, though those of wiser administrative capacity need to do so in proportionately less degree as they prevent delinquent states from arising.

Many confirmed delinquents are men of criminal or antisocial tendencies, whose inherent instinctive propensities, impulses and reactions are more or less vicious or refractory. Such men are apt to present permanent disciplinary problems as long as they remain in the service because of this fundamental psychological make-up. They furnish much more than their share of serious offenses in proportion to their own numbers, and especially is this the case in respect to crimes of moral turpitude.

There is another class of delinquents in which a weak character renders them easily swayed to fault by harmful associations. They are the tools of stronger personalities. They have but poor concepts of right and wrong and are weak in a sense of responsibility or appreciation of consequence. If placed in an environment for good, they become worthy soldiers.

A third class is composed of men whose normal tendency is to do right, but who may be highly emotional and thereby react antisocially to occasional severe strain. They rarely commit crimes of moral turpitude, but their very strength of character may lead them to infractions of military authority, particularly if they believe that there has been infringement of their self-respect or rights. Morale work is of special value in minimizing offenses of this class, for their natural standards are high and they are particularly open to appeal and logic. They respond readily to correction of the environmental factors which stimulated them to depart from their accustomed mental state and physical behavior. If these factors cannot be corrected, an understanding of the reasons which prevent it will largely promote a better state of mind and conduct.

But all delinquents are individuals who fail to function in

harmony with other members of the society of which they are a part, in accordance with the accepted rules of behavior. They are discordant units in an organization and as such tend to disturb the common purpose and prevent mutual accomplishment. Every man under punishment is receiving it because of his failure to adjust himself to his environment. Irrespective of a lowering effect on the efficiency of others, the time and service lost to the Government through delinquencies is of great economic and administrative importance through its vastness in the aggregate.

The discontents which tend to spring up in the routine and monotony of peace seem to be potent breeders of delinquency. The excitements and emotions of war, on the other hand, give such relief to mental stress along such other channels as to prevent much misbehavior. Abroad, courts-martial were said to have doubled within two months following the Armistice. On this subject, General Pershing, in his report, says: "Prior to the signing of the Armistice, serious breaches of discipline were rare, considering the number of the troops. This was due to the high sense of duty of the soldiers and their appreciation of the seriousness of the situation. In the period of relaxation following the cessation of hostilities, infractions of discipline were usually more numerous."

The influence of war on military offenses is further shown by the fact that while in 1917, before the war, there was one general court-martial trial for every twenty-one men, in 1918 there was but one case to every 138 men. This was due to a combination of factors in which harder training, intensive instruction, higher ideals and a lively appreciation of need for military instruction in self-preservation and that of the country predominated. The class of men was perhaps higher on the whole, for it included a superior grade of men who up to that time would never have entered the service except under the stimulus or compulsion of war.

To men who were about to risk their lives in the grim-

mest of warfare, the ordinary offenses of soldiers seemed tame affairs. The nearer the fighting, also, the lower the rate of offenses. Those in Europe were less in number than were committed by the same number of men at home. In ten months at the front one overseas division had only twenty-five general court-martial cases, while in the same period of time another division at home, being drilled in Mississippi, had 369, or nearly fifteen times more. It is in peace, then, that the commander must expect to face a great number of disciplinary problems, and needs, therefore, to pay special attention to measures of prevention.

The repeated offender, or recidivist, is the one who especially jeopardizes the military society. He might be defined as an individual, who, in spite of warnings, reprimands, probation or punishment proceeds to commit further antisocial acts. Investigation of such cases discloses that a large proportion of such offenders have inherent defects of character which existed prior to entering the service.

As illustrating the importance of previous history in the case of repeated offenders, a study of 566 prisoners at the U. S. Naval Prison at Portsmouth showed that 236 of them had a record of at least one residence in a penal institution or hospital for the insane prior to enlistment, and that in eleven such cases the offender had been committed to both institutions before enlistment. Commitments were shown as follows:

Times committed to penal institutions	Number
1	102
2	31
3	16
4	10
5	6
More than 5	55

Times committed to insane institutions	Number
1	10
2	2

Times committed to insane institutions	Number
3	2
More than 3	2

No previous residence in penal or insane institutions, 113.
No record of above, or record unconfirmed, 228.

It appears from the foregoing that in cases in which accurate data were obtainable, two-thirds of them had experienced life in a penal or insane institution before they enlisted.

In a study made of 1871 ex-soldiers confined in the U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, the above results



Figure 31. Nature of Military Offense and Civil Criminal Record.

were largely corroborated. Of the above number, forty-four per cent. had a known previous criminal record, while doubtless some of the other fifty-six per cent. had previous court records which they had succeeded in concealing. On the other hand, it is doubtless true that a certain per cent. of men who have made good soldiers and are not found in military prisons have been civilly punished for disobedience of law. This class is probably made up chiefly of emotional and not constitutional offenders. The distribution by character of offense in relation to previous criminal record in these convicts is shown in Figure 31.

A further inquiry into the above group of 1871 prisoners showed that sixty-seven per cent. were reported as having had a bad character in civil life. How such offenders, with

alleged bad civil life records were distributed among the various classes of military offenses is shown in Figure 32.



Figure 32. Nature of Military Offense in Relation to Bad Character in Civil Life.

Further analysis shows that in the distribution of bad civilian characteristics, out of each 1000 of the men studied, 312 had a record of excessive use of intoxicants, twenty-eight were drug-addicts, 165 are recorded as mentally defective, and 167 as having generally bad records. It is possible that a considerably greater number than reported were really mental cases, as it does not appear that psychological examinations were given to all. The analysis in respect to civil offense is given in Figure 33.



Figure 33. Distribution of Bad Civilian Characteristics, with Reference to Military Offenses.

Of the men showing disrespect and disobedience, thirty-three per cent. had previous civil court records; of men convicted of absence without leave or desertion, twenty per

cent. also had such previous court records. It is apparent, therefore, that one of the greatest possibilities for reducing serious delinquency in the service lies in the exclusion by the recruiting officers of men whose defects have already shown their inability to adjust to their environment. Such men tend to become a burden to the Government, not only through the difficulties they create in the impairment of general efficiency, but through loss of their own personal services, while, in addition, they become a charge upon it for maintenance and care.

In civil life, much study has been given to the relation between unsound mentality and crime. A beginning only of such a study has been made in the army, and this should be extended as part of a general inquiry into the causation of military offenses as a whole. The inherent defects of mentality and character so frequently found in military offenders include an excessively egocentric personality, as seen in men who are individualistic, opinionated, self-willed, or vain to an extreme degree; an extreme emotional instability, and an inadequate intelligence or judgment. It is worthy of note that insanity is usually egomania in some form. In a study of prisoners in the Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, the proportions in which such defects existed were as follows:

Emotional instability	1.
Very low intelligence	3.
Egocentrism	9.

While recruiting methods will exclude those who are obviously insane at the time of enlistment, they are not able to detect in advance men who later become insane or who, in greater or less degree, verge on the border of an unsound mentality of varying type and who may later commit military offense by reason of irrational impulse and irresponsibility. The detection and handling of such cases is a medical problem, the factors in which need not be considered

here. It is essential for line officers to bear their importance in mind and bring to the attention of the Surgeon cases in which abnormal conduct or ideas would seem to warrant such a course.

The level of intelligence is an important matter in the occurrence of military offenses and the matter of mental capacity should enter into their consideration. The sense of responsibility is based on mental competence to distinguish between right and wrong and to appreciate the consequences of act. If this constitutional competence is poor, the individual has a tendency toward becoming an habitual offender. Whether a man should be tried for the commission of an act, or eliminated from the service as mentally incompetent, depends upon the existence of motive and sufficient appreciation of responsibility.

One salient feature in delinquency, especially in delinquencies involving offenses of turpitude, is the fact that no small proportion of delinquents are mentally defective. This proportion is sufficiently great so that the commission of serious offense, or a series of minor offenses, should be reason for inquiry into the mental capacity and state of the offender, including a psychological examination and rating if this has not already been done.

In civil life, considerable inquiry has been made relative to delinquents whose faulty acts are due more to inherent defects than faulty environment. Studies of British civilian criminals indicate that defectives commit 29 times their allowance of crimes, the unintelligent 1.7 times their allowance, and the intelligent and fairly intelligent only 0.6 of their allowance. It has further been found that civilian defectives are 60 times more apt to commit sex offenses and 100 times more apt to commit offenses when crime involves property than are normals.

When both mental capacity and environment are bad, some common cause may exist for the poor surroundings and moral failure. These might be feeble-mindedness, epilepsy,

alcoholism, etc. But in the army, most examples of such innate causes for delinquency ought to be excluded through careful investigation by recruiting officers, draft boards and examining boards.

In the army, investigation of intelligence and mental capacity in relation to delinquency has not been carried out to any great extent, but what has been done is indicative of its practical value. Thus, of 479 white soldiers convicted by summary and special courts-martial at Camp Dix in 1918, psychological tests showed that twenty-one per cent. of these offenders had an intelligence rating of "E." This means that these men were in the lowest decile of the army so far as intelligence was concerned, and belonged to a class which psychologists would recommend for discharge from the service or for assignment to labor or development battalions, or other duty requiring less than ordinary mentality. The above group included 66.4 per cent. of men below the average intelligence expressed by a "C" rating, only 10.4 per cent. above it, and 23.2 per cent. of average mentality. Since in the psychological findings for the white draft as a whole, only seven per cent. were rated "E," and but 47.9 per cent. were found below average mentality, the above figures show that mental low grades commit about three times their quota of offenses such as are handled by summary and special courts, and are from four to six times as liable to get into trouble as are men of markedly superior ability.

At Camp Cody, of 250 men discharged for mental deficiency, the president of the disability board stated that "nearly all of them were discharged because they could not keep out of the guard house for more than a week at a time." It was further stated that had these men been retained in the service and confined, they would have composed about thirty per cent. of the convictions of the entire camp. Further, of sixty-five offenders confined in the stockade at Camp McClellan, nearly forty-two per cent. were rated "E," and 92.3 per cent. were below average. While

the number examined is relatively small, the conclusions seem unmistakeable.

It may also be stated that in the 644 prisoners at the Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, whose mental state was considered by a special clemency board, a rough classification was as shown in Figure 34.

	NUMBER OF CASES	PER CENT OF ALL MENTAL CASES
Subnormal mentally*	399	62
Alcohol and drug addicts	123	19
Insanity	52	8
Nervous disorders	47	7
Miscellaneous	23	4

*Includes 7 both subnormal mentally and alcohol or drug addicts.

Figure 34.

Men giving a mental test of "E" are often not fully responsible, the frequency with which they get into trouble and their failure to profit by discipline being largely due to mental limitations. Such a conclusion is supported by the nature of their offenses, which are for the most part of a minor sort conditioned more upon lack of judgment and irresponsibility than upon malicious intent. This checks with studies made on Fort Leavenworth prisoners convicted of serious offenses as compared with men convicted in camps on minor charges. Low intelligence is a marked factor in less serious delinquencies. In industry, it probably accounts for many annoying difficulties and infractions of local administrative requirements.

The information gained by psychological inquiry should show not only the sum of those within the army group who tend to irresponsibility and offense, but the psychological ratings of a company should point out to its commander the actual mentally subnormal individuals who will presumably present an unduly high proportion of infractions of discipline unless given the benefit of preventive supervision and special attention.

As to education, analysis of the records of 3041 prisoners at Fort Leavenworth showed that the average had reached the seventh grade. There were 81.7 per cent. who did not

get beyond the common school, 14.6 per cent. who had some high school work, and 3.7 per cent. who got into college. The group included some religious and political conscientious objectors who were far better educated than the average.

Environment, past and present, may be considered the controlling factor in nearly all offenses committed by men of normal mentality. This applies particularly to the minor offenses which spring from emotional states, often temporary, and due to causes which, in many instances, are removable or preventable by wise administration. It applies especially to acts against military authority which, because



Figure 35. Proportionate Classification of Military Offenses.

they have no analogy in civil life, carry, to many at least, no sense of moral turpitude. In industry, the special restrictions of the new job, not experienced in past employment, provoke reaction in the recently employed. There further enters the factor at the age of young soldiers, whose mental immaturity is reflected in lack of discretion and sense of responsibility as judged by the more mature standards which, as a whole, govern any community. The great importance of environment in controlling act is fully emphasized elsewhere.

The nature and proportions of the serious offenses for which 1871 ex-soldiers were confined in the Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, are well shown in Figure 35.

Further detail in these matters is given in the following table: —

CLASS OF OFFENSE	CLASSIFICATION OF CASES			NATURE OF PREVIOUS CRIMINAL RECORD			CHARACTER IN CIVIL LIFE					
							Kind of record		Nature of bad record			
	Number of cases	No known previous offense	Previous criminal record	Felony	Misdemeanor	Unknown	Good or unknown	Bad	Drink	Drugs	Mental defect	Gen'l. bad record
Unauthorized absence	1141	636	505	139	324	42	375	766	329	35	190	212
Personal dishonesty	366	183	183	51	118	14	123	243	117	5	66	55
Against constituted authority	120	88	32	12	20		48	72	42	3	6	21
Violence	54	32	22	6	16		13	41	28	2	6	5
Drink	39	20	19	5	14		4	35	29	2	2	2
Sex offense	22	15	7	4	3		5	17	5	2	8	2
Other	129	82	47	15	30	2	47	82	34	3	26	19
Total	1871	1056	815	232	525	58	615	1256	584	52	304	316

It is interesting to note that unauthorized absence, which is not a crime in civil life, accounted for sixty-one per cent. of all the foregoing cases. Offenses against constituted authority accounted for six per cent. more. It thus appears that two-thirds of these severely punished men were incarcerated for no civil crime of moral turpitude, but for offenses developing in and from the special military environment.

As compared with civil life, some of the motives for certain crime existing therein are wanting in the army, for there is no destitution, starvation nor worry for the future. Conditions are such that opportunities for theft are practically limited to petty larceny. Hence there is lacking in military life the great volume of crime which in civil life depends upon want or opportunity for great and rapid financial gains.

On the other hand, military life creates requirements and standards which are peculiarly its own and which have no counterpart in civil life. Their enforcement creates a special code of military offenses and punishments for dereliction against military authority. A considerable per cent. of soldiers transgresses against this code to the extent of receiving formal punishment. That there should be any such large number of offenders shows the necessity of thoroughly training the recruit in the matter of his military obligations in which conditions in civil life have afforded neither object lesson nor experience. In the report of the Judge Advocate

General for 1918, the following figures show the extent and classification of formal punitive action:

	Convicted	*Acquitted*	*Total*
Trials by summary court of enlisted men...	202,085	9732	228,839
Trials by summary court of general prisoners	88	8	96
Trials by summary court, all others	10	0	59
Trials by special court, enlisted men	13,275	1440	14,715
Trials by special court, general prisoners...	19	0	19
Trials by special court, all others	35	1	36
Trials by general court martial	10,873	1484	12,357
Total offenses for which tried	226,385	12,665	256,121

Analysis of 16,342 convictions of enlisted men by general courts-martial, as given in the report of the Judge Advocate General for 1918, shows the following general classification and proportions of the offenses for which punishment was imposed:

OFFENSES OF UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE

Offense	Number of convictions.
Absence without leave	2870
Breach of arrest	268
Breach of restriction or quarantine	190
Desert, attempting to	26
Desertion	1743
Desertion, advising	15
Desertion, assisting	2
Draft, attempting to evade	2
Escape from confinement	603
Escape, attempting to	49
Escape, conspiring, etc.,	4
Failure to repair to appointed place for duty, etc.,	127
Leaving without permission, place	24
Prisoner, general, violation of parole by	28
	5951

OFFENSES AGAINST CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY

Offense	Number of convictions.
Disobedience, order of arrest	13
Disobedience of standing orders	168
Disorderly in command	18
Duty, failure to perform	55
Failing to report for prophylactic treatment	9

Offense	Number of convictions.
Mutiny, attempting to create	5
Mutiny, beginning, joining in	37
Mutiny, causing or exciting	1
Mutiny, failure to make known	2
Non-commissioned officer, assaulting	171
Non-commissioned officer, disobeying	385
Non-commissioned officer, failing to obey order of	52
Non-commissioned officer, using threatening language toward	317
Refusing to submit to medical or dental treatment	18
Refusing to submit to surgical operation	126
Refusing to serve as a soldier	110
Sedition	7
Sentinel, behaving disrespectfully to	16
Sentinel, disobeying order of	34
Sentinel, failure to obey order of	8
Sentinel, attempting to strike	5
Sentinel, assaulting	31
Sentinel, threatening	6
Sentinel, using insulting language to	4
Superior officer, assaulting	39
Superior officer, disobeying	694
Superior officer, disrespect to	391
Superior officer, failure to obey	175
Superior officer, failure to salute	2
Superior officer, offering violence to	27
Threatening, drawing weapon on, etc., officer in quelling fray	5
Using contemptuous words toward President and others	36
	2967

OFFENSES BY SENTINELS AND GUARDS

Giving parole or countersign	1
Prisoner, allowing to receive liquor, etc.	4
Prisoner, conspiracy to release	2
Prisoner, failing to work	1
Prisoner, suffering to escape	60
Property, military, allowing to be lost	29
Sentinel, allowing prisoner to receive liquor, etc.,	1
Sentinel, drunk on post	123
Sentinel, leaving post	329
Sentinel, loitering, sitting on post	52
Sentinel offenses by, miscellaneous, etc.,	28
Sentinel, sleeping on post	773
Abandoning guard	67
Total	1470

MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES (Solely Military)

Offense	Number of convictions.
Appearing in civilian clothes	173
Appearing in unclean uniform, improper uniform	30
Casting away arms or ammunition	1
Disorderly conduct, discreditable to service	529
Duty, sleeping on	7
Enemy, giving aid, harboring	1
Fraudulent enlistment	175
Impersonating officer, sentinel, etc.,	37
Laying a duty or imposition upon bringing victuals	1
Malingering	18
Muster, making false	1
Non-commissioned officer, abuse of authority by	11
Shamefully abandoning command	5
Spy, being a	1
Straggling	3
Unclean accouterments, equipment, etc.,	5
Occasioning false alarm	3
Total	1001

OFFENSES CONNECTED WITH GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

Offense	Number of convictions.
Abusing public animals	3
Concealing, destroying, public records	2
Property, advising sale of	2
Property, conspiracy to destroy	4
Property, destroying public	2
Property, attempting to pawn	3
Property, losing or spoiling clothing or accouterments	147
Property, losing or spoiling other than the above	23
Property, military, trying to sell, etc.,	6
Property, misappropriation of, military	347
Property purchasing or receiving in pledge, military, etc.,	1
Property, receiving stolen	24
Property, selling accouterments, clothes	263
Property, selling, disposing of, except accouterments	36
Property, military, allowing to be lost	29
Property destroying	18
Property, wilfully injuring, military, etc.,	41
Property, wrong appropriation of, captured military	2
Total	953

OFFENSES CONNECTED WITH DRINK OR DRUGS

Offense	Number of convictions.
Drug, introducing habit forming	19
Drug, narcotic, use or possession of	30
Drunk, bringing discredit, etc.,	65
Drunk, and disorderly	263
Drunk, etc., arrest by civil police	2
Drunk in command	132
Drunk on duty	122
Liquor, bringing in command, etc.,	87
Selling intoxicating liquor	20
Total	740

OFFENSES WITH VIOLENCE INVOLVED

Offense	Number of convictions.
Assault, (simple)	18
Assault and battery	62
Assault with dangerous weapon, etc.,	24
Assault with intent, felony, etc.,	11
Assault with intent to commit manslaughter	2
Assault with intent to commit murder	34
Assault with intent to commit robbery	21
Assault with intent to do bodily harm	167
Committing depredation or riot	4
Discharging fire arm	50
Fighting	3
Manslaughter	33
Mayhem	32
Murder	21
Threatening to kill or injure	23
Total	505

OFFENSES AGAINST HONESTY

Offense	Number of convictions.
Bribe soliciting	2
Bribery	4
Burglary	42
Burglary, attempting to commit	5
Claim, false or fraudulent, making	30
Claim, false, advising	9
Fraud, conspiracy	2
Embezzlement	164
Failure to pay just debts	16
False statement to deceive	204

Offense	Number of convictions.
False swearing	15
Falsifying account	3
Forged instrument, uttering	113
Forged instrument, having in possession	2
Forgery	221
Larceny	1217
Larceny, intent to commit	39
Obtaining money, etc., false pretence	192
Perjury	20
Robbery	113
Subornation of perjury	1
Using U. S. mail to defraud	2
Total	2416

OFFENSES AGAINST DECENCY

Offense	Number of convictions.
Adultery	3
Assault with intent to commit rape	14
Assault with intent to commit sodomy	15
Buccal coitus	55
Fornication	5
Illicit cohabitation	8
Indecent exposure	7
Lewdness	7
Obscene letter, sending	11
Prostitute, attempting to induce woman to become	5
Rape	5
Seduction	1
Sodomy	39
Total	175

MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES (Solely Civil)

Offense	Number of convictions.
Arson	3
Bigamy	16
Carrying concealed weapon	66
Committing a nuisance	7
Committing waste or spoil	2
Gambling	9
Loaning money, usurious rates	1
Trespass or loitering around private residence or house	13
Using provoking words, speeches	37
Total	154

The foregoing figures show that out of 16,342 convictions, offenses of unauthorized absence, those against constituted authority, those by sentinels and guards, and certain miscellaneous military offenses, aggregate 11,391, or about seventy per cent. of the total. These relate exclusively to the military environment, represent reaction against it, and only in a few instances are analogous to offenses punishable under the civil code. In the minds of the general public, not only does there exist a lack of realization of criminality in them, but a certain degree of sympathy for such offenders probably obtains.

The figures also show certain offenses which could not be positively classified as relating wholly to the military environment, since it was not clear in all cases how far they represented breaches of military conduct as well as civil law. This class includes offenses connected with government property and those relating to drink or drugs. They aggregate 1713, or ten per cent. of the total.

The third group of the study includes offenses with violence involved, those of dishonesty, sex offenses against morals and decency, and miscellaneous others. These 3238 offenses are all crimes according to the civil code, and are infractions of law as well as of military requirements. They represent only twenty per cent. of all of the general court-martial cases of all soldiers, although all cases of moral turpitude were probably disposed of by general courts-martial. Lesser courts and company punishment handle the many additional offenses having no criminality equivalent in civil life, but which are merely infractions of military requirements.

The report of the Adjutant General for 1918 gives the total strength of the army on June 30, 1918, as 2,219,685. As the army was gradually increased during the year from a small number, the strength by months gives an average strength of 1,213,071 for the purpose of comparison with offenses. As the convictions for all offenses by all courts

were 226,385, it appears that while approximately one soldier in each 5.4 was a military offender, only about one in each 378 committed what could positively be classified as crime under civil law, and only one in every 270 committed what might or might not be construed as offense under the civil code.

But it is recognized that military offenses are always lowest in time of war and hence war ratios are not properly applicable to peace conditions. The Judge Advocate General's report for June 30th, 1916, gives figures for such a peace year when the regular army was not materially affected by increments of the National Guard, which at the time was employed to some extent on the Mexican border. In that year the average strength was 107,000 and there were 4,743 convictions by general courts-martial, and 40,070 convictions by inferior courts. This gives an average of one offense to about each 2.4 men. Analyzing these causes, and excluding " drunk and disorderly in post or quarters," there remain 2,982 offenses commonly punishable under the civil code, or a ratio of one such offense to each 36 soldiers.

It has been stated by civilian writers that in England about six per cent. of the population commit offenses punishable under the civil code. If this is the case, it would appear that the popular idea that soldiers present an excessively high proportion of criminality is not supported by facts. It is true that many habitual criminals and defectives are prevented from entering the army through the standards of selection, and thereby remain in civil life to swell the total of its delinquencies. But, on the other hand, civil life includes a major proportion of women, children and mature or elderly men in whom the incidence of crime is relatively low, and this should far more than offset any increase in crime due to retention of a high proportion of its established criminals and derelicts.

The conclusion seems fair that military life, and especially conditions of war or active service, far from promoting what

is regarded in civil life as criminality, greatly decreases it through its high ideals, wholesome restraints and restricted opportunity to transgress along certain lines. This despite the fact that young men of military age form an age class in which a high proportion of infractions of law is known to occur. Unfortunately no data for the comparison of soldiers with the same age group of males in civil life are available, for it would appear that the legal profession in civil life has paid far more attention to the handling of the offender after the act than to inquiry into and analysis of the factors from which the offense developed. Present systematized effort at character building and inculcation of high standards of conduct in the army should be reflected in result in lower rates of its criminal delinquency.

In the consideration of delinquency, it is not possible to go into the detail of each possible individual cause, but there are certain important problems which naturally fall into groups, and here it is simple and profitable to consider not only the nature of the causes but the relative extent to which they operate. Identification not only of motive but the class of the men becoming offenders should usually lead to the recognition, either directly or by deduction, of the cause responsible, and its elimination as far as possible as a disturbing influence in other cases. It is now required that the Morale Branch be furnished in all general court-martial cases resulting in conviction with statements as to probable motive from the trial judge advocate, the reviewing judge advocate, and, if the case goes to the Disciplinary Barracks, from the psychologist there. These are being studied with a view to informing the army as to results.

At the request of the Morale Branch, it was furnished by the board of officers reviewing records in the Judge Advocate General's Office with cards showing the finding as to the probable motive of the offense as revealed by reading the general court-martial records in clemency cases. In all, 6,811 cards were received, of which 3,363 bore notation of

an ascertainable cause from which the offense apparently sprung, while the remaining 3,448 cards noted the fact that the cause was not revealed in the record. Analysis and classification of the first class of cards gave the following results: —

TABULATION OF CAUSES OF ALL OFFENSES

I. Connected With Character.

Criminal instinct	69
Degeneracy	8
Drug addiction	29
Drink	1164
Established criminal	20
Ignorance	161
Illness	113
Irresponsibility	20
Mental Weakness	100
Unstable	205
Wanderlust	16
Weakness of character	85
Youth	25
Total	2015

II. Connected With Service.

Belief of unjust treatment	46
Conditions at place of confinement	7
Conditions out of control of offender	4
Dissatisfaction with organization	25
Discontent with station	9
Dissatisfaction with medical treatment	11
Disappointment in not being restored	5
Fatigue, cause unknown	9
Fatigue from excessive duty	19
Failure to appreciate seriousness of offense	64
Failure to obtain transfer	6
Failure to obtain discharge	3
Failure to understand reasons for military discipline	92
Failure to appreciate responsibility of duty	25
Fear of punishment for other offense	25
Friction with N. C. O's.	17
General dislike of service	20
Growing out of gambling	29
Influenced by associates	42

Lack of discipline	80
Lack of funds to return to station	3
Lack of proper instruction in guard duty	9
Lax accounting methods	7
Manner of order	9
Military causes provocation	3
Misunderstanding	22
Mistake	14
Nature of order	12
Need of money due to delayed pay	32
Non-carrying out of enlistment promises	2
Personal need of money	17
Physical weakness	12
Poor handling by officers	21
Racial difficulty	19
Relationship with other prisoners	5
Refusal of furlough unreasonably	23
Temporary state of mind fertile to offense	13
To gather crops	3
Unpopular with associates	4
Total	768

III. Connected With Family Matters.

Expected birth of child	11
Home difficulties caused by allotment non-payment	10
Homesickness	68
Illness of near relative	143
Miscellaneous domestic troubles	73
Poverty of dependents	64
Total	369

III. Connected With Family Matters.

Desire to marry	34
Entanglement with women	46
Opportunity to earn more	6
Total	86

V. Peculiar To War Conditions.

Conscientious objections	10
Cowardice	40
Desire for active service	8
Ignorant of draft provisions	7
Lack of loyalty	59
Total	124
Grand Total	3362

Proportions of general court-martial convictions are presented in Figure 36.

Analysis of the foregoing data may well cause serious reflection as to whether all is being done that should be done


Offenses against decency, 72
Miscellaneous, civil in nature, 15
Escape 172
Desertion 663
Absence without leave 825
Offenses against constituted authority 422
Miscellaneous solely military 92
Offenses by seamen and quarrels 164
Offenses with violence 451
Offenses of dishonesty 417

Figure 36. Distribution of Offenses by Group Cause, as Revealed by Records of General Courts-Martial.

to facilitate the adjustment of soldiers to their military environment and surroundings.

In the causes relating to character, it is apparent that there were many of inherent mental and moral deficiency, who should never have been admitted to the service. Men reported as having criminal instincts, mental weakness, irresponsibility, degeneracy, and men who were drug addicts, established criminals, unstable and susceptible to wanderlust aggregated 467. These defects were probably largely impossible to overcome by even the most skilful handling.

It is interesting to note that the use of liquor was the apparent cause of 1,164 cases, or about one-sixth of all cases reported, and one-third of all those in which cause could be ascertained were due to drink. This is a most eloquent statistical argument in favor of prohibition, and bears out common knowledge that liquor is the greatest enemy to military good order. Obviously it is largely under military con-

trol and, with national prohibition, the exercise of this control should not be difficult. Similarly, the causes classed as "ignorance, illness, weakness of character and youth," aggregating 384, seem controllable by wise and sympathetic handling.

But it is in relation with causes stated to be connected with the service that preventive measures might be particularly effective. These causes developed from temporary states of mind which in many cases might readily have been prevented or allayed before the act. Such conditions as "belief of unjust treatment, dissatisfaction with medical treatment, failure to understand seriousness of military offense, failure to understand reasons for military discipline, failure to appreciate responsibility of duty, lack of discipline, lack of proper instruction in guard duty, manner of order, misunderstanding, nature of order and poor handling by officers," aggregate 391 cases in which a fair share of responsibility for the ultimate offense cannot be evaded by superiors who seem not to have performed their full duty. Industry may well inquire if parallel faults do not exist in its own administrative methods.

Similarly, the evil results of bad physical relationships and surroundings are apparently in large part due to omissions and failures of officers to live up to their proper responsibilities toward their subordinates and reflect their own efficiency through better conduct on the part of the latter. Man is, to a large extent, his "brother's keeper," and to none does this apply with greater truth and force than to superiors, whether in the army or civil life.

The class of "home difficulties" above mentioned could probably have been materially reduced by invoking the aid of the Red Cross, and by giving the sympathetic advice so efficacious in removing homesickness. Similar advice in connection with relationships with women would also have been helpful.

The final class "peculiar to war conditions" represents

purely mental ideals. Some one talked these offenders against authority into their antisocial state of mind. It was not impossible, in many cases at least, to have seen that they were talked out of it. " Cowardice " may be an innate state of defectiveness which, if not removed by strengthening character, means that the individual is physically unable to withstand the stress of conflict and danger.

Close examination of the component elements entering into the above classifications will reveal to the able officer causative conditions for which he will have no great difficulty in formulating appropriate remedy. For that reason, the facts are presented here in a suggestive form without further discussion. It may be mentioned, however, that one factor in preventing delinquency is that every one should understand that he has the right of appeal to higher authority, with the assurance of patient hearing and the correction of the grievance discovered to be well founded. Very likely many of these difficulties developed because commanders were not in close enough touch with their men to realize their existence and utilize the simple measures of correction at their disposal. Most individuals in our army, no matter where or how raised, have fundamental conceptions of right and wrong. An appeal to a man's conscience is often the best way to get him to conform naturally and regularly to a proper mode of life. If the officer has not properly warned and advised him, he is frequently partly responsible for results.

Another factor is found in the fact that most men like to be appealed to for assistance in a worthy cause. In one instance, for example, the new commander of a disorganized command had personal interviews with the two best and the two worst men in each company, during which conditions were talked over. The ring-leaders in mischief were told that the commander would far prefer to have them as sergeants than as guard house prisoners, as they had demonstrated qualities of natural leadership in the following they

had. All were appealed to to make the post a better place to live in, and the results abundantly justified the wisdom of the course taken. Trouble stops if the trouble-makers are won over to the side of discipline.

Crime, or military offense, is often the manifestation of the abnormal or the subnormal in the individual resulting from abnormal or subnormal conditions in the environment of the individual. Not all who commit crime have deviation from the normal mental standards, though that the proportion is high there can be no question. Some offenses are committed by men who are normally all right at heart, but who are psychologically badly adjusted to the conditions of military life. They represent the well recognized type of "a good man gone wrong." The remedy here lies not so much in the penalizing of the man himself as in the removal of any unnecessary points of painful contact and social friction, or in supplying any elements of moral support which may be lacking.

When a man is troublesome or unruly, the first thing to do is to ascertain and remedy any local influence which might account for such conduct, even if it does not justify it. When mischief-makers are found who do not readily respond to facts, reason or kindness, they should, as a first step, be removed from conditions in which they can make much trouble and their power for harm thus minimized. Sometimes this simple procedure, available to local authority, is all that is necessary to check the pernicious influences of men working so subtly and indirectly as to prevent a case against them resulting in conviction by a court.

Whenever higher authority decides that the perverted mental make-up of a repeated offender is such as to make him truly worthless, he should be removed from the service without delay. The analogy here is that a bad soldier, confirmed in his antisocial attitude, has an effect upon the command similar to a case of infectious disease among more or less susceptible individuals.

It not infrequently happens that wide variations in such expressions of poor morale as are found in desertions and courts-martial are observed in different organizations at the same post. Under such conditions, the conclusion is legitimate that the exceptionally high proportion of such offenses in any single organization must be attributed to factors and conditions peculiar to that organization and do not arise from anything appertaining to the post or its physical environment. Wherever any such differences exist, it is the duty of higher authority to make a careful and complete investigation with a view to determining the causes and applying the appropriate remedy. The time has gone by when the commander whose men unduly desert or fill the guard house may excuse the discreditable results by claiming that his men are a criminal, unruly lot. Public opinion will recognize the fact that such acts of indiscipline and disorder largely reflect discontent born of an inefficient and unintelligent leadership.

Desertion. Desertion of course means physical depletion as to numbers with resulting curtailment of ability to fight. It also represents an important element in what might be regarded as a military "labor turnover," whereby the loss of men who are trained or partly trained results in inefficiency and lessened coördination within the military group through the necessity of putting inexperienced men in the places thus vacated. Reference should be had to the discussion of this matter in the chapter on industrial morale.

Desertion throws an added burden on the recruiting service and adds to its difficulties in filling the ranks. This burden of outgo tends to fall heaviest at such times and under such conditions when the increment of new men dwindles. It has been abundantly demonstrated that one cause of lowered morale is an insufficient number of men for the performance of required duty. Every desertion adds to this difficulty by leaving a share in the common task which must be performed by some one else. It has a further

effect of reducing fighting force in a way not shown by figures, but expressing lowered willingness to perform duty, which may be more or less general among others who do not go so far as to effect their illegitimate separation from the service. Where desertion is high, there is a honeycombing of the fighting spirit.

Finally, it discloses the existence of certain conditions within the military environment which are so oppressive to many men that they create an impelling motive to escape



Figure 37. Desertions Compared with Convictions by Summary Court-Martial. (Scale 10 Summary Courts to 1 Desertion.)

from it. It is important to study such conditions and causes to determine their nature and outline corrective measures to such as appear unnecessary and remediable.

At the outset, it may be stated that morale is the controlling factor in the case of desertions. In a general way, desertions are high when morale is low and vice versa. That they are merely one expression of an indisciplinary state is well shown in Figure 37, in which the curve for desertion follows an almost exact parallel of that for lesser offenses. The influence of mind on military behavior is expressed in no more striking manner than in respect to desertions. The ultimate act which concretely expresses a high degree of dissatisfaction with the service is found in

illegal separation from it. Conversely, if the soldier has a strong liking for his environment, he will wish to remain in it and will reënlist at the expiration of his term of service.

That the problem to be met is one of much magnitude and practical importance is common knowledge. The exact extent of this canker of the military body is less well known, but is clearly shown by the following figures. In the five peace years before the United States entered the World War, 1912–1916, a total of 169,554 men enlisted or re-enlisted in the service. In the same period, 20,035 men deserted. It is thus apparent that about one soldier in every eight found the army environment so repellant or so lacking in attractiveness during this period that he was willing to become a criminal and a fugitive to get out of it. A study of desertions for thirteen peace years, 1904–1916, showed that the average annual desertion rate for that period was sixty-one per thousand. This means that out of every 1,000 men enlisting for three years, 183 — or nearly one in five — might be expected to desert, and that every commander would have only about four men out of every five that should be present. Clearly an evil of this magnitude cannot be treated symptomatically, but can only be struck at effectively through the agents which cause it.

The incidence of desertion by years, over a considerable period, is shown in Figure 38. It will be noted that the desertion curve is characterized by violent oscillations above and below a certain general average. This curve will be analyzed more in detail later.

The proportion of desertion varies greatly between organizations. Thus one report of 1906 showed that as high as thirty per cent. of men had deserted from certain units in a single year, or nearly five times more than the average for the army; while in 1907, of two batteries at the same post, one lost twenty-three by desertion, while but two deserted from the other in the same period. It is



Figure 38. Desertions per 1000 Strength by Years.

very clear that desertions from organizations thus having excessively high rates must depend on causes especially pertaining to those organizations. As there is a fair standardization of physical factors affecting the military service, it would appear that opportunity for difference rested chiefly in the matter of administration. This would seem borne out by the following officially reported examples. In one

company in which thirteen out of sixty-five men deserted, the cause in every case was attributed by the inspector to harsh and profane handling of the men by the company commander and the first sergeant. There were found but five men in this company in their second enlistment, indicating that matters had been going wrong for a long time. In one company of fifty-one men, five desertions within a fortnight were directly charged to the harsh and severe methods of its commander, who shortly after left the service.

In a recent inquiry by the Navy Department, it was found that of two like ships in the same port, desertions from one ship were three times that of the other. The only difference that could be found was that the commander of one ship had been able to select his officers on a basis of known experience and ability, while the officers on the ship with high desertion rate had been sent there hap-hazard from the officer group as a whole.

Investigation of labor turnover in civil industry would doubtless disclose many parallel examples.

The problem of desertion calls for constant study in each command. Between posts, between commands, and between organizations in each command there should be constant comparison. Wherever an unduly high proportion of desertions has occurred, a special investigation as to cause and remedy should follow. Human nature is more or less the same; any factors of common application that have resulted in the desertion of one man may, if continued, result in the desertion of others.

A large proportion of desertions, perhaps twenty-five per cent., occur in men who are known by their non-commissioned officers and associates in advance of the act to be dissatisfied with the service and apparently making up their minds to leave it at an early opportunity. In such cases, the tendency has been to consider that the man, being dissatisfied, was of no use to the organization, that his influence over other men was not beneficial and that his desertion

meant a good riddance. This attitude is of course wrong. If the morale operatives look for and report such cases to higher authority, steps can usually be taken to remove the offending cause, change the man's mind, alter his influence to one for good and save him to the service. When soldiers have been absent without leave for several days, letters or telegrams to their nearest relatives, urging return, will often secure return and prevent such absence from developing into desertion.

Desertion as a whole is the result of a complex of causes, some within and some without the power of the military service to control. The same generally applies to labor turnover. So many observers have been led astray by fragmentary information and limited observation, failing in their endeavors to apply the particular instance to the general rule, that the evil of desertion has come by default to be largely regarded as necessary and inevitable. The latter, however, is not the case. It is true that any single remedial measure in a complex case will necessarily give unsatisfactory results. But much may be expected of general measures calculated to include all individual basic causes, and with the degree of success with which these measures cover the field and are intelligently and effectively applied.

With soldiers of normal mentality, the problem of desertion, in its simplest analysis, is merely a problem of relative attractions. To persons of innate mental or moral defectiveness, the laws of psychology do not so well apply and there is no forecasting of the reactions of the insane or pervert. But if the motives impelling the normal soldier out of the service and the motives attracting him into civil life, in their sum total, are of greater potency than the sum total of all interests retentive within the service and the motives attracting toward it, the man will repudiate his military obligations and separate himself from the service. If these motives for desertion do not permanently continue

as a governing factor in conduct, after a variable period of absence without leave, he will return and place himself again under military authority. But if they do so continue, or if new and sufficiently strong motives to the same end develop to replace or reinforce them, he will remain absent permanently and become a deserter from the army. Exactly the same principles apply in industry to labor absenteeism or turnovers.

Causes and motives which are expulsive of the soldier are inherent in the military service itself. They develop from military conditions and methods and as such are largely amenable to official military control. They may cause desertion by individuals or groups. Where many men desert from a single organization, a common local cause should be suspected. Extrinsic causes which attract men away from the army are the product of civil conditions. Over these, military authority has no direct control, though it can frequently modify or offset their influence by indirect methods. Outside of general economic attractions, such as high wages, these extrinsic causes operate ordinarily in respect to individuals alone, for their nature is highly diverse and their application is usually personal. This general principle is shown graphically in Figure 39. The factor of


Attractive Causes inherent in the Military Environment
Military Environment
Expulsive Causes inherent in the Military Environment
The Soldier
Impulsive Causes pertaining to Civil Life
Attractive Causes pertaining to Civil Life

Figure 39. The Problem of Desertion and Absence Without Leave.

allurement toward civil life is less frequent. A reaction against military conditions serving as a direct expulsive force is much more common. A third group represents a combination of these two causes.

The solution of the potential problem of desertion thus

consists in reducing, neutralizing or removing the causes which impel or invite the man to leave the army, or to increase the power of motives attracting and holding him in the service. As a matter of practice, all these methods usually would be combined to securing the end desired. It is obvious that attractions in civil life which tend to induce desertion apply more or less equally to the military service as a whole and to the various branches and individuals which compose it. Accordingly, any material difference between the desertion rates of different arms or commands must express the relative extent of expulsive causes within the service itself. It is thus of interest to note that the percentage of desertions by arm of the service, for the thirteen years of peace, 1904–1916, was:

Field Artillery	5.73
Coast Artillery	4.76
Cavalry	4.47
Engineers	4.43
Hospital Corps, Medical Dept.	3.98
Infantry	3.63
Army at large	4.33

It is apparent that certain differential factors must pertain to the above arms, in which, for every three men that desert from the infantry, four desert from the cavalry and coast artillery and five from the field artillery. The fact that more old soldiers reënlist in the infantry than do in the cavalry, coast artillery and field artillery further corroborates the above. For the ten year period 1906–1915 there were 4 desertions to 20 reënlistments in the infantry, while in the same period there were 13 desertions to each 20 reënlistments in the field artillery. See Figure 40. It is well worthy of the attention of the officers of these branches of high desertion and low reënlistment rates to seek out and remove so far as possible their causes of relative unpopularity.

The environment due to season has a marked effect on



Figure 40. Comparison of Rates of Desertions and Reenlistments, by Services.

desertion. Obviously it is a common factor which affects alike all troops within like climatic conditions. Figures show that for the army at large, proportionately about twice as many desertions occur during the six warm months of the year as compared with the six cold weather months. This comparison is graphically illustrated in Figure 41.

Figure 41. The Average Rate of Desertion for the Thirteen Peace Year Period 1904 to 1916 Inclusive Is 45 Per Thousand Enlisted Contracts in Force Per Year. The 45 Desertions Are Distributed Monthly as Above.

It is a well known fact that cold and lack of sunshine tend to inhibit the activity of living organisms. Many of

them pass into a dormant, hibernating or resting stage. With warm weather they regain activity. Human beings, as a class, are no exception to this rule. With warm weather the migratory instinct is stimulated and soldiers have more out of door opportunities for an easy vagabondage appealing to the irresponsible. It is of interest to note that, by months, the ratio of desertions closely follows the curve of labor turnover in civil life. Most men desert from the army at the seasonal period that labor in civil life tends most to change its job and to strike. Most men desert the army during the months that there is the least movement toward it through enlistment. Figure 42 shows



Figure 42. Monthly Desertions Compared with Monthly Enlistments. Period 1906 to 1915, Excluding 1909 and 1910.

that in January there is approximately 1 desertion to 13 enlistments, while in June there is 1 desertion to 4 enlistments. Some common factor in human nature seems implicated here. The so-called "snowbird," who enlists in the army in the fall only to desert it in the spring, has his counterpart in the itinerant, floating labor class — or "*journeyman*" in the early sense of the term.

For the service, not only the lure from outside, but the season of unrest and greater opportunities for unskilled

labor in the fields, combine with the harder drills and work of the military establishment to influence soldiers to leave it. Commanders should recognize the special difficulties pertaining to this season and take measures to offset them. Short hikes, trips and easy marches to attractive points give outlet to the migratory instinct. Sports and recreation in the open air should be stimulated. The men should be watched for signs of unrest and individuals manifesting them given special attention.

Desertions tend to rise during the periods of prosperity when the attractive wages and opportunities of civil life give stronger temptation. Conversely, they fall during the years of economic stress and panic to the extent to which the latter interfere with self-support in civil life and render correspondingly more attractive the security which an army living affords. The exactness with which the curves of business prosperity and army desertions are complementary to each other is surprising. These external economic conditions are of course beyond the direct control of military authority. But a knowledge of their close relation to desertion and recruiting is valuable as indicating the special conditions to be met. The relative success of recruiting the new army after the Armistice against the economic obstacle of exceptionally great business prosperity is the best possible evidence of the efficiency of the methods involved.

The class of men enlisted naturally has a close relation to desertion. This, in the past, has had direct relation to material prosperity, when the incentives were stronger for high-class men to remain in civil life. Thus of the 15,996 men who enlisted in the prosperous year of 1906, no less than twenty-four per cent. deserted in the next three years. An important fact in relation to the influence of the recruit stage on desertions is that of the total desertions occurring in 1906, no less than forty-three per cent. were men who had enlisted in 1906. In 1907, another prosperous year, twenty-eight per cent. of the men enlisting during that year

deserted within three years. But in the national panic year of 1908, there were 29,307 original enlistments, of which but fifteen per cent. deserted in the next three years. As compared with the experience of 1906, enlistments nearly doubled and desertions were almost halved.

Desertions tend to be greater among recruits than older soldiers. This is a parallel to labor turnover in civil life, in which voluntary separations by older employes is relatively low. In not a few instances, desertion in recruits, and especially in those of low mentality, is due to ignorance, lack of understanding of its seriousness as an offense, or looking on it much like "getting through" with a job in civil life. A more important factor is the lack of proper adjustment of the recruit to his new environment. Company officers should look to the adjustment of recruits as helpful in tiding over the critical period of early service.

The ratio of desertions rises to its maximum in peace and prosperity and falls to its minimum in the alarms and dangers of war. Here powerful motives are developed to hold the man in the service. Public opinion scorns the slacker and idealizes the soldier when the country is imperiled. In 1918 there were only 1553 convictions for desertion as against 3640 in 1915 and 4682 in 1909, though the army had in the meantime increased more than ten fold. Moreover, the nearer the man was to the enemy, the less likely he was to desert. The divisions fighting or preparing to fight had the smallest proportion of desertions, while the divisions that apparently had no chance to get across show the largest proportion. The inference is logical that while desertions occurred from many motives, that of fear was relatively insignificant.

The reasons of enlisted men given for not reënlisting should ultimately throw considerable side light on the subject of desertion, for both are due to similar motives. Analysis of the probable specific group causes and motives producing desertion in 663 cases, as revealed by the read-

ing of their general court-martial proceedings by officers of the Judge Advocate General's office, gives the following data, which are also summarized in Fig. 43:

DESERTIONS

CONNECTED WITH CHARACTER OF DESERTER.

Degeneracy	6
Drug Addiction	12
Drink	37
Ignorance	86
Illness	17
Irresponsibility	8
Mental weakness	30
Wanderlust	7
Youth	9
Weakness of character	40
	252

CONNECTED WITH SERVICE.

Belief of unjust treatment	8
Discontent with station	5
Dissatisfaction with organization	19
Dissatisfaction with medical treatment	4
Failure to appreciate seriousness of offense	11
Failure to obtain discharge	2
Failure to obtain transfer	2
Failure to understand reasons for military discipline	24
Fear of punishment for other offense	18
Friction with non-commissioned officers	3
General dislike of service	14
Poor handling by officers	9
Influenced by associates	9
Non-carrying out of enlistment promises	2
Refusal of furlough	7
Unpopularity with associates	4
	141

CONNECTED WITH FAMILY MATTERS.

Expected birth of child	5
Home difficulties caused by allotment non-payments	4
Homesickness	21
Illness or death of near relative	49
Miscellaneous domestic troubles	15
Poverty of dependents	37
	131

CONNECTED WITH OUTSIDE MATTERS.

Desire to marry	14
Entanglement with women	20
Opportunity to earn more	5
	39

PECULIAR TO WAR CONDITIONS.

Conscientious objections	9
Cowardice	35
Desire for active service	8
Ignorance of draft provisions	7
Lack of loyalty	41
	100


Peculiar to war conditions 100
Connected with outside matters 39
Character of offender 252
Connected with family 131
Connected with service 141

Figure 43. Analysis as to Cause of 663 Desertions, as Revealed by Court Martial Records.

Of the foregoing causes, it is apparent that 252, or nearly two out of every five desertions, spring from defects of character. This is supported by psychological findings at one camp during the war, in which eighty-two per cent. of the white deserters examined were of less than average mentality. Obviously many of these defectives should have been kept out of the service. On the other hand, that such factors as "ignorance," "youth" and perhaps "weakness of character" were invariably beyond control can scarcely be claimed with justice. Had company commanders recognized these conditions as fruitful of desertion, much might have been done to avoid it.

Of " causes connected with the service," analysis shows that relatively few of them seem specifically to relate to physical surroundings. Most of the states of mind from which the act developed were due to administrative handling, and express the result not only of faulty method of doing but also of omission to do. Errors of handling men thus reverted to both positive and negative causes. Some were perhaps due to inertia, some to indifference, but most to failure to appreciate the full responsibilities of command. It may be mentioned here that one cause of desertion seems to exist in too frequent changes of company officers, whereby the latter are unable to get the best results through study of their enlisted men.

It has happened in the past that non-commissioned officers have apparently acted on a declared purpose to " run out of the company " men obnoxious to them. Any such tendency is of course to be looked for and repressed. Sometimes when public opinion in a whole organization is against a man, as one suspected of unnatural practices or other offense difficult of proof, a social boycott of the presumptive offender has been effective in getting him out of the service.

Of " causes connected with family matters," 131 in number, many seem traceable back to failure by officers to know and understand the personal problems of their men. " Homesickness " merely means a relative lack of personal sympathy and interest, the deficiency in which any good commander might have remedied by a few tactful words or simple measures. " Birth of child " and " illness or death of near relative " are such epochal events in human life that some consideration as to furlough might well be shown, instead of the alternative at a most trying time of necessitating either the absence of the soldier from a loved one or unlawful separation from the service. " Poverty " and " home difficulties " might have their effect minimized through recourse to civilian welfare agencies, or if extreme

and permanent, might be reasonable grounds for consideration of discharge.

Causes "connected with outside matters" chiefly relate to marriage and women. The influence here is strong. Probably a frank mutual understanding, assistance to marriage when feasible, good advice where delay seems necessary, or admonition where undesirable relations are concerned, would have been materially helpful. "Causes peculiar to war conditions" would seem to offer a fruitful field for explanation, reasoning and logic. Not a few men of perverse mental state may be won over. It should not be forgotten that the man who ultimately proved the greatest individual hero of the war entered the service as a conscientious objector and was won over by his commander.

From such data as are given in the foregoing, and especially when amplified by further research, it would seem that every officer is in an excellent position to attack the problem of desertion at its source with every prospect of material success. Similar data on the motives behind labor turnover would point the way to a better solution of this most serious industrial problem.

Absence Without Leave. In many instances, absence without leave represents a certain mental condition the extremes of which are expressed in failure to reënlist on the one hand and in desertion on the other. It is a reaction against a military environment which, for the while at least, has become repellant or which has lost its attraction. Favorable response can usually be obtained by arousing sober, second thought relative to the causes of the act and its seriousness if persisted in.

The aggregate loss in military service and efficiency from absence without leave is very great. It accounts for a large proportion of military misdemeanors and work unperformed. Being largely handled by inferior courts and summary punishments, it does not appear in statistical reports with the importance which is warranted by the lowering on


ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE
DESERTION
Connected With Military Service 26%
Connected With Character 39%
Connected With Home & Family Matters 30%
Outside Matters 4%
Peculiar to War Conditions (Disloyal, Conscientious Objector, etc.,) 1%
Connected With Military Service 21%
Connected With Character 38%
Connected With Family Matters 20%
Outside Matters 6%
Peculiar to War Conditions 15%

FIGURE 44. Comparison of general causes underlying desertion and absence without leave.

collective efficiency of such widely spread absenteeism. The factors having to do with desertions are largely those which lie behind the more serious cases of absence without leave such as come before general courts-martial. How closely this is true is shown by Figure 44, in which the elementary group-causes of these two offenses are compared. Such a condition is only to be expected, inasmuch as they represent different degrees of what is practically the same offense.

It will be noted in this comparison of absence without leave and desertion that intrinsic character defects play practically the same part in both. In respect to war conditions such as disloyalty, conscientious objectors, etc., the motive is so strong that the man who reacts against the service desires to separate himself entirely from it when he leaves and entertains little thought of returning to it. The same applies in less degree to outside influences, as women, etc., which induce a higher proportion of men to remain away permanently than desire to return.

In home and family matters, however, the condition is reversed. Here homesickness and anxiety induce men to leave, but when these apprehensions and motives are allayed many of the men return. Probably not a few of these cases never intended to remain away permanently but expected to return after they had investigated disturbing conditions and made such corrections as seemed practicable. More cases go absent without leave than desert as a result of causes classified as connected with the military service. Here the men secure temporary respite from conditions which have become for the time intolerable to them. This is like absenteeism from work in civil industry. Those who leave through emotional reaction or pique have opportunity for sober reflection and discover that conditions were not as bad after all as were thought at first.

Out of 1652 cases of court-martial tried by general court for the offense of absence without leave, as evidenced to the officers of the Judge Advocate General's office, the causes

could not be determined from a reading of the records in 1027 cases. This does not mean that no cause existed, but merely that the evidence did not happen to bring it out. Some potent cause and motive of course did exist in sufficient plausibility to the man to cause the action. The causes and motives appearing in the 625 cases of absence without leave tried by general court-martial, and revealed


Connected with outside matters 24
Peculiar to war conditions 8
Connected with family 186
Character of offender 247
Connected with service 160

Figure 45. Analysis by Group Cause of 625 Cases of Absence Without Leave Convicted by General Courts-Martial.

by the evidence appearing in the records, are graphically shown by groups in Figure 45, and in greater detail were as follows:

Connected with character of offender

Degeneracy	2
Drug addiction	6
Drink	120
Ignorance	35
Illness	28
Irresponsibility	12
Mental weakness	13
Wanderlust	9
Youth	6
Weakness of character	16
Total	247

If these are compared with the desertions from the same causes, it will be seen that drink is three times as strong a factor in absence without leave as in desertion, and that weakness of character is about two and one-half times as strong. On the other hand, ignorance is a factor two and one-half times stronger in desertion. Degeneracy and drug addictions are also stronger in producing desertions. As with desertion, so certain low standard men who should never have been admitted to the service and certain ignorant or easily swayed men are responsible for much absence without leave. The factor due to drink is naturally higher in absence without leave than in desertion due to the transitory nature of its influence. It should be largely eliminated by prohibition.

Causes connected with the service

Belief of unjust treatment	5
Discontent with station	4
Dissatisfaction with organization	3
Dissatisfaction with medical treatment	7
Failure to appreciate seriousness of offense	10
Failure to obtain discharge	1
Failure to obtain transfer	4
Failure to understand reasons for military discipline	68
Fear of punishment for other offense	6
Friction with non-commissioned officers	1
General dislike of service	5
Poor handling by officers	6
Influenced by associates	4
Refusal of furlough	16
Mistake	14
To gather crops	3
Lack of funds to return to station	3
Total	160

The obvious suggestiveness of this list is such that readers may well draw their own conclusions as to suitable means of prevention, especially in such matters as "failure to appreciate seriousness of offense," "failure to understand reasons for military discipline," "belief of unjust treatment" and "poor handling by officers."

Causes connected with family matters

Expected birth of a child	6
Home difficulties caused by non-payment of allotments	6
Homesickness	47
Illness or death of near relative	93
Miscellaneous domestic troubles	7
Poverty of dependents	27
	186

It will be noted that these were not merely the allegations of the men themselves, but, according to the reviewing officers of the Judge Advocate General's office, were sufficiently demonstrated in the court-martial records. The inquiry would seem warranted as to what effect better knowledge of the personal problems of the men by superiors with a little sympathetic advice and encouragement and a more wise bestowal of furloughs, would have had in cutting down such offenses as appear in this group. In not a few specific cases, what appear to be reasons of proper validity for a furlough were advanced to higher authority and yet the absence was refused. For example "death of mother," "illness of parents and wife," "illness and great tragedy in family," "death of father, illness of sister," "mother not expected to live," "consumptive wife about to be confined, with failure to receive allotment checks," etc.

In absence without leave as a whole, the general court-martial records indicate that about a third of them could be traced to legitimate need of furlough. While this does not relieve the offender from fault, it indicates that somewhere there is poor functioning if men go absent without leave when a furlough would have been justified by the facts in the case.

Connected with outside matters

Desire to marry	16
Entanglement with women	7
Opportunity to earn more	1
Total	24

Advice, suggestions, and perhaps more generous giving of furloughs in special cases would seem indicated here.

Peculiar to war conditions

Conscientious objectors	1
Cowardice	5
Lack of loyalty	2
Total	8

As with desertions, cowardice resulting in absence without leave is very often a fear of the unknown, which information, explanation and encouragement will frequently dispel. Similarly disloyalty and conscientious objections may often be removed by explanation of patriotic ideals.

Under the heading of " escape " appear the following:

Causes due to character

Drink	28
Mental weakness	3
Illness	2
Unstable	26
Total	59

Connected with the service

Belief of unjust treatment	6
Conditions at place of confinement	7
Disappointment at not being restored	5
Lack of discipline	11
Relationship with other prisoners	5
Total	34

Connected with family matters

Home conditions	29

These groups causes are summarized in Figure 46.

The chief point to note here is the high proportion of cases caused by home troubles in comparison with absence without leave and desertion.



Figure 46. Analysis of Group Causes of 122 General Court-Martial Convictions for Escape.

Minor cases of absence without leave are usually handled by inferior courts-martial or company punishment. The motives here are so various as hardly to permit of being classified in any detail. Not a few of them are due to the irresponsibility of the mentally immature. Some represent reaction and temporary release from repressions and irritations which had become galling. Some are due to lack of full appreciation that an act, which in civil life means merely the staying away from work and is perfectly legitimate, becomes a serious offense under the military code. The importunities of friends may persuade to absenteeism. In the past, liquor has been a powerful factor by deadening judgment and responsibility. In the young especially, the migratory instinct may enter. Finally, there may be a deliberate weighing of present pleasure against future punishment, with choice of the former as being worth the price to be paid for it.

It is worthy of note in this connection that causes implying moral degeneration, other than those springing from drink or drug addiction, or from dishonesty, do not appear as factors of desertion, absence without leave, escape, offenses against constituted authority, offenses by sentinels and guards and miscellaneous offenses. The foregoing

analysis shows that such offenders may be mental defectives or irresponsibles, they may be uninformed, they may be immature youths, they may be self-assertive, emotional, etc., but they are not deliberate offenders against the standards of law and morals established by the criminal code in civil life.

As one means of reducing absence without leave, the discriminating extension of pass privileges has often proven successful. At one camp, brigade, regimental and separate unit commanders were authorized to grant passes from noon on Saturday to midnight on Sunday. At another camp, furloughs of two days per month, or five days every two months, were granted, provided that no absence without leave had existed in the company for ten days before application was made, and under this plan the offense promptly decreased to less than half its previous rate. Indirect reminders to soldiers on A. W. O. L. were printed on the backs of passes, urging that it be avoided. Calendars, programs, dance and theatre tickets issued by the War Camp Community Service have often carried a message on the subject. The same organization gave special rates at its hotels to men showing their passes. The date of expiration of pass was written opposite each man's name and an hour was stated at which he should be notified that it was time to get back to his station. Similar arrangements were in vogue at many other hotels and sleeping quarters.

One of the greatest factors in absence without leave, especially in time of war, is civilian ignorance of its gravity as an offense. The very spirit of patriotism, during the recent war, contributed to it by thoughtlessly urging further hospitality upon military guests, thereby inducing them to overstay their periods of authorized absence. To such an extent did this apply at the Port of Embarkation, New York, that the Governor of New York issued a proclamation to the people of the State in the matter. A systematized campaign of advertising and newspaper publicity was also

carried out to the same end. Advertising sign boards were put up and posters and placards on the subject were issued. Window displays were used in prominent stores and attracted much attention. Animated cartoons on A. W. O. L. were prepared, together with slides and other " fillers " for moving picture shows, not only for impressing soldiers but for informing civilians who were more or less unconsciously contributing to breaches of discipline. Leaflets were supplied through the War Camp Community Service, which also took charge of posting cards in street cars, busses, railroad stations, etc. Merchants associations and various civic clubs and church organizations were lined up in the matter and, as a final step, the " Four Minute Men " agreed to talk on A. W. O. L. with a view to its curtailment. The tendency to write despondent letters from home, making the soldier homesick and discontented, was discouraged.

Absentees usually get into early touch with their friends and family and favorably respond to home influences for their good. The Morale Branch accordingly sent out the following form letter to the service as suggestive of the line of approach which might be used by commanders for this purpose:

Dear Mr. (or Mrs.) ————:

The company commander of ———— has just reported to me that he is absent from his organization without proper permission.

As you are the person whom he requested should be notified in case of emergency, I am writing to you as probably being one most interested in his welfare and good reputation.

The officers and men of the regiment and of the company to which ———— belongs are interested in the good name of these organizations and the success of each other. For this reason I am writing to you in the belief that you would not approve such an act as the one of which he is now guilty.

Absence from duty without permission is a military offense, and is not like throwing up a job in civil life. A soldier takes oath to serve his country for a definite period, and the Government requires him to live up to his word. Desertion is a military crime, which may be punished by heavy penalties, including imprisonment and loss of civil rights as a citizen. Disgrace rests on a deserter as long as

he lives, not only in the eyes of his comrades, but with the people in civil life.

It is of the very greatest interest to ———— that he complete his military career with honor and credit. An honorable discharge from the army is one of the greatest credentials a man can have in securing employment in civil life. The United States Government by law gives many advantages to honorably discharged soldiers in respect to preference as to employment, securing public lands and other matters. Various communities also give preference to honorably discharged soldiers along similar lines.

An honorable discharge also confers upon the soldier the esteem and respect of his associates in any civil community. It is a card of admission to the great and powerful patriotic societies which must grow out of the war. It gives social status.

I am sure that you would not wish him to lose such advantages or injure his record by any foolish act at this time.

If he does not return, I shall have to proceed according to the requirements of army regulations and ask the United States authorities to compel his return.

I trust, however, that this may not be necessary, and that you will speak to him or communicate with him without delay.

Very truly,

———— Signature

———— Rank.

These form letters proved very helpful in causing the return of absentees by evoking the coöperation of their friends. Periods of absence were shortened, and others that would doubtless have developed into desertion were kept from lengthening to that extent. Some men who thought they could explain or excuse their return to their friends did not relish being shown up at home in the implied light of shirkers. A reinforcement of this letter has been successfully tried. In this, if, after five days from the sending of the foregoing letter, the man had not returned, the company commander notified the Red Cross, which wired its home service representative to take up the matter personally with the soldier's relatives.

Offenses Against Military Authority. Offenses against military authority as discussed here relate to disrespect to superior officers and disobedience of orders of higher authority, but without violence being involved. While it is con-

ceivable that a draft may bring into the service men whose state of mind is such that they serve with resentment, this is a rare and exceptional state. In the vast majority of recruits the mental state is the reverse.

Certainly in voluntary enlistments the men enter the service in a state of mind which is not only willing but also anticipatory and eager. As this latter class makes up the army in time of peace, it is not only of interest but of practical importance to endeavor to seek out and remove the main causes which later inspire so many of them to anti-social reactions against authority and in reversal of their previous lofty ideas and purposes. There were 422 offenses against constituted authority in which the cause seemed apparent from the series of general court-martial records already mentioned. The group causes are shown in Figure 47. These were further classifiable as follows:

Nature of cause	*Disrespect to Superior officers*	*Disobedience of orders*	*Total*
Connected with character:			
Drink	115	63	178
Illness	5	15	20
Ignorance	6	11	17
Unstable	19	40	59
Totals	145	129	274
Connected with Service:			
Belief of unjust treatment	7	14	21
Lack of discipline	7	23	30
Manner of order	4	5	9
Misunderstanding	5	17	22
Nature of order	1	11	12
Poor handling by officers	1	5	6
Poor handling by N. C. Os.	0	13	13
Racial difficulty	1	5	6
Temporary state of mind fertile to offense	3	10	13
Totals	29	103	132
Peculiar to war conditions:			
Disloyalty	3	13	16

These figures show the great importance of alcohol as a factor in promoting indiscipline and disorder through the altered mental state and lack of judgment which it develops. Doubtless many of these offenders would not have reacted against authority had they been sober. When liquor enters a company, good order tends to go out of it.



Figure 47. Analysis of 422 Cases of Offense Against Constituted Authority, as Revealed by General Court-Martial Records.

Another important factor revealed by these figures relates to the administrative errors and omissions of superiors. When "illness, ignorance, belief of unjust treatment, lack of discipline, manner of order, misunderstanding, nature of order, poor handling by officers, poor handling by N. C. O's., and racial difficulty" are found to be the attributable causes of thirty-seven per cent. of infractions of discipline of this nature, it would seem as if superior authority could not evade a considerable share of responsibility for their development. A qualifying factor in this case, however, doubtless exists in the fact that many of the officers concerned were themselves probably serving under temporary commissions and were proportionately inexperienced in the handling of men.

In civil life, reactions against administrative authority are

usually expressed by "quitting the job." Faulty business administration and poor handling of the human element in personnel are unquestionably responsible for a large proportion of "labor turnover" and strikes. Here mental relief is afforded through physical separation. Conditions in the army are somewhat different, since from military authority, however exercised, there is little opportunity for legitimate escape. But behind the difficulties of both the civilian and the soldier lie the same basic laws of human nature.

Customs, standards and ideals of the political group also



Figure 48. Group Causes in 164 Cases of Offense by Sentinels and Guards.

enter. In any nation of free men, in which equality under the law, universal suffrage and other political ideals flourish, a greater restiveness against control is inevitable. America cultivates and exalts an individualism which encourages an idea of personal competency as to self-decision, protection and control. To this are added the self-reliant ideas and individualistic standards developed by the hardy pioneers who conquered its wildernesses. These standards still remain, though the conditions which developed them may have largely disappeared. Further, it should not be overlooked that immigrants from abroad have been impelled to these shores by motives, as individuals, of reaction against

Old World authority or conditions regarded as intolerable or undesirable. It follows, then, that methods of control which might be acquiesced in abroad might be reacted against here.

Offenses by Sentinels and Guards

These were classed under " sleeping on post " and " other offenses." Their group causes are shown in Figure 48. Their detailed causes in 164 cases were as follows:

Cause	*Sleeping on Post*	*Other Offenses*	*Total*
Connected with Service			
Conditions out of control of offender	1	3	4
Failure to appreciate seriousness of offense	5	13	18
Fatigue, cause unknown	9	0	9
Fatigue from excessive duty	17	2	19
Lack of discipline	2	5	7
Lack of proper instruction in guard duty	2	7	9
Physical weakness	5	7	12
Totals	41	37	78
Connected with Character of Offender			
Drink	10	14	24
Ignorance	0	10	10
Illness	34	9	43
Mental weakness	1	2	3
Weakness of character	1	1	2
Youth	2	2	4
Totals	48	38	86

It will be noted that more than half of these offenses are for sleeping on post. This of course is a most serious offense by reason of its possible consequences to the command. But it is an offense which develops in the absence of motive to do wrong and is due to the reaction of physical condition on mental state. It will be accepted that few, if any, sentinels go on post with the deliberate intention of going to sleep. They succumb to a systemic craving in

which will power is reduced at a time when the craving is reinforced by opportunity. This demand of the physical body for physiological rest may be so insistent that even the best of intent may not be able to resist it. The good deacon who falls asleep during the sermon and scandalizes his family certainly had no intent to do so, while the outward evidences of his losing internal struggle of mind against body are often as amusing as interesting. So, too, with the soldier, and especially the young recruit of an age when immaturity demands a greater amount of rest and whose mind and body may be exhausted and relaxed from mental and physical strain. Statistics show that it is especially the young soldier who sleeps on post.

Only a highly disciplined will power can successfully withstand the soporific influence of physical fatigue; such will power is probably never fully attained in some and in any case is developed fully only through age and mental training. If to the factor of fatigue is added one of sickness, control over will power is further lessened. As stated, the gravity of the offense cannot be minimized because of its effect upon others, but at the same time a heavy responsibility rests upon superiors that men shall not be posted as sentinels when there is reason to believe that they may, through no desire or intent on their own part, succumb to — and be punished as a result of — conditions due to military service and beyond their control.

These remarks do not apply to other offenses of guards and sentinels in which volition is concerned, such as quitting of post, for example. Here the problem largely relates to ignorance and corresponding failure to attach due importance to the obligation. About half of the foregoing cases of "other offenses" seem to revert to this cause. The removal of ignorance and inculcation of responsibility is a matter of training, and it seems illogical to penalize a man for being imperfectly instructed.

Miscellaneous Military Offenses

These include fraudulent enlistment, false official statement and similar matters. Classification of ninety-two such



Figure 49. Analysis by Cause of 92 Miscellaneous Offenses Solely Military in Nature.

cases is summarized in Figure 49, and also gives the following:

Connected with character

Carelessness	3
Character of offender	11
Drink	22
Ignorance	2
Mental	2
Illness	3
Total	43

Connected with service

Belief of unjust treatment	1
Failure to appreciate responsibility to duty	25
Failure to appreciate seriousness of offense	6
Fear of punishment	1
General dislike of service	1
To secure honorable discharge through fraudulent enlistment	6
Total	40

Connected with family matters

Miscellaneous domestic troubles 4

Connected with outside matters

To marry 1
Entanglement with women 4

Total 5

It will be noted that causes unquestionably within the control of commanders related to a third of all these cases. There were also 212 cases of miscellaneous military offense which were peculiar to overseas conditions in the American Expeditionary Force, but which are not included in the above.

Offenses with Violence Involved

These are shown by groups in Figure 50, and are analyzed as follows in 451 general court-martial cases:

Connected with character of offender

Drink 268
Established criminal 20
Mental weakness 8
Unstable 87

Total 383



Figure 50. Analysis by Cause of 451 Convictions by General Courts-Martial for Offenses with Violence Involved.

The important point here is that drink, with the irresponsible mental condition which it produces, is by far the most important element in such offenses.

Connected with the service

Growing out of gambling	22
Military causes provocation	3
Racial prejudice	16
Lack of discipline	15
Total	56

Connected with outside matters

Entanglement with women	12

Offenses of Dishonesty

In 417 general court-martial cases the grouping is shown in Figure 51. In greater detail it was as follows:



Figure 51. Shows Group Causes in 417 Convictions for Dishonesty by General Courts-Martial.

Connected with character of offender

Criminal instinct	69
Drink	149
Drug addiction	8

Ignorance	9
Mental weakness	8
Weakness of character	25
Youth	6
Total	274

The importance of drink as a factor in dishonesty should be noted.

Connected with the service

Dissatisfaction with organization	3
Failure to appreciate seriousness of offense	19
Gambling	7
Influenced by associates	25
Lack of discipline	2
Lax accounting methods	7
Need of money due to delayed pay	32
Personal need of money	17
Belief of unjust treatment	5
Total	117

It can be understood how delayed pay, though no excuse for dishonesty, may be a predisposing cause for it. "Influenced by associates" may relate to character.

Connected with outside matters

Entanglement with women	3
To marry	3
Total	6

Connected with family matters

Home needs	20

In the latter cases, the Red Cross is usually in a position to render financial assistance where justified and thus remove incentive.

Offenses Against Decency

These relate to sex crimes and perversions of all sorts. In seventy-two court-martial cases, shown by groups in Figure 52, the classification was as follows:

Connected with character of offender

Drink	21
Mental weakness	13
Unstable	33
Total	67

Connected with the service

Influenced by associates	5

As might be expected, these crimes of shame seem to spring from defects of character, with drink often tipping the balance of judgment in men who would otherwise, in many cases, probably not have been offenders. Men coming under suspicion of such inclinations should be watched for; if they cannot at once be got rid of they can at least be put under environmental conditions where their influence on weaker associates can be minimized and a restraining influence exerted on them through surrounding them with strong, wholesome personalities.

Miscellaneous Civil Offenses

There were only fifteen of these in which causative relationships could be classified, a number too small to give



Figure 52. Group Causes in 72 Cases of Offenses Against Decency, Convicted by General Courts-Martial.

satisfactory conclusions. They are shown in Figure 53.

Connected with character of offender

Drink	8
Ignorance	2
Weakness of character	2
Total	12

Connected with family matters

Miscellaneous domestic troubles	3



Figure 53. Group Causes in 15 Cases of Miscellaneous Offenses, Civil in Nature.

Drink or Drugs Constituting Principal Offense

Beside the instances already given under various group heads, there were 309 cases in which drink was the cause of the trial and eleven cases were based on the use of drugs. It may be repeated here that in 3,363 cases of general court-martial analyzed, drink was shown by the evidence to have played a causative part in 1,164, and drug addictions in twenty-nine. These figures suggest the important part which prohibition may be expected to play in promoting military efficiency.

While many of the foregoing causes have no exact par-

allels in civil life, they reveal many influences and trends of human character which should throw a valuable side light on various administrative and disciplinary problems pertaining to the personnel of industry.

CHAPTER XX

INDUSTRIAL MORALE

Relation of morale to industrial, economic and political problems; apparent faults of the management of the human element in industry; principles here evolved for military morale applicable to industry; complexity of the general industrial morale problem does not prevent reasonable solution; need for study of special morale problems of industry; all trace back to basic elements of human nature as problems of applied psychology. Comparison of compulsion with effort which is voluntary; relations between superiors and subordinates; the psychological side of industry; incompleteness and unscientific character of administrative measures in use. Mental factors of productivity; efficiency of labor; productiveness of the individual; standards of productivity; causes of deficiency in output; depressed mental state has effect of decreased man-power. Absenteeism in industry and its diminution. Labor turnover; its cost to all concerned; magnitude of the problem; the analogy of industrial resignation to military desertion; some causes of voluntary separation; ratio in industry far greater than in the military service; classes of workers with high labor turnover; the migrant worker. The importance of leadership in industry; efficiency over machines and efficiency over men quite different qualifications; results of poor industrial handling of the human element. Mental attitude of the worker class; the physical environment of the worker and some of its common faults; the psychological environment; industrial psychology. Fitness for the job; records of the worker; the working period, mental state and productivity. Self-interest in the worker; acquisitiveness; self-esteem; sympathetic understanding; community of experience; expression of personality; choice of occupation; analysis of the job; opportunity for promotion; permanency of employment; powers of discharge; pride of workmanship; vocational training; rivalry; class consciousness; the square deal; courtesy and consideration; recreational activities; home influences; educational opportunity; systematized information; appropriate publicity; the human elements of leadership; complaints and faults; the guide to conduct.

Industrial Morale. The General Order establishing the Morale Branch of the General Staff charged it with the stimulation of morale — that is, industrial productivity —

among the producers of munitions. This opened up almost the entire field of industrial morale, for not only were arsenals and government plants included but also plants functioning for any government production purposes whatever. A large part of the manufacturing facilities of the country was at the time employed on government contracts and it would have been difficult to find many of the major industries of the country which were not concerned either directly or indirectly.

At the time of the organization of the Morale Branch, the stimulation of the production of munitions was one of the most important and pressing problems presented to it. Coincident with the recruiting, training and dispatching of organizations was the need of equipment. Production, in many instances, was not keeping pace with requirements. The signing of the Armistice suddenly did away with this problem. Production along military lines was stopped as rapidly as practicable and every effort made to turn industrial effort into normal civilian channels as soon as possible. In the meantime, however, the morale organization had accumulated a considerable and varied experience, and gratifying response was already being manifested to the stimulating measures which had been introduced.

All will agree that many industrial difficulties and reactions are in urgent need of being solved. Coercion is impossible, and only mental change offers a prospect of solution, whereby there may be a tendency to convergence rather than divergence. The writer is convinced that the suitable adaptation of scientific morale principles to industrial problems affords by far the most promising approach to the removal of many industrial difficulties interfering with production, and through this to the abatement of many of the economic, social and political difficulties and dangers that confront the national life.

Someone has spoken of corporations as being organizations "without a soul." In a general way, this probably

applies, though a certain number of examples indicate that great business establishments need not necessarily be soulless, and that cold-blooded methods, or on the other hand those in which the element of human interests and relations appear, are merely matters of election and of the management of affairs to the end chosen. Experience further demonstrates that the latter method is more successful in that, while adding to the sum total of human happiness, it pays economically. The reasons for this seem to be imperfectly understood, even by the organizations which have made effort to use it. But what has gone before in this book sets forth such reasons very clearly as founded on the laws of human nature. In exactly the proportion in which such laws are employed to the desired purpose, and are not contravened, industrial difficulties are avoided, unnecessary wastage of potential man power is reduced, productivity is increased and economic results are successful. It is not only a case of dollars and cents, but of dollars and sense. Successful business does not overlook the human agencies contributing to business success.

Certain results of applied industrial morale work are illuminating. In 1918, the production of motors for airplanes was falling behind needs. An allotment of 3,000 motors was made to five firms for the month of August and but 2,297 were delivered. For September, the same allotment was made to the same concerns and but 2,362 were produced. In October, a whirlwind campaign to promote industrial morale in these very same plants was carried out by the military morale organization, and their output during the month ran up to 3,878 motors, with a value of about ten million dollars for the increased production. Similarly, a less comprehensive campaign in another plant and industry was followed by an increased production of twenty-nine per cent., and by a reduced labor turnover of twenty-six per cent., while the man who came late or laid off became an object of suspicion. Such gratifying results were of

course brought about under war conditions when the sentiment of patriotism could be appealed to and when suggestion was further reinforced by the powerful pressure of an active public opinion. The main theme here was to link up the munitions maker with the soldier and to feature industry as the second line of defense behind the line of combat. A very great variety of methods and approaches for stimulation to this end were used.

While the supreme stimulus of war is lacking in time of peace, there is no question but that lesser stimuli, available at any time and in any place, would have proportionately successful effect upon output, if of appropriate nature and intelligently applied. The principles on which their use is based have been tested in the military service too many times on parallel, if different, problems to leave any apprehension of failure.

It is true that the complexity of the general industrial morale problem is very great, including as it does the hundreds of possible varieties of men and women, races and creeds, skill and awkwardness, trades and professions, classes and diversity of environmental conditions, many of which do not enter into the problem of military morale. Large organizations have proportionately greater industrial difficulties because of the greater number and diversity of their elements. As the aggregation of men in masses increases liability to epidemic of infectious disease, so it increases the problems brought about by infectious thought. Nevertheless, it is believed possible to demonstrate that the problem of industrial morale is practically solvable to an extent far greater than is usually appreciated.

It will be admitted at the outset that any discussion of industrial morale confined to the possible limits of a chapter of this general nature must necessarily give the impression of imperfection and superficiality. But these faults are not as great as they may seem if the general principles of applied psychology and stimulation of morale which have been

previously discussed in this book are duly considered in connection with this special subject. For, after all, the difficulties come back to the fundamental elements of human quality. Accordingly, it seems perfectly feasible to reduce considerably many of the points of unnecessary friction between the employer and employed to their mutual advantage and profit. Many repressions of perfectly natural human traits can be done away with by wise management, and the reactions which spring from them, such as lowered production, increased labor turnover, strikes and lockouts, be avoided.

It has already been shown that the morale problems in an army are restricted in variety as compared with those of civil life, by reason of unity of purpose, limitations of class through sex, age and selection, more or less standardization of environment, and a single code for the government of conduct. This, however, does not mean that the morale problems of industrial life, by reason of their greater diversity and complexity, will not be similarly responsive to intelligent methods of control. The task is great, but as in the military service, it is greatly simplified by the fact that many of its problems fall within general groups which may be handled on general principles.

It is necessary, however, that the special morale problems of industry shall be recognized, dispassionately studied, evaluated as to importance, and the remedy which is scientifically indicated be applied effectively. Any such conditions as are left unremedied will continue to serve as irritants and result in corresponding loss in efficiency — that is, in productivity.

One difficulty in respect to industrial morale problems is that economic considerations are basic. Commercial life is competitive, and therefore the lowest standards of cost tend to compel all to descend to their levels. Low cost of production may permit of price cutting, which tends to force

down the standards of competitors who desire to hold their business. Such financial considerations have no application to military morale, in which efficiency is stimulated, not by the lowest, but by the highest standards. Industrial labor laws, however, serve to create minimum standards along certain lines, below which efforts to lower costs may not go.

As might be expected, the broad problems of industrial morale bear a general relation to those relating to military efficiency. Better knowledge as to the efficient management of men in the military service has revealed very clearly many facts applicable, with little or no modification, to the industrial problems of civil life. Many of these points have already been brought out in the foregoing pages and need not be repeated here. The instincts, for example, are common human qualities. While their present discussion has been primarily from the military aspect, business interests will have no difficulty in suggesting to themselves a multiplicity of analogous applications of instinctive trends to industrial conditions in civil life. Next to life itself, the most important thing in the world for each individual is his associations with other human beings. Even the most casual conversation embodies the subject of human relations. To disregard the factor of human relations is to disregard the mainspring of human behavior.

Every individual industry has its own special problems, which subdivide into those of various classes of workers coöperating to the common end. Also around each is its special environment, including physical, economic, social and other factors which leave their impress upon conduct. Every individual industrial problem can thus be fully solved only by proceeding from an understanding of its special individual premises. Nevertheless, much can be done by applying to all common sense methods based on general principles of human nature — for the term "human nature" is merely inclusive of certain basic emotions, desires

or instincts which are common to all human individuals and control their acts, whether they wear the garb of the artisan or the soldier.

Thus, as with the military service, the problem of applied psychology in relation to the worker class necessitates knowledge of the laws entering into the general human equation. From this, it is a logical step to its intelligent application to the problems of the individual, just as the mathematician applies certain general mathematical laws to a diversity of problems. Imagination and guess-work can have no place where rational, scientific measures can be substituted, and the efficiency of the latter should be checked up by seeing their actual results on men at work. Not inflexible methods formulated in advance, but a series of experiments are indicated; the factors in any problem of industrial morale are changing and measures to control them must change accordingly in nature or in emphasis.

As in the military service, morale work increases efficiency in industry, but it does so not through measures of compulsion but through voluntary action of the individuals concerned. Interest replaces listlessness, desire supplants indifference, and loyalty, enthusiasm, contentment and esprit reinforce each other. Any manager of men, whether officer or civilian, knows the influence these intangible qualities have upon the concrete result.

If it be granted that applied psychology may be used to practical advantage, then it must be conceded that the relations between the employer and the worker are often too materialistic. The usual procedure is chiefly confined to the paying and receiving of a money reward for an output of energy of an approximate money value. There is no scientifically systematized attempt to turn the psychological side of industry to the promotion of productivity. Yet the mind of the worker is no less important to the final output and value than is the machine. In every factory, a certain optimum steam pressure is necessary in the boilers if the

machinery is to be run to best efficiency. Similarly, no industry can succeed which apparently proceeds on the unsound idea that the human qualities which are the energizing factors of the human agents may be safely disregarded, if such industry comes into competition with others administered under more rational principles.

It is probably true, therefore, that few would deny in theory the value of the psychological urge in promoting the interests of an industry. But in practice it would seem that relatively little effort is made to develop and sustain it, and that what efforts have been and are made seem empirical rather than scientific, are always incomplete and frequently misapplied. The very wide difference in such applicatory measures as are used in various concerns give justifiable reason for doubt as to whether causes, conditions and purposes have been well worked out and understood — just as in medicine a diversity of drugs and methods of treatment recommended for a certain disease may be accepted as evidence of lack of exact knowledge by the medical profession as to its origination and progress. Nor is it necessarily true in either case that because the administration of a supposed remedy is followed by improvement that a panacea for all the symptoms in question has been discovered. Such may be due to coincidence and not based on any relation between cause and effect.

It is well understood that certain progressive business interests have already taken steps along appropriate lines. But in no known instance is the subject approached with the thorough scientific accuracy essential to best results. There are good managers of men in civil life just as there are good leaders in the military service — men who by natural ability and experience possess a high degree of leadership. But the proportion is relatively small; probably much smaller in civil life than in the military service, where one of the essential qualifications of officers is the ability to exercise a fair degree of human control. The value of state of mind

as affecting output and achieving results is also appreciated, even if relatively vaguely, by the workers themselves. Ordinarily the intangibles receive little attention and consideration, but if these are aroused in them their reaction is much like that expressed by the foreman whose champion gang at the Hog Island ship yard set a new record for riveting, "According to my way of figuring, this thing called morale is blamed important."

All business men realize that production is not a smooth and orderly process at all times and that with exactly the same physical equipment of plant, machinery, material and capital invested, and with the same number of workers, elements of morale affecting the latter will enter to force output up or down. This may be so variable as to run the gamut between profit and loss. There is thus an oscillation of industrial efficiency just as it has been shown that there is an oscillation of military efficiency. If the curve shown in Fig. 1 is used for analogy, its levels might be compared as follows:

Military Morale	*Civilian Productivity*
Maximum of possible accomplishment.	Maximum productiveness.
Faith in commanders.	Trust in superiors.
Team work.	Coöperation.
High spirits.	Enthusiasm for the job.
Contentment.	Interest in the work.
Level of average morale.	*Level of average efficiency.*
Dissatisfaction.	Listlessness at work.
Criticism and complaint.	"Conscious withdrawal of efficiency."
Desertion; disorder.	Labor turnover; sabotage.
Unwillingness to obey orders.	Strikes.
Mutiny.	Riots.

It is clear that any industry which does not attain a certain degree of productiveness cannot economically survive any more than the military organization which has not reached reasonable standards of efficiency can hope for

success. In both, act results from a sufficient motive. A basic factor of the industrial problem is thus in seeing that motives, suitable and adequate for the purposes and results intended, are provided.

The efficiency of labor is probably the greatest factor that influences productivity and profit. This is evidenced by the unceasing efforts to produce new "labor saving" devices, not only to lower costs but to reduce the various difficulties attaching to human agencies. Labor probably enters into costs more than capital invested in machinery and plants, and as a far more variable and perplexing factor. It is curious that the importance of this element has not been more fully realized and that more intelligent effort has not been made to solve the problem of increasing productivity through the man as well as the machine. Inasmuch as the purpose of an industry is to produce, an essential quality to consider in an employee is his comparative productiveness. Where differences in productivity exist between individuals of the same group of workers producing the same thing under the same conditions and encouraged to develop their output to the full capacity, it is apparent that these relate to diversity of qualities within the individual workers themselves. It is economically important to determine where and to what extent such differences exist and their causes, for the worker who does more is worth more, having due consideration not only to quantity but to quality.

Civilian industry can create standards and determine degrees of efficiency in the worker far more readily and exactly than the military establishment can do with the soldier. In the former, it may be mathematically expressed in units, yards or pounds of product having a definite commercial value. With the soldier, his degree of efficiency must be sensed since it often cannot be mathematically proven.

The causes of deficiency in workers may be physical, in which appropriate physical measures of correction are

necessary, such as correction of poor eye-sight, change to a task to which the worker is more adapted, training in technics, and in other ways. Habits enter, as where attendance or sobriety materially affect output over a period of time. Mental state enters, in that workers of enthusiasm and loyalty will show it in producing more than those not prompted by these influences, often in great degree of difference. Conversely, such negative factors as impatience, indifference and lack of interest reveal themselves with mathematical accuracy in the amount of product created. Morale depression thus has the same effect on the individual's productivity as physical defect. In the industrial group, it has the same effect on output as decreased numbers of workers and man-power, but without any corresponding diminution in labor costs. Fortunately such mental and moral depressions are, in practice, largely preventable. Since they are preventable, it is a fair question for any employer to ask as to whether they are being adequately prevented.

Absenteeism is one of the important causes of industrial inefficiency, variable with the character of employment and the industrial concern. It is for industry what absence without leave is to the military service. Motives are diverse. Matters of necessity of course enter, but probably not to the considerable extent alleged. The delinquents, if followed up, are apt to give excuses rather than reasons. In a general way, the chief cause seems to be that the job, for the time at least, is less attractive than something else.

The average amount of absenteeism among workers seems to run from ten to twelve per cent. Some industrial concerns run as high as twenty per cent. This means that one or two workers in every ten must be green hands, or a corresponding proportion of the plant lies idle. That any such proportion is probably unduly high is shown by the fact that the absentee ratio in many similar industrial establishments has been held well below it. As absence without leave seems to be a precursor of desertion, so absenteeism in industry is

often preliminary to quitting the job. There is relative lack of satisfaction with the position and want of interest in it.

Bonuses for attendance, rather than docking for absence, seem to have produced the best results in combating absenteeism. This result runs true to the general findings of morale work that stimulation is a more effective agent than repression. An excellent way to follow up cases of absence is through visiting nurses. Much good may be done in this way, not only in showing interest and sympathy and in helping to alleviate actual suffering, but in checking up absence from other causes.

Labor turnover is one of the most disturbing factors of industry. It gives a staggering blow to the prosperity of both parties concerned, for the shifting from one job to another is alike detrimental to the employer and the employee. As the latter loses the benefit of the wages which might have been earned in the idle periods, so the former loses in the lessened productivity inevitable during the periods of absence and new adjustment. No military force could be efficient if it had to depend largely on wanderers from one organization or branch of the service to another, with little or no training and little or no cohesion by attraction.

The economic loss in labor turnover relates not only to the clerical cost of replacement, but enters into training, waste and breakage due to inexperience, idleness of machinery during replacement, lowered productiveness and greater liability to accident. What this amounts to in any plant is a local question well worth careful inquiry. It will probably be found one of the chief sources of leakage and waste. Studies of labor turnover show that three out of every four separations are due to the desire of the workers to quit, the remaining separations being about equally divided between "lay-offs" and discharge. Eliminating "lay-offs," which do not properly enter into turnover, it is found that only eighteen per cent. of separations are due to

discharge. When ten out of every thirteen workers separated thus leave their jobs voluntarily, it is clear that the causes operating to produce such separation are of great industrial importance and well worth inquiry and efforts at remedy.

The problem of labor turnover by resignation is, in its essentials, the same as that of desertion,— viz. the sum total of the separating motives is greater than the sum total of the attracting motives. When the impulse away is greater than the impulse toward, the worker quits. These impulses should be analyzed as to cause and relative strength. It is as important to know why the worker goes as why he comes. In many instances some of the expulsive causes of loss need only to be understood in order to be remedied, and it is also quite possible to strengthen the pull of some of the attracting forces. Doubtless a certain proportion of separations depend upon a multiplicity of personal reasons which cannot well be determined and therefore neutralized. But it is surprising what a large proportion of difficulties may be readily reached and dissipated if there is honest purpose and intelligent effort to do so. Often there may be general dissatisfaction due to an accumulation of grievances not referred to a single definite factor.

In a general way, only about one-fourth to one-third of all cases of voluntary separation are referred to wages. The other factors seem variable with establishments and industries, and sufficient data have not been secured for their accurate determination and analysis. On the whole, however, they seem chiefly to relate to human relations. As to the general problem of turnover, it is stated that of one industrial district " 2000 hirings in a year for 1000 permanent positions was not an exaggerated index of labor's mobility." In not a few instances, the turnover was much higher than this. If such extreme conditions obtained in the military service, it would mean the impossible task of enlisting twice the strength of the army every year.

Figures on labor turnover in industry in comparison with desertion from the army are very interesting. Government labor statistics covering 100,000 employees in Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit and San Francisco, for the years 1918–1919, were compared with army desertions for the thirteen-year peace period, 1903–1916. These figures showed that an average of 513 workers out of every thousand would voluntarily quit their jobs yearly, leaving but 487, while in the army an average of but 45 soldiers per thousand deserted annually. This comparison indicates that the rate of " quitting the job " is eleven times greater than that of quitting the army. Even allowing that army recruiting methods prevent the enlistment of a certain proportion of men of the " floater " class, the conclusion seems warranted either that army administrative conditions are comparatively good or that the corresponding methods of civilian industry are very poor.

These figures are especially illuminating in view of frequent newspaper articles holding up the army to criticism for its desertions, which the civilian mind is led to believe resulted from such military harshness as forced men to escape from it. If the military service suffered any such loss of men as civilian life accepts as normal for industry throughout the country, where one employee in every three leaves his job annually, the belief in such alleged strictures might seem better justified.

A comparison of 1000 civilians who quit their work with 1000 enlisted men who desert, shows the following:

Service at time of quitting or deserting.	Civilian employees.	Enlisted men.
Less than three months	668	174
Three to six months	116	170
Six months to one year	89	218
One year to two years	58	175
Two years to three years	21	65
Over three years	48	198
	1000	1000

This comparison shows that only one-fourth as many recruits desert during their first three months of service as civilian workers quit their jobs during the same period of employment. It would seem that recruits find the army much more attractive, despite its unfamiliar conditions and firm government, than civilian workers find the much-heralded opportunities of civil industry. While no statistics on the subject are available, it is believed that less than one in ten enlisted men are married. Among civilian workers, labor statistics indicate that six out of every ten are married. In other words, the military service has a much higher proportion of men who have no marital and local ties and thus belong to a relatively unstable class, socially and economically. The above figures indicate that not only has the army thus to contend with the factor of an unduly high proportion of men who have a tendency above average toward shifting occupation and residence but it is handling the matter relatively successfully.

Within the same industry and within the same communities, there is often great variation in labor turnover between separate industrial concerns. Under such conditions, it is evident that any great difference relates to causes within the establishments themselves and has directly to do with an often grave problem of industrial waste. For any undue waste of this sort some persons or methods can be held responsible. It is theoretically possible to make the poorest record in such respects approximate that of the best. Rotation of labor never occurs in equal degree throughout an organization. Certain classes of work, especially those employing much casual labor, have much more rapid rotation than others. In certain industries where both sexes are employed, about twice as many women as men quit their jobs in the same period, probably due to marriage and the fact that men are more stabilized by having families to support. Some foremen hold workers where others lose them. Men, methods or conditions may be at fault. Therefore, special

attention should first be focussed upon these weak industrial points with a view to determining the factors of such special weakness. The first step in morale work in any commercial concern should be its survey with reference to its human factor.

Labor turnover is far higher in unskilled and semi-skilled groups, and is especially high in workers of short service. In some such extreme instances, the turnover may amount to from five hundred to one thousand per cent. per annum. There are instances recorded where more than ten thousand men were hired during a year in the effort to fill one thousand jobs. In this connection it may be said that there is in this country a very large proportion of the unskilled labor class which may be designated as "migrant." How large this class may be it is impossible to state. It varies with industrial prosperity, reaching its minimum at times when business activity and demand open up the largest number of well-paid, fixed positions. It attains its maximum when industrial depression causes establishments to curtail their pay rolls either as to employees or wages, thereby breaking an increased number of individuals from their moorings to become "floaters" in search of a job.

According to Parker, "there were in 1910 in the United States some 10,400,000 unskilled male workers. Of these, some 3,500,000 moved, by discharge or quitting, so regularly from one work town to another that they could be called migratory labor. . . . The (California) census shows the existence in the state of some 175,000 workers in the casual-using occupations." The very geographical magnitude of the United States, its diversity of climate and the succession of crops depending thereon favors the development of "floating labor." Great numbers of persons are needed in certain places at certain times, but for brief periods only. Thus the ripening of the wheat crop moves itinerant labor from Texas to Manitoba, to help with a harvesting far beyond the capacity of permanent local labor in

the wheat states to accomplish. But this local need lasts but a few weeks, after which the demand for labor successively follows in hop and apple picking in the northwest, later in citrus fruit gathering in California, and still later in the winter industries of lumbering, ice cutting, etc., in the north.

The simplicity of certain industrial operations also operates to produce instability. Some jobs may be learned in a day or a week, after which the creative instinct is submerged under automatism and the individual has little to occupy him mentally except interests outside his work. These interests tend to do with personal disabilities, and whether real or imagined, they flourish under culture. The ultimate result favors a shifting to what is believed to be a more favorable environment. This floating class finds its expression in various radical tendencies. It is a class without permanent residence and is therefore without local ties, voteless and without voice or personal interest in the Government. It is a womanless class, and therefore without the stabilizing and stimulating influence of family and home. It is without a permanent job, and its relatively high wages of employment are dissipated in unavoidable periods of idleness. It is thus a class without property, and all restraints to conduct which flow from property possession are absent. It should not be confused with the general worker type, merely because it engages along similar general lines of work, for it represents a separate and distinct social group.

To this floating class naturally gravitate not only men of a naturally vagrant temperament, in whom the urge to move is exceptionally strong, but those lacking in mental strength to formulate a definite purpose and ambition and adhere to it. The irresponsible of the moron type, the sickly and diseased and those refractory to the pressure of social code recruit it. Some reinforce it as a result of economic conditions which, once overwhelming them, continue to submerge

them. All manifest certain qualities, or the lack of others, which render them unfit to cope with the average type of human beings in the competitive stresses of industrial life. It is impossible to go into any detailed discussion of the industrial floater, the ramifications of which would lead into sociology, political economy, psychiatry, the domain of medicine and other things. It can only be said that the condition of being a floater is symptomatic of other causes, and that the difficulties flowing from floating labor can only be attacked successfully through the causes which gave the latter birth.

As it is recognized as true of an army, so it will be admitted in industry that the efficiency of workers, both as to output and in respect to labor turnover, is largely a matter of handling. Some administrative officials and their methods gain good results where others fail. Thus it appears that the efficiency of workers is a matter of industrial leadership, and that the same general principles of human nature which govern effective leadership in an army apply also in industry. There are the same general human trends, cravings and reactions to be met in both cases, though in industry certain particular problems become more prominent.

It is believed that this quality of industrial leadership is too often overlooked. Superintendents may be drivers rather than leaders and may apply force where it is not only unnecessary but harmful. Feelings may be hurt, and natural channels of sympathetic interest and understanding dammed and blocked. The driving power of industry is in community of interest and friendly relations. It happens also that workers are doubtless not infrequently promoted to foremen and other supervisory and controlling positions because of knowledge of the mechanics of the task and with little consideration of other qualities. But because an individual knows the mechanical processes of a certain job is no indication that he understands human nature and possesses the qualities necessary to the wise control of men.

Delegated authority to control, and personal ability to control, may be as far apart as the poles. Efficiency at the machine and efficiency over men require very different qualifications, and the overlooking of this fact will bring about many unnecessary frictions and difficulties. The close contact between the workers and their immediate supervisors makes this matter of special importance. On the other hand, unsympathetic policies handed down from above as to the handling of men will be carried out by loyal subordinates even if they are in conflict with the ideas of the latter.

One result of the poor handling of the human element is the impairment of interest and initiative and a resulting slowing down in productivity. There may be direct reaction against repression, or a lack of stimulus for the expenditure of a fair degree of energy. Either cause affects result. There is slacking, carelessness, wastefulness and perhaps the conscious withdrawal of efficiency. All these are practical difficulties which are hard to meet. It may be stated here that while the noun " soldier " implies a most honorable status, the verb " to soldier " may have quite a different quality of interpretation. One of the definitions of the latter is " to make a pretense of working, while doing only enough to escape punishment or discharge." This misuse of the word is a slur on the military profession, whose every ideal is opposed to the slowing down of efficiency. It is true that there are some men with a natural tendency to take it easy, whether in the army or in civil life. But in the army more incentives are at work to offset this tendency than exist in industry — with one of its chief interests centered in the pay envelope. Where such workers do not see sufficient reward available to compensate for effort, the effort is not made. One reaction of industrial dissatisfaction is, therefore, to do as little as possible and still hold employment. But neither pay nor willingness to limit output, lest it destroy their own job, are influences affecting soldiers.

The mental attitude of the worker class at any and all times is most important. In order to remedy any difficulty, whether mental or physical, its existence, nature and extent must be known. The viewpoint of the group must be understood. Just as a great number of individuals have to be considered in any mass problem, so there is diversity in points of view. No one of these is typical of the whole; they tend to fall into classes expressive of mental state and may be largely handled as such. It is the type widely aberrant from the statistical average which is particularly in need of special individual handling. Accordingly, the viewpoint of the individual must also be sought out and understood. Often it has sprung from false or incomplete premises or conditions which only await appreciation to be corrected. The worker is no inanimate bit of mechanism in the fabric of industry. He has sensibilities. These are often wounded; frequently unnecessarily, though at times there is apparently undue sensitiveness. But it must be emphasized that it is upon his own ideas, however acquired, and not upon other ideas which may be entertained by his superiors, that he governs his conduct.

A service of information to keep in touch with his ideas is thus necessary. Such services have at times been established, but perhaps more for the purpose of determining the actually discontented individuals than for inquiring into and endeavoring to remedy their causes of discontent. But the function should be larger and broader — just as a fire department does not limit itself to extinguishing conflagrations, but busies itself also with investigations and corrections whereby fires shall not occur. This service of information should head up centrally so that effective action may be taken in the problems concerned. Its purpose should be stimulative and positive rather than repressive and negative. Its representatives should be present in every group, and should be more active in finding out the difficulties of the well-disposed than in determining the disaffected. As with mo-

rale operatives in the military service, wise selection is necessary, based on the human attributes which they possess. If their work is well done, and is justly supported from above, the class of disaffected will dwindle to a quantity almost negligible in industrial result and its problems cease to vex because they will largely fail to develop.

An effective organization for morale work in the military service has already been described. It is a simple matter to transpose the military status of these agents to the corresponding administrative grades of industry. So modified, the general plan, if it reaches into every part of the organization and not only exists in name but functions in fact, will be effective.

In the matter of physical environment, it is easier to control this in the military service than in industry. The soldier is part of an aggregation under continuous control throughout the twenty-four hours of the calendar day; the worker is usually under control but one-third of such period. Outside of working hours, the industrial employee is merged back into a special environment of his own, in which "a man's house is his castle," and the influences which react upon him in this period are chiefly to be reached indirectly through the public opinion of his community. Identification of the interests of the industry and the community is thus important. Since the influence of public opinion in ultimate results of productivity can not be averted, it should not be disregarded. It can often be capitalized in industrial morale. Thus during the war, one effective bit of a general advertising plan which increased the output of a concern thirty-nine per cent. was the window display of artillery harness with the words, "In war, this harness must stand the supreme test. It will, because it was made here in ——."

But while the influence of environment on the worker is less complete and continuous than on the soldier, because he is under less complete control at all times, it still exerts a

powerful influence on conduct. The special problem under consideration relates to industrial task,— and the environmental conditions pertaining to it, whether pleasant or unpleasant, are mentally associated with the task itself. Many industrial difficulties have developed from no special fault of the work required, but from apparently remediable conditions of its physical environment, such as lack of sanitary necessities, reasonable comfort and even need for such improvements as better light or more air, which tended directly to the advantage of productivity of the industrial concern as a whole. It is probable that in many instances the desired improvements are considered primarily from the standpoint of personal interests. This, however, as repeatedly emphasized, is a normal human trait. Whether self-interest be desirable in others than ourselves, is not the subject of present consideration. The point to note here is that, since it cannot be eliminated as a factor, careful consideration must be had in every instance as to whether it is worth while to repress or block it, from an economical standpoint at least.

It may happen that such matters of physical environment fall within the control of superiors who may not be qualified by education or technical knowledge to pass upon them, or who may look more to personal advantage through a showing of present economies than to the ultimate interests of the concern represented. Not all have projective vision whereby the influence of present conditions in relation to future results can be forecasted. Yet sometimes a modest outlay to relieve an obvious irritant in the industrial environment which interferes with interest, loyalty and endeavor will pay tremendous financial returns upon the investment. Exactly what the physical improvements should be is a local problem. There are, however, certain general standards of sanitation and comfort which are accepted by public opinion as right and proper. No mistake will be made if these general standards are made to govern. Some

general points to which attention is always required are mentioned later in this discussion. To these should be added whatever measures the local conditions may render desirable and practicable. The relief of physical difficulty is thus transmitted into state of mind and thence into the release of energy promotive of industrial conduct. In any case, good working conditions are indispensable. Good light, proper temperature, sufficient fresh air, freedom from dust, suitable toilets, wash-rooms and shower-baths, rest-rooms, cafeterias run at cost, good drinking water and other factors are necessary to the industrial environment. These are not concessions to employees but are matters of economic advantage. They are based upon the common sense idea that the mental and physical strain resulting from efforts to offset unnecessary physical disadvantage might better be used in increased productiveness. Where workers get sick, it means substituting a trained worker adjusted to the whole by a less trained one, or going without.

Allied to this problem of working environment are such efforts as an industrial concern may make to better the lot of its workers outside of industrial hours. Here again the inherent qualities of human nature determine the degree of success in respect to effect on interrelations. The building of model towns and modern houses may lack of desired results of appreciation if the atmosphere of industrial control extends unduly over them. There are so many repressions from above necessary to the conducting of any modern industry that human nature does not relish having them, even in part, carried over into periods of outlet for expression. Human beings are more interested in what they do for themselves than in what is done for them. Value attaches to the cost of acquirement and individuality is prized. The worker who lives in a house like a thousand others will, if permanency of residence is assured, seek to give it the elements of a home, and take more personal pride and interest in a well-kept lawn or a beautiful rose-bush which he

has planted than in the general conveniences which others have installed. Encouragement and assistance in building and owning one's own home, however humble, does more for morale than the opportunity to hire a standardized dwelling, however convenient. Some one once expressed this idea by saying that while a man would fight for his home, none would do it for his boarding house.

With this also goes the manner of provision and maintenance of housing and other improvements by higher authority. To give the impression of claiming credit is to impair the sense of appreciation. Effort for "uplift" is really successful only when the uplifter works from beneath. Few relish charity. Anything given in an attitude of catering to the self-esteem of the giver loses the quality of sympathy. If the average man is helped, he wants to be helped in such a way as to enable him better to help himself. He values the right and ability to provide for himself as he sees fit and as public opinion determines.

The same principles apply to the psychological environment. To leave the worker a prey to doubts, misapprehensions and discontents developed from erroneous concepts, mentally conveyed to him from indiscriminate sources by irresponsible or perverted individuals, is to invite physical difficulty therefrom as a consequence. Education, information and publicity, by any and all agencies, broad and accurate, furnish the antidote. Nor should their functions be limited to the meeting of existing mental difficulties. On the contrary, their chief purpose should be that of anticipating and dissipating potential mental difficulties otherwise liable to future development. Healthy thoughts are as important to industrial efficiency as healthy bodies. Much the same general principles govern the bringing about of the one as the other.

It has already been brought out that men differ, and differ widely, in any trait or combination of traits. Civilians as well as soldiers differ in their fitness for certain studies,

games or classes of work. This difference of quality, real or potential, is shown by common experience to apply within any large industrial group. It follows that if a number of men apply for a certain job and the most fit man rather than the least fit gets the place, both the employer and the employee profit — the former in terms of immediate economic advantage and the latter through present satisfaction in congenial work, which will be an incentive to develop to such higher positions of pay and opportunity as the natural capacity of the man may warrant. Industry gains in proportion as such double fits are approximated.

One important function of industrial morale work is thus to fit the man to the most appropriate job. This is not done by industry with the generality and thoroughness deserved. Little relative progress has been made along these lines, while the division of workers according to quality and capacity is still much as it was half a century ago. The old way of testing was to give the man a direct trial at the job itself, but usually all or even a major fraction could not be so tried. The net result merely demonstrated whether the individual could or could not come up to required standards; not his relative efficiency as compared with that of the other units of the applicant group from which he had been chosen. Similarly, much thought was given and progress attained in selection and development of machines to carry out some special line of work more efficiently; yet from the standpoint of man as a machine, this was not done in the human instance. Modern industrial science carefully analyzes and tests physical material as to its suitability for special purpose, while the certainly no less important human material is not so tested with a view to special utility. Such a situation is illogical.

As some few men have a high quality of leadership ability, so, proportionately, there are others with exceptional ability to select the right man for a certain place. But these

are few. Often several persons do the hiring, and however good may be their intentions, their standards and methods vary and their results are correspondingly different. Moreover, in any industry, such individual selectors change, and with the change come new standards for employment in the concern in question. Within the same person, moods vary and alter standards, just as between individuals matters of class, nationality, religion and other affiliations unconsciously operate to warp judgment.

More progressive employers endeavor to exercise some principles of selection to reduce the number of candidates in advance of actual trial. In many instances, these are relatively crude, imperfect and unsatisfactory. Usually they consist of looking over the men and accepting those who " look good." This, of course, is better than no selection at all, for a certain degree of information is given by outward appearance. But more precise methods of selection, based on the science of psychology, offer much promise in respect to economies of time, labor and expense. Psychology has a constructive part to play in promoting the welfare of industry. Mere guesses are in large part to be replaced by facts in the special problem of employment. The army mental and trade tests, already mentioned, are more or less applicable to determining the relative fitness and functions of industrial workers. Suitably modified, they furnish permanent and comparable standards for any time and place. They permit the filling of requirements for human agents under definite specifications, just as requisitions for machinery would be so filled.

To facilitate the fitting of the man to the job, an individual record card should be kept giving all important facts about every worker. The data secured would practically become the specifications of the man whereby he could be best fitted to the task. This would require a certain amount of extra clerical help. But since one of the main results of

morale work would be to reduce labor turnover, the ultimate result should be a material reduction in new cards and clerical work.

Informative data as to industry might include facts relative to attendance, work done, industry, intelligence, reliability, speed, initiative, tact, executive ability, orderliness and habits. Such headings might be entered on printed form cards with "good," "average" and "poor" under each one. The estimate would be made by simply checking and would be repeated at suitable successive intervals. Morale data regarding the man would include age, race or nationality, mental state, apparent literacy, church and social affiliations, special interests if any, morale difficulties and how remedied and such other matter relative to personality and bearing on human relations as might be desirable. If such report cards are checked over by the next higher authority it would correct error, restrain exaggeration and subject original judgment to further appraisal. If prejudices cannot be avoided, they may thus be neutralized.

The maintenance of such data can be so systematized as not to be such an extensive matter as might be anticipated at first thought. The army has long maintained an effective system of individual card records of soldiers and has found no particular difficulty in doing so. Its experience is that very satisfactory records may be kept in simple form and few words. What the army finds valuable and can accomplish in such respects, civilian industry should give fair trial.

The ideal condition in industry would be to have the right man in the right place. This implies not only proper selection but retention, and the methods both of employing and discharging are too often haphazard. Many more superiors have the right to discharge than have the power to hire. Personal motive may often enter. Even such committees as some business organizations have to advise them in cases of discharge cannot be free from such influence.

This matter needs safe-guarding, for permanence of the job is a prized quality. The man should have the right to present his side of the case to authority above that of an immediate superior. Sometimes retention or transfer is a matter not only of justice but productivity.

The number of hours in the working day should not be too large. In many instances it is prescribed by law or is the result of industrial agreement. In so far as productivity is concerned, the actual number, within certain limits, is not necessarily significant. It has already been shown that human beings tend to exert themselves far below their actual limits of physical capacity and that an increased output of energy can only be aroused by special stimuli possessing the quality of personal interest. Productivity then is not only a matter of length of physical opportunity to produce but has to do with the use which is actually made of such opportunity. With a reasonable period for productiveness, psychological factors become controlling. By this is meant that the sum total of output of ten hours work performed in a half-hearted way may be no greater or even materially less than that of eight hours work carried out in a spirit of higher efficiency. Also there is no question but that the longer hours and their greater cumulative effect in respect to repressions tend to depletion of psychological energy. This may be manifested not only in relatively smaller output for the same period but in a mental state of irritability in which any agents of irritation assume an exaggerated importance, and what was intended to increase productivity through physical agencies may defeat its own object by bringing about the sapping of the mental qualities by which these physical agencies are energized and kept in motion. There may be a conscious or an unconscious withdrawal of efficiency. Labor which has the quality of being forced is always relatively inefficient, and that in which economic necessity is made to drive and in which other incentives are not made to invite is, in a way, forced labor.

The question of shorter hours in relation to productivity therefore comes back to the state of mind in which the worker receives such consideration. If industrial antagonism exists, shorter hours may lower output. On the other hand, if there be a spirit of friendliness and coöperation between the organization and the worker, there will be tacit acceptance of the idea that reduction in period should in all fairness be at least compensated for by such proportionate increase of intensity as the human organism is capable of giving without detriment to its own physiological interests.

Based on what has already been brought out in the foregoing pages, a summary review of some of the human reasons apparently underlying industrial difficulty, though necessarily brief, imperfect and superficial, may have some value. It proposes constructive action through psychological influences scientifically directed and not left to chance. Reasons for the specific suggestions are not given here, as it is believed that they will be apparent from the general principles already elucidated in this book.

It may be stated at the outset that the determining factor of the point of view of any worker is self-interest, which is a natural quality in self-preservation. Any prospective employee is an applicant for a job by reason of desire to improve his status, economically or socially, and such incentives do not cease to operate after he has secured employment. Even though the interests of employer and employee may conflict in some respects, where the former can identify the interests of the worker with his own program, the best advantage to all is attained. No man is in the right place unless his own interests, as well as those of the employer, are being furthered to the extent that mutual adjustment will permit.

An important element of this self-interest is expressed through acquisitiveness. This is one expression of self-protection, in so far as wages relate to cost of living under local standards. But while the question of remuneration fre-

quently presses, it is a fact too often disregarded that all the sources of industrial dynamics and difficulties are not found in the pay envelope. Not infrequently there is reasonable contentment with the financial returns and the desires are chiefly for consideration along other lines. In civil life, as in the army, recompense is not always expressed in terms of money. Nevertheless, many differences do spring from the question of relative financial return, and this will be the case so long as the relations between employer and worker are competitive in such respects. Striving by one element for greater advantage at the expense of the other, and especially if the presumed disadvantages be considered inequitable, always tends to create refractory reaction. Profit sharing does much to induce mental harmony in such matters and to replace competition by cooperation. Sick-benefit associations, insurance, loan and housing funds have an obvious value, not only through acquisitiveness but in relief of apprehension. Company, — and especially coöperative — stores, operated as facilities for effecting savings and controlling local prices are of much value in this connection. The enjoyment of a right or privilege is always accompanied by reciprocal sense of increased responsibility.

A fundamental characteristic of all individuals is self-esteem. This quality must be reckoned with in industry as the pivot about which many actions and attitude revolve. As with the soldier, the best work and results cannot be obtained from a civilian worker who is convinced that his employer regards him in the light of a mechanical fixture and does not consult his interests other than in respect to such wage scale as will attract sufficient labor to meet the demands. The urge for the recognition of personality is strong. As example, consider the pride with which the subordinate recounts his petty triumphs over the "boss," especially perhaps in matters of difference in ideas of method. In a general way, the higher the type of worker,

the greater the personal estimate placed on one's individual worth. Unnecessary repression along this channel is probably as common as it is a serious administrative fault. Except with the spiritless, its exercise will produce reaction in discontent, inefficiency or worse. The matter is one which, being largely unnecessary, offers much opportunity for minimization and improvement. It is not sound economics to permit general interests to suffer because of the mental clash between subordinates.

A craving for sympathetic understanding is strong in the human being. Not to be "understood" breeds discontent and complaint. Conflict, whether it be military or industrial, is always preceded by a misunderstanding or disregarding of the feelings of one party by another. Severance of mental relations is always preliminary to strife, destruction and bloodshed. Difficulties which interfere with the transmission of ideas between individuals and groups are obstacles to mental harmony and physical coöperation. Such matters are fully appreciated by the sales department of any concern, which realizes that the extent of its success must lie in ability to influence human nature to the performance of a special act — in this case, the signing of an order blank. The company agents must sell the company wares to an outsider.

But it is not so well understood generally that the same thing applies with equal force to the producing end of industry. Here the company representative must sell the idea of the company itself to those composing its organization. There must be sympathy and understanding in order to induce the desired state of mind. Real sympathy and friendship depend, not upon the number of times of physical contact, but upon the sharing of mental experience. The greater the common experiences and the more intense the feelings, the stronger is the mutual bond. Troops which have faced destruction together, and communities or fami-

lies which, as a unit, have met a great crisis, manifest a high degree of mutual support. The same applies to those who have shared their pleasurable experiences, though the effect is not as powerful as in the case of those who have undergone an "ordeal as by fire." This factor of community of experience is a matter too often overlooked in respect to industrial efficiency. The joys and sorrows of the individual worker are not merely to be considered as his problems alone, but as opportunities for the superior and the concern as a whole to reach an understanding and extend genuine sympathy, whether this take the form of congratulations, condolences or physical help.

The organization that gets close to its employee, in what is to him the great hour of trial or triumph, gets far closer in spirit than could ever be possible through years of formal relations. Gregariousness unites here with sympathy to add a value to the act, not only because it was done, but because it was done together.

To the man above, the gratification or resentment experienced by a subordinate from what was to the former a minor act may seem disproportionate. But again it must be emphasized that the ideas and outlook of the individual concerned govern his action — not those entertained by the bystander. In any case the expression of mutuality of interest and sympathy, if real, can do nothing but good. The moment of hiring, the promotion, the new baby at home, the death in the family, the holiday — all these should be looked upon, not as merely pertaining to the affairs of the individual, but as affording opportunity to the organization to demonstrate an interest and establish close, friendly relations that will go far toward being permanent. And such sympathetic interest is in itself endowment of status and gratification of yearning to be recognized as an individual among men. It expresses a desire to be of helpfulness which, according to the law governing the excitation of the

instincts, tends to stimulate in the subject the same character ot emotion toward the agent by which it was originally manifested.

The self-respect which makes the individual want certain things for himself will, if properly linked up through sympathy and gregariousness with his organization, make him hesitate to accept these things unless they represent the best interests of the organization as well as himself. This applies whether the organization be of a military or civil nature.

The price of maximum productivity is the development of maximum personality for every human producer. Some repressions and checks are necessary to accepted conduct, but these should be no more than human and industrial relationships require. On the other hand, outlet should be provided for the natural and proper expressions of the personality of the producer. This can only be brought about industrially by the establishment of right relationships and associations, instituted from the top down and thereby evoking a complementary reaction from the bottom up.

It is important that the desires of the individual as to choice of task should be helped as far as possible and not thwarted. It has already been stated that what human beings want to do they usually do well, and they do it well because they want to do it. This of course has a direct bearing on productivity. It is short-sighted economic policy to attempt to meet a special need at the expense of the sacrifice of interest and the checking of the energy flowing from constructiveness. Recommendations not only as to character but capacity should be required from former employers and followed up where practicable; similarly, references should be given where justified. But there must be fitness for the task proposed. Strong desires usually imply mental competence. But physical ability to perform a task is an obvious essential. This implies adequate physical examination which may often disclose physical defect which,

pending remedy, will bar the way to certain duties. Defective eye-sight, for example, need not be very great to interfere materially with efficiency in work requiring close visual attention. A hernia interferes with heavy lifting, and persons with fallen arches cannot effectively perform tasks requiring them to be much on their feet. Determination of these or other defects, and the opening of other channels of opportunity, is clearly to the advantage of the worker and his productiveness.

Medical supervision thus has a great value not only in meeting accidents and emergencies but in physically examining workers and remedying minor ailments without cost. It should have oversight of work in respect to duration and intensity in relation to fatigue and output, and to occupational hazards and diseases. It has to do with ability to place the injured to best advantage. It should see that suitable and sufficient first-aid kits are distributed and their use understood. It should ensure that the individual is reasonably well informed in matters of personal hygiene and self-care.

Besides analysis of the worker, the job itself should be analyzed in respect to its specifications and requirements. It is not possible to fit the worker to the job to best advantage unless it is known what kind of qualifications in the worker are specially required. Apparently few, if any, industrial establishments standardize job requirements in the practical way in which this was carried out in the army in promoting its efficiency. In this connection it may be stated that since the word " efficiency " has come to have an undesirable significance in some respects, its use should be avoided. But practical ways and means of simplifying work and eliminating unnecessary hardships or duplication of effort will always be welcomed.

The job should offer opportunity for promotion; this is an essential to good work and decrease in labor turnover. It is the rare individual who does not react by greater effi-

ciency to real opportunity for personal betterment. Also a comprehensive system of promotion from the ranks provides qualified understudies for emergencies or expansion. There should thus be no jobs which are recognized as industrial blind alleys leading nowhere. If such exist, pathways should be opened from them giving access to higher place. Subordinates desirous of promoting efficiency in their own departments of work may tend to discourage separations from it with a view to retaining men of known technical or other ability for the job, not realizing that whether such technical ability is exerted to the fullest extent or not depends on state of mind. Any idea of the worker that he has " no chance " for betterment will tend to make any man of ambition and force slow down in effort, or swell the ranks of labor turnover in an endeavor to seek a better chance elsewhere. This latter quality is not limited to American born, and because men may not speak good English is no reason for assuming that they are unintelligent and without ambition. Not only should opportunities for advancement from any task be provided, but workers should be encouraged to strive for them. They should be plainly pointed out to the individual, so that if he does not take advantage of them there is only himself to blame. Even if promotion be slow, the incentive to better effort is there. The worker should not have the idea that others than himself set limits to his advancement.

Bonuses for length of service are desirable. The military service has found that beside the necessarily indefinite incentive of promotion a definite percentage increase of pay for length of service helps to hold interest and promote efficiency. It is a stimulus which remains even after the worker has apparently reached the limit of promotion warranted by his capabilities. It might be of advantage to pay such bonuses as Christmas gifts. In this connection should come the stimulus of personal ambition. Those who are doing good work in any task, no matter how humble,

should be called out and told of it and suggestion made as to the best means to take in securing the next step in advancement. Similarly, citing the good work of one group not only gratifies that group but stimulates others to emulate or surpass the standard.

One great element in the problem of the worker is the permanency of the job. Those in positions which give assurance of long retention are considered fortunate by their associates. With little if any savings to fall back upon in case of non-employment, the worker is necessarily beset by worry and apprehension as to the continuance of conditions enabling him to make a living. Such apprehensions should be allayed as far as possible. Retention of the position should be assured during convalescence from accident or illness. Planning in advance will often enable the holding of worthy individuals during slack periods. It is of course impossible, under business and economic conditions, to assure every individual of permanency of position, nor is this expected by the worker. But it should be well understood that the best men will be longest retained. It sometimes happens that a department is reduced or discontinued and the whole or the greater part of the employees therein set adrift. This not only arouses profound discontent among those discharged, but creates a feeling of uncertainty and inefficiency among those retained, in the idea of the latter that their turn may come at any time and that nothing in the way of service toward higher authority will weigh against temporary business convenience. Provision for transfers within the organization will offset this feeling. If men cannot be so transferred, then efforts might be made by the employers to see that they are placed with some other industrial concern. Old age pensions are a further expression of the purpose of the company to look out for the workers' interests.

The power of discharge should be curtailed in respect to foremen and subordinates. The recommendations of these

should be acted upon by a small number of competent officials, among whom members of the worker group might well have representation. In reducing loss of productivity through absence, special effort to smooth out any difficulties of transportation in getting to and from work will be of value. A continued and progressive study of causes of absence should be maintained, so that they may be minimized as far as possible by removing or modifying such causes.

For many years, the mechanical processes of production have undergone great progress. One marked result of this has been the division of laborers into classes of specialists, each performing some minor part in the general plan. Mechanically, this is doubtless desirable, but it is not an unalloyed advantage through new difficulties which have developed in its wake. Among these it has repressed " pride of workmanship " and thereby impaired interest in the product, while " speeding up " has largely done away with attention and interest through the development of habit. What was an absorbing vocation to the master workman of a generation ago has now become a task to his successors, each performing a minor part in which there is no great outward evidence of constructive and utilitarian result in the elaboration of the whole. This unquestionably tends to slow down productiveness, and efforts should be made to offset it through stimulation of energy in other ways. Reward is not to be expressed in money alone; the incentive from this agency is only one of many. Where there is recognition of work well done, in respect, praise, and in knowledge of higher efficiency, there is no limit to the incentive. One aid to giving " pride in the job " is to link up the worker with the finished article, just as the famous Spanish swordmaker hammered his personality as well as his name into the " Toledo blade." The letter of this may not now be practicable, but it is still possible to give the worker a mental concept of the finished product, the part he plays in its pro-

duction and his share in the final result of its use. Descriptive articles, group photographs of the finished product and representatives of the departments that entered into its construction, moving pictures showing the manufacture and use — all are valuable. Machine gun production during the war was speeded up by posters showing the workman making them and the soldier using them, thus visually linking industry with the military and patriotic spirit. These ideas and many others may be brought to bear from diverse angles. There must of course be an adequacy of good tools, material and equipment. These must be inspected regularly and kept in perfect condition so that the worker may feel that he has all the accessories to high class production necessary to do justice to his qualifications.

With unskilled workers, "pride of workmanship" naturally plays a relatively smaller part. Here labor is usually regarded as essentially unpleasant and undesirable and is performed only under the greater stimulus of some special end, as comforts or pleasure. If these be attained, the work is tolerated; if it curtails them, listlessness and dissatisfaction result. It is apparent that to hold this class of workers they must be put in positions that will give them fairly satisfactory earning capacity at an early date, together with incentive and opportunity to move upward into the ranks of skilled workers. But it is also important that no class of work, however humble or dirty, should be allowed to carry with it any sense of social or industrial degradation in its performance. The idea should be that the necessity for the performance of any duty dignifies and ennobles it and that any position which is essential to the whole is important.

The work of unskilled labor should, accordingly, be regarded merely as a first step in the upward course to be expected and encouraged. Any tendency to keep men down may be easier for the foreman but is, in the long run, costly for the employer. It should be offset by the so-called "vestibule school" for the training of workers, which af-

fords opportunity for advancement, gives the elation of relative success, stimulates ambition and lessens labor turnover. Incidentally, such schools offer facilities for observation of qualities and correction of fault, standardization of methods, more intelligent assignment of tasks and permission to the individual of a certain choice in his work.

As already mentioned, wholesome rivalry is a strong incentive to productiveness which should be used appropriately. Department against department, group against group and individual against individual — these can be brought up for comparison in diverse ways. Proper publicity should accompany rivalry. Reward in such cases is found in the gratification of recognized ability and success as well as in any increased share in monetary return. Record cards are thus a great aid to efficiency, not only in demonstrating comparative merits, but in helping to assure the competent worker of the greater permanence of his employment.

To allow group distinctions to arise is inevitably to create ideas of class consciousness with resulting mass reactions. The instinct of gregariousness concerned should be stimulated in relation to group rivalry to the common end, but repressed in respect to rivalries toward different ends. All are engaged in a common employ in which diversity of grade merely expresses a necessity of organization and in which all work with each other and not some under others. Americanization lies at the basis of allayment of group distinction. It should be promoted so that all should stand on the common ground of patriotic citizenship. The right of suffrage sobers and stabilizes. Esprit de corps is essential to industrial as well as military success. The worker must be made to feel that he is an integral part of the organization. A slogan or motto for the organization, with special insignia, exploited by publicity, posters, buttons and in other ways will be of value. Any activity which links the individual

up with his fellows, and the whole with the greater organization, will be useful.

One of the obvious qualities of the worker, common to human nature generally, is the desire for what he considers a "square deal." He wants an even break and equal opportunity; what he thinks savors of injustice is not soon forgotten. To it, general discontents, each perhaps trivial but in the mass potential, may attach themselves. The result slows down production. Resentment against an individual or condition may be expressed in the poor performance of a task with which the idea of either may be associated.

Foremen and workers, being human beings, inevitably form likes and dislikes which have their relation to labor turnover. An old adage says that "kissing goes by favor"; similarly promotions and increases of pay are often one of the mysteries of industry. The establishment of a merit system, with effective supervision for its impartial administration, is essential. Human nature wants judgment on its merits and tends to escape from any conditions under which it is believed not to be forthcoming.

Courtesy, always important, is particularly valuable in the human relations of industry, in which the worker's continuance in employment is, on his part, a matter of adequate satisfaction and volition. Consideration in manner as well as act is always appreciated, while discourtesy is a blow to self-esteem and as such is resented. Reasonable regard for the feelings of others is one of the methods of promoting productiveness; it is as inexpensive as it is effective.

Recreational activities, athletics, amusements, clubs, bands, socials, etc., have the same value in relieving repressions in industrial life that they have in the military service. They should be selected and utilized with a view to giving appropriate self-expression to the several groups concerned, and to help to create and intensify a strong organizational spirit. Baseball, bowling and other teams

should be developed and arrangements made for games and prizes. Clubs for music, choral singing, and dramatics should be encouraged to give entertainments. Provision for Saturday night dances, summer picnics, country clubs or camps for week-end outings and vacations is valuable along this line. Athletic and social clubs should be tactfully suggested and discreetly supported, leaving it to the workers themselves to organize and administer them without appearance of their being welfare affairs or under other control than the worker's own. The interest and encouragement given by feminine workers in these and other matters will largely determine the general attitude of the group as a whole.

For sedentary occupations and for the higher officials who get no great amount of exercise, gymnasia and gymnastic work should be provided. The relation of a vigorous body in promoting sound mental state and reducing irritability and pessimism has already been mentioned.

Some of the indoor factors necessary to industrial comfort, sanitation and well-being — that is, efficiency — have already been mentioned. In addition, reasonable beautification of the plant and its surroundings should be carried out. These have a marked if unconscious influence on the state of mind, pride of organization and resulting conduct. The appearance of the plant should invite and not repel, and the relatively little money necessary for cleanliness, neatness, verdure and outward attractiveness is well invested.

The state of mind in which the worker reports for work daily is materially affected by home influence. The housing and living conditions of the worker in the hours when not employed should, accordingly, receive attention. They should be made as pleasant as possible, gardens encouraged, seeds and advice as to planting given, and prizes awarded for the best results. Courses in domestic science, the canning of foods, dress-making, home hygiene and the care of

children should be promoted for the benefit of workers and their families. Securing suitable boarding places, especially for women, is desirable. Reaching workers through their children and the parental instinct is a valuable approach in human relations. The record of every man should show whether he is married and the number and age of his children, and their welfare should be inquired about occasionally. Formal, periodic expression of interest might be made through a Christmas tree, with a gift for every young child of an employee. This, for example, would pay many times the cost of the presents through betterment of state of mind and the resulting future efficiency of the parents.

Education helps the worker as it does the soldier, by giving him a broader outlook, more accurate information, a more harmonious mental attuning, and by implanting better ideas of responsibility. In civilian industry, it has been found that the higher the education, the proportionately less the labor turnover. At the same time, the specialization of industry has made education less necessary in the day's work, and has tended to develop a class with limited and poorly organized ideas, furnishing receptive subjects readily swayed by outside influence. The particular use of education is not only to qualify the worker better for a present position but to fit him for something higher. Accordingly, employees should be encouraged to take night or correspondence school courses. If night courses are practicable at the plant they should be conducted. It is especially important that English be understood by aliens. This promotes productivity directly by enabling ideas and instructions to be better understood, and indirectly by opening to the individual the door of opportunity. The tendency of some foremen to keep their foreign-born subordinates ignorant of English and illiterate, for their own purposes, should be combated. Delinquency falls as standards of literacy rise.

As in the military service, much industrial discontent is due to rumors and false or imperfect ideas. A sufficient

service of information, including a " house organ " for local publicity, is necessary to meet such situations and offset errors developed through word of mouth. Bulletin boards should be used freely as a means of getting information rapidly and officially to the men and also to create incentive thought and constructive ideas. But they must also contain items to amuse and interest in order to attract readers and serve their purpose. The morale organization also serves as an effective agency for verbal information where necessary.

As with the army recruit, the new employee comes into an industrial environment which is strange and unfamiliar, and is often painful because of such strangeness. Brief but kindly explanations of work, wages, hours of labor, shop rules and other matters of interest would go far in promoting adjustment. Rules for safety should not only be posted but explained. That safety devices should be understood and used is in the interest of all concerned. Short, snappy, informal shop talks, on the principle of the " Four Minute Men," should be given frequently at the noon hour. These, among other things, should cover what the larger organization is to attain, the purpose of the work of individual groups, the relationship of the whole to national endeavor, and what is being accomplished as a result of the work. Through all should run the threads of coördination, coöperation and enthusiasm.

Evening lectures and community gatherings are valuable, at which matters relating to industry are interestingly interspersed with matters of hygiene, self-interest, domestic problems, current problems of interest, music, moving pictures, etc., and followed by dancing and general sociability. The families and friends of workers should be invited to attend. Libraries and reading rooms for employees, with newspapers, magazines, good fiction and educational books, should be established and systematically brought to attention so that their use may be promoted.

Much valuable publicity of local events and happenings, linking up the industrial concern and its personnel with the community at large, could be secured through a local news representative if it were understood by the press that these items were for news and not advertising purposes. It is human nature that the more humble the individual, the greater he appreciates the enhanced status given by favorable publicity concerning him. If such items are not secured and furnished the press, the natural tendency of industrial publicity is to relate to the sensational in the chronicling of difficulty. But newspaper publicity has its use constructively quite as much as from the standpoint of spreading depressing criticism.

The cost of the physical aids to industrial morale work is so small as to be negligible in comparison with the results to be obtained. The expense attached to any break in industrial relations, as a strike or lockout, would probably pay for the maintenance of a morale system in any given concern for a period of more than the span of human life. A cent per man per day would probably finance it on a large scale. But aside from preventing such overt acts with the accompanying cost, industrial morale work will yield daily and heavy returns in increasing current output and in benefit to all concerned. The fact that this will be accomplished, not at the cost of contentment, but through its promotion, is in its further favor.

The basic importance of wise industrial leadership has already been mentioned. It cannot be over-emphasized. In its furtherance, frequent conferences between minor chiefs, like foremen, are important for closer relationship and understanding, coördination and mutual helpfulness and suggestion. Methods of handling men especially should be discussed with a view to standardization along the best lines and avoiding unnecessary difficulties. It is indispensible that interrelations shall be harmonious. The most important factor in the success of any industry is the efficiency of

its individual man-power. Where women or children are employed, special problems will of course arise which will require special methods for handling and solution.

In every organization there are men who are inclined to withdraw from association with other men and from participating in organization affairs. This attitude may be due to shyness, unfamiliarity with the language or customs, or from nursing a grievance. Such men are particularly susceptible to all sorts of suggestions. It is better to extend encouragement, sympathy and assistance and transform them into active and cheerful supporters than to have them come under the influence of malcontents. The way to do this is to give them special attention from above and to introduce a strong preponderance of high class men into their immediate industrial and social environment.

Much labor turnover could doubtless be avoided by better facilities for the hearing, investigating and remedying of complaints. The relief of mental tension through the channel of sympathy tends to decrease the importance of the grievance, which, unless so relieved, might result in the physical reaction of slowing down work or through quitting the job. There should be a readily accessible and sympathetic agency to serve as a clearing house for troubles. Membership of employees on committees for investigation is valuable not only in promoting interest and confidence, but in dissipating false impressions among their fellows.

As in the military service, first offenses should be relatively lightly treated. Often they are due to ignorance and not intent. In such cases, the management and not the individual is really to blame. There may be a tendency to cover up omission from above in severe penalization of the act flowing from it, as if the latter alone were at fault.

Finally, as with soldiers, success in management consists in not only understanding the point of view of the workers but in giving an attentive ear and ready sympathy to their troubles. Encouragement succeeds where driving fails.

Appreciation rouses a sense of creative pride which brings not only the hands but the personality to the work. What is needed is a spirit of service — not of servitude. In industrial relations, the "Golden Rule" is a safe psychological guide to establishing and maintaining such mental state as will express itself in the desired conduct, coöperation and productivity.

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